Are words immaterial?

[Togo]

When someone asks "what is it like to be him", sensual experience is part of what it's like to be someone/something. Sure there are also memories, will (possibly), tendencies etc.

No. All that is the content of SE, not SE.

I'm finding this hard to follow - what part of subjective experience is not its content?

 

[Kharakov]

I like that guy. Moving on- I still don't see a soccer ball, with its function roll, functioning the same as a serotonin molecule.

I suppose you were aiming for the joke about a soccer ball's function "roll" all along, and I just got it. <- quick on a pun, slow on a roll...

You're still caught up on a different issue. The point that I was trying to make assumed that it is possible for a soccer balls to function as some parts of the body; I was not concerned on whether it could or not. Simon DeDeo used silicon chips as an example; I used soccer balls to really stress the strange implications that functionalism might have.

Yeah, it's a cool idea. However, the idea of a silicon chip functioning as a neuron in a mind functions differently than the idea of a neuron functioning as a neuron in a mind.

Assume that there exists a mind with a substrate of neurons, tissue, etc. (a brain), and a mind with a substrate of chips, electronics, etc.

Both minds believe they have a substrate of neurons (because they function the same).

So in the one case (chips), a mind would presumably be deceived as to its true nature. In the other case (neurons), a mind presumably would not.

Ultimately the function of the 2 would be different, resulting in a deceived mind and a undeceived mind.


Even in the case in which both minds function in such a way that they have knowledge of their substrates, they would perceive their substrates differently, which is also a divergence.

 

[ryan]

You're still caught up on a different issue. The point that I was trying to make assumed that it is possible for a soccer balls to function as some parts of the body; I was not concerned on whether it could or not. Simon DeDeo used silicon chips as an example; I used soccer balls to really stress the strange implications that functionalism might have.

Yeah, it's a cool idea. However, the idea of a silicon chip functioning as a neuron in a mind functions differently than the idea of a neuron functioning as a neuron in a mind.

Assume that there exists a mind with a substrate of neurons, tissue, etc. (a brain), and a mind with a substrate of chips, electronics, etc.

Both minds believe they have a substrate of neurons (because they function the same).

So in the one case (chips), a mind would presumably be deceived as to its true nature. In the other case (neurons), a mind presumably would not.

Ultimately the function of the 2 would be different, resulting in a deceived mind and a undeceived mind.


Even in the case in which both minds function in such a way that they have knowledge of their substrates, they would perceive their substrates differently, which is also a divergence.

Functionalism as it pertains to the mind might work better for conscious experience in general, not necessarily specific conscious experiences with unique processes and structure. And why not because we know that there is at least some "flexibility" with the processes that give rise to a consciousness. A couple examples are that our processes are always changing, and our cells are constantly being replaced with "older" cells that have shorter telomeres. So the chips might allow for a different consciousness but a consciousness nonetheless.

 

[Kharakov]

It might be a bit backwards... doesn't it seem like our minds function in many different ways with very similar substrates?

 

[DBT]

So is this issue nearly settled? That words are indeed material. That words exist in various material forms: written symbols, spoken words and neural/mental thought forms?

 

[fast]

So is this issue nearly settled? That words are indeed material. That words exist in various material forms: written symbols, spoken words and neural/mental thought forms?

Nope.

Words are immaterial

 

[Kharakov]

So is this issue nearly settled? That words are indeed material. That words exist in various material forms: written symbols, spoken words and neural/mental thought forms?

Nope.

Words are immaterial

Does anyone believe that I am not smiling at this point? Don't take this material as words, please, if you feel that the material nature of my words interferes with the continuation of this conversation.

 

[DBT]

So is this issue nearly settled? That words are indeed material. That words exist in various material forms: written symbols, spoken words and neural/mental thought forms?

Nope.

Words are immaterial

I still don't know what this 'immaterial' 'non material' 'not material' 'stuff' is, or how it is supposed to interact with matter and its processes. I can only perceive words in their material form, words as symbols on paper, screen, etc, and interpreted by a material brain with material information processing ability. So to say 'words are immaterial' makes no sense to me. If words are immaterial, I could not perceive them, nor could the brain form mental representations of word, just as it could not form mental representations of any aspect of the external world, or self. So, sorry fast, but I can't agree.

 

[ryan]

It might be a bit backwards... doesn't it seem like our minds function in many different ways with very similar substrates?

Yes, but there is something constant through it all. This constant is our conscious experience in general.

 

[DBT]

It might be a bit backwards... doesn't it seem like our minds function in many different ways with very similar substrates?

Yes, but there is something constant through it all. This constant is our conscious experience in general.

The only known constant is the electrochemical activity of the brain. The moment that electrochemical activity of information exchange ceases, marks the end of conscious mind.

 

[ryan]

So is this issue nearly settled? That words are indeed material. That words exist in various material forms: written symbols, spoken words and neural/mental thought forms?

As a written symbol, there needs to be a contrast of particles and no particles. No particles (empty space) are necessary for a word to take form. So, if empty space between particles exists, and if you would consider empty space to be immaterial, then words are both material and immaterial.

On the surface this may seem trivial, but think about how bizarre it is that certain amounts of "nothing" (nothing material) helps give rise to very different effects.

 

[ryan]

Yes, but there is something constant through it all. This constant is our conscious experience in general.

The only known constant is the electrochemical activity of the brain. The moment that electrochemical activity of information exchange ceases, marks the end of conscious mind.

We can sense electrochemical activity in the brain, but that isn't the exact same thing as sensory experience that electrochemical activity gives rise to.

 

[DBT]

The only known constant is the electrochemical activity of the brain. The moment that electrochemical activity of information exchange ceases, marks the end of conscious mind.

We can sense electrochemical activity in the brain, but that isn't the exact same thing as sensory experience that electrochemical activity gives rise to.

How do you know, Ryan? All the same questions appear to remain unanswered.

What is this 'we' that senses electrochemical activity?
What is it, within the nature and makeup of material, electrochemical information processing, that does not allow sensory experience to form?
Conversely, what is it about this 'non material' that enables sensory experience to form?

 

[ryan]

We can sense electrochemical activity in the brain, but that isn't the exact same thing as sensory experience that electrochemical activity gives rise to.

How do you know, Ryan? All the same questions appear to remain unanswered.

What is this 'we' that senses electrochemical activity?
What is it, within the nature and makeup of material, electrochemical information processing, that does not allow sensory experience to form?
Conversely, what is it about this 'non material' that enables sensory experience to form?

Let me explain this more clearly. Subject A can be "experienced" with the 5 senses and can "experience" with the 5 senses. Assume Subject A needs all of its present parts to experience with the 5 senses. Experiencing subject A will never be the experience of subject A unless the reference point is all parts of subject A. And we know that no two identical fermions can occupy the same quantum state simultaneously (And even if they could, the other body's experience would still not be detectable even though they would be identical experiences.) Subject A's experience is not accessible or observable to anything else. It can only exist to Subject A.

 

[Juma]

How do you know, Ryan? All the same questions appear to remain unanswered.

What is this 'we' that senses electrochemical activity?
What is it, within the nature and makeup of material, electrochemical information processing, that does not allow sensory experience to form?
Conversely, what is it about this 'non material' that enables sensory experience to form?

Let me explain this more clearly. Subject A can be "experienced" with the 5 senses and can "experience" with the 5 senses. Assume Subject A needs all of its present parts to experience with the 5 senses. Experiencing subject A will never be the experience of subject A unless the reference point is all parts of subject A. And we know that no two identical fermions can occupy the same quantum state simultaneously (And even if they could, the other body's experience would still not be detectable even though they would be identical experiences.) Subject A's experience is not accessible or observable to anything else. It can only exist to Subject A.

Just a big non sequitur....

 

[ryan]

Let me explain this more clearly. Subject A can be "experienced" with the 5 senses and can "experience" with the 5 senses. Assume Subject A needs all of its present parts to experience with the 5 senses. Experiencing subject A will never be the experience of subject A unless the reference point is all parts of subject A. And we know that no two identical fermions can occupy the same quantum state simultaneously (And even if they could, the other body's experience would still not be detectable even though they would be identical experiences.) Subject A's experience is not accessible or observable to anything else. It can only exist to Subject A.

Just a big non sequitur....

Nope, this is the best argument that I have ever given. It is airtight Juma - airtight!

 

[Juma]

No. All that is the content of SE, not SE.

I'm finding this hard to follow - what part of subjective experience is not its content?

SE is the medium, qualia and other mental stuff is what is "communicated" through this mefium.

 

[Juma]

Just a big non sequitur....

Nope, this is the best argument that I have ever given. It is airtight Juma - airtight!

What is? As has been stated before: we ( and you) have no idea what SE is. So any references to fermions etc is totally misguided. You have no idea what role fermions play in SE.

 

[ryan]

Nope, this is the best argument that I have ever given. It is airtight Juma - airtight!

What is? As has been stated before: we ( and you) have no idea what SE is.

I have never known anything else as intimately, certain and as well as sensory experience; for all I know, all I am is sensory experience.

We may not know what it is objectively, but we know what it's not. From personal experience, we know it's not or not only the processes that we observe in other brains.

So any references to fermions etc is totally misguided. You have no idea what role fermions play in SE.

The point that I was trying to make with the fermions was intended for a slightly different argument, the argument that another's sensory experience is not observable and therefore immaterial. I know it can't be described with matter which makes it a strong candidate for immaterial.

 

[fast]

Nope.

Words are immaterial

I still don't know what this 'immaterial' 'non material' 'not material' 'stuff' is, or how it is supposed to interact with matter and its processes. I can only perceive words in their material form, words as symbols on paper, screen, etc, and interpreted by a material brain with material information processing ability. So to say 'words are immaterial' makes no sense to me. If words are immaterial, I could not perceive them, nor could the brain form mental representations of word, just as it could not form mental representations of any aspect of the external world, or self. So, sorry fast, but I can't agree.

We speak as if certain things are immaterial, and I'd be happy to concede that there is a material basis for the existence of things that are spoken of as immaterial, but there is distinction between the material existants that which gives rise to what is spoken of as immaterial and the things we often regard as immaterial.

The fact we even speak of certain things as immaterial, is important, I think. Sure, you could take the stance that there are no things that do in fact exist that are immaterial and say that those who think certain things that exist are immaterial are mistaken, but I think the scope by which we should categorize things as material to the tune of excluding things that are often regarded as immaterial is a breach of language usage. Thoughts, for instance, are clearly resultant of material substance, but to conflate the material substance which gives rise to thoughts should not, in my opinion, lead us to therefore conclude that thoughts themselves are material. To say such a thing goes against the very nature of how we use language to regard such things.