Are words immaterial?

[Togo]

We can write a word so as to identify a person in a number of ways, in a variety of handwritings, typed in various fonts, and so on. The variety is such that there is no necessary common elements between them that identify the person. The common meaning of all these various inscriptions works like membership of a set in mathematics - the various instances are all members of the same set, but the unifying principles of the set is not their physical composition, but their meaning.

 

[Kharakov]

We can write a word so as to identify a person in a number of ways, in a variety of handwritings, typed in various fonts, and so on. The variety is such that there is no necessary common elements between them that identify the person. The common meaning of all these various inscriptions works like membership of a set in mathematics - the various instances are all members of the same set, but the unifying principles of the set is not their physical composition, but their meaning.

Functionalism without the crazy ass "soccer ball" brains (although computers have been built using water and valves instead of electrons and transistors).

Neural architectures that are not exactly the same can both comprehend 1+1=2. The basic bits don't have to be set up exactly the same to contain the same (or similar enough) information.

We can encode an image in many formats (lossless jpeg, raw, bmp), all of which could convey the same image with the same exact pixels (color, placement, etc.). In fact, the meaning of the image could probably be transmitted with a lossy jpeg, or even a simple 256 color gif, especially if the image is a symbol.


None of this even hints at words lacking material existence. They may simply fill in gaps between physical spaces between, and within, our minds. Spacehead.

 

[DBT]

How do you know, Ryan? All the same questions appear to remain unanswered.

What is this 'we' that senses electrochemical activity?
What is it, within the nature and makeup of material, electrochemical information processing, that does not allow sensory experience to form?
Conversely, what is it about this 'non material' that enables sensory experience to form?

Let me explain this more clearly. Subject A can be "experienced" with the 5 senses and can "experience" with the 5 senses. Assume Subject A needs all of its present parts to experience with the 5 senses. Experiencing subject A will never be the experience of subject A unless the reference point is all parts of subject A. And we know that no two identical fermions can occupy the same quantum state simultaneously (And even if they could, the other body's experience would still not be detectable even though they would be identical experiences.) Subject A's experience is not accessible or observable to anything else. It can only exist to Subject A.

Ryan, that doesn't really address my questions.

It doesn't explain why the electrochemical activity of the brain cannot form mental representations of sensory information, and all the associated thoughts and feelings.

Nor does it explain what this 'non material element' is, or why it is capable of doing what you claim physical processes cannot do, form mental representations from an interaction of sensory inputs and memory function.

 

[ryan]

Let me explain this more clearly. Subject A can be "experienced" with the 5 senses and can "experience" with the 5 senses. Assume Subject A needs all of its present parts to experience with the 5 senses. Experiencing subject A will never be the experience of subject A unless the reference point is all parts of subject A. And we know that no two identical fermions can occupy the same quantum state simultaneously (And even if they could, the other body's experience would still not be detectable even though they would be identical experiences.) Subject A's experience is not accessible or observable to anything else. It can only exist to Subject A.

Ryan, that doesn't really address my questions.

It doesn't explain why the electrochemical activity of the brain cannot form mental representations of sensory information, and all the associated thoughts and feelings.

Nor does it explain what this 'non material element' is, or why it is capable of doing what you claim physical processes cannot do, form mental representations from an interaction of sensory inputs and memory function.

I still have no argument to prove that sensory experience exists except that individuals claim that it does.

And, I don't claim to know what sensual experience is, but I do know what it's not. It's not only my brain even though my seems necessary for it to exist.

 

[Juma]

To say such a thing goes against the very nature of how we use language to regard such things.

So what? "The very nature of how we use language" isnt really an argument for anything.

 

[Kharakov]

I still have no argument to prove that sensory experience exists except that individuals claim that it does.

And, I don't claim to know what sensual experience is, but I do know what it's not. It's not only my brain even though my seems necessary for it to exist.

So ryan can't read (or feel) this because he has no sensory experiences. I do sort of wonder how it seems like he is responding to our statements, even though he lacks sensory experiences.

Perhaps ryan is simply a rule set that produces certain results when we input certain things to it? I'm wondering if the rule set that is ryan will validate this information (hopefully the rule set that ryan "follows" includes an appropriate response to this line of thought).


Ryan, are you a set of rules that creates certain responses, without sensing or feeling anything?

If the rule set does not include what it is to feel or sense, then the rule set might not have a specific response to this query.

 

[ryan]

I still have no argument to prove that sensory experience exists except that individuals claim that it does.

And, I don't claim to know what sensual experience is, but I do know what it's not. It's not only my brain even though my seems necessary for it to exist.

So ryan can't read (or feel) this because he has no sensory experiences. I do sort of wonder how it seems like he is responding to our statements, even though he lacks sensory experiences.

Perhaps ryan is simply a rule set that produces certain results when we input certain things to it? I'm wondering if the rule set that is ryan will validate this information (hopefully the rule set that ryan "follows" includes an appropriate response to this line of thought).


Ryan, are you a set of rules that creates certain responses, without sensing or feeling anything?

I know that I am not, but how could I prove it? What if I can pass a Turing type test for the consciousness?

Anyway, I only meant that I can't prove it to anyone even though I am as sure as anything that I am sensing.

 

[Kharakov]

Ryan, are you a set of rules that creates certain responses, without sensing or feeling anything?

I know that I am not, but how could I prove it?
What if I can pass a Turing type test for the consciousness?

Anyway, I only meant that I can't prove it to anyone even though I am as sure as anything that I am sensing.

Ok. At some point in development individuals may need the perception that they are interacting with a rule set, rather than a being, so that they do not feel bad about their immature reactions to the being.

I have infinitesimally little doubt that you are a thinking feeling being, although obviously we interact using certain rule sets (lingual, logical, mathematical, etc.).

 

[ryan]

I know that I am not, but how could I prove it?
What if I can pass a Turing type test for the consciousness?

Anyway, I only meant that I can't prove it to anyone even though I am as sure as anything that I am sensing.

Ok. At some point in development individuals may need the perception that they are interacting with a rule set, rather than a being, so that they do not feel bad about their immature reactions to the being.

Can you explain how this proves that other people have sensual experiences? I know I do, but you could be tricking me by telling me anything that I would need to hear.

I looked at the philosophical zombie debate on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and I didn't find any good arguments against the idea of a zombie, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/#4.1 .

 

[Kharakov]

Ok. At some point in development individuals may need the perception that they are interacting with a rule set, rather than a being, so that they do not feel bad about their immature reactions to the being.

Can you explain how this proves that other people have sensual experiences? I know I do, but you could be tricking me by telling me anything that I would need to hear.

Proof? Why not  inductive reasoning?

I looked at the philosophical zombie debate on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and I didn't find any good arguments against the idea of a zombie, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/#4.1 .

Philosophical zombies make crappy lovers, and in fact are quite pointless in the grand scheme of things. However, pretending to be a philosophical zombie is another matter altogether (said in a Sheldon Cooper voice).

 

[fast]

To say such a thing goes against the very nature of how we use language to regard such things.

So what? "The very nature of how we use language" isnt really an argument for anything.

I wouldn't be so hasty in those regards.

 

[Kharakov]

I sensed someone was talking to fast.

 

[ryan]

Can you explain how this proves that other people have sensual experiences? I know I do, but you could be tricking me by telling me anything that I would need to hear.

Proof? Why not  inductive reasoning?

Yeah I was being too strict. Inductive reasoning should be sufficient.

 

[fast]

I sensed someone was talking to fast.

Haha (good one)

 

[Juma]

So what? "The very nature of how we use language" isnt really an argument for anything.

I wouldn't be so hasty in those regards.

The very nature of how we use language isnt a argument for anything else than how we use language. It has absolutely zilch, nada, naught, noll to do with wether our thoughts are material or some dreamt up "immaterial" process.

 

[Juma]

We can write a word so as to identify a person in a number of ways, in a variety of handwritings, typed in various fonts, and so on. The variety is such that there is no necessary common elements between them that identify the person. The common meaning of all these various inscriptions works like membership of a set in mathematics - the various instances are all members of the same set, but the unifying principles of the set is not their physical composition, but their meaning.

And the meaning are created by a extremely powerful information processor and event predictor, the brain,when it deduces the intent of the agent that wrote the word.

 

[fast]

Maybe the wind can guide me to the incorporeal hereditament. No wait, that was an easement.

 

[DBT]

Ryan, that doesn't really address my questions.

It doesn't explain why the electrochemical activity of the brain cannot form mental representations of sensory information, and all the associated thoughts and feelings.

Nor does it explain what this 'non material element' is, or why it is capable of doing what you claim physical processes cannot do, form mental representations from an interaction of sensory inputs and memory function.

I still have no argument to prove that sensory experience exists except that individuals claim that it does.

Reported experience is a form of evidence. Especially if it is confirmed by everyone you ask, and they give the same account. Further supported by the fact that they are observed to respond in a way that strongly supports their report: the ability to process and respond to your questions, appearing to be conscious in the same way that you yourself experience.

And, I don't claim to know what sensual experience is, but I do know what it's not. It's not only my brain even though my seems necessary for it to exist.

But just given the fact that you/we don't know how a brain forms conscious experience, how do you know what it's not? How does this 'non material' offer an explanation for conscious experience if you feel that material processes do not? That is the point I'm trying to get at.

 

[ryan]

I still have no argument to prove that sensory experience exists except that individuals claim that it does.

Reported experience is a form of evidence. Especially if it is confirmed by everyone you ask, and they give the same account. Further supported by the fact that they are observed to respond in a way that strongly supports their report: the ability to process and respond to your questions, appearing to be conscious in the same way that you yourself experience.

Yeah, but whenever the hard-core physicalists ask me to prove or show evidence for the existence of sensory experience, I can never come up with anything good or find good arguments from acclaimed philosophers.

And, I don't claim to know what sensual experience is, but I do know what it's not. It's not only my brain even though my seems necessary for it to exist.

But just given the fact that you/we don't know how a brain forms conscious experience, how do you know what it's not? How does this 'non material' offer an explanation for conscious experience if you feel that material processes do not? That is the point I'm trying to get at.

My sensory experiences cannot be observed. The processes that give rise to my sensual experiences can be observed. The reason why my sensual experiences can't be observed is because there can only be one me in the physical form of my brain strictly. A perfect copy of me would probably experience the same thing, but it isn't my brain. This is a break in the symmetry of mind and body.

 

[Juma]

The reason why my sensual experiences can't be observed is because there can only be one me in the physical form of my brain strictly.

A = "My sensual experiences cant be observed"
B = "there can only be one me in the physical form of my brain strictly."

How do you know that B is true?
How do A follow from B?

Please answer both these questions.