Wavelengths are objective facts. "Color" is a filing system, which is applied inconsistently between individuals, cultures, and languages. "The chair is blue" has meaning in the same way that "the man is tall" has meaning. In that it describes an empirical fact with subjective and variable language.
But the chair is not actually blue (or any colour) though.
The surface of the chair absorbs EM radiation of most wavelengths except those of 650 nanometers. These bounce off instead. If and when some of the bounced 650 nm radiation hits a human retina, a particular set of retinal cone cells which respond to radiation of that wavelength (and only that wavelength, or thereabouts) are triggered to send electro-chemical signals into the brain. The other types of cone cell aren't triggered. If the amplitude of the 650 nanometer radiation is large enough and the radiation hits the retinal cone cells for a long enough time, a conscious sensation is created in the brain, otherwise it isn't, although the brain system can still respond to the electro-chemical inputs without the associated conscious experience.
We could equally talk of oscillating photons instead of wavelengths but the upshot would be much the same.
Apologies if you knew that already.
Point being the chair is not blue. Or at least this is generally agreed to have been established by science.
Whether the 650 nanometer EM radiation (or the photons oscillating at 650 trillion cycles per second), which is what is/are actually being detected by the retina, is/are blue, is another question. I tend to think that just as it's a misconception to say the chair is blue, it is another misconception to say the EM radiation or photons are blue. I, and many cognitive scientists, neurobiologists, physicists, psychologists and others, tend towards saying that the blueness is the private conscious experience and is not a property of the EM radiation/photons, or of the chair. Just as pain is not actually a property of anything entering the body (or brain) and is a private conscious experience that is merely caused by that stimulus entering the body (or brain). As with a colour-causing stimulus, if the pain-causing stimulus is not strong enough or does not last for a long enough duration, there is no pain experience.
Your point about the variance in the use of
descriptors for the experience still stands (and would likely apply to pain as well as colour). And it also seems very likely that the quality of the actual experience itself varies between individuals, at least somewhat, though not very much. Even when there is no variance, there can be experience errors that every normal brain makes (eg experiencing two colours when there is only one EM radiation input). This illuson seems to occur because it's pragmatically useful for navigating the world.
Almost all of the above has come from fairly recent science of one form or another. Philosophy, as far as I know, has been hanging onto the coat-tails of science about this and many other things, for quite a long time. Why fromderinside has decided to rail against non-empirical philosophy I have no idea. It's basically a straw man.
Fromderinside argues that blueness for example is in the EM radiation or the photons of themselves, just as he seems to argue that pain is in electricity of itself, which makes no sense to me, and would seem to be on a par with saying that either feathers themselves, or the physical forces involved when they are dragged across skin, such as friction for example, contain tickles, rather than merely causing the brain sensation we call tickles.
Steve bank, judging by his description of the process, seems to implicitly assume the blueness is in the EM radiation or the photons.
I think they're both wrong. That is my understanding, and it's not an unusual one among the relevant experts. Unfortunately, I rather think the issue is unresolved at this time, but I would argue that the indicators are that for example blueness is most likely a private brain experience only and that there is nothing to indicate otherwise.