Compatibilism: What's that About?

[fromderinside]

Determining whether there is will and it is free free are entirely dependent on cause and cause has only been shown publicly, not privately through self testimony or self observation, to be determined.

When you come up with an experiment that demonstrates publicly, through material experiment, that choice and will exist otherwise than by the direct result of being determined then I'm willing to examine your data.

Play on.

 

[DBT]

Why? Well, as pointed out, because it does not take the unconscious neuronal nature of decision making into account.

I pointed out quite rightly that free will does not require consciousness.

It requires the right kind of control, ie, agency. The right kind of control/agency is not present within a determined system.

Quite simply, a determined/necessitated decision is not a freely chosen decision.

Not being a freely chosen decision, it is not a free will decision.

Namely, if a decision is determined unconsciously and no alternate action is possible (determinism), that it's the deterministic incremental states of neural networks unfolding over time that determines the decision and related action, the decision was not freely chosen. Rather than freely chosen, it was determined.

Which does nothing to change there fact that it was their neural state and nobody elses, that caused this thing to happen.

You are WRONG in your assumption that deliberation does not ever happen deliberately.

Experiments in neuroscience tells us the foundation of brain function, consciousness, self awareness, deliberation, motor action - everything that we experience - is enabled by information processing. Which in turn is represented in conscious form as deliberating and acting.

That is not me asserting this. It is well supported by research, which I have provided in abundance.

You have no case to argue. Necessitated decisions are not freely chosen or willed. Which puts compatibilism to bed, but of course its adherents cling on regardless....

 

[DBT]

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Namely, if a decision is determined unconsciously and no alternate action is possible (determinism), that it's the deterministic incremental states of neural networks unfolding over time that determines the decision and related action, the decision was not freely chosen. Rather than freely chosen, it was determined.

To keep this brief and to the point, you are defining free will as a choice that is "free of causal necessity" (determinism). I am defining free will as a deterministic choice that is "free of coercion and undue influence".

We both agree that there is no such thing as freedom from causal necessity. All events unfold over time as the reliable result of prior events. Because we agree that "freedom from causal necessity" cannot exist, I am justified in questioning its use as the definition of free will.

"Free will" has another definition, one that is real, one that is meaningful and relevant, and one that everyone commonly understands. Free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. It is the notion of a voluntary or deliberate act. An action that we chose to do, rather than an action we were forced to do. And it is this notion that is actually used when assigning moral or legal responsibility for a person's behavior.

Because we agree that "freedom from causal necessity" is an irrational notion, one that is never used by anyone when assigning responsibility, it must be rejected. Anyone advocating for such a definition should be suspect of desiring to undermine the notions of moral and legal responsibility.

Therefore, rather than being than a freely willed decision, it is a determined decision followed by a determined action (freely performed/necessarily performed). Consequently, it is false to label determined decisions and related actions as freely willed.

So, you are really in deep with the notion that "freely" must imply "freedom from causal necessity", something which you claim cannot possibly exist. Are we correct to assume that your intention is to undermine the notions of moral and legal responsibility?

Rather than [freely] willed, they are determined or necessitated.

If you use a rational definition of "freely", one that is limited to things that one might actually be free of, like, free from slavery, free from handcuffs, free from jail, free to speak my mind, free from coercion, free from mental illness, free from hypnosis, etc., then you can preserve the notion of freedom. But if you insist that "freely" must include "freedom from causal necessity" then all of those freedoms disappear, because none of them can claim to be free of reliable causation.

So, by choosing to require "freedom from causal necessity" in your notion of "freedom" one may also assume that your intention is to wipe out the notion of freedom itself. Is that your intent?

Inner necessitation is no more an instance of free will than external coersion -

So, it continues to appear that you do in fact intend to wipe out moral and legal responsibility from human understanding. Inner necessitation includes us choosing for ourselves what we will do. External coercion is a guy with a gun forcing us to subjugate our will to his. If you fail to make any distinction between these two events, then you have lost any moral grounding.

The distinction is that you either act according to your necessitated will (necessarily) or you are being forced against you necessitated will.

Yes. That's better (P3 and P4). All events, without exception, are causally necessitated by prior events. However, the event in which you chose for yourself what you would do is commonly known as a voluntary or deliberate act that you were free to choose to do yourselves, and the event in which the guy with the gun forced you to do his will is one in which you were not free to choose for yourself what you would do.

At no point is will free of necessitation.

AT NO POINT IS ANY EVENT EVER "free of causal necessitation" (also known as good old fashioned "reliable cause and effect").

As necessitation or determinism is the antithesis of freedom,

Then we should find the incompatibilists lobbying to remove "free" and "freedom" from all of our dictionaries, right? No event is ever free of reliable causation, because without reliable causation we would have no ability to do anything at all.

Thus, "freedom from causal necessity" is a paradoxical, self-contradicting, and a false notion.

It is not enough to assert: it is the brain/us that is doing it, therefore free will. How it is done is the issue.

How is it done? The brain is doing it through a deterministic series of unconscious and conscious processes that perform many functions, including deciding for us, when presented with multiple possibilities (for example the restaurant menu), which option we will choose (for example, the steak or the salad). At least, that's what the neuroscientists are consistently telling us.

They are avoiding the term "free will", because it carries a lot of baggage, but if we clean it up, like I've done, it once again becomes a meaningful and relevant term. It is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.

Which comes down to: Determinism makes it impossible for us to “cause and control our actions in the right kind of way.''

The customer in the restaurant chooses to tell the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please". The waiter brings him the dinner and the bill. This is sufficient proof that we can "cause and control our actions in the right kind of way". You've shown no examples, or any other evidence, that contradicts what we have seen with our own eyes.

To be brief and to the point: Compatibilism fails at the point of neural agency.

The brain as a deterministic system by definition lacks the right kind of control or agency to qualify as free will.

Determined or necessitated decisions are not freely willed or freely chosen decisions. They are determined by the state of the system, incrementally, as events unfold both in the external world and within the brain as a deterministic system as it processes information and responds.

Responds, not according to freely willed or chosen decisions, but the state of the system in each and every instance of input, processing and response.

A determined 'decision' is - by definition - is fixed by antecedents.

Being fixed means that it is not free. Free - by definition - means not fixed, able to do otherwise.

Not being fixed or able to do otherwise is the antithesis of determinism.

Consequently, the idea of free will is not compatible with determinism.


Dr. Robert Sapolsky: The basic theme is that we are biological creatures, which shouldn't be earth-shattering. And thus all of our behavior is a product of our biology, which also shouldn't be earth-shattering—even though it's news to some people.
If we want to make sense of our behavior—all the best, worst, and everything in between—we're not going to get anywhere if we think it can all be explained with one thing, whether it's one part of the brain, one childhood experience, one hormone, one gene, or anything. Instead, a behavior is the outcome of everything from neurobiology one second before the action, to evolutionary pressure dating back millions of years.

 

[Jarhyn]

Compatibilism fails at the point of neural agency.

You keep claiming this, but you keep failing to back up the fundamental basis of your claim: that neurons "can't", when neurons very much CAN.

At this point your argument reduces to "Neurons (not determinism) rule out free will", which is not in any way convincing.

Determined or necessitated decisions are not freely willed

And yet the dwarf in a deterministic universe observably freely willed to knock down a statue.

If Algorighms without neurons can observably display free will under this definition even without consciousness, then they are clearly capable of holding things such as "will"! We watched it happen all the way down to binary.

Then to say "but neurons" when neurons can execute any arbitrary algorithm is silliness.

Being fixed means that it is not free

Only under intentionally broken definitions of "free". "Free" in the compatibilist sense addresses success with respect to systemic inertia, not whether we could do otherwise; otherwise as Marvin points out, we would need to strike the whole word from our dictionaries. For some reason we are not doing that so...

You consistently abuse "able". "Able" does not imply will, "able" provides a very simple exercise: it assumes some systemic state, and then calculates determinancy to an outcome from that assumed state. An example of such is when I "assume" the state of my cat having had her guard hairs near her hips messed with: if this was assumed of the state, she would jump down and be annoyed with me.

She would freely will to do so, to jump down, if I did that. She would not freely will to be annoyed. That would just happen.

This is what it means to be "able": to have the means for a task available regardless of whether one executes on those means.

I am "able" to play dwarf Fortress in the immediate term.

I am "unable" to play Elder Ring in the immediate term.

Notice, this only happens in the perspective of stochastic actors within the deterministic system: only a thing "of" a deterministic system, not "the system itself" can be "able" to do anything.

The other "able" is an intentionally broken idea, a perfect example of "Why Can't I Hold All These Limes?"

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Determining whether there is will and it is free free are entirely dependent on cause and cause has only been shown publicly, not privately through self testimony or self observation, to be determined.

When you come up with an experiment that demonstrates publicly, through material experiment, that choice and will exist otherwise than by the direct result of being determined then I'm willing to examine your data.

Play on.

All events are always the reliable result of prior events. This includes the event where someone decides for themselves what they will do. Choosing for ourselves what we will do is a deterministic event, just like every other event.

Causal necessity is neither a meaningful nor a relevant constraint. It is not meaningful because what we will inevitably do is exactly identical to us just being us, choosing what we choose, and doing what we do. It is "what we would have done anyway". And it is not relevant because it is always present and cannot be removed, so its a bit silly to even bring it up. It makes itself irrelevant by its own ubiquity. So, the intelligent brain would simply acknowledge it, and then forget about it.

All of the utility of the notion of causation comes from knowing the specific causes of specific effects. That knowledge gives us the freedom to control many of the events that affect our lives, like Polio and Measles and other diseases. It enables us to imagine and event things, like automobiles, airplanes, and Moon rockets. But universal causal necessity/inevitability itself has no meaningful implications to any human affairs.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Namely, if a decision is determined unconsciously and no alternate action is possible (determinism), that it's the deterministic incremental states of neural networks unfolding over time that determines the decision and related action, the decision was not freely chosen. Rather than freely chosen, it was determined.

To keep this brief and to the point, you are defining free will as a choice that is "free of causal necessity" (determinism). I am defining free will as a deterministic choice that is "free of coercion and undue influence".

We both agree that there is no such thing as freedom from causal necessity. All events unfold over time as the reliable result of prior events. Because we agree that "freedom from causal necessity" cannot exist, I am justified in questioning its use as the definition of free will.

"Free will" has another definition, one that is real, one that is meaningful and relevant, and one that everyone commonly understands. Free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. It is the notion of a voluntary or deliberate act. An action that we chose to do, rather than an action we were forced to do. And it is this notion that is actually used when assigning moral or legal responsibility for a person's behavior.

Because we agree that "freedom from causal necessity" is an irrational notion, one that is never used by anyone when assigning responsibility, it must be rejected. Anyone advocating for such a definition should be suspect of desiring to undermine the notions of moral and legal responsibility.

Therefore, rather than being than a freely willed decision, it is a determined decision followed by a determined action (freely performed/necessarily performed). Consequently, it is false to label determined decisions and related actions as freely willed.

So, you are really in deep with the notion that "freely" must imply "freedom from causal necessity", something which you claim cannot possibly exist. Are we correct to assume that your intention is to undermine the notions of moral and legal responsibility?

Rather than [freely] willed, they are determined or necessitated.

If you use a rational definition of "freely", one that is limited to things that one might actually be free of, like, free from slavery, free from handcuffs, free from jail, free to speak my mind, free from coercion, free from mental illness, free from hypnosis, etc., then you can preserve the notion of freedom. But if you insist that "freely" must include "freedom from causal necessity" then all of those freedoms disappear, because none of them can claim to be free of reliable causation.

So, by choosing to require "freedom from causal necessity" in your notion of "freedom" one may also assume that your intention is to wipe out the notion of freedom itself. Is that your intent?

Inner necessitation is no more an instance of free will than external coersion -

So, it continues to appear that you do in fact intend to wipe out moral and legal responsibility from human understanding. Inner necessitation includes us choosing for ourselves what we will do. External coercion is a guy with a gun forcing us to subjugate our will to his. If you fail to make any distinction between these two events, then you have lost any moral grounding.

The distinction is that you either act according to your necessitated will (necessarily) or you are being forced against you necessitated will.

Yes. That's better (P3 and P4). All events, without exception, are causally necessitated by prior events. However, the event in which you chose for yourself what you would do is commonly known as a voluntary or deliberate act that you were free to choose to do yourselves, and the event in which the guy with the gun forced you to do his will is one in which you were not free to choose for yourself what you would do.

At no point is will free of necessitation.

AT NO POINT IS ANY EVENT EVER "free of causal necessitation" (also known as good old fashioned "reliable cause and effect").

As necessitation or determinism is the antithesis of freedom,

Then we should find the incompatibilists lobbying to remove "free" and "freedom" from all of our dictionaries, right? No event is ever free of reliable causation, because without reliable causation we would have no ability to do anything at all.

Thus, "freedom from causal necessity" is a paradoxical, self-contradicting, and a false notion.

It is not enough to assert: it is the brain/us that is doing it, therefore free will. How it is done is the issue.

How is it done? The brain is doing it through a deterministic series of unconscious and conscious processes that perform many functions, including deciding for us, when presented with multiple possibilities (for example the restaurant menu), which option we will choose (for example, the steak or the salad). At least, that's what the neuroscientists are consistently telling us.

They are avoiding the term "free will", because it carries a lot of baggage, but if we clean it up, like I've done, it once again becomes a meaningful and relevant term. It is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.

Which comes down to: Determinism makes it impossible for us to “cause and control our actions in the right kind of way.''

The customer in the restaurant chooses to tell the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please". The waiter brings him the dinner and the bill. This is sufficient proof that we can "cause and control our actions in the right kind of way". You've shown no examples, or any other evidence, that contradicts what we have seen with our own eyes.

To be brief and to the point: Compatibilism fails at the point of neural agency. The brain as a deterministic system by definition lacks the right kind of control or agency to qualify as free will. Determined or necessitated decisions are not freely willed or freely chosen decisions. They are determined by the state of the system, incrementally, as events unfold both in the external world and within the brain as a deterministic system as it processes information and responds. Responds, not according to freely willed or chosen decisions, but the state of the system in each and every instance of input, processing and response.
A determined 'decision' is - by definition - is fixed by antecedents. Being fixed means that it is not free. Free - by definition - means not fixed, able to do otherwise. Not being fixed or able to do otherwise is the antithesis of determinism. Consequently, the idea of free will is not compatible with determinism.

And every bit of that was dealt with above, so, there's no need to repeat myself here.

Dr. Robert Sapolsky: The basic theme is that we are biological creatures, which shouldn't be earth-shattering. And thus all of our behavior is a product of our biology, which also shouldn't be earth-shattering—even though it's news to some people.
If we want to make sense of our behavior—all the best, worst, and everything in between—we're not going to get anywhere if we think it can all be explained with one thing, whether it's one part of the brain, one childhood experience, one hormone, one gene, or anything. Instead, a behavior is the outcome of everything from neurobiology one second before the action, to evolutionary pressure dating back millions of years.

Hello, Dr. Sapolsky. Yes, we are quite aware that we are biological creatures. Please be advised that millions of years of evolutionary pressure have resulted in having a brain that can imagine, evaluate, and choose.

One of the notions we have evolved to deal with our social environment is the distinction between a choice that we make for ourselves versus a choice that is imposed upon us by someone else. We use this distinction when assessing who should be held responsible for some behavior. When a person is free to decide for themselves what they will do, we call this "free will". When a person is forced to do the will of someone else, we call this "coercion".

Now, I know you've been caught up in the debate, so you may have an entirely different notion of what free will is about. You may think, for example, that free will means that we are free of those millions of years of biological evolution. But, no, free will is not "freedom from evolution". Free will is nothing more than "freedom from coercion and undue influence". And you might think that free will means "freedom from our brains", or "freedom from childhood experience" or "freedom from hormones" or "freedom from genes" or any number of impossible freedoms. But, no, it doesn't mean anything like that.

Free will is simply when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence, like a significant mental illness that alters ones perception of reality, or that imposes an irresistible impulse, or that impairs the ability to reason. Those are all real constraints upon a person's ability to decide for themselves what they will do. They are constraints that one may actually be free of, or not free of.

 

[Jarhyn]

Determining whether there is will and it is free free are entirely dependent on cause and cause has only been shown publicly, not privately through self testimony or self observation, to be determined.

When you come up with an experiment that demonstrates publicly, through material experiment, that choice and will exist otherwise than by the direct result of being determined then I'm willing to examine your data.

Play on.

All events are always the reliable result of prior events. This includes the event where someone decides for themselves what they will do. Choosing for ourselves what we will do is a deterministic event, just like every other event.

Causal necessity is neither a meaningful nor a relevant constraint. It is not meaningful because what we will inevitably do is exactly identical to us just being us, choosing what we choose, and doing what we do. It is "what we would have done anyway". And it is not relevant because it is always present and cannot be removed, so its a bit silly to even bring it up. It makes itself irrelevant by its own ubiquity. So, the intelligent brain would simply acknowledge it, and then forget about it.

All of the utility of the notion of causation comes from knowing the specific causes of specific effects. That knowledge gives us the freedom to control many of the events that affect our lives, like Polio and Measles and other diseases. It enables us to imagine and event things, like automobiles, airplanes, and Moon rockets. But universal causal necessity/inevitability itself has no meaningful implications to any human affairs.

Another thing that's been percolating through is this idea of "fungibility".

While the exact same outcome is not expected from inexactly similar inputs, the output condition for "goal evaluation" is often a set with more than a single member.

When a NPN transistor "turns on", it is not concerned with which shells in the P layer are leaving holes and allowing the electrons to bunch closely enough to the interface to manage to get attracted from the emitter through the base to the collector. It is just concerned with having "enough". The microstate may end up differently, but the overall goal was still achieved.

In this same way, goal behaviors are not just a single object of the near-infinite set of things that could happen on the basis of imperfect knowledge of circumstance.
Instead, goal behaviors rely on a number of different things that could all push the switch past a threshold so as to set off a wave of activity through the graph network it is connected to.

If such concepts as "able" did not have real worth and function, we would not have switching systems in the first place, and they would have no use. The switch makes you "able" to turn the light "off OR on". The "ability" for the light to be otherwise than on "while" plugged in is mediated by the switch.

Things that do not relate to real effects cannot themselves be real.

As we see, our language is literally filled with things that only make sense when one processes the concept of "can" not as "inevitably must happen" and able not as "deterministic action of the system eventually makes it come to pass", but as "a potential state, given outside 'seeding'*"

*This really deserves its own post, so it's going to get one.

 

[Jarhyn]

I realize in this conversation the concept of "systemic seeding" is important, and relates to the evolution of states and how this relates to stochastic models.

Essentially stochastic models are merely "deterministic models missing seed information".

To properly understand deterministic systems, there is always a discussion of how, exactly, the initial state got initialized.

Usually, this amounts to an absurdity (not to be confused with nonsense). In the case of our universe, and our understanding of it, the best we can model it as is as a single chunk of invisible, predetermined but otherwise impenetrable randomness: a "pad" of results that will be used "one time". This is what is meant by "one time pad"

What is not random is "prior cause". The randomness of prior cause organizes into information over time as the "dice rolls"

In deterministic systems, any revelations of initial state over time constitute as remaining "seed material".

Always, the future is the interaction of state and seed material. One can look at the state and, IGNORANT of that seed material, calculate what various results against seed would cause to arise within a fungible or even fuzzy bound.

And moreover any subset of state can be treated as seed and held "unknown" for the calculus against those "unknowns".

A lot of this comes down to the fact that we must suffer under The Halting Problem, itself a demand of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem.

 

[fromderinside]

Determining whether there is will and it is free free are entirely dependent on cause and cause has only been shown publicly, not privately through self testimony or self observation, to be determined.

When you come up with an experiment that demonstrates publicly, through material experiment, that choice and will exist otherwise than by the direct result of being determined then I'm willing to examine your data.

Play on.

All events are always the reliable result of prior events. This includes the event where someone decides for themselves what they will do.

What do you mean by the event where someone decides ....

To me that means some sort of intervention - an intervening process which must also be determined since the only demonstrated relationship is "this caused by that" - by some material event. All such must be caused. IOW to decide requires a chain of events leading to the particular option you call chosen. I don't see that as choosing. Nor do I see it as an excuse to make up some process, unspecified, you think should be inserted.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

What do you mean by the event where someone decides ....

To me that means some sort of intervention - an intervening process which must also be determined since the only demonstrated relationship is "this caused by that" - by some material event. All such must be caused. IOW to decide requires a chain of events leading to the particular option you call chosen. I don't see that as choosing. Nor do I see it as an excuse to make up some process, unspecified, you think should be inserted.

Every event, from the motion of the planets, to the thoughts going through your head right now, is causally necessary from any prior point time. This is a logical fact, derived from the presumption of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect.

I don't see that as choosing.

Choosing is a deterministic operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice, usually in the form of an "I will", as in, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

Did you think that choosing was not a deterministic process? Or do you have the illusion that since the choice is inevitable it must not really be choosing? It really is choosing. If the choice was inevitable, then the choosing was also inevitable.

Universal causal necessity/inevitability doesn't actually change anything. What you will inevitably do is basically what you would have done anyway.

 

[DBT]

Compatibilism fails at the point of neural agency.

You keep claiming this, but you keep failing to back up the fundamental basis of your claim: that neurons "can't", when neurons very much CAN.

At this point your argument reduces to "Neurons (not determinism) rule out free will", which is not in any way convincing.

Determined or necessitated decisions are not freely willed

And yet the dwarf in a deterministic universe observably freely willed to knock down a statue.

If Algorighms without neurons can observably display free will under this definition even without consciousness, then they are clearly capable of holding things such as "will"! We watched it happen all the way down to binary.

Then to say "but neurons" when neurons can execute any arbitrary algorithm is silliness.

Being fixed means that it is not free

Only under intentionally broken definitions of "free". "Free" in the compatibilist sense addresses success with respect to systemic inertia, not whether we could do otherwise; otherwise as Marvin points out, we would need to strike the whole word from our dictionaries. For some reason we are not doing that so...

You consistently abuse "able". "Able" does not imply will, "able" provides a very simple exercise: it assumes some systemic state, and then calculates determinancy to an outcome from that assumed state. An example of such is when I "assume" the state of my cat having had her guard hairs near her hips messed with: if this was assumed of the state, she would jump down and be annoyed with me.

She would freely will to do so, to jump down, if I did that. She would not freely will to be annoyed. That would just happen.

This is what it means to be "able": to have the means for a task available regardless of whether one executes on those means.

I am "able" to play dwarf Fortress in the immediate term.

I am "unable" to play Elder Ring in the immediate term.

Notice, this only happens in the perspective of stochastic actors within the deterministic system: only a thing "of" a deterministic system, not "the system itself" can be "able" to do anything.

The other "able" is an intentionally broken idea, a perfect example of "Why Can't I Hold All These Limes?"

I am pointing out that a determined action is not a freely chosen action. A determined action, as per the given definition of determinism (yours included), is entailed or necessitated by antecedents.

This is not my claim. It is how determinism works, as it is defined (including your own definition).

Given that a determined action is not a freely chosen action and has nothing whatsoever to do with 'will,' a determined action is not a freely willed action.

Not being a freely willed action, it cannot be claimed to be an example of free will.

Free will playing no part in determined actions, determinism and free will are not compatible.

Therefore free will is not compatible with determinism.

That is the nail in the coffin of compatibilism.

Not because I say so, but by the dictates of the given terms and definitions,

 

[Jarhyn]

I am pointing out that a determined action is not a freely chosen action.

No, you are repeatedly claiming that without proof, even in the presence of an immediate disproof. I have mathematically disproved your claim through example.

Your claim is that "deterministic systems" "cannot possibly" "contain wills that are objectively evaluable as free"

I showed you a deterministic system, which contained "wills" that were objectively "free XOR constrained"

Your 'pointing out' after that is standing on a false proclamation.

At that point you are left with a MUCH weaker proposal: that "neural systems are incapable of implementing those specific algorithmic shapes", which itself is a losing proposition because neural systems can implement ANY algorithm within their complexity limit, and these algorithms are not even highly complex.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

To be brief and to the point: Compatibilism fails at the point of neural agency.

Compatibilism assumes that our own brains, through our own neural architecture, is deciding whether we will order the steak or the salad for dinner.

The brain as a deterministic system by definition lacks the right kind of control or agency to qualify as free will.

The only kind of control or agency required to qualify as free will is the ability to decide what we will do. Our brains routinely do this every day. For example, in the restaurant, our brain inputs the menu of possible dinners, and decides to order the salad.

This is indisputable proof that our brains have precisely the kind of control and agency to causally determine whether to order the steak or the salad. And if that choice is free of coercion and free of undue influence, then it is a freely chosen will.

Free will needs only to be free of coercion and other forms of undue influence in order to be a freely chosen will. Coercion is when someone else forces their choice upon us. The influence of significant mental illness can distort our view of reality, impose an irresistible impulse, or render our mind incapable of reasoning and choosing. Things of this nature can actually prevent or impair us from deciding for ourselves what we will do. They actually threaten our free will.

Free will does not require "freedom from evolution", "freedom from causation", "freedom from our brains", "freedom from childhood experience", "freedom from hormones", "freedom from genes" or any number of other impossible freedoms. These things do not threaten our ability to choose for ourselves what we will do. They are integral parts of who and what we are. Their influence is never considered coercive nor undue, because they are all a common part of all of us.

Determined or necessitated decisions are not freely willed or freely chosen decisions.

The fact of causal necessity does not alter the fact of coercion versus freedom from coercion.
The fact of causal necessity does not alter the fact of undue influence versus freedom from undue influence.

Your presumption that "if not free of causal necessity then it cannot be free from something else" is clearly false.

They are determined by the state of the system, incrementally, as events unfold both in the external world and within the brain as a deterministic system as it processes information and responds.

That is certainly correct. But it is no threat to the meaningful and relevant definition of a freely chosen will. There is no need to be free from the brains deterministic operation in order to be free of coercion and undue influence.

Responds, not according to freely willed or chosen decisions, but the state of the system in each and every instance of input, processing and response.

There is no need to be free from the brain's "input, processing, and response". That would be impossible, of course, because that is how choosing what we will do works. But it IS possible for that choosing process to be free from coercion and undue influence.

A determined 'decision' is - by definition - is fixed by antecedents.

All events are always fixed by antecedent events. For example, the event in which I told the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad for dinner, please", was fixed by my previous consideration of whether to have the steak or the salad for dinner. The antecedent event is called "choosing what I will have for dinner". The antecedents of that choice included having bacon and eggs for breakfast and a cheese burger for lunch, which fixed my choice upon the salad, even though I could have ordered the steak.

Being fixed means that it is not free.

Being fixed only means that it is not free of being fixed. It does not imply any lack of freedom from other things, like coercion, or undue influence.

Free - by definition - means not fixed, able to do otherwise.

Again, only one freedom, freedom from being fixed by antecedent events, is threatened by being fixed by antecedent events.

For example, on the night of a wedding rehearsal, all of the guests will have their meals paid for by the groom's father. The guests meals will all be free of charge. The fact that the event will be fixed by antecedent events does not change the fact that the meals will be free.

The ability/freedom to do otherwise is true in every choosing operation. For example, in the restaurant, I have the ability to order the steak and I also have the ability to order the salad. No one, other than me, is going to force me to choose either one, therefore I am free to choose for myself. Not free of causal necessity (antecedent events), but definitely free of coercion and undue influence.

So, your conclusion that being fixed by causal necessity removes all freedom is false. It only removes the single freedom of not being fixed by causal necessity. It has no effect at all upon the freedom to decide for yourself whether to order the steak or the salad in the same way that it has no effect at all upon being treated to a free lunch on your birthday.

Not being fixed or able to do otherwise is the antithesis of determinism.

Not at all. The antithesis of determinism is indeterminism. The ability to do otherwise comes as a logical implication of the choosing operation. Determinism means that you will not do otherwise. Determinism does not mean that you could not do otherwise.

Free will is a deterministic empirical event, just like every other event. It poses no threat at all to determinism. And determinism poses no threat at all to operational free will.

Consequently, the idea of free will is not compatible with determinism.

I hope it is beginning to dawn on you by now why operational free will is fully compatible with determinism. To make them incompatible requires figurative statements, false assumptions, and other forms of wordplay.

 

[fromderinside]

What do you mean by the event where someone decides ....

To me that means some sort of intervention - an intervening process which must also be determined since the only demonstrated relationship is "this caused by that" - by some material event. All such must be caused. IOW to decide requires a chain of events leading to the particular option you call chosen. I don't see that as choosing. Nor do I see it as an excuse to make up some process, unspecified, you think should be inserted.

Every event, from the motion of the planets, to the thoughts going through your head right now, is causally necessary from any prior point time. This is a logical fact, derived from the presumption of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect.

I don't see that as choosing.

Choosing is a deterministic operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice, usually in the form of an "I will", as in, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

Did you think that choosing was not a deterministic process? Or do you have the illusion that since the choice is inevitable it must not really be choosing? It really is choosing. If the choice was inevitable, then the choosing was also inevitable.

Universal causal necessity/inevitability doesn't actually change anything. What you will inevitably do is basically what you would have done anyway.

The point is that 'choosing' is a self referenced without necessity. What one does is determined. No need to invent terms to wedge your beliefs or subvocalized interpretations into the discussion. If you tried to use a material mechanism like subvocalization, a deterministic process of passing behavior through an interpreter, an aide, to report already executed function, you would understand what you were doing was driven by previous events not something you, the behaving, were choosing.

Defining an echo of behavior is not choosing. It is the basis for self reference a process whereby one can reinterpret what one has already done into beliefs one is initiating for purpose or as reality.

 

[pood]

1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated

2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers

3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers

Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false.''

1. If causal determinism is true, effects reliably follow causes.
2. If effects reliably follow causes, then I have the power to cause an effect.
3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers.
4. Therefore, if causal determinism is true, I have free will.

FIFY.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The point is that 'choosing' is a self referenced without necessity. What one does is determined.

No. Choosing is a causally necessitated event, just like any other event. There is no need to escape from reliable cause and effect in order to decide to have the salad instead of the steak.

In fact, reliable causation is required in order to make any decision. Choosing the salad for dinner was reliably caused by my recalling that I had bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch. At no time did I step outside of causal necessity.

Now, what you need to realize is that both my choice and my choosing were causally necessary from any prior point in eternity. Causal necessity guaranteed that I would be making that choice at that time and at that place. And causal necessity guaranteed that I would be free of coercion and undue influence at that time and at that place.

No need to invent terms to wedge your beliefs or subvocalized interpretations into the discussion. If you tried to use a material mechanism like subvocalization, a deterministic process of passing behavior through an interpreter, an aide, to report already executed function, you would understand what you were doing was driven by previous events not something you, the behaving, were choosing.

Well, if it wasn't me that ordered the salad, then who was it? Was it you? Was it causal necessity? Was it the Big Bang?

I need to know, because the waiter is handing me the bill for my salad, and I need to tell him who the bill belongs to.

Defining an echo of behavior is not choosing. It is the basis for self reference a process whereby one can reinterpret what one has already done into beliefs one is initiating for purpose or as reality.

It is not the "echo of behavior" or any "reinterpretation" of events. Everyone at the dinner table (including me) witnessed me telling the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please." This was a real event that took place in the real world. Choosing happens. And I chose to order the salad. So, the waiter brings me the bill.

Perhaps it is you that is reinterpreting these events in some odd way.

 

[fromderinside]

The point is that 'choosing' is a self referenced without necessity. What one does is determined.

No. Choosing is a causally necessitated event, just like any other event. There is no need to escape from reliable cause and effect in order to decide to have the salad instead of the steak.

In fact, reliable causation is required in order to make any decision. Choosing the salad for dinner was reliably caused by my recalling that I had bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch. At no time did I step outside of causal necessity.

Now, what you need to realize is that both my choice and my choosing were causally necessary from any prior point in eternity. Causal necessity guaranteed that I would be making that choice at that time and at that place. And causal necessity guaranteed that I would be free of coercion and undue influence at that time and at that place.

No need to invent terms to wedge your beliefs or subvocalized interpretations into the discussion. If you tried to use a material mechanism like subvocalization, a deterministic process of passing behavior through an interpreter, an aide, to report already executed function, you would understand what you were doing was driven by previous events not something you, the behaving, were choosing.

Well, if it wasn't me that ordered the salad, then who was it? Was it you? Was it causal necessity? Was it the Big Bang?

I need to know, because the waiter is handing me the bill for my salad, and I need to tell him who the bill belongs to.

Defining an echo of behavior is not choosing. It is the basis for self reference a process whereby one can reinterpret what one has already done into beliefs one is initiating for purpose or as reality.

It is not the "echo of behavior" or any "reinterpretation" of events. Everyone at the dinner table (including me) witnessed me telling the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please." This was a real event that took place in the real world. Choosing happens. And I chose to order the salad. So, the waiter brings me the bill.

Perhaps it is you that is reinterpreting these events in some odd way.

What we call thinking is normally repeating sub-vocalizations. I've noted before we can be visually, gustatorily, proprioceptively, somatosensorily, and other sensorial aware just as we are auditorily aware except that when we are auditorily aware we are also linguistically aware because what we act on is also heard which can be acted upon again. The effects of this latter is important since while we can be aware of what's seen we cannot be aware of what it is unless we can name it.

A mouse does not see paw to bite and it will bite it before recoiling. A human almost never accidentally bites oneself. Very few species are self aware at all. Many will bite themselves and continue doing so. Mammals usually are self aware to some extent. Some can come to recognize many objects by sound of a label for it.

As for your example you refuse to understand you are self describing as explanation rather than attributing caused behavior. They see and reinterpret a 'real' event. They believe they are in control of what they do and so resort to rhetoric in consonance with that effect. They nor you are describing behavior. Instead you and they are reinterpreting behavior as believed of one in control rather than one in response forms. We don't need this assertion of self to behave. We will behave anyway.

I'm not saying language nor the concept of self aren't necessary. I'm saying language, misunderstood or represented, gets in the way of us understanding reality. Simply put faeries even godly ones are not real.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

What we call thinking is normally repeating sub-vocalizations. I've noted before we can be visually, gustatorily, proprioceptively, somatosensorily, and other sensorial aware just as we are auditorily aware except that when we are auditorily aware we are also linguistically aware because what we act on is also heard which can be acted upon again. The effects of this latter is important since while we can be aware of what's seen we cannot be aware of what it is unless we can name it.

I understand the notion of sub-vocalization. Back in the day, when they were doing experiments in parapsychology, the researcher would hold a card and the subject would try to read his mind. Some subjects were able to pick up on the sub-vocalization as the researcher "spoke" the card to himself.

And we do seem to reason verbally, often by talking silently to ourselves. But this should not in any way disqualify the notion of choosing. Choosing is an operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparison, and outputs a single choice. In the restaurant, the options are on the menu, and the customer reduces those options to a single choice, and tells the waiter, "I will have the salad, please".

So, the choosing, by whatever mechanisms, is happening. If choosing were not happening, the customer would be stuck staring at the menu all night.

A mouse does not see paw to bite and it will bite it before recoiling. A human almost never accidentally bites oneself. Very few species are self aware at all. Many will bite themselves and continue doing so. Mammals usually are self aware to some extent. Some can come to recognize many objects by sound of a label for it.

I'm skeptical about mice biting their own paws (not more than once, anyway). Most animals that we are familiar with are aware of other animals and the difference between themselves and others.

Birds have a "theory of mind", like we do. They are aware of another bird's awareness of them. If a crow is hiding food and notices another crow watching, she will move the food and hide it somewhere else.

As for your example you refuse to understand you are self describing as explanation rather than attributing caused behavior. They see and reinterpret a 'real' event. They believe they are in control of what they do and so resort to rhetoric in consonance with that effect. They nor you are describing behavior. Instead you and they are reinterpreting behavior as believed of one in control rather than one in response forms. We don't need this assertion of self to behave. We will behave anyway.

Perhaps. But as soon as someone asks us, "Hey! Why did you do that?!", we will feel required to explain our thinking and our action.

And, of course, choosing would have actually happened, whether we controlled it or not. The menu of possibilities would still be reduced to a single choice, by someone or by something. And, to any objective observer, the cause of the choice would be the person who gave the order to the waiter.

I'm not saying language nor the concept of self aren't necessary. I'm saying language, misunderstood or represented, gets in the way of us understanding reality. Simply put faeries even godly ones are not real.

The reality is pretty simply. The guy who ordered the salad gets the bill for the salad.

 

[fromderinside]

I'm glad that what we do isn't what early humans did. I prefer the comfort of a warm home and the understanding that I am safe in my environment for most things in the here and now. Would have been a waste of hardware otherwise.

Still, at base we are beings that can disappear in an instant should a large thing hit our earth or some power hungry maniac can bring down our world by simply pushing a button. The world is determined and we will suffer the consequences of it being what it is.

Everything we are are wrapped up in the existence of that world. We are not consequential just temporary. That we are complex is fortunate for us. But evolution nor the world provided will or any of those other things you fancy we have. They are constructs men imagine as part of their being social animals because that is all we can directly sense or make sense about. Yet, when we look at the world it makes sense to explain it as determined through a system we call science.

I alerted you to the imaginariness of religion and faeries. Now I'm alerting you to the imaginariness of will, choice, and the other which are no more that reinterpretations of our labeled behavior.

Keep it simple. We are strictly materially determined. Evolution out of being determined is not an option. No matter how you connect this to that what comes in this goes out that. The sum of the parts is no more than equal to the parts and emergence isn't a property of the material determined world.

If you want to start a subcategory of philosophy based on self observation please be sure to label it as such. It has incomplete derivative association with determinism. We probably can never know how to complete the square for it since it arises from executed behavior among social beings.

A follow on puzzle. Find the objective elements in the definitions below if you can.

Hint: 0

The common usage definitions of consciousness in Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1966 edition, Volume 1, page 482) are as follows:

1. • awareness or perception of an inward psychological or spiritual fact; intuitively perceived knowledge of something in one's inner self
   • inward awareness of an external object, state, or fact
   • concerned awareness; INTEREST, CONCERN—often used with an attributive noun [e.g. class consciousness]
2. the state or activity that is characterized by sensation, emotion, volition, or thought; mind in the broadest possible sense; something in nature that is distinguished from the physical
3. the totality in psychology of sensations, perceptions, ideas, attitudes, and feelings of which an individual or a group is aware at any given time or within a particular time span—compare STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
4. waking life (as that to which one returns after sleep, trance, fever) wherein all one's mental powers have returned . . .
5. the part of mental life or psychic content in psychoanalysis that is immediately available to the ego—compare PRECONSCIOUS, UNCONSCIOUS

 

[DBT]

''Free will is an illusion. Our wills are simply not of our own making. Thoughts and intentions emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control.''

I am pointing out that a determined action is not a freely chosen action.

No, you are repeatedly claiming that without proof, even in the presence of an immediate disproof. I have mathematically disproved your claim through example.

I'm not claiming it without proof. It is the definition of determinism and what it entails, and its implications.

The very definition you gave.

If something is fixed by antecedents, that being determinism, it cannot be freely chosen. It is, by definition, fixed by antecedents.

Jarhyn - ''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.''

Where do you see free choice in determinism?

There is your logical proof. You, yourself gave it.

Your claim is that "deterministic systems" "cannot possibly" "contain wills that are objectively evaluable as free"

I showed you a deterministic system, which contained "wills" that were objectively "free XOR constrained"

You showed nothing. Based on not understanding the implications of determinism, your reasoning is flawed.

Your 'pointing out' after that is standing on a false proclamation.

At that point you are left with a MUCH weaker proposal: that "neural systems are incapable of implementing those specific algorithmic shapes", which itself is a losing proposition because neural systems can implement ANY algorithm within their complexity limit, and these algorithms are not even highly complex.

Basically, the capabilities of neural systems (the brain) is determined by architecture, processing power, inputs and memory function. A failure of any of these element's results in a capability failure.

Plus, there is no getting around that determined actions are not freely chosen or freely willed actions. A determined action is not subject to will or modification. A determined action - by definition - proceeds as determined.

That - by definition, and not because I say so - is how determinism works.