Our own brain's do process information and initiate actions, just not according to free will or free choice in the sense that an alternate action is possible.
We do not expect our brains to act "according to free will or free choice", whatever that means.
But we do expect our brains to determine for us what we will do, when we are faced with a problem or issue that requires us to choose between two or more possible actions. For example, should I have breakfast now, or should I finish this comment first?
Freedom demands alternate possibilities, determinism rules out alternate actions, determined actions are not freely chosen or freely willed actions. A determined action is not subject to will or modification. A determined action - by definition - proceeds as determined.
Freedom doesn't "demand" alternate possibilities. Alternate possibilities simply show up in empirical reality, requiring us to choose what we will do about them. For example, we enter a restaurant and are presented with a literal menu of alternate possibilities.
And there is no getting around that. Either we make a choice or we go without dinner.
So, as evolution would have it, our brains routinely perform choosing operations, every day.
The notions of "free will", and "deliberate", and "voluntary" are used to distinguish choices we make for ourselves versus choices imposed upon us by someone or something else, for example, a mental illness that imposes upon us an irresistible impulse.
Arguments that apply to "free will" would apply to "deliberate" and "voluntary" as well. If free will is eliminated, then so is deliberate and voluntary, by the same methods.
Determined by antecedents.
Every event is always reliably caused by antecedent events. But you seem to think that this fact has supernatural implications, that it simply does not have.
Nothing to do with will, wish, free choice, free will or conscious agency.
For example, "will", "wish", "choice", and "consciousness" can all be antecedent events of the current choice. The fact of antecedent events cannot be used to eradicate or hide the actual antecedent events.
The "wish" to satisfy our hunger is the antecedent event of our "choice" to eat at the restaurant. Our deliberate "will" to have dinner at the restaurant is the antecedent event of us actually getting up, going into the restaurant, reading the menu, and placing our orders.
We cannot claim that antecedent events have causal power to necessitate subsequent events, and then dismiss the actual antecedent events as if they never existed.
Information inputs, processing, behavioral output resulting in thoughts and actions, the system doing what it does.
Exactly. And the system decided to go to the restaurant, read the menu, choose what it would order for dinner, and place its order with the waiter.
Form and function, not free will.
It is an irrefutable fact that one of the brain's functions is to choose from the menu what we will have for dinner.
Whether the term "free will" applies or not depends entirely upon whether the brain performed this function while free of coercion and undue influence or not.
Control implies the ability to do otherwise.
That which decides what will happen next exercises control. The brain that decides what the person will order for dinner controls the voice that tells the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".
The "ability" to do otherwise never requires that we actually do otherwise. We have the ability to order the steak and we also have the ability to order the salad. If we order the salad, then, given determinism, we may safely say that it was always the case that we would order the salad. But it would be false to suggest that we could not have ordered the steak. In fact, given determinism, it was always the case that we could have ordered the steak.
"I ordered the salad, but I could have ordered the steak", is a true statement in both its parts.
Determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise.
That is a false claim. Determinism never rules out anything that "can" or "could have" happened. It can only assert that, what could have happened, would not have happened, given the same circumstances. And everyone would find that logically consistent.
But we experience cognitive dissonance when told that "we could not have done otherwise", because the logical representation of the choosing operation requires that there be at least two things that we "can" choose, even when there is only one thing that we "will" choose. At the end of the choice, between our two "I can's", there will be the single thing that "I will" do and at least one other thing that "I could have" done, but didn't.
The logic of the language is this: If "I can" was true at any point in the past, then "I could have" will forever be true in the future. It is a simple matter of present tense and past tense. And that is why we experience cognitive dissonance when told that we "could not have done otherwise", but do not experience it when told that we "would not have done otherwise".
Function is not free will.
That is a false dichotomy. Not all functions are free will, but one of those functions is. When the function is to decide for ourselves what we will do while free of coercion and undue influence, then that specific function is specifically free will.
Regulation determined by architecture is determined by that architecture (mouse brains, cat brains, chimp brains, human brains, etc, etc). A brain lacks the right kind of regulation.
That is another false dichotomy. Not all regulatory functions determined by the brain's architecture is free will. But when the function is to decide for ourselves what we will do while free of coercion and undue influence, then that specific function
regulates our subsequent actions, then that regulatory function is specifically free will.
There is no escaping agency:
And yet the incompatibilist continues trying to escape human agency! Their problem is that there is no place else to put it.
A determined action is not a freely willed action.
Another false dichotomy. Not all determined actions are free will events. But the specific determined action, of deciding for ourselves what we will do while free of coercion and undue influence, happens to be a
freely chosen "I will". And the specific determined action where our choice is coerced or unduly influenced happens to be
not freely chosen.
Not being a freely willed action, a determined action is not a matter of free will.
Except when the determined action happens to be a choice we make for ourselves that is free of coercion and undue influence.
Being determined does not tell us whether or not our choice was free of coercion and undue influence. In most cases it will be causally determined that we will be free of coercion and undue influence. In that case, it is causally necessary that we would make that choice of our own free will.
Free will playing no part in determined actions, determinism and free will are not compatible.
Free will is not an agent with a will of its own. It does not participate in making decisions. A deterministic process makes the decision, by choosing from two or more alternate possibilities what the person will do. Free will is about whether the
deterministic process was subject to coercion or undue influence or not. If the deterministic decision making process was free of coercion and undue influence, then it is called a freely chosen will.
Free will is therefore not compatible with determinism.
The logical and physical evidence does not support that position. The logical and physical evidence supports the notion that a deterministic decision making process can be either subject to coercion or undue influence, or, the process can be free of them. Free will, as a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and undue influence, appears to be perfectly compatible with causal determinism.
The consequence argument again;
(1) The existence of alternative possibilities (or the agent's power to do otherwise) is a necessary condition for acting freely.
(2) Determinism is not compatible with alternative possibilities (it precludes the power to do otherwise).
(3) Therefore, determinism is not compatible with acting freely.
1. As I've pointed out, we are commonly faced with empirical circumstances in which there are at least two distinct courses of action, each of which we have the ability to successfully follow, if we choose to do so. And we have the
ability to choose either one, even though we
will choose only one.
2. Both causal determinism and logical necessity guarantee that there will be alternative possibilities whenever a choice needs to be made.
3.
Determinism is never incompatible with anything other than indeterminism. The only freedom that determinism is incompatible with is "freedom from determinism". It is not incompatible with "freedom of speech", or "free of charge", or "freedom to assemble", or "freedom of religion", or "freedom of the press", or "free will".