Compatibilism: What's that About?

[DBT]

Let me get this straight.

CHOOSING

We (compatibilists and incompatibilists) all agree that it happens.

The problem is that incompatibilists (FDI at least) insist that the word "choosing" should not be used.

This isn't philosophy.

No, it's a matter of necessitated decisions and agency.

As determinism happens to be defined, events proceed as determined, no alternate actions are possible.

Necessitated decisions, with no possible alternative (determinism) are not freely willed decisions. They are not even willed decisions (will is not the agency), therefore it is false to claim that free will is compatible with determinism.

 

[DBT]

Quote = Marvin Edwards:
It's nice that you have listened and understood and even quoted those words of mine. Now, if you could do the same with some of the other words that I've said.

I don't know where you guys find the time.

I'll just say that the issue works both ways, that I do understand your 'other words.'

That I do understand your position and the compatibilist definition of free will.

I just don't agree with it.

Incompatibilists, for the given reasons, do not agree with the compatibilist definition of free will.

From my side of the fence, it appears that it is the compatibilist who fails to consider the problems that are being pointed out.

Basically:
Necessitated actions - being determined - are not (by definition) freely chosen, negotiable or alterable. Determined events proceed or unfold deterministically according to antecedent events and the laws or principles of nature. Consequently, determined/necessitated actions are not freely willed actions.

1. We have no control over circumstances that existed in the past, nor do we have any control over the laws of nature.

2. If A causes B, we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B.

3. All of our actions and thoughts are consequences of past events and the laws of nature.

4. As assuming responsibility requires the right kind of regulative control, ultimately, we are not responsible for what we do or think (2, 3).

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.'' - cold comfort in compatibilism.

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

 

[The AntiChris]

Let me get this straight.

CHOOSING

We (compatibilists and incompatibilists) all agree that it happens.

The problem is that incompatibilists (FDI at least) insist that the word "choosing" should not be used.

This isn't philosophy.

No, it's a matter of necessitated decisions and agency.

As determinism happens to be defined, events proceed as determined, no alternate actions are possible.

Necessitated decisions, with no possible alternative (determinism) are not freely willed decisions. They are not even willed decisions (will is not the agency), therefore it is false to claim that free will is compatible with determinism.

I'm afraid I can't see any relationship between what you wrote and what I assume you're responding to.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

That brain cells treat with inputs from the world should make clear that what the individual is doing is processing best evidence of what is going on in the world according to what the brain cells suggest. What the brain cells transduce into action potentials is controlled by evolution in that senses are arraigned by type and magnitude of domain used to sense.

Sensing is relative and it is not really aligned with the information carried to the organism. That is it is recorded as type, strength, duration. pattern and direction of a digital record what is sensed. As I've been forced to admit we don't know color, texture, etc. except by association. We are not deciding based on what is out there rather we are reacting to well established patterns and directing response to those most of then received.

That is not choice, decision making, especially not exercise of will free or otherwise. It is an improving and very successfully determining reaction to previous transactions. We say before and during our actions confirms the building and reinforcing of memory, not executing self determined will.

If it is not choosing or decision making, then what do you call the operation where the customer in the restaurant reads the menu and then places their order?

A very complex reaction by a language endowed being to satisfying biological demands for nutrition.

That would describe the word "eating".

The word "choosing" refers to any operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice. The choice is usually in the form of an "I will X", where X is something we have chosen to do. For example, telling the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

 

[Jarhyn]

Compatibilists simply define 'free will' in a way that allows it to be compatible with determinism.

Yes, we do. Good of you to admit that we have successully defined free will in a way that allows it to be compatible with Determinsm. I daresay that was entirely the goal of compatibilists: to find a "free will" that, given determinism, allows the derivation of responsibility in a way that does not "prove all sentences".

You confuse function with will. Robots have function not will.

That function encodes a will.

That you do not understand that "will" is a state held unto a set of requirements, and is a PIECE of a function, is kind of sad.

It is not will that processes information and produces outcomes.

The function processes information, and the will is part of that information.

Will is not something that acts upon the process

The will is not something that acts upon the process, the process is something that acts upon the will, either to create it, or hold it, or act upon it, or even to reject it.

Now, the will itself can be a definition of process, but that's getting into some weeds that I don't think you are ready for.

 

[pood]

DBT, you wrote:

Crock. Compatibilists simply define 'free will' in a way that allows it to be compatible with determinism.

To which I respond:

Crock. INcompatibilists simply define 'free will' in a way that allows it to be INcompatible with determinism.

FIFY, again.

I mean,what good is this sort of argument? Of course compatibilists define free will in way that it is compatible with free will; but incompatibilists do the same, to make free will incompatibile with determinism.

And that’s the crux of the dispute — who has the more reasonable definition of free will?

I asked you earlier whether you make a distinction between the words “will” and “must.”

And you offered a two word response to my question: “Too vague.”

Too vague?

Anyone not effed up by philosophy can easily tell you the distinction between the two words. WILL means contingently true (could have been otherwise) and MUST means necessarily true (could not have been otherwise).

As I have pointed out, you are basically arguing for modal collapse: the idea that all true propositions are necessarily true. Thus, you make no distinction between the proposition “All triangles have three sides” and “I ordered salad for dinner last night.” You want us to believe that both these propositions are substantively identical — that each statement is true and could not be false.

This is an absurdity.

Only the first proposition could not be false. The second could be false. This is obviously true. The truth of the first statement is a priori, the truth of the second a posteriori We know in advance that all triangles must have three sides because this is an analytic truth, but we know after the fact that I can order steak or something else instead of salad for dinner because we have seen people do that.

You keep talking about the “laws” or “principles” of nature. I also asked you whether you thought these “laws” are prescriptive or descriptive, but I don’t believe you gave a straight answer. I say again that the so-called “laws” of nature are DEscriptive and not PREscriptive. General relativity does not make it be the case that objects in free fall follow geodesics in warped spacetime. They just do that — a brute fact — and general relativity mathematically describes this relationship.

Once it is understood that the “laws” are descriptive and not prescriptive, the first prop of the hard determinist argument — the laws of nature, in conjunction with antecedent events, entail all future events, including human actions — is obliterated.

As to antecedent events, of course they influence (but do not necessitate) what I do. How could it be otherwise? I make decisions based largely on facts and knowledge about past events.

Although Marvin and I are almost entirely on the same page, I must say I do not recognize his “causal necessity.” I really don’t know how to parse that. The only necessity I recognize is logical necessity, and I asked you about this, too: in modal logic, where does one situate the physical or nomic necessity you maintain exists? You call it “inner necessitation.” I don’t think you answered that, either. I can tell which category it fits in modal logic: None. Nowhere. Zip, nada, nil.

One might argue, I suppose, that causal necessity consists in the fact that it is necessary that effects reliably follow causes. It isn’t. That effects reliably follow causes is contingent truth about the world, and as a matter of fact it is not even true! It is not true in quantum mechanics (and the entire world is quantum, even big stuff like humans and galaxies) and it is arguably not even true in classical physics, where time asymmetry does not exist at the fundamental level. Effects reliably following causes depends on time asymmetry.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I don't know where you guys find the time.

I'm retired, so I've got all the time in the world.

That I do understand your position and the compatibilist definition of free will.
I just don't agree with it.

Do you possibly agree, that the compatibilist definition of free will, is in fact compatible with the notion of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, in which every event is the reliable result of antecedent events?

I mean, if you look just at our definition, without replacing it with your own, do you find our definition incompatible with a deterministic view of the universe, or compatible with it?

Incompatibilists, for the given reasons, do not agree with the compatibilist definition of free will.

And that would explain why the incompatibilist would continue to replace our definition of free will with some form of "freedom from causal necessity", whether neurological necessity, or antecedent causal necessity, or natural law necessity, or some other form of causal necessity.

None of those freedoms are required by compatibilist free will. We only require freedom from coercion and other forms of undue influence, which are meaningful and relevant constraints upon a person's freedom to choose for themselves what they will do.

From my side of the fence, it appears that it is the compatibilist who fails to consider the problems that are being pointed out.

I think we are very aware that your definition of free will is definitely contrary to the notion of determinism. Your definition of free will is basically "freedom from determinism". And we would agree that your "free will" is certainly incompatible with determinism.

But our definition is not.

Basically:
Necessitated actions - being determined - are not (by definition) freely chosen, negotiable or alterable.

Let's start there. With our definition of free will, requiring only freedom from coercion and undue influence, and not freedom from causal necessity, when I choose to order the salad instead of the steak for dinner, I am free to make that choice for myself, because I was neither coerced nor unduly influenced.

I was certainly not free of causal necessity, but I certainly was free of coercion and undue influence.

Determined events proceed or unfold deterministically according to antecedent events and the laws or principles of nature.

Of course. All events always proceed or unfold deterministically according to antecedent events and the laws or principles of nature. So, it would be silly to define free will in any fashion that suggested otherwise. So, we don't. But the incompatibilist does!

For us, it will either be the case that it was causally necessary, from any prior point in time, that we would be free of coercion and undue influence, or, that we would be coerced or unduly influenced while making our choice.

Causal necessity holds. And our definition of free will holds.

Consequently, determined/necessitated actions are not freely willed actions.

Only when using your definition of free will. If you define free will as the absence of causal necessity, then obviously your free will contradicts causal necessity.

But with our definition, it will either be causally necessary that we will be free of coercion and undue influence or it will be causally necessary that we will not be free of them.

Causal necessity holds. And our definition of free will holds.

1. We have no control over circumstances that existed in the past, nor do we have any control over the laws of nature.

Correct. And yet we do have control over whether we will order the steak or the salad, and that control is consistent with our past and also consistent with the laws of nature.

Our free will only requires freedom from coercion and undue influence. It does not require freedom from the causal effects of our past and it does not require freedom from the causal effects of our own nature.

We, in the present, are the result of our antecedent events and our own nature. However, it is always us, in the present, that is controlling, through our own choosing whether we will have the steak or whether we will have the salad.

2. If A causes B, we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B.

That's a believable suggestion, but false. And that's how paradoxes are built, by false but believable suggestions.

The truth is that our prior causes are insufficient to order the salad for dinner. Whatever control they had in forming us is now located in us. It will be our brain that decides whether to order the steak or the salad, and our own voice that tells the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

Let's correct that formula: If A (antecedent events and the laws of nature) causes B (a person), such that B can exercise control by making choices, then B is sufficient to exercise control by making choices. That is the truth of the matter.

3. All of our actions and thoughts are consequences of past events and the laws of nature.

All events, from the motion of the planets to the thoughts going through our heads right now, are causally necessary from any prior point in time. However, this is not a meaningful or relevant constraint. What we will inevitably do is exactly identical to us just being us, choosing what we choose, and doing what we do. It is basically "what we would have done anyway". And that is not a meaningful constraint.

And since it is a universal constant that cannot be altered, it is seldom relevant to bring it up.

4. As assuming responsibility requires the right kind of regulative control, ultimately, we are not responsible for what we do or think (2, 3).

And the incompatibilist should cringe at having to make such an absurd statement. The bank robber is not responsible for the robbery? Putin is not responsible for murdering citizens and destroying the civilian infrastructure of Ukraine? What the fork?!

No. We hold responsible the most meaningful and relevant causes of an event. A meaningful cause efficiently explains why the event happened. A relevant cause is something we can actually do something about.

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.'' - cold comfort in compatibilism.

You'll need to unpack that rant into statements you're willing to support. I've already pointed out the moral problem of its suggestion that a person acts upon their desires without constraint. And whether specific animals have free will or not is a separate issue. And, despite its author's claim, we actually do judge non-human animals in moral terms.

So, I don't know what it is specifically that you care to address in that mishmash.

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.

Correct. We have no time machines and no power to create universes that operate under different laws. Fortunately, none of that is necessary in order for our choices to be free of coercion and undue influence.

2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).

Correct, but only if you include the past and the laws of nature that happen to be within us, that is to say, we also, by our own choices and own actions, happen to be prior causes of future events.

3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

That's false, of course. Every one of us, by our own choices and actions in the present, exercise power over the facts of the future. We, too, are prior causes within the causal chain. To deny this invalidates the incompatibilist's definition of antecedent causes, and disintegrates their causal chains. So, don't do that.

 

[Jarhyn]

3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

That's false, of course. Every one of us, by our own choices and actions in the present, exercise power over the facts of the future. We, too, are prior causes within the causal chain. To deny this invalidates the incompatibilist's definition of antecedent causes, and disintegrates their causal chains. So, don't do that.

Minor quibble here, "nobody has power over the facts of the future" is a statement that is false only because it is conditionally true, not universally true. It depends on the given fact of the future.


Also, I note we disagree on free will. This does not invalidate your ultimate conclusions, because it is a will that is contextually free that you are addressing (the free will to hold a will), but it means your system has issues, from my perspective.

 

[Jarhyn]

So to answer where I get the time...

I have a career, insofar as I manage a software department, and this is one of the things I throw my mind at which I like, so as to act as the carrot to do things which I know I hate.

It is just one more example of a will held through perhaps absurd, but real, mechanisms.

It's a real trick and a half getting myself all enthusiastic about shoving my face into a stupid problem surrounding debugging an API issue.

The reward for doing that any particular amount of time is looking at problems like approaching Ethics as a form of math and game theory and trying to figure them out on basic, logically precise terms.

 

[pood]

In this thread, DBT is basically restating van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument:

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true)
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

Premise one assumes the laws of nature govern the universe. That is false. Hence we do not need to have “power” over the laws of nature, because those “laws” have no power over us. And, as Norman Swartz and others, often called Humean or neo-Humean compatibilists, argue, we do in fact, have some power over the “laws” of nature, because our own acts make those laws be what they are. As Swartz writes, to paraphrase, it’s true we have no power over the charge on an electron, but we do have the power to choose what color shirt to wear in the morning. If we take laws to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, and they are, then it is just as much a “law” that I wore a blue shirt this morning as is the “law” of the charge on the electron. Both “laws” are nothing more than a subset of true descriptions of the way that the world is.

Premise one has also by challenged on another front by Hoefer, whose own definition of determinism was rather ironically quoted by DBT, since Hoefer rejects hard determinism. Hoefer says that we do, in fact, have some power over the facts of the past, about which more later, though I have alluded to this before.

Since premise one is faulty premise two cannot follow and hence the conclusion cannot follow.

But even if both ends of premise one were true it still does not derail compatibilism when compatibilism merely says that doing what we choose to do, without external coercion or derailment, constitutes necessary and sufficient conditions for free will. Because even if P1 and 2 were both true, and they aren’t, those premises fail to take into account that we ourselves are part of the deterministic stream that has “power” over the facts of the future.

 

[Jarhyn]

In this thread, DBT is basically restating van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument:

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true)
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

The laws of nature entail that the power over any given event in the future lies distributed hierarchically among the state of the present.

Therefore the conclusion is rejected: the present has power over the future.

This heirarchical structure of any given events causality may be mapped.

This mapping may be used to solve for and regulate future causalities.

 

[pood]

The only thing I would disagree with what you wrote above is that the laws of nature entail that … because the laws of nature, being descriptive, entail nothing. I agree with the rest of your first premise, just not that it is entailed by anything.

 

[Jarhyn]

The only thing I would disagree with what you wrote above is that the laws of nature entail that … because the laws of nature, being descriptive, entail nothing. I agree with the rest of your first premise, just not that it is entailed by anything.

More, I assume nature has "laws". Not that the ones we understand are necessarily descriptive or absolute, but they seem that way. I am a contrary motherfucker, so I'm going to scratch at the walls, and in ways that all might see what holes I poke!

I expect some truth of math prescribed the existence of this, and so through physics, as a particular relationship within that truth of math, would be prescriptive. I just don't think it's entirely possible to locate ourselves in that multiverse with absolute faith, mostly due to Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. Calculating for fingerprints in the pie is pretty much the only way, and that just says "no fingerprints yet".

 

[Marvin Edwards]

One might argue, I suppose, that causal necessity consists in the fact that it is necessary that effects reliably follow causes. It isn’t. That effects reliably follow causes is contingent truth about the world, and as a matter of fact it is not even true! It is not true in quantum mechanics (and the entire world is quantum, even big stuff like humans and galaxies) and it is arguably not even true in classical physics, where time asymmetry does not exist at the fundamental level. Effects reliably following causes depends on time asymmetry.

The notion of reliable cause and effect is that a specific cause will always produce the same specific effect. Causal necessity states this in a slightly different fashion, saying that if the cause happens then the effect must happen.

I think I understood your question to DBT. To say "I will call you tomorrow" is a simple assertion, but to say "I must call you tomorrow" implies some force beyond mere intention.

But I'm not sure how to apply that distinction to causal necessity. And I'm not sure that there is any pragmatic difference between will and must in matters of cause and effect. To say that something will happen expresses certainty that it will happen. To say that something must happen seems to express that same certainty.

I'm not sure I understand the use of "contingent" as a modifier of "truth", but I majored in psychology rather than philosophy. I had only a few philosophy courses.

 

[Jarhyn]

One might argue, I suppose, that causal necessity consists in the fact that it is necessary that effects reliably follow causes. It isn’t. That effects reliably follow causes is contingent truth about the world, and as a matter of fact it is not even true! It is not true in quantum mechanics (and the entire world is quantum, even big stuff like humans and galaxies) and it is arguably not even true in classical physics, where time asymmetry does not exist at the fundamental level. Effects reliably following causes depends on time asymmetry.

The notion of reliable cause and effect is that a specific cause will always produce the same specific effect. Causal necessity states this in a slightly different fashion, saying that if the cause happens then the effect must happen.

I think I understood your question to DBT. To say "I will call you tomorrow" is a simple assertion, but to say "I must call you tomorrow" implies some force beyond mere intention.

But I'm not sure how to apply that distinction to causal necessity. And I'm not sure that there is any pragmatic difference between will and must in matters of cause and effect. To say that something will happen expresses certainty that it will happen. To say that something must happen seems to express that same certainty.

I'm not sure I understand the use of "contingent" as a modifier of "truth", but I majored in psychology rather than philosophy. I had only a few philosophy courses.

I think there is a point over a horizon implied by locality that will becomes calculable to "must", but there are many points often after the will is held before that horizon actualizes "must".

 

[fromderinside]

That brain cells treat with inputs from the world should make clear that what the individual is doing is processing best evidence of what is going on in the world according to what the brain cells suggest. What the brain cells transduce into action potentials is controlled by evolution in that senses are arraigned by type and magnitude of domain used to sense.

Sensing is relative and it is not really aligned with the information carried to the organism. That is it is recorded as type, strength, duration. pattern and direction of a digital record what is sensed. As I've been forced to admit we don't know color, texture, etc. except by association. We are not deciding based on what is out there rather we are reacting to well established patterns and directing response to those most of then received.

That is not choice, decision making, especially not exercise of will free or otherwise. It is an improving and very successfully determining reaction to previous transactions. We say before and during our actions confirms the building and reinforcing of memory, not executing self determined will.

If it is not choosing or decision making, then what do you call the operation where the customer in the restaurant reads the menu and then places their order?

A very complex reaction by a language endowed being to satisfying biological demands for nutrition.

That would describe the word "eating".

The word "choosing" refers to any operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice. The choice is usually in the form of an "I will X", where X is something we have chosen to do. For example, telling the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

You are inventing a way to support choosing. There are no two or more options except in the rationalizations of the observer, self, not a material thing.

The determined for of what is going on is "We are not deciding based on what is out there rather we are reacting to well established patterns and directing response to those most of then received."

There are no two options available to the being there is only the one determined.

My entire position is based on only taking material events into account. No self defined, self thought garbage like consciousness, mind, choice, etc. and other stuff of internal reconstruction.

I have extended a welcoming hand for an adjunct, not derived, presentation of self defined architectures under or related to determinism. If there is an objective and a being equipped for social behavior and communication derived from that objective then there can be a consequent or derivative subjective arising from that social/communicative status. It will be missing part of reality since it is derived from reality IAW incompleteness.

If one can't accept this then one must find ways to make every construct presented derive directly from the objective. Philosophers to date haven't done that. Saying I think (a weasel word) therefore I am (another weasel word) doesn't do the job. Oneself cannot establish reality from the inside.

 

[fromderinside]

In this thread, DBT is basically restating van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument:

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true)
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

The laws of nature entail that the power over any given event in the future lies distributed hierarchically among the state of the present.

Therefore the conclusion is rejected: the present has power over the future.

This heirarchical structure of any given events causality may be mapped.

This mapping may be used to solve for and regulate future causalities.

Wonderful. So we can agree there may be a subjective dimension associated with reality if beings evolve into interacting and communicating forms. Interacting and communicating functions operate differently from reality else they would not be needed. Yet since pre is interacting-communicating then subjective would be related to reality by which the being evolved. Now here is the rub.

If one accepts one has evolved and one has developed interacting and communicating capabilities then one must also accept that anything subjective is derivative, less than, reality. It can be driven by, related to, associated with, but cannot directly represent reality since it is derivative to reality.

Doncha love it when something comes together.

Science works because it describes reality lawfully and faithfully. Subjectivity fails because it only reflects the evolved natures of the beings, Self diagnosis just doesn't cut it.

movin' on

 

[Marvin Edwards]

You are inventing a way to support choosing. There are no two or more options except in the rationalizations of the observer, self, not a material thing.

But then again, what you are saying is also nothing more than the "rationalizations of the observer, self, not a material thing."

The determined for of what is going on is "We are not deciding based on what is out there rather we are reacting to well established patterns and directing response to those most of then received."

The menu is out there, laying on the table. The "well established patterns" are the words on the menu describing each meal that the chef is willing and able to prepare for the customer. This is a literal menu of alternate possibilities. And it is sitting there, on the table, where you can plainly see it.

There are no two options available to the being there is only the one determined.

Incorrect. It was obviously determined that there would be multiple options available. The menu was causally necessary from any prior point in eternity.

My entire position is based on only taking material events into account. No self defined, self thought garbage like consciousness, mind, choice, etc. and other stuff of internal reconstruction.

Okay. Then walking into the restaurant is a material event. Sitting at the table is a material event. Reading the menu is a material event. Choosing what we will have for dinner is a material event. Telling the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please", is a material event.

And, for that matter, becoming consciously aware of the item on the menu is a material event, taking place in the physical brain. So, what's the problem?

I have extended a welcoming hand for an adjunct, not derived, presentation of self defined architectures under or related to determinism.

Well, assuming there is no God, the first living organism would be a self-defined architecture arising naturally and deterministically.

If there is an objective and a being equipped for social behavior and communication derived from that objective then there can be a consequent or derivative subjective arising from that social/communicative status.

That would be the two of us communicating right now. So, apparently the self-defined architectures arising naturally and deterministically have, over time, become both social and communicative.

It will be missing part of reality since it is derived from reality IAW incompleteness.

Oh, hell, we're missing all kinds of knowledge of reality. But we seem to limp along nonetheless.

If one can't accept this then one must find ways to make every construct presented derive directly from the objective. Philosophers to date haven't done that. Saying I think (a weasel word) therefore I am (another weasel word) doesn't do the job. Oneself cannot establish reality from the inside.

Well, we ordinary humans have never attempted to establish reality from the inside. All we can do is symbolically model reality from the sensory data available to us. So, in some fashion, we are all "brains-in-a-vat". Still, we successfully navigate the external objective reality well enough to survive and reproduce, and communicate, and invent cars, planes, and washing machines. What more could Pangloss want?

 

[fromderinside]

You are inventing a way to support choosing. There are no two or more options except in the rationalizations of the observer, self, not a material thing.

But then again, what you are saying is also nothing more than the "rationalizations of the observer, self, not a material thing."

The determined for of what is going on is "We are not deciding based on what is out there rather we are reacting to well established patterns and directing response to those most of then received."

The menu is out there, laying on the table. The "well established patterns" are the words on the menu describing each meal that the chef is willing and able to prepare for the customer. This is a literal menu of alternate possibilities. And it is sitting there, on the table, where you can plainly see it.

There are no two options available to the being there is only the one determined.

Incorrect. It was obviously determined that there would be multiple options available. The menu was causally necessary from any prior point in eternity.

My entire position is based on only taking material events into account. No self defined, self thought garbage like consciousness, mind, choice, etc. and other stuff of internal reconstruction.

Okay. Then walking into the restaurant is a material event. Sitting at the table is a material event. Reading the menu is a material event. Choosing what we will have for dinner is a material event. Telling the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please", is a material event.

And, for that matter, becoming consciously aware of the item on the menu is a material event, taking place in the physical brain. So, what's the problem?

I have extended a welcoming hand for an adjunct, not derived, presentation of self defined architectures under or related to determinism.

Well, assuming there is no God, the first living organism would be a self-defined architecture arising naturally and deterministically.

If there is an objective and a being equipped for social behavior and communication derived from that objective then there can be a consequent or derivative subjective arising from that social/communicative status.

That would be the two of us communicating right now. So, apparently the self-defined architectures arising naturally and deterministically have, over time, become both social and communicative.

It will be missing part of reality since it is derived from reality IAW incompleteness.

Oh, hell, we're missing all kinds of knowledge of reality. But we seem to limp along nonetheless.

If one can't accept this then one must find ways to make every construct presented derive directly from the objective. Philosophers to date haven't done that. Saying I think (a weasel word) therefore I am (another weasel word) doesn't do the job. Oneself cannot establish reality from the inside.

Well, we ordinary humans have never attempted to establish reality from the inside. All we can do is symbolically model reality from the sensory data available to us. So, in some fashion, we are all "brains-in-a-vat". Still, we successfully navigate the external objective reality well enough to survive and reproduce, and communicate, and invent cars, planes, and washing machines. What more could Pangloss want?

Choosing is personal. Personal is subjective. Can't find choosing in any of the trees or hierarchies posted by Jarhyn. I've suggested another way to incorporate subjective into discussion of determination. Incorporate as subjective as derivative to reality in determinism.

The sensory data available to us comes from the range of sense data available and neural processing of effects caused by it. That data is interpreted by us from evidence provided to us through senses, not the sensed data itself. Ergo subjective. Sense data which isn't reality at all, is a best estimate to the extent adaptive evolution can provide.

*The laws of nature entail that the power over any given event in the future lies distributed hierarchically among the state of the present.

Therefore the conclusion is rejected: the present has power over the future.

This heirarchical structure of any given events causality may be mapped.

This mapping may be used to solve for and regulate future causalities.

Do so by defining caused behaviors social and communication and how they are causally related to determinism through their creation and development.

Get rid of self definitions Like cognit ergo sum. That little gem would be discussed under the derivation of Subjective to reality via social and communication evolution. The more science the better.

Your philosophy is corrupted by the use of other than reality, subjectivity which is only linked by poor association and approximation to reality caused by weak transduction fidelity.

 

[fromderinside]

You are inventing a way to support choosing. There are no two or more options except in the rationalizations of the observer, self, not a material thing.

But then again, what you are saying is also nothing more than the "rationalizations of the observer, self, not a material thing."

The determined for of what is going on is "We are not deciding based on what is out there rather we are reacting to well established patterns and directing response to those most of then received."

The menu is out there, laying on the table. The "well established patterns" are the words on the menu describing each meal that the chef is willing and able to prepare for the customer. This is a literal menu of alternate possibilities. And it is sitting there, on the table, where you can plainly see it.

There are no two options available to the being there is only the one determined.

Incorrect. It was obviously determined that there would be multiple options available. The menu was causally necessary from any prior point in eternity.

My entire position is based on only taking material events into account. No self defined, self thought garbage like consciousness, mind, choice, etc. and other stuff of internal reconstruction.

Okay. Then walking into the restaurant is a material event. Sitting at the table is a material event. Reading the menu is a material event. Choosing what we will have for dinner is a material event. Telling the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please", is a material event.

And, for that matter, becoming consciously aware of the item on the menu is a material event, taking place in the physical brain. So, what's the problem?

I have extended a welcoming hand for an adjunct, not derived, presentation of self defined architectures under or related to determinism.

Well, assuming there is no God, the first living organism would be a self-defined architecture arising naturally and deterministically.

If there is an objective and a being equipped for social behavior and communication derived from that objective then there can be a consequent or derivative subjective arising from that social/communicative status.

That would be the two of us communicating right now. So, apparently the self-defined architectures arising naturally and deterministically have, over time, become both social and communicative.

It will be missing part of reality since it is derived from reality IAW incompleteness.

Oh, hell, we're missing all kinds of knowledge of reality. But we seem to limp along nonetheless.

If one can't accept this then one must find ways to make every construct presented derive directly from the objective. Philosophers to date haven't done that. Saying I think (a weasel word) therefore I am (another weasel word) doesn't do the job. Oneself cannot establish reality from the inside.

Well, we ordinary humans have never attempted to establish reality from the inside. All we can do is symbolically model reality from the sensory data available to us. So, in some fashion, we are all "brains-in-a-vat". Still, we successfully navigate the external objective reality well enough to survive and reproduce, and communicate, and invent cars, planes, and washing machines. What more could Pangloss want?

Choosing is personal. Personal is subjective. Can't find choosing in any of the trees or hierarchies posted by Jarhyn. I've suggested another way to incorporate subjective into discussion of determination. Incorporate as subjective as derivative to reality in determinism.

The sensory data available to us comes from the range of sense data available and neural processing of effects caused by it. That data is interpreted by us from evidence provided to us through senses, not the sensed data itself. Ergo subjective. Sense data which isn't reality at all, is a best estimate to the extent adaptive evolution can provide.

*The laws of nature entail that the power over any given event in the future lies distributed hierarchically among the state of the present.

Therefore the conclusion is rejected: the present has power over the future.

This heirarchical structure of any given events causality may be mapped.

This mapping may be used to solve for and regulate future causalities.

Do so by defining caused behaviors social and communication and how they are causally related to determinism through their creation and development.

Get rid of self definitions Like cognit ergo sum. That little gem would be discussed under the derivation of Subjective to reality via social and communication evolution. The more science the better.

Your philosophy is corrupted by the use of other than reality, subjectivity which is only linked by poor association and approximation to reality caused by weak transduction fidelity. We rule the roost because overall our makeup better parallels reality that does an other known living thing. Reality is a lot bigger and more complicated than we seem to be able to imagine. But mankind is closing in on reality nevertheless.