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Compatibilism: What's that About?

On the last point I believe determinism, to be causal, reduces experiments to a single cause resulting in a single effect.

Determinism never causes anything.

Determinism ONLY produces results given a state.

Determinism PLUS state generates effects.

Nothing happens without the state.

We are part of the state.

Therefore we are part of the cause.

When something is "part of a cause" they are "responsible" for the effect.

Therefore we are responsible for the effect, as we are part of the cause.
 
@FDI Again, I can demonstrate with a deterministic system (the property that you reference when you say 'the universe is _______') that determinism is not enough. You need the state field as well, of which we are an active part. If you were to again stop the universe, change the state field, and let it keep going, you would see different effects.

It's not a frame by frame movie with fates getting involved, where you will always kill your father and fuck your mother.

As has been shown, thankfully, the computer is "an object existing in reality", as is every configuration and charge pattern on the system. I can walk up to it, probe it, debug it, or core dump it.

Every aspect of the geometry of it's charge patterns is open and visible except the memory of the debugger itself, and even that would be visible and measurable with a jtag probe.

It's behavior is sickeningly complicated, and highly mutable, and because it is an object in a deterministic universe, NOTHING it can actually do, no aspect of it's mechanical function can be "nonsense". Every event that it generates absolutely happens in reality, as a change in electron charge patterns.

In this way the dwarf is not an "image of a dwarf", the dwarf is exactly the object that it is: a complex series of charge patterns on the memory against the processor.

This is what you seem repeatedly to fail to understand, that we are not talking about an image of some flesh and blood thing, but some object of some electronic configuration, unless you want to judge it an "automatic image", but that isn't what we are talking about. Every object is trivially "an automatic image of itself". You are the one making a huge mistake to imagine of it being more than it is, or imagining that it needs to be.

This is why the experiment is valid. There are a number of images generated of it, but the thing being viewed is a set of bits in a memory range, themselves charge patterns, and the charge patterns are "objects of material".

So when these OBJECTS objectively hold WILLS, things which satisfy the compatibilist definition of such, those are validated as "existing in reality".

There is a meaningful and real "truth value" associated with the resolution of requirements When I validate that a will may be held because it was the first one the process of the dwarf saw that was "ostensibly free to it's requirements" I validate that this belief to exist as an object which itself is "an image of imagined freedom".

This means that "provisional freedom" is imaginary*, but there is a "real freedom" which is concrete: whether the requirement gets satisfied.

Hence, I can identify a "real freedom property" which is "true" or "false" of any given will object that is distinctly separate from imaginary concepts of freedom.

One of these images, themselves individually objects just like the dwarf (in fact objects that are PART of the dwarf) shall be chosen by a choice function, which is a mechanism of other objects: switches and the like.

Then one of them shall be used as the basis for an execution upon information by an interpreter, another object, which happens to have the quality of taking particular image formats and then behaving differentially on the aspects of the image: the images, each a "will", contains a series of instructions.

And at that point it quits being "an image of a will" and becomes "the causal driver of the interpreter", a series of causes upon which a machine shall generate a series of effects.

This "will" is observably "causally responsible" for the momentary behavior of the interpreter in the deterministic system.

So we have an objectively existing will, with both objective freedom and an image of provisional freedom attached to it. You have been trying to claim the image of provisional freedom invalidates the reality of the actual freedom property of the deterministic system with respect to that given will. It does not.

Even the freedom itself is represented in an object, the momentary configuration of matter that sends the system out of execution with either a "success" or "failure".

It is more an event than an object, though it is an event of a specific interaction of objects, no less objective than a football going over a goalpost.

Whether the event happened or not is an objective fact.

So we have objects (dwarves) holding objects (wills) as part of their structure and making choices between those objects (deciding what they shall do of the set of possibilities, objects, presented to the choice function), and inserting those selected objects to an interpreter (the dwarf's behavioral engine), which causally determines behavior on the basis of the shape of the object it runs on (the will, again), with an objective fact that pertains to it: it SHALL be free to it's requirement (an objective quality of the object of the will).

It's objects all the way down, FDI.

*Even the imagination of it has an object structure, the object of the image, which itself is causally effective upon the choice function. and so has an objective reality behind it. "The imagined truth value objectively evaluates to X"
 
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I have explained the terms of reference too many times that - by your given definition of determinism - there can be no alternate action in any given instance in time.

And I've explained many times that the definition of determinism means that there will not be any alternate action, even though there always could have been alternate actions.

To which I pointed out the given definition of determinism allows no ''could have been alternate actions''

That a moment by moment fixed progression allows no ''could have happened''

What happens, happens necessarily. No deviation.

No deviation eliminates all alternate possibilities.

Eliminating all alternate possibilities eliminates 'could have happened.'

Thus, there is no 'could have happened' within a deterministic system.

What can happen constrains what will happen. If it cannot happen then it will not happen.

With determinism, it's not a matter of what can happen, but what must necessarily happen.

What must necessarily happen excludes alternate actions. Theay cannot happen.


But what will happen never constrains what can happen or what could have happened. What can happen is only constrained by our ability to make it happen, should we choose to do so. If we have that ability, then we can, in fact, do it. Even if we choose not to do it, we still retain that ability. Here, watch...there, did you see? I just raised my right hand, which proves that I had that ability all along.

And if, right now, I can raise my right hand, then it will be the case later on that I could have raised my hand right now, even if I didn't.

No, if it is determined by the system, brain/environment, etc, that you raise your right hand at 12:15 and 32 seconds, there is no possibility of you raising your left hand at 12:15 and 32 seconds.

Different times, different actions. Not because you could have done otherwise but that the state of the system evolves deterministically.

You can raise your right arm in one instance and your left in the next instance as events progress, but not the opposite in either instance because determinism doesn't allow alternate actions.


If you claim that you could have chosen either option in any given instance in time, it could have been chocolate or vanilla, etc, in any instance in time, you are contradicting your own definition of determinism.

Determinism asserts that every event will be the reliable result of prior events. Thus only one thing will happen.

Exactly. Not just 'reliably,' but necessarily.
But it is ridiculous for determinism to assert that only one thing can happen or only one thing could have happened. Such a notion corrupts the meaning of these terms, and leads to absurdities and paradoxes.

No, that is exactly what 'without deviation' means - the consequences of 'without deviation' mean that only what has been determined to happen (antecedents) can happen.

Remember the waiter who told the customer that there was only one thing that the customer could order for dinner, but could not tell the customer what that one thing was? That's a paradox. And it is absurd.

That's not how it works. The menu is full of items to cater to different tastes. Different people, different tastes.

The restaurant doesn't know what any particular customer wants, the waiter doesn't know what any particular customer may want, hence a number of items on the menu.

To predict who goes with what menu item requires you to know the state of the system in any given instance, and that is impossible.

The customer himself may not know until reading the menu and the impulse to order Trout comes to mind.

Remember that red light that we slowed down for, because it could have remained red, even though it turned green? And then our hard determinist insisted that it could not have remained red, because it did not, and then asked us again to explain why we slowed down? You can't go around disabling the meaning of words like "could have".

The lights do whatever they do. We have no access to the state of the operating system. We act according to our past experience with traffic lights.

Which means that you are not a Compatibilist at all, but a Libertarian.

Baloney. Compatibilists understand the difference between things that "will" happen versus things that "can" happen. Only the incompatibilists, both the hard determinists and libertarians, remain confused about the difference between saying something "can" happen versus saying that something "will" happen.

The 'can happen' is false. Nothing that is not determined can happen.



''Some aspiring compatibilists maintain that only humans are judged morally because only they could have acted differently. Those who try this argument must realize that they are not compatibilists at all; they are libertarians. The acceptance of determinism is a defining element of compatibilism. It forbids us to say that evil-doers could have done good if only they wanted to. Well yes, if they wanted to, but they were determined to not want to.

Hence, the compatibilist must find a defense for moral judgment that is applicable only to humans and that is safely nonlibertarian. He must look for a psychological feature that is presumably uniquely human and that is involved in the causal chain leading to action. The general version of this feature is self-consciousness and the specific version is intentionality. In other words, a person is judged to have acted freely and (ir)responsibly if he was aware of his desire to do X, foresaw the consequences (e.g., how moralists would judge him if he did X), and endorsed the desire (thereby forming an intention). Notice that a true compatibilist, who has gone on record saying that determinism is a fact of nature, must believe that the events of experiencing a desire, foreseeing the consequences of action, and forming an intention to act on the desire, are all determined. The causal chain leading a human to lift a finger is longer than the chain leading a squirrel to lift an acorn, but it is no less deterministic (he who says that it is less deterministic is not a compatibilist but a closet libertarian).''



The fact that all events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time, and that they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment, does not logically imply that things could not have turned out differently under different circumstances.

A progression of events fixed by antecedents logically rules out anything from turning out differently. Everything proceeds as determined, without deviation.

''Without deviation' logically rules out anything happening differently. If something different happens, things are not proceeding without deviation.




Every use of the term "could have" always carries the logical implication that (1) it didn't happen that way, and, (2) that it only would have happened that way under different circumstances.

There are - by definition - no 'different circumstances' in determinism.

Within a fully deterministic system, there is only one thing that actually "will" happen. But there are many different things that actually "can" happen.

Not if it is a deterministic system;


''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.



I've already responded to most of them, pointing out that they are using the libertarian definition of free will and not the operational definition. The compatibilist notion of free will, the one that most people grew up with, is simply a voluntary choice that a person makes for themselves while free of coercion and undue influence. It does not require freedom from causal necessity.

'Free will' according the accepted meaning of ''free'' and 'will' requires regulative control. If there are no possible alternatives, will has no agency, therefore no freedom to choose otherwise.

Compatibilism seeks to bypass this problem by defining free will as acting without external coercion or force, which as a definition has its own problems.

It just doesn't work any way you look at it.


Here's an example you've posted before and are repeating here:
The personal narrative
''For example, in one study, researchers recorded the brain activity of participants when they raised their arm intentionally, when it was lifted by a pulley, and when it moved in response to a hypnotic suggestion that it was being lifted by a pulley.

Similar areas of the brain were active during the involuntary and the suggested “alien” movement, while brain activity for the intentional action was different. So, hypnotic suggestion can be seen as a means of communicating an idea or belief that, when accepted, has the power to alter a person’s perceptions or behaviour.''

''All this may leave one wondering where our thoughts, emotions and perceptions actually come from. We argue that the contents of consciousness are a subset of the experiences, emotions, thoughts and beliefs that are generated by non-conscious processes within our brains.''

First, the narrator function provides accurate descriptions when it has accurate information, but when it's garbage in then it will be garbage out. Manipulation by hypnosis or other means during an experiment is designed to provide inaccurate information to the narrator function, and will cause confabulation.

The narrator function can and does get things wrong. Nor can the narrator function alter output

''Experiments on split-brain patients reveal how readily the left brain interpreter can make up stories and beliefs. In one experiment, for example, when the word walk was presented only to the right side of a patient’s brain, he got up and started walking. When he was asked why he did this, the left brain (where language is stored and where the word walk was not presented) quickly created a reason for the action: “I wanted to go get a Coke.”

Even more fantastic examples of the left hemisphere at work come from the study of neurological disorders. In a complication of stroke called anosognosia with hemiplegia, patients cannot recognize that their left arm is theirs because the stroke damaged the right parietal cortex, which manages our body’s integrity, position, and movement. The left-hemisphere interpreter has to reconcile the information it receives from the visual cortex—that the limb is attached to its body but is not moving—with the fact that it is not receiving any input about the damage to that limb.'' - Michael Gazzaniga

Second, we are not in the dark as to where our thoughts, emotions, and perceptions actually come from. They come from within us. And, by "within us", we may include their being generated by non-conscious processes within our brains. It is still us. It is still our brain.

But that's not enough to establish freedom of will. That requires the right kind of regulative control. If our brain goes haywire, it is not something we desired, willed or wanted.


Third, the Libet-styled experiments do not address operational free will. To see operational free will in action, observe the people being asked whether they would like to participate in the study. Some will choose to participate. Others will choose not. In either case, it is a voluntary choice, a choice made while free of coercion and undue influence. So, we see operational free will before the experiment even begins.

That's not a matter of 'operational free will' - it's brain function in action. The brain acquires and processes information and responds accordingly, signals to muscle groups, generating thoughts and actions.

''When it comes to the human brain, even the simplest of acts can be counter-intuitive and deceptively complicated. For example, try stretching your arm.

Nerves in the limb send messages back to your brain, but the subjective experience you have of stretching isn't due to these signals. The feeling that you willed your arm into motion, and the realization that you moved it at all, are both the result of an area at the back of your brain called the posterior parietal cortex. This region helped to produce the intention to move, and predicted what the movement would feel like, all before you twitched a single muscle.''
 
the given definition of determinism allows no ''could have been alternate actions''
There were "possibilities", and determinism allows this. "Alternate actions" are not necessary for choice, only a set of possibilities on the choice function.

Even so, I can display that the possibilities are IMAGES of alternate actions, and that if those images were somehow reified, through a modification of the choice function so that they, rather than the other were selected, the described behavior would result of the image.

In fact playing around with the choice function of a live system is exactly what "debugging" is.

Without these things being sensible thoughts, the phone you are reading this on could not have been invented at all, no discovery that because transistors "can" be connected this way together that they "can" evoke of their arrangement a functional behavior.

"Can" is entirely in the realm of "statements" and statements can be false, or nonsense, or anywhere in between.

Of course the system cannot possibly go down both branches at the same time. It was never asked to. A choice function operated, and a result happened. The output of the choice, at least with respect to a chosen will, leads to the immediate interpretation and execution of the will. The will+interpreter contain/executes more choices. And ultimately a choice is made, of two possibilities: success/failure; free/unfree.
 
... That a moment by moment fixed progression allows no ''could have happened''

To which I replied that the fixed progression of events includes all mental events, including the notions of things we can do. For example, the deterministic series of mental events would include the notions "I can choose the steak" and another notion "I can choose the salad". And there would be further mental events in which I compared these two options, leading inevitably to the event where I set my intention (my will) upon having the salad rather than the steak.

Because "I can choose the steak" was true in that moment, "I could have chosen the steak" will be forever true regarding that exact same moment. This is simple grammar, the built in logic of the language, a matter of present tense and past tense.

And it is true a priori, in the same sense that 2 + 2 = 4. Both addition and choosing are logical operations. The terms and their meanings are fixed, and stable, in order to support the operations that they were mentally evolved to perform.

So, once again, your conclusion is false. The fixed progression itself included the fact that "I can choose the steak", even though I never would choose the steak.

The fixed progression never excludes anything. Every physical event, every biological event, and every rational event is inevitable.

Thus, causal necessity guarantees that "I can choose the steak" will appear as a logical fact in the fixed progression of events.

What happens, happens necessarily. No deviation.

Exactly.

No deviation eliminates all alternate possibilities.

Apparently not. But this seems to be over your head. You keep repeating the same thing, and it continues to be incorrect.

No, if it is determined by the system, brain/environment, etc, that you raise your right hand at 12:15 and 32 seconds, there is no possibility of you raising your left hand at 12:15 and 32 seconds.

The fact that it was deterministically necessary that I would raise my right hand at 12:15:32 has no impact upon the truth of the fact that I could have raised my left hand instead, or I could have raised neither hand, or I could have done a great many other things instead of raising my right hand at 12:15:32. The fact that it was deterministically necessary that I would raise my hand did not eliminate a single thing from the list of things that I could have done instead.

The truth of any fact, of what I "can" do, rests in whether I have the ability to do it if I choose to do it. The fact that I do not choose to do it never contradicts the fact that I am able to do it.

So, your claim is false. The fact of what will happen does not contradict the facts of what can happen.

Remember the hard determinist waiter who told the customer that there was only one thing that the customer could order for dinner, but could not tell the customer what that one thing was? That's a paradox. And it is absurd.

That's not how it works. The menu is full of items to cater to different tastes. Different people, different tastes. The restaurant doesn't know what any particular customer wants, the waiter doesn't know what any particular customer may want, hence a number of items on the menu.

Exactly. The menu contains many alternate possibilities, and each customer chooses from those possibilities what they will have for dinner tonight. The fact that all events are always causally necessary from any prior point in time clearly does not eliminate people choosing from lists of multiple possibilities.

To predict who goes with what menu item requires you to know the state of the system in any given instance, and that is impossible.
The lights do whatever they do. We have no access to the state of the operating system. We act according to our past experience with traffic lights.

When it is impossible to know what will happen, we imagine what can happen, to prepare for what does happen. The notion that the light could remain red caused us to slow down.
When choosing from the restaurant menu, we do not know, at first, what we will choose, but we can see on the menu a list of all the things that we can choose.

You cannot eliminate the facts of what can happen by arguing "but it didn't happen" or "but it never would have happened".

You cannot eliminate the facts of what we can choose by arguing "but you didn't choose it" or "but you never would have chosen it".

Nothing that is not determined can happen.

Nothing that is not causally determined will happen. But a great many things that will not happen nevertheless can happen.

For example, I could tell you to go fork yourself. But I won't. That would be nonproductive and very rude. Still, it is certainly not impossible for me to do exactly that, even though it may be causally determined that I will not.

If something different happens, things are not proceeding without deviation.

Everything that happens is happening without deviation. This includes our thinking about the many things that we can do, and choosing from them the single thing that we will do.

There are - by definition - no 'different circumstances' in determinism.

There are no different circumstances in empirical reality, everything is exactly as it is. However, when considering our past choices we will imagine what we might have done differently if we knew then what we know now. Possibilities exist solely within the imagination. We can't drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. However, imagining a possible bridge is required in order to build an actual bridge.

The logic and language of possibilities, things that can happen, has evolved over millions of years to serve us in rationally dealing with our common uncertainties as to what will happen. When we do not know what will happen, we imagine what can happen, to prepare for what does happen.

'Free will' according the accepted meaning of ''free'' and 'will' requires regulative control.

And, since our evolved brains provide that regulative control through the process of decision making, we have precisely the executive control that is required to decide for ourselves what we will do. And the operation of that executive function is perfectly deterministic, just like every other series of events in the universe.

If there are no possible alternatives, will has no agency, therefore no freedom to choose otherwise.

And I've explained over and over exactly why there are many alternative possibilities:
1) Uncertainty over what will happen requires the logic of possibilities, the notion of things that can happen but will not necessarily happen.
(2) Uncertainty over what we will choose requires the logic of possibilities, the notion of things that we can choose but will not necessarily choose.

Compatibilism seeks to bypass this problem ...

There is no problem to bypass. There is only the illusion of a problem, created by the paradoxical notion of "freedom from causal necessity". Dispose of the silliness and the problem disappears.

It just doesn't work any way you look at it.

Of course it works the way I look at it. And I've demonstrated repeatedly that the way incompatibilists look at it is irrational. It is a delusion created by paradoxical and figurative statements that result in absurdities. But once trapped in the paradox, it is difficult to get oneself untangled. I've been doing my best to make the solutions clear to everyone.
 
... That a moment by moment fixed progression allows no ''could have happened''

To which I replied that the fixed progression of events includes all mental events, including the notions of things we can do. For example, the deterministic series of mental events would include the notions "I can choose the steak" and another notion "I can choose the salad". And there would be further mental events in which I compared these two options, leading inevitably to the event where I set my intention (my will) upon having the salad rather than the steak.

The consequences of that process being that whatever happens must necessarily happen. Which means that all actions are fixed, each and every incremental step of the process of unfolding events fixed by antecedents, therefore nothing within the system is freely chosen or freely willed, not thoughts, not considerations, not actions....all fixed every step of the way by countless elements that we are not even aware of, let alone regulate.

Free will? Not at all.


Because "I can choose the steak" was true in that moment, "I could have chosen the steak" will be forever true regarding that exact same moment. This is simple grammar, the built in logic of the language, a matter of present tense and past tense.

Your choice of steak was inevitable. No other action was possible for you in that place and moment in time. Determinism doesn't allow freedom of choice. Choice entails the possibility of doing otherwise. Determinism entails actions without alternatives. Events proceed precisely as determined, not freely chosen.

And it is true a priori, in the same sense that 2 + 2 = 4. Both addition and choosing are logical operations. The terms and their meanings are fixed, and stable, in order to support the operations that they were mentally evolved to perform.

So, once again, your conclusion is false. The fixed progression itself included the fact that "I can choose the steak", even though I never would choose the steak.

It's not my conclusion. It's just how determinism is defined. If it is determined that you choose steak, not only can you choose steak, you must necessarily choose steak. You cannot do otherwise.

That is necessitation, not freedom of choice, which requires possible alternatives that do not exist within a determined system.

Necessitation does not entail freedom of choice or will.


The fixed progression never excludes anything. Every physical event, every biological event, and every rational event is inevitable.

Thus, causal necessity guarantees that "I can choose the steak" will appear as a logical fact in the fixed progression of events.

The fixed progression of events must necessarily exclude anything and everything that is not being determined by antecedents.

If it's determined that you select steak on your outing at your favorite restaurant Saturday evening at 8:35 pm, your necessitated action of selecting steak excludes everything else on the menu in that moment in time. The rest of the menu is for the benefit of other diners.

Some take Spanish Mackerel, others go with Caeser Salad, etc, each according to the own proclivities.

''It is unimportant whether one's resolutions and preferences occur because an ''ingenious physiologist' has tampered with one's brain, whether they result from narcotics addiction, from 'hereditary factor, or indeed from nothing at all.' Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognitive states.

So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunity, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.' - Prof. Richard Taylor -Metaphysics.



What happens, happens necessarily. No deviation.

Exactly.

Yes. Including the consequences for the idea of free will.

No deviation eliminates all alternate possibilities.

Apparently not. But this seems to be over your head. You keep repeating the same thing, and it continues to be incorrect.

It cannot be incorrect. The condition of ''no deviation'' by definition cannot allow alternate possibilities. If other things can happen, that is a deviation.


No, if it is determined by the system, brain/environment, etc, that you raise your right hand at 12:15 and 32 seconds, there is no possibility of you raising your left hand at 12:15 and 32 seconds.

The fact that it was deterministically necessary that I would raise my right hand at 12:15:32 has no impact upon the truth of the fact that I could have raised my left hand instead, or I could have raised neither hand, or I could have done a great many other things instead of raising my right hand at 12:15:32. The fact that it was deterministically necessary that I would raise my hand did not eliminate a single thing from the list of things that I could have done instead.

You could have done none of those things. If a system is deterministic, you do whatever is determined, nothing more, nothing less.

There is no 'could have done' in determinism, only what is necessarily done.

When you say 'I could have done' you are invoking Libertarian free will.



The truth of any fact, of what I "can" do, rests in whether I have the ability to do it if I choose to do it. The fact that I do not choose to do it never contradicts the fact that I am able to do it.

So, your claim is false. The fact of what will happen does not contradict the facts of what can happen.

Determinism allows no alternate actions. If the state of the system at 12:35 and six seconds entails you to raise your right hand, you cannot do otherwise in that moment in time. If you could, it's not determinism. Determinism, by your own definition, entails no deviation.

If you could raise your left hand at 12:35 and six seconds, that is a deviation from the state of the system, which means that you are not talking about determinism, but some mish mash of ideas.


Remember the hard determinist waiter who told the customer that there was only one thing that the customer could order for dinner, but could not tell the customer what that one thing was? That's a paradox. And it is absurd.

The example is silly. The waiter has no more access to the state of the brain of the customer in the moment of action than he has to his own brain, input, processing leading to conscious action, etc.
 
The consequences of that process being that whatever happens must necessarily happen. Which means that all actions are fixed, each and every incremental step of the process of unfolding events fixed by antecedents, ...

Correct.

therefore ...

Incorrect.

The only correct "therefore" is that all things are exactly as they are and all events happen exactly as they do. Period.

For example, people still make choices and people will still be held responsible for they they choose to do. People still go into a restaurant, browse the menu, and place an order. The waiter brings them their meal and a bill that they must pay on the way out.

Every event in this process is reliably caused by a history of prior events. There is a history of prior events that reliably resulted in an entrepreneur buying the land and building the restaurant. There is a history of prior events that led to each customer being born and raised and eventually ending up in that restaurant to have dinner. All of these histories extend into the past as far as anyone can imagine, and all of them are a series of events that were each caused by prior events. Thus, all events at any point in time, are the reliably result of prior events.

So what? So, it was causally necessary, from any prior point in time, that those specific people would be in that specific restaurant having their own specific thoughts about what they would order for dinner, and then making their own choices based upon their own goals and interests, and for their own reasons.

It was causally necessary, from any prior point in time, that it would happen, just so, and in no other way.

Free will?

Glad you asked. Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.

Free will is not free from cause and effect. Every choice is reliably caused by each person's own thoughts and feelings about what they will order for dinner and why they chose to order this dinner rather than that one. And even those thoughts and feelings will have their own reliable histories of cause and effect.

But as long as those thoughts and feelings are the products of that person's own mind and brain, and as long as that brain is mature and healthy, and not subject to coercion or undue influence, that person will be held responsible for what they deliberately choose to do.

Your choice of steak was inevitable.

My choice of the salad was inevitable. It was inevitable because I had already had bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch. I could have chosen the steak, of course, but I needed to order the salad for dinner to balance out my lack of vegetables at breakfast and lunch. My choice was reliably caused, and it was reliably caused by my own specific goals and reasoning.

Those goals and that reasoning will also have a history of reliable causes. However, it remains the case that they are my goals and my reasoning, and the choice would only be made by me and no one else at that moment in time. It was inevitable that it would be just so.

No other action was possible for you in that place and moment in time.

That's just silly. I could have ordered any item on the menu. The fact that I would inevitably order the salad does not logically imply that I could not order anything else. It was possible for me to order anything on the menu, even though I would inevitably order the salad.

What "I can do" and what "I will do" are two very different things. I know for a fact that I could have ordered the steak, because I've actually ordered the steak at that restaurant before, and will likely order it again if I have more veggies at breakfast and lunch. It is never impossible for me to order the steak. But, given the fact that I had bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch, it was necessary, to me, to satisfy my own goals and reasons, to have the salad for dinner.

Determinism doesn't allow freedom of choice.

Obviously, determinism does "allow" freedom of choice. Determinism not only "allows" freedom of choice, but it also "allows" coercion, and it also "allows" undue influence. We know this for a fact because we have observed all three of these conditions occurring in what we all presume to be a world of reliable cause and effect. Any event that we objectively observe must therefore be "allowed" by determinism.

It's not my conclusion. It's just how determinism is defined. If it is determined that you choose steak, not only can you choose steak, you must necessarily choose steak. You cannot do otherwise.

Hard determinism claims I could not have done otherwise, but it is clearly a false claim. The fact is that I could have chosen any item on the menu, but I would only choose the salad that night.

The notion of possibilities includes all of the things that I can do, and all of the things that I could have done.

The notion of possibilities is a functional part of the rational causal mechanism. It is how the mind logically manages matters when it is uncertain as to what will happen or what it will choose to do.

When we do not know what will happen, we imagine what can happen, to better prepare for what does happen.

When we do not know what we will do, we consider the many things that we can do, to choose the one thing that we will do.

And please keep in mind that what we will do is constrained by what we can do, because if we cannot do it then we will not do it. But what we can do is not constrained by what we will do. The fact that we will not do it does not imply that we cannot do it.

Necessitation does not entail freedom of choice or will.

Causal necessity entails EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENS. It entails free choices, coerced choices, and unduly influenced choices. It entails the sun coming up in the morning and us getting out of bed, choosing what we will have for breakfast, choosing what we will wear to work, and every other event that actually happens in the real world.

If it's determined that you select steak on your outing at your favorite restaurant Saturday evening at 8:35 pm, your necessitated action of selecting steak excludes everything else on the menu in that moment in time. The rest of the menu is for the benefit of other diners.

But how do I come to know what was inevitable that I would order?

If I already knew what I would choose, then I wouldn't even look at the menu. I would simply tell the waiter what I wanted. The problem is that I do not know what I will choose until after I choose it!

So, the rest of the menu is not just for the benefit of the other diners, it is for my benefit as well. The menu tells me what it is possible for me to order. From these multiple possibilities, I will choose the single meal that I will order. And it is only after choosing that I will know what was inevitable, because my choosing was one of the prior causes that made that choice inevitable.

And part of that choosing was the consideration of the multiple possibilities on the menu. So, those possibilities, those many things that I could have ordered, were also part of the causal chain that resulted in that choice.

''It is unimportant whether one's resolutions and preferences occur because an ''ingenious physiologist' has tampered with one's brain, whether they result from narcotics addiction, from 'hereditary factor, or indeed from nothing at all.' Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognitive states.

So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunity, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.' - Prof. Richard Taylor -Metaphysics.

Professor Taylor again? Same quote again? Really?

The fact that Taylor suggests that there is no distinction between us tampering with someone's brain to cause him to commit murder versus him deciding for himself that he will murder someone, is an example of Taylor's moral illiteracy. But, what else can you expect from a professor of metaphysics. It's not like he is a professor of Ethics.

But the failure to make relevant distinctions about the causes of a person's action is one of the absurdities that results when we sweep such distinctions under the rug of a vague generality, like causal necessity. But, Taylor's just speaking of a metaphysical world, not the real world. A failure to make these distinctions in the real world would have very bad consequences, as it would justify and excuse every form of harmful behavior regardless of its cause. I find Taylor's comment to be morally disgusting.

But, as a hard determinist, you may have no existential problems with it, even though as a human being I'm sure that you do.
 
The consequences of that process being that whatever happens must necessarily happen. Which means that all actions are fixed, each and every incremental step of the process of unfolding events fixed by antecedents, ...

Correct.

therefore ...

Incorrect.

The only correct "therefore" is that all things are exactly as they are and all events happen exactly as they do. Period.


Conditions which eliminate freedom of choice and freedom of will. Freedom, by definition, means that realizable alternatives are possible - where ''all things are exactly as they are and all events happen exactly as they do,'' with no realizable alternatives, no freedom of choice or freedom of will.

For example, people still make choices and people will still be held responsible for they they choose to do. People still go into a restaurant, browse the menu, and place an order. The waiter brings them their meal and a bill that they must pay on the way out.

Punishment is meant to deter bad behaviour, and people are held responsible because it sets an example for others: this is what happens when you do the wrong thing.....the brain as a rational information processor should make rational decisions.

And of course, the state of the brain in relation to circumstances determines the action in that instance, you may run a light and get fined, then feel regret for making the wrong decision.....the only action possible for you in that instance in time.

The courts are full of people who made bad decisions, only to regret their action.....but of course, too late, the action could not have been different and the past cannot be changed.

Goodbye free will. The brain is an information processor.

Every event in this process is reliably caused by a history of prior events. There is a history of prior events that reliably resulted in an entrepreneur buying the land and building the restaurant. There is a history of prior events that led to each customer being born and raised and eventually ending up in that restaurant to have dinner. All of these histories extend into the past as far as anyone can imagine, and all of them are a series of events that were each caused by prior events. Thus, all events at any point in time, are the reliably result of prior events.

Not reliably, which is too soft, but absolutely. Everything proceeds as determined, not freely chosen. Fixed.

If - ''all of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment'' - Marvin Edwards - proceed without deviation from the big bang to this moment, everything you think or do is not freely chosen, but determined before you were born.




So what? So, it was causally necessary, from any prior point in time, that those specific people would be in that specific restaurant having their own specific thoughts about what they would order for dinner, and then making their own choices based upon their own goals and interests, and for their own reasons.

It was causally necessary, from any prior point in time, that it would happen, just so, and in no other way.

But their actions, by your own definition, is determined long before they being acted out, therefore not an instance of free will.

If determined, actions are not freely willed.

Free will?

Glad you asked. Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.

A person is not something that decides or acts in isolation, rather, being acted upon by information inputs (external determinants) and the non-chosen states of the brain (internal determinants).

Nothing is being willed. The progression of events and the state of the system, both the environment and the brain, determines an action as it unfolds.

No free will to be found. The label is not the thing.

Free will is not free from cause and effect. Every choice is reliably caused by each person's own thoughts and feelings about what they will order for dinner and why they chose to order this dinner rather than that one. And even those thoughts and feelings will have their own reliable histories of cause and effect.

Not reliably caused, but determined. We have no idea of the internal workings that produce our thoughts and actions in response to events in the world.

Something happens...pause...thoughts and impulses come to mind, actions proceed as determined. Determinism at work, not free will.



But as long as those thoughts and feelings are the products of that person's own mind and brain, and as long as that brain is mature and healthy, and not subject to coercion or undue influence, that person will be held responsible for what they deliberately choose to do.

Everything that happens is a product of countless elements that brought it into existence and swept along as determined.

By your definition, any mechanism that acts in response to something has 'free will' because it is the mechanism that is reponding acording to its own makeup.... computers, calculators, light sensors, relays, microchips.....all got free will, oh yeah.
Your choice of steak was inevitable.

My choice of the salad was inevitable. It was inevitable because I had already had bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch. I could have chosen the steak, of course, but I needed to order the salad for dinner to balance out my lack of vegetables at breakfast and lunch. My choice was reliably caused, and it was reliably caused by my own specific goals and reasoning.

What happened before is the information that acts upon the brain and determines your next 'selection' - you are presented with a menu....pause....the thought of ordering salad comes to mind.

It comes to mind not because we have free will, but that our brains are rational information processors.

Everything that happened during the day, what your breakfast was, snacks, drinks, bring you to the point of selecting salad.

Selecting as the surface appearance, where salad is necessitated, not selected.

''Selected'' implies the possibility of an alternate selection, yet no alternate selection is possible within a deterministic system.

Professor Taylor again? Same quote again? Really?

Yep, because given the dialogue I'm responding to, it's still relevant and necessary.


The fact that Taylor suggests that there is no distinction between us tampering with someone's brain to cause him to commit murder versus him deciding for himself that he will murder someone, is an example of Taylor's moral illiteracy. But, what else can you expect from a professor of metaphysics. It's not like he is a professor of Ethics.

If determinism is true, nobody chooses their brain state or condition. Non chosen brain state and condition determines thoughts, deliberations and actions taken.

If one's brain functions normally, it can be expected to produce rational decisions and actions. We don't get to choose how our brain functions, be it rationally or irrationally. The state of the system/brain is the state of us.

On the neurology of morals
''Patients with medial prefrontal lesions often display irresponsible behavior, despite being intellectually unimpaired. But similar lesions occurring in early childhood can also prevent the acquisition of factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.'



But the failure to make relevant distinctions about the causes of a person's action is one of the absurdities that results when we sweep such distinctions under the rug of a vague generality, like causal necessity. But, Taylor's just speaking of a metaphysical world, not the real world. A failure to make these distinctions in the real world would have very bad consequences, as it would justify and excuse every form of harmful behavior regardless of its cause. I find Taylor's comment to be morally disgusting.

But, as a hard determinist, you may have no existential problems with it, even though as a human being I'm sure that you do.

There are distinctions to be made, it's just that none of the distinctions that can be made involve free will. As in the example above.

It is the state of the brain of the subject that determines how they think and what they do. Someone can be intellectually unimpaired, intelligent, yet physically unable to ''acquire factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.''

They act in accordance with their will, it is 'they who think and act,' yet their actions are irrational because they are physically (neural network condition) unable to acquire factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior, therefore not morally responsible for their condition or their actions.

Moral responsibility rests not on 'free will' but a rational, functional brain.
 
Conditions which eliminate freedom of choice and freedom of will.
Sentences without a contextual subject.

Freedom, by definition, means
"That the object to which the property is referent shall have it's requirement met". This means that in any statement of freedom, the requirement being referenced must be contextually singular.

Note, there is no requirement that more than a single thing happen of a deterministic system for this to make sensem

What IS required is for physics to have a state field in addition to the

Determinism allows this too, not only in thought experiment but in actual direct experiments on deterministic systems. That we play a make-believe game and pretend we are going to decide differently than we are and running forward with simplified models makes no difference to the fact that we have a will, the will has a "requirement", and that requirement will either be met or be missed.

As it is, some guy  assembled a mind from transistors and decision trees. That mind produces wills. Those wills have requirements, and operate in a clearly deterministic system, and we can observe the requirement either shall or shall not, by determinism, be satisfied; to then call these state results "free" and "unfree" would invoke no contradiction.

So when you say "minds can't do that" and I produce "a mind that can do that" or that you say "this is not really happening", you are quite simply wrong.
 
Two things. The brain is a piss poor reason for claiming anything beyond that it is a processing system. DBT, the brain isn't a realism based system. Jarhyn the brain isn't a realism based processor. You are both overlooking that what the brain processes depends on what the brain can process. Since the brain only receives indirect information about the world it cannot process, nor even be programmed to process, reality.

There is no unknown-to-reality convergence speculation that will permit short term machines to achieve such. Stop. Reality is humanly unknowable Drop it.

Re determinism. It is singular. It must be reductive to single event analyses if it is deterministic. Two or more anything fractures the paradigm. Any other formulation must be motivated by individual biases/demands.

For instance believing we have free will etc. is not justification for proposing determinism permits free will etc. There is no evidence we are created. That we evolved is demonstrated well beyond six sigma.

Go.
 
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There is no evidence we are created. That we evolved is demonstrated well beyond six sigma.

Go.

Go where?

What is the point of this mystifying response? Is anyone here arguing that we are created and not evolved? And what does this have to do with free will?
 
Two things. The brain is a piss poor reason for claiming anything beyond that it is a processing system. DBT, the brain isn't a realism based system. Jarhyn the brain isn't a realism based processor. You are both overlooking that what the brain processes depends on what the brain can process. Since the brain only receives indirect information about the world it cannot process, nor even be programmed to process, reality.
It was never asked to process reality directly, and it does not need to do so to contain a series of instructions unto a requirement, and to do so in reality.



There is no unknown-to-reality convergence speculation that will permit short term machines to achieve such. Stop. Reality is humanly unknowable Drop it.
Ah so you wish to claim no knowledge is possible, that all you are doing is spouting nothing that can ever possibly make sense because reality is unknowable.

So I can safely ignore everything you say because you by your own admission know nothing.
Re determinism. It is singular. It must be reductive to single event analyses if it is deterministic. Two or more anything fractures the paradigm. Any other formulation must be motivated by individual biases/demands.
No two of different concepts: no true/false, no words no is and is not, no no, because it is not yes.

No two different particles. no ability to differentiate any other thing...

This is just silliness you propose.
For instance believing we have free will etc. is not justification for proposing determinism permits free will etc. There is no evidence we are created. That we evolved is demonstrated well beyond six sigma.

Go.
I don't get where you think having evolved has anything to do with it; I'm a through and through believer in Darwin's Origin of the Species by Natural Selection.

I keep it in a place most keep their Bibles, and I read it a good deal more often, to boot.

But the fact that I did and have created minds that do what you say they cannot:take in observable objectively extant objects as a set, return a single result, that result itself being an image unto execution of an interpreter, wherein the interpreter operates this unto the particular and identifiable cogitation by some specific part of itself: it either jumps to execute at address B or continues on to execute the next instruction.

Which one of these it does is not arbitrary subjective, or in any way open to interpretation. Determinism, the laws by which this "causal necessity" operates, demand it.

So you who claim no thing can be known, that there is no "two" despite direct contradiction in your own speech, are simply wrong.

In fact part of your job, and part of what society will and ought educate everyone to do, on pain of continued education, is to look at your will, assess whether it is shitty according to a set of rules governing responsible behavior, and if it is shit, decide not to do that thing and say to yourself "think of something that isn't shit".

And if it never ever gives you something that isn't shit, try figuring out something to do for yourself without looking at a process in your head you clearly understand nothing about, and seek to understand nothing about.

That's the regulatory control you are looking for and that most people have.
 
Since the brain only receives indirect information about the world it cannot process, nor even be programmed to process, reality
Since the brain is a real object, and a part of the world, it can only process (or be programmed to process) reality.

What else do you think it has access to, apart from reality?
 
Since the brain only receives indirect information about the world it cannot process, nor even be programmed to process, reality
Since the brain is a real object, and a part of the world, it can only process (or be programmed to process) reality.

What else do you think it has access to, apart from reality?
Well, he wants to claim that the things it processes, patterns flashed by a neuronal surface, are "not reality but an image of it".

The thing is, they are exactly what they are, in addition to being objects which also image some other thing.

Either way, the things it processes are real, even if they only contain mere slivers of implications of anything further on; that's all they need to keep functioning.
 
Conditions which eliminate freedom of choice and freedom of will.

Free will is when our choosing is free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.
We've walked into the restaurant. We saw the people choosing what they would order from an actual menu of realizable alternatives. We saw no evidence of coercion or undue influence. Therefore each choice was made of their own free will.

One cannot truthfully say that this event has been "eliminated" by determinism.

In fact, we can reasonably conclude that the process was deterministic. Each event was caused by preceding events. And we can confirm this by sampling. For example, if anyone asked me why I chose the salad for dinner, despite the menu's delicious picture of a juicy steak, I can tell them the reasons that caused my choice (bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch). My personal dietary goals and my reasoning causally necessitated my choice of the salad. Totally deterministic.

And we could, in theory, track the prior causes of my having those specific dietary goals, and reasonably conclude that my choice was causally inevitable from any prior point in time.

So, we've got free will and we've got determinism, both there in the same event, at the same time and in the same place.

Therefore, your statement is false.

Freedom, by definition, means that realizable alternatives are possible

And, of course, realizable alternatives are possible. The restaurant menu is filled with them.

"Realizable" means "able to be realized". This ability does not require that the alternative is ever actually realized.

"Possible" means "able to happen". This ability does not require that the possibility ever happens.

Freedom of choice is when we are free to choose for ourselves what we will order for dinner, without coercion or undue influence.
"Freedom of will" and "free will" are simply abbreviated phrases for the freedom (from coercion and undue influence) to choose for ourselves what we will do. Thus "freedom of will" and "free will".

In a fully deterministic universe, people still make choices and people will still be held responsible for they they choose to do. People still go into a restaurant, browse the menu, and place an order. The waiter brings them their meal and a bill that they must pay on the way out.

Punishment is meant to deter bad behaviour, and people are held responsible because it sets an example for others: this is what happens when you do the wrong thing.....the brain as a rational information processor should make rational decisions.

Personally, I don't believe in punishment as a deterrent. A deterrent theoretically prevents the crime before it happens, yet, no matter how bad we make the punishment, even the death penalty, we still get people will will commit the crime anyway. And punishment as a deterrent has no natural limit, except death.

Punishment is a means of correction. It communicates our disapproval of the behavior, and how strongly we disapprove, to motivate a desire to change. But then that desire to change must be supported by counseling, education, training, addiction treatment, restoring the victim's loss, and generally changing the way a person thinks about their behavior so that they will make better choices in the future.

The courts are full of people who made bad decisions, only to regret their action.....but of course, too late, the action could not have been different and the past cannot be changed.

But the future can be different and we and our choices can change. And one of the mechanism of change is to revisit that earlier choice and consider what we could have done otherwise. That's how we learn from our mistakes. That's how we come to see new options in future situations.

Hard determinism, the denial of free will, makes rehabilitation impossible. If we tell the person that, due to determinism, they had no control over their past actions, then we would also have to tell them that, again due to determinism, they will have no control over their future actions. And that makes rehabilitation impossible.

everything you think or do is not freely chosen, but determined before you were born.

No, that's a superstitious take on the notion of causal necessity. There will surely be an inevitable chain of cause and effect from the Big Bang to me choosing the salad for dinner. But the Big Bang will play no meaningful role in my dinner choice.

What you would like to say is that "it is as if the Big Bang chose the salad, and not you". But that kind of thinking is figurative and thus fallacious.

It will in actual fact be me that chooses the salad, and that choice will not be made until I make it. Why? We assume it is causally determined to be just so.

No event will ever happen until its final prior causes have played themselves out. While events may sometimes be predicted in advance, under no circumstances can any event ever be caused in advance.
 
Since the brain only receives indirect information about the world it cannot process, nor even be programmed to process, reality
Since the brain is a real object, and a part of the world, it can only process (or be programmed to process) reality.

What else do you think it has access to, apart from reality?
  1. to convert (something, such as energy or a message) into another form
    essentially sense organs transduce physical energy into a nervous signal

Not only that but those elements that transduce need only be sensitive to that which they convert.

So, as I wrote "You are overlooking that what the brain processes depends on what the brain can process. Since the brain only receives indirect information about the world it cannot process, nor even be programmed to process, reality."

That is why I use the term experiment, as described in  Scientific method as the tool which can be used to find realities. I'm pretty sure reality isn't a natural human experienced thing.

What the human does with what she receives may determine her (perception) sense of reality which is not actually reality. For instance many believe our eyes are the most true, first responding sensors. However there are exceptions everywhere. Our ears respond to source direction and drive the eye muscles and neck within 7 to 15 milliseconds. The eyes don't even get their signals out of the receiving cells in less than 20 or 40 milliseconds.
 
Since the brain only receives indirect information about the world it cannot process, nor even be programmed to process, reality
Since the brain is a real object, and a part of the world, it can only process (or be programmed to process) reality.

What else do you think it has access to, apart from reality?
Well, he wants to claim that the things it processes, patterns flashed by a neuronal surface, are "not reality but an image of it".

The thing is, they are exactly what they are, in addition to being objects which also image some other thing.

Either way, the things it processes are real, even if they only contain mere slivers of implications of anything further on; that's all they need to keep functioning.
You are wrong. The response need only be enough to do little more than keep one from dying. Also as I pointed out to bilby sensations are not anywhere near immediate and they are variable between senses.

Even when I ran my dissertation in 1975 signals from the computer operated at about one instruction per microsecond. They then travelled about 10 microseconds to my lab before they engaged experimental operations which took up another forty or fifty milliseconds to produce moving sounds in an anechoic environment which the observer began to hear some 10 to 20 milliseconds after that. Where's the reality there?

Too big a bite?


There's more ....
 
Also as I pointed out to bilby sensations are not anywhere near immediate and they are variable between senses.
I never thought otherwise.

That doesn't make them not real, though.

Everything you are talking about is a part of reality. Everything.
Kind of my point here.

He doesn't seem to understand that a configuration of charge patterns on a bus is still an object.
 
Also as I pointed out to bilby sensations are not anywhere near immediate and they are variable between senses.
I never thought otherwise.

That doesn't make them not real, though.

Everything you are talking about is a part of reality. Everything.
Different brushes.

Reality according to brain activity is much different than is reality with respect to material activity. Yes brain activity is a material outcome. It just isn't one reflecting the physical state of things around us. Reality isn't meaningful unless it is consistent across problems.

Evolution has left us with tools mostly incompatible with what are the state of affairs in the world. There are no formulas for getting from energy and location drives to what the brain and other driving metabolic responses beyond what the being has evolved to function.

For instance, the nervous system provides sense data mixed with noise and ongoing processing. It's all real. Except what the human does with it changes, often incompatibly, with what would be life saving actions. No other way to explain such as Trump or the existence of black holes.

I take my ques from the advent of a standardized scientific reality versus the prior rationalistic reality or even desires. No way back.
 
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