DBT
Contributor
The essence of determinism is "would" not have done otherwise. That is sufficient for determinism. Determinism cannot rationally assert "could" not have done otherwise. That would be a fallacy.
All events fixed by antecedents entails it. Rewording doesn't alter the conditions. Which are - no deviation, consequently no 'could have done otherwise.'
Semantics.
Yes. And thanks for noticing.
Semantics is about the meaning of the words we use. And I've been explaining the distinction between saying that "we would not have done otherwise" versus "we could not have done otherwise". We might think that the distinction between "would" and "could" is rather obvious. But the discussion of determinism, long ago, made the figurative leap that effectively conflated the two terms, by falsely suggesting that if something "will not" happen then it is AS IF it "cannot" happen (or, if something "would not" happen then it is AS IF it "could not" happen).
What can I say, other than that philosophy screwed things up, and created a paradox (a self-induced hoax, created by one or more false, but believable, suggestions).
It doesn't matter how it's rationalized, fixed is fixed, no deviation means no alternate actions.
If you literally cannot have done otherwise, saying 'would not have done otherwise' does not alter the fact.
If saying 'would not have done otherwise' seeks to imply freedom or the possibility of doing otherwise, it does not relate to determinism.
The fact is that there is always the possibility of doing otherwise, even if the otherwise is simply between doing something or not doing it. But, of course, there is no possibility of both doing it AND not doing it. Such would be physically and logically impossible. But whether I decide to do it, or to not do it, one will be the thing I did, and the other will be the thing I "could have" done instead.
Determinism, by definition, negates all possibility of doing otherwise.
''However, in order for determinism to be true, it must include all events. For example, determinism cannot exclude the effects of natural forces, like volcanoes and tidal waves or a meteor hitting the Earth. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of biological organisms that transform their environments, like tree seedlings changing bare land into a forest. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of deliberate choices, like when the chef prepares me the salad that I chose for lunch.
All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards
When deciding between the salad and the steak, each is a real, true, and actual possibility. Both are actually things that I actually "can" choose to order, even though I inevitably "will" only choose one. And the one that I do not choose will inevitably become the thing that I "could have" chosen instead.
The mental act of deciding, being subject to the same causal processes as the world at large, is itself on a fixed course.
What you think and feel prior to acting being the inevitable effect of information input and body/mind state and condition as events evolve as determined.
A fixed course of events, by definition, permits no deviation.
No deviation entails no alternate actions.
No alternate actions mean no choice or freedom of will.
As to freedom, there is no "freedom from causal necessity", of course. But there is a freedom to choose for myself whether to have the steak or the salad, where the "freedom" refers implicitly to freedom from coercion and undue influence. This is the freedom which is referenced by the "free" in operational "free will".
You don't choose for yourself. The world and its events is the source of our existence and acts upon our physical and mental makeup.
That internal necessitation is driven by information input which is external and acts upon the system is the fatal flaw in compatibilism.
''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents''
We've discussed the two distinctly different definitions of free will. And, yes, the distinction between the two is also a matter of semantics. And we can certainly discuss both definitions again if you like. But operational free will has no problem with determinism.
There is no such thing as 'operational free will' - the notion of free will is not compatible with determinism.
Applying labels to carefully selected conditions does not prove the proposition.
... and 'would not have done otherwise' is precisely the same as 'could not have done otherwise.
If they were precisely the same then there would be no need for two distinct words. But they are not the same at all. For example, I "could" have ordered anything on the menu, but, given my goals and reasons, I "would" only order the salad that night.
One is a common reference that gives no consideration to determinism as it is defined, the other does.
One relates to how things appear, the other relates to how, if the world is deterministic, the world works, not as it appears.
This contradicts the terms of your definition.
No. It doesn't. After all, the distinction between "could" and "would" was causally inevitable from any prior point in time. And so was the philosopher's error to conflate them, leading to your confusion.
I am pointing out that your wording does not and cannot alter the conditions of your definition of determinism: no deviation, no alternate actions.
You want it both ways, events fixed by antecedents and events not fixed by antecedents.
No! All events are fixed by antecedent events. For example, the meaningful antecedent events, of my choosing the salad rather than the steak, included my recalling that I had bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch versus my chosen goal of eating more fruits and vegetables daily. Those were the immediate prior causes that fixed my choice.
The causes that bring you to that point began long before what you call ''immediate prior causes' - which have their own antecedents.
At no point do you get to choose your own state and condition, or have regulation over what must necessarily happen.
''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen
Those prior causes had their own prior causes, of course, such as my genetic enjoyment of high protein and high fat meals, and my education over the years that more fruits and vegetables would lead to better health. And those prior causes had their own prior causes, etc. etc. etc., all the way back to the Big Bang. But only the more recent causes are meaningful causes, things that we might do something about to change my dietary choices. Viewing the Big Bang as a "meaningful" cause would be silly nonsense.
”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.
When presented with options within a deterministic system, it is the state of the system as it evolves from prior to current and future states that determines all actions, no exceptions.
Yep. Just like I have repeatedly described. But I am providing meaningful information about the prior states that caused me to choose the salad. You seem eager to sweep meaningful information under the rug of a broad, abstract generality.
Without the ability to alter the determined course of events, whatever the causes happen to be is irrelevant, events proceed as they must.
What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''
That remains correct. Determinism will always produce the same results, without randomness or variation. Given a choice between a vanilla ice cream cone versus a chocolate ice cream cone, one of these options will always be the single inevitable "I will" and the other will always be the single inevitable "I could have". Thus, determinism, without randomness or variation.
Yet, what you 'will' is the inevitable effect of an intricate web of causality, over which you have no control or freedom to choose or do otherwise.
''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen
”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.