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Compatibilism: What's that About?

I'm not telling you anything. I merely outlined the compatibilist definition of free will.
I'm a compatibilist. You telling me what "a compatibilist believes..." is you telling me what I believe.

So, you hand wave it away rather than discuss how or why you might think it is vague.

Of course it's fucking "vague", though. We're talking about one of the most general principles in game theory. It's so big it's fucking foundational.

You might as well argue that "sets" are vague or classes, just because they don't describe anything of what's in them. They are vagueries entire!

Even so,
A will that is not free is a will which cannot be fulfilled within the bounds of it's foundational vision.

You could as easily say "that was/is a good plan" and you accomplish the same intent of utterance.

Plan quality can be objectively assessed.

If you cannot understand how, when I say "I have the will to go to a store and buy a Mercedes" you can say "you do not have the free will to do that", both statements can be objectively assessed for truth value, then you are even closer to @MrIntelligentDesign in your basis of belief than I would otherwise have thought.

I mean shit, it doesn't even require actually doing the thing, especially after identification that the will cannot be fulfilled and you have no free will to do that particular thing.

If I instead said "I have the will to go to the store and buy <a specific cereal>" then you can say "it appears you have the free will to go buy cereal", as I stand up and go out the door. When I come back 15 minutes later, you can assess the quality of my will: do I have with me the specific cereal, or was the store out?
 
This then that. This follows that. When is relevant to this only in the sense it occurs to this before that occurs when that is directly associated to this. Nope. No cause.
Plan quality can be objectively assessed.

If you cannot understand how, when I say "I have the will to go to a store and buy a Mercedes" you can say "you do not have the free will to do that", both statements can be objectively assessed for truth value, then you are even closer to @MrIntelligentDesign in your basis of belief than I would otherwise have thought.

I mean shit, it doesn't even require actually doing the thing, especially after identification that the will cannot be fulfilled and you have no free will to do that particular thing.

If I instead said "I have the will to go to the store and buy <a specific cereal>" then you can say "it appears you have the free will to go buy cereal", as I stand up and go out the door. When I come back 15 minutes later, you can assess the quality of my will: do I have with me the specific cereal, or was the store out?
 
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Still flawed for the given reasons.

But none of your reasons have held up.

Yes, the work of neural networks, not will, not free will.

Take that one for example. You repeatedly suggest to us that the nature of the brain is such that it precludes us choosing for ourselves what we will have for dinner in a restaurant. And yet, there we are, sitting in the restaurant, browsing the menu, choosing what we will have for dinner, and then placing our order. Obviously, the nature of our brain does not exclude this activity, but in fact enables it.

One of the key adaptive functions of an intelligent brain is to imagine alternative possibilities, estimate the likely outcomes of different options, and choose the option that seems best to us at that time.

''It seems obvious that we exist in the present. The past is gone and the future has not yet happened, so where else could we be? But perhaps we should not be so certain.''

''Sensory information reaches us at different speeds, yet appears unified as one moment. Nerve signals need time to be transmitted and time to be processed by the brain. And there are events – such as a light flashing, or someone snapping their fingers – that take less time to occur than our system needs to process them. By the time we become aware of the flash or the finger-snap, it is already history.''

Sprinkling the conversation with these interesting tidbits from neuroscience does not address the argument on the table. There is nothing about the way our brains work that precludes our brains from choosing what we will have for dinner.

Objects and events in the external world -> information input ->propagation of information throughout the neural networks of the brain -> conscious perception of that information forms ->conscious feelings and emotions emerge ->conscious thoughts and deliberations emerge -> a conscious impulse to respond (the conscious will to act) -> a conscious action is performed.

Do you see yet, that you are confirming what I am saying? The restaurant menu is an "object in the external world" that the brain "propagates through the neural network" to "conscious perception" of the items on the menu. Our "conscious feelings and emotions" regarding those items emerge, as well as our "conscious thoughts and deliberations", which lead to our "conscious will to act". Our deliberately chosen will then motivates and directs our "conscious action", as we tell the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please."

And, thank you for supporting my case!

There is nothing in neuroscience that contradicts the fact that the brain is choosing from the menu what the person will order for dinner. The choice is reliably determined by the choosing process, so it is also consistent with both causal necessity and free will.

Not sufficient to qualify as free will.

Well, let's see: (P3) A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).

I had bacon and eggs for breakfast. So, my goal was to avoid a fatty lunch. I reasoned that the Chef Salad would satisfy my tastes and my hunger, so it was in my best interest to order the salad rather than the cheese burger.

By definition, that is a freely chosen will.

Unconscious information processing is not willed, yet alone freely willed.

Well, that's a bit puzzling, because you just listed a string of conscious events involved in the choosing process! Remember this? "conscious perception of that information forms ->conscious feelings and emotions emerge ->conscious thoughts and deliberations emerge -> a conscious impulse to respond (the conscious will to act) -> a conscious action is performed."

To qualify as free will, actions must be actually freely willed, not merely labelled as such.

To qualify as free will, we must be free to choose for ourselves what we will do. If someone forces their choice upon us against our will, then his will is free, but ours is subjugated.

The personal narrative;
''For example, in one study, researchers recorded the brain activity of participants when they raised their arm intentionally, when it was lifted by a pulley, and when it moved in response to a hypnotic suggestion that it was being lifted by a pulley.

Hypnosis, like coercion, is when one person imposes their will upon another. It is not free will.

"Similar areas of the brain were active during the involuntary and the suggested “alien” movement, while brain activity for the intentional action was different. So, hypnotic suggestion can be seen as a means of communicating an idea or belief that, when accepted, has the power to alter a person’s perceptions or behaviour.''

Yes. Hypnosis is a form of external manipulation. And it is not an example of free will.

''All this may leave one wondering where our thoughts, emotions and perceptions actually come from. We argue that the contents of consciousness are a subset of the experiences, emotions, thoughts and beliefs that are generated by non-conscious processes within our brains."

Unfortunately, this does not mean what you think it does, DBT. There will be interactions between conscious awareness and unconscious processes in all of our deliberate choices. You laid it out yourself in the series of mental events you listed above. Remember this? "conscious perception of that information forms ->conscious feelings and emotions emerge ->conscious thoughts and deliberations emerge -> a conscious impulse to respond (the conscious will to act) -> a conscious action is performed."

Acting without external force or coercion does not free us from inner necessitation, ie, 'he acted according to his will, as opposed to being forced against his will.'

The choosing causally necessitates the chosen will. Free will does not require freedom from choosing, but rather the freedom to do the choosing for ourselves.

Will is just will. We can act according to our will. In fact it is inevitable that we act according to our will if action is determined. Not only action, but will itself.

Again, you're burying the meaningful distinction in a generality. It actually makes a difference to most of us whether we are free to decide for ourselves what we will do versus being forced to do something against our will. It actually makes a difference to us whether our brains are functioning normally versus impaired by dementia, or schizophrenia, or other significant brain injuries or illnesses.

For instance;
Movement Intention After Parietal Cortex Stimulation in Humans;
''Parietal and premotor cortex regions are serious contenders for bringing motor intentions and motor responses into awareness. We used electrical stimulation in seven patients undergoing awake brain surgery. Stimulating the right inferior parietal regions triggered a strong intention and desire to move the contralateral hand, arm, or foot, whereas stimulating the left inferior parietal region provoked the intention to move the lips and to talk. When stimulation intensity was increased in parietal areas, participants believed they had really performed these movements, although no electromyographic activity was detected. Stimulation of the premotor region triggered overt mouth and contralateral limb movements. Yet, patients firmly denied that they had moved.''

Like hypnosis, neurological manipulation by direct stimulation of specific brain areas would not be examples of free will. We would lack conscious awareness of what is actually happening, and would have to confabulate an explanation consistent with the facts available to us.

Fortunately, we are not subject to neurological manipulation while reading the menu, deciding what we will have for dinner, and placing our order with the waiter.

Will is the conscious impulse or urge to act according to thoughts or plans. Underlying the conscious experience thought and will are the production mechanisms, of which we are blissfully unaware.

Exactly. We are aware when we need to be aware. We are aware of the items on the menu. We are aware that we must make a choice. We are aware of our dietary goals and the reasoning that led to our choice. We are aware of telling the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please."

Free will does not require us to be aware of the firing of each neuron in our brains (it would take many additional neurons just to keep track of one neuron, and many more to keep track of them!). Free will only requires that it is actually us (our own neurons) that is deciding what we will have for dinner.

''The amygdala interacts with the cortical sensory systems in the assessment of fear-related stimuli and modulates the reflex responses through projections to the hypothalamus and brainstem. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex, especially the medial prefrontal network, is connected to the amygdala, hypothalamus, and PAG, and allows cortical control over the system in relation to a wider set of emotions. This cortical region is involved both in the assessment of reward and in mood disorders and it plays a central role in the ability to discern the consequences of one's actions and make appropriate behavioral choices. It also forms an interconnected circuit with specific cortical areas in the rostral superior temporal cortex, posterior parahippocampal cortex, and retrosplenial/posterior cingulate cortex.'' - J. Comp. Neurol. 493:132-139, 2005. © 2005 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Please note the highlighted sentence, and, again, thanks for supporting my argument!
 
This then that. This follows that. When is relevant to this only in the sense it occurs to this before that occurs when that is directly associated to this. Nope. No cause.
Plan quality can be objectively assessed.

If you cannot understand how, when I say "I have the will to go to a store and buy a Mercedes" you can say "you do not have the free will to do that", both statements can be objectively assessed for truth value, then you are even closer to @MrIntelligentDesign in your basis of belief than I would otherwise have thought.

I mean shit, it doesn't even require actually doing the thing, especially after identification that the will cannot be fulfilled and you have no free will to do that particular thing.

If I instead said "I have the will to go to the store and buy <a specific cereal>" then you can say "it appears you have the free will to go buy cereal", as I stand up and go out the door. When I come back 15 minutes later, you can assess the quality of my will: do I have with me the specific cereal, or was the store out?
It comes down to what can be publicly verified. If all you have is "You can say ..." then you haven't got anything. If you leave it up to me to assess what I see you have an empty container at best.

Proof does not rise from logical consistency. Proof or evidence arises from a public process of verifying material evidence. Your attempt falls far short. Thoughts are not material if the only evidence for your claim is you said them. Will is one of those self-evident constructs. Your claim and a pound of dynamite on the table is not proof of your claim.

You need to operationally define the terms then specify the physical processes by which you test your operationally defined construct providing material evidence of it's physical nature in real material environment. These things are called experiments.

We can all have common understanding of a construct. Having and sharing this condition is not evidence of existence or reality of the construct.
 
Thoughts are not material if the only evidence for your claim is you said them.
:ROFLMAO:

You are claiming that speaking thought is not evidence of having thought.

Thoughts are caused by a material configuration and are very much "material" to "will".

You seem to actually be claiming that people can it hold intent, that people cannot hold a model of reality which predicts the future within a certain error.

You might as well be claiming people do not operate calculations of math on the stochastically predictable elements of our experiences of reality.
 
Thoughts are not material if the only evidence for your claim is you said them.
:ROFLMAO:

You are claiming that speaking thought is not evidence of having thought.

Thoughts are caused by a material configuration and are very much "material" to "will".

You seem to actually be claiming that people can it hold intent, that people cannot hold a model of reality which predicts the future within a certain error.

You might as well be claiming people do not operate calculations of math on the stochastically predictable elements of our experiences of reality.
Ah, not just saying. Now you're speaking. Completely different. Now its vocal chords passing air generated by diaphragm and lung activity.

I never said operate wasn't useful. Operational is at the root of my claim. I don't consider people's calculated stochastically predictable elements of experienced reality since they haven't connected experienced reality to the material world.

Your bolded text is just a waving of hands. Specify the workable material configuration of thought and by association one for will as well. Once you have provided a workable operational definition of reality linked to the material world I'll examine the results of that work to confirm it's basis as one of reality.
 
Thoughts are not material if the only evidence for your claim is you said them.
:ROFLMAO:

You are claiming that speaking thought is not evidence of having thought.

Thoughts are caused by a material configuration and are very much "material" to "will".

You seem to actually be claiming that people can it hold intent, that people cannot hold a model of reality which predicts the future within a certain error.

You might as well be claiming people do not operate calculations of math on the stochastically predictable elements of our experiences of reality.
Ah, not just saying. Now you're speaking. Completely different. Now its vocal chords passing air generated by diaphragm and lung activity.

I never said operate wasn't useful. Operational is at the root of my claim. I don't consider people's calculated stochastically predictable elements of experienced reality since they haven't connected experienced reality to the material world.

Your bolded text is just a waving of hands. Specify the workable material configuration of thought and by association one for will as well. Once you have provided a workable operational definition of reality linked to the material world I'll examine the results of that work to confirm it's basis as one of reality.
The fact is, your religion is kinda silly. You deny that thoughts happen, and that emotional states which pertain to plans are a thing.

I sat at meetings where plans were discussed, drawn up, the physics of how the plan was to be resolved laid out in front of everyone such that everyone was able to speak the plans in their own terms, and where everyone executed it properly, and the plan went off smoothly

I have seen, with my own eyes, meetings where plans were discussed, the physics of the plan was to be resolved laid out on front of everyone such that it was clear that it would fail, and I kept my mouth shut, but everyone was able to speak the plan in their own terms, and where everyone executed properly, and then the plan blew up when the model problem was encountered.

The only thing that makes any of that possible is the stochastically predictable deterministic behavior of the system.

This makes us stochastic future prediction engines, and which do so for the sake of fulfilling survival priorities, some of which we ourselves are responsible for having adjusted.

A free will is one which is well formed against the stochastically predictable elements such that it more closely matches the globally deterministically calculable result.

To deny that people have plans, and that those plans are more or less likely (based on the observable data), is religion, and dumb religion at that.
 

I sat at meetings where plans were discussed, drawn up, the physics of how the plan was to be resolved laid out in front of everyone such that everyone was able to speak the plans in their own terms, and where everyone executed it properly, and the plan went off smoothly

I have seen, with my own eyes, meetings where plans were discussed, the physics of the plan was to be resolved laid out on front of everyone such that it was clear that it would fail, and I kept my mouth shut, but everyone was able to speak the plan in their own terms, and where everyone executed properly, and then the plan blew up when the model problem was encountered.

The only thing that makes any of that possible is the stochastically predictable deterministic behavior of the system.

This makes us stochastic future prediction engines, and which do so for the sake of fulfilling survival priorities, some of which we ourselves are responsible for having adjusted.

A free will is one which is well formed against the stochastically predictable elements such that it more closely matches the globally deterministically calculable result.

To deny that people have plans, and that those plans are more or less likely (based on the observable data), is religion, and dumb religion at that.
When one drinks the Kool Aide one is lost. The Kool Aide is that one need not justify things based on material reality for it to be true. Until you come to terms with the idea that self-identified constructs aren't justifiable as reality by just supporting them with logical frameworks, that something more is needed one is going to find one self in a hazed of coulda shoulda world where anything so justified serves until it collapses when the basis for it has been overthrown by physical realities.

One needs to show that something cannot be reduced to some combination of its parts, that  Emergence exists that there is something new in the world of knowns.

It comes down to understanding emergence relating to

Objective or subjective quality[edit]​

Crutchfield regards the properties of complexity and organization of any system as subjective qualities determined by the observer.

Defining structure and detecting the emergence of complexity in nature are inherently subjective, though essential, scientific activities. Despite the difficulties, these problems can be analysed in terms of how model-building observers infer from measurements the computational capabilities embedded in non-linear processes. An observer’s notion of what is ordered, what is random, and what is complex in its environment depends directly on its computational resources: the amount of raw measurement data, of memory, and of time available for estimation and inference. The discovery of structure in an environment depends more critically and subtly, though, on how those resources are organized. The descriptive power of the observer’s chosen (or implicit) computational model class, for example, can be an overwhelming determinant in finding regularity in data.[24]
On the other hand, Peter Corning argues: "Must the synergies be perceived/observed in order to qualify as emergent effects, as some theorists claim? Most emphatically not. The synergies associated with emergence are real and measurable, even if nobody is there to observe them."[13]

The low entropy of an ordered system can be viewed as an example of subjective emergence: the observer sees an ordered system by ignoring the underlying microstructure (i.e. movement of molecules or elementary particles) and concludes that the system has a low entropy.[25] On the other hand, chaotic, unpredictable behaviour can also be seen as subjective emergent, while at a microscopic scale the movement of the constituent parts can be fully deterministic.

I take the position that everything can be explained as a consequence of some combination of its parts. I say that just because it is not self-evident, does not give one permission to throw away a perfectly good analytic tool of analysis by parts. throwing probability into equations does not resolve the problems. Rather it provides means for modelling them in the absence of understanding of all combinations of parts with the caveat that with effort a direct combinatorial solution can be found. The shortcut is not the solution.

For instance I use statistics to estimate actual thresholds determined by a combination of interacting activities within a noisy system without resolving the actual character and sources of the noise. Result is I know an outcome not the system. Perhaps you need to have tinnitus to appreciate what I am saying.
 
I'm not telling you anything. I merely outlined the compatibilist definition of free will.
I'm a compatibilist. You telling me what "a compatibilist believes..." is you telling me what I believe.

Compatibilists give their own definition of compatibility. Which comes in several flavours, Dennett, J.M Fischer, etc.

But essentially, compatibilists argue that free will is compatible with free will

You gave your definition of determinism, but you have not adequately explained free will in relation to determinism

If you cannot understand how, when I say "I have the will to go to a store and buy a Mercedes" you can say "you do not have the free will to do that", both statements can be objectively assessed for truth value, then you are even closer to @MrIntelligentDesign in your basis of belief than I would otherwise have thought.

I don't say that. I argue that decision making is not a matter of free will, or even will. Decision making is the work of neural networks and information processing.

What you do or do not do is determined by what went on in your brain prior to being aware of your decision .

I have explained all this over and over, yet here I am explaining it again as if nothing has been said.

I mean shit, it doesn't even require actually doing the thing, especially after identification that the will cannot be fulfilled and you have no free will to do that particular thing.

If I instead said "I have the will to go to the store and buy <a specific cereal>" then you can say "it appears you have the free will to go buy cereal", as I stand up and go out the door. When I come back 15 minutes later, you can assess the quality of my will: do I have with me the specific cereal, or was the store out?

You don't even have a basic grasp of the issue of agency, determinism or the argument for incompatibility.

images
 
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Still flawed. Information is acquired and processed, not freely chosen. An interaction of inputs and memory function determines behavioral output, not free will.
Still flawed for the given reasons.

But none of your reasons have held up.

They hold up perfectly. The brain functions on the principle of inputs, memory function and criteria, not free will, each brain according to its own makeup, state and condition in each instance of an action being performed. Which is not a matter of choice.

“It might be true that you would have done otherwise if you had wanted, though it is determined that you did not, in fact, want otherwise.” - Robert Kane


Yes, the work of neural networks, not will, not free will.

Take that one for example. You repeatedly suggest to us that the nature of the brain is such that it precludes us choosing for ourselves what we will have for dinner in a restaurant. And yet, there we are, sitting in the restaurant, browsing the menu, choosing what we will have for dinner, and then placing our order. Obviously, the nature of our brain does not exclude this activity, but in fact enables it.

Given that it's the state and condition of the brain that determines outcome in the moment of decision making, the option was chosen, but not through the agency of free will. No is there a possible alternate action. The action that is taken is the only possibility in that moment in time

Quite simply, if free will doesn't do it, it's false to label information processing as free will.


One of the key adaptive functions of an intelligent brain is to imagine alternative possibilities, estimate the likely outcomes of different options, and choose the option that seems best to us at that time.

Imagining possibilities doesn't mean that any possibility is open to you at any time you wish. The rules of determinism still apply to both imagination and future actions.

''It seems obvious that we exist in the present. The past is gone and the future has not yet happened, so where else could we be? But perhaps we should not be so certain.''

''Sensory information reaches us at different speeds, yet appears unified as one moment. Nerve signals need time to be transmitted and time to be processed by the brain. And there are events – such as a light flashing, or someone snapping their fingers – that take less time to occur than our system needs to process them. By the time we become aware of the flash or the finger-snap, it is already history.''

Sprinkling the conversation with these interesting tidbits from neuroscience does not address the argument on the table. There is nothing about the way our brains work that precludes our brains from choosing what we will have for dinner.

They are more than just interesting tidbits. They describe how the brain makes decisions and carries out actions. Which is not through the agency of free will.

That the brain is doing it doesn't make it free will.

Nothing is being freely willed.

A brain can do nothing that is not enabled by the circuitry of its neural networks, performing its evolutionary function as determined by architecture, memory and inputs. A failure of any of these elements disrupts rational function.

The issue here is a question of the right kind of regulative control.

Prefrontal Cortex damage:
''The 20-year-old female subject studied by Damasio et al. was intelligent and academically competent, but she stole from her family and other children, abused other people both verbally and physically, lied frequently, and was sexually promiscuous and completely lacking in empathy toward her illegitimate child. In addition, the researchers say, "She never expressed guilt or remorse for her misbehavior'' ''Both of the subjects performed well on measures of intellectual ability, but, like people with adult-onset prefrontal cortex damage, they were socially impaired, failed to consider future consequences when making decisions, and failed to respond normally to punishment or behavioral interventions. "Unlike adult-onset patients, however," the researchers say, "the two patients had defective social and moral reasoning, suggesting that the acquisition of complex social conventions and moral rules had been impaired." While adult-onset patients possess factual knowledge about social and moral rules (even though they often cannot follow these rules in real life), Damasio et al.'s childhood-onset subjects appeared unable to learn these rules at all. This may explain, the researchers say, why their childhood-onset subjects were much more antisocial, and showed less guilt and remorse, than subjects who suffered similar damage in adulthood.''



Objects and events in the external world -> information input ->propagation of information throughout the neural networks of the brain -> conscious perception of that information forms ->conscious feelings and emotions emerge ->conscious thoughts and deliberations emerge -> a conscious impulse to respond (the conscious will to act) -> a conscious action is performed.

Do you see yet, that you are confirming what I am saying? The restaurant menu is an "object in the external world" that the brain "propagates through the neural network" to "conscious perception" of the items on the menu. Our "conscious feelings and emotions" regarding those items emerge, as well as our "conscious thoughts and deliberations", which lead to our "conscious will to act". Our deliberately chosen will then motivates and directs our "conscious action", as we tell the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please."

I'm pointing out that it is not a free will process. The choice is not subject to will or conscious veto, it is determined by elements beyond the ability of will to regulate or control.

The state of the system determines outcome, not will.

You are merely applying the free will label without regard for the ingredients.

Inner necessitation negates freedom of will.

In other words:
''The brain is a physical system whose operation is governed solely by the laws of chemistry and physics. What does this mean? It means that all of your thoughts and hopes and dreams and feelings are produced by chemical reactions going on in your head (a sobering thought). The brain's function is to process information. In other words, it is a computer that is made of organic (carbon-based) compounds rather than silicon chips. The brain is comprised of cells: primarily neurons and their supporting structures. Neurons are cells that are specialized for the transmission of information. Electrochemical reactions cause neurons to fire. ''

Not sufficient to qualify as free will.

Well, let's see: (P3) A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).

I had bacon and eggs for breakfast. So, my goal was to avoid a fatty lunch. I reasoned that the Chef Salad would satisfy my tastes and my hunger, so it was in my best interest to order the salad rather than the cheese burger.

By definition, that is a freely chosen will.

All a matter of information processing, no will, not free will. Applying a label is not sufficient to establish freedom of will.

''What does this mean? It means that all of your thoughts and hopes and dreams and feelings are produced by chemical reactions going on in your head (a sobering thought).''


''The amygdala interacts with the cortical sensory systems in the assessment of fear-related stimuli and modulates the reflex responses through projections to the hypothalamus and brainstem. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex, especially the medial prefrontal network, is connected to the amygdala, hypothalamus, and PAG, and allows cortical control over the system in relation to a wider set of emotions. This cortical region is involved both in the assessment of reward and in mood disorders and it plays a central role in the ability to discern the consequences of one's actions and make appropriate behavioral choices. It also forms an interconnected circuit with specific cortical areas in the rostral superior temporal cortex, posterior parahippocampal cortex, and retrosplenial/posterior cingulate cortex.'' - J. Comp. Neurol. 493:132-139, 2005. © 2005 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Please note the highlighted sentence, and, again, thanks for supporting my argument!

You see it that way by ignoring nature and the means by which your experience is being produced. That each step in the cognitive process is determined by antecedents and brain state, not will, not free will.

''The increments of a normal brain state is not as obvious as direct coercion, a microchip, or a tumor, but the “obviousness” is irrelevant here. Brain states incrementally get to the state they are in one moment at a time. In each moment of that process the brain is in one state, and the specific environment and biological conditions leads to the very next state. Depending on that state, this will cause you to behave in a specific way within an environment (decide in a specific way), in which all of those things that are outside of a person constantly bombard your senses changing your very brain state. The internal dialogue in your mind you have no real control over.''
 
When one drinks the Kool Aide one is lost. The Kool Aide is that one need not justify things based on material reality
It is MATERIAL reality that people have plans. My neurons have a configuration which creates an inevitablity, and an outside observer can take knowledge of that plan and assess it objectively to find out what that inevitability is.

We call that a plan.

The plan is a real, material part of the thing, same as a circuit diagram is a real and demonstrable part in the material configuration that makes a circuit an inevitablity.

Things would not happen without the plan.

You're trying to say thoughts don't exist, just because we can only talk about them using words rather than directly observe them despite the fact that they can also be directly observed from the graph properties of the network, and despite the fact that humans directly observe these things inside their own heads.
 
you have not adequately explained free will in relation to determinism
I don't need to. I need to explain free will from within closed systems game theory, which I have. Determinism or !determinism does not matter because all systems, fully deterministic or just-so deterministic (stochastic), can only be modeled from the inside imperfectly, in a stochastic way.

This creates the possibility for a model to arise of the system, within the system, which features a will. Technically every subset of material within the system interacting as a "reference frame" or with "locality" has such an observable will, it's just chaotic and entropic for things that "aren't alive". The rock has "no" alignment towards goals, and it's learning function is purely reactive and even destructive.

In many ways this comes down to whether the material in reference has some model of math, a concept of "more" and "less", implemented in some machine of chemistry.

It does not matter whether the system is deterministic, or just-so deterministic. Determinism is unimportant to compatibilist positions.

It says "one property is not related to nor restricted by the other."

The thing that creates free will is in fact that the minds of the players of the game are created by the environment of the game. It is the containment, not the systemic determinism that creates it.
 
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

The brain functions on the principle of inputs, memory function and criteria,

The brain inputs the restaurant menu, remembers past eating experiences and its dietary goals, and chooses what it will have for dinner.

Which is not a matter of choice.

Well, we don't choose our brains, or how our brains work, but that does not prevent us from choosing what we will have for dinner. That's what brains do.

Your claim that we have to choose our brain and choose how it works before we can choose anything else is obviously false. And it doesn't matter whether you say it or Robert Kane says it or Albert Einstein says it. It remains a false claim.

If you believe the claim is true, then please offer some proof. So far, you've only offered evidence as to how the brain works. And you seem to think that the fact that our brain is making our choices is somehow different from the fact that we are making our choices. That would only be possible if we existed separately from our brains, but we don't.

Given that it's the state and condition of the brain that determines outcome in the moment of decision making, the option was chosen,

Thank you for owning up to the fact that the option was indeed chosen.

but not through the agency of free will.

Free will is not an independent agent. Free will is the brain deciding for itself what we will have for dinner, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

Nor is there a possible alternate action.

The possible actions are listed on the restaurant menu. The single inevitable actuality will become known as soon as you finish choosing it and just before you order it, as in "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

The action that is taken is the only possibility in that moment in time

No, the action taken is the only actuality in that moment in time. All of the items on the menu remain valid possibilities. In fact, if the salad doesn't satisfy your hunger, you are still free to order the steak as well.

Quite simply, if free will doesn't do it, it's false to label information processing as free will.

Again, free will is not an entity that goes around doing things. A freely chosen will is what we call the cases where the brain decides for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. Cases where we do not make this choice for ourselves, but in which the choice is imposed upon us by someone or something that is not us, are cases where our will is not freely chosen.

Free will is when we are free to choose for ourselves what we will do. It is about the conditions of the choosing.

Imagining possibilities doesn't mean that any possibility is open to you at any time you wish.

Only the items on the restaurant menu are open to us when choosing our dinner. They are our only possibilities. On the other hand, some restaurants may be open to a possibility that you imagine, if they have the ingredients and feel like accommodating you.

The rules of determinism still apply to both imagination and future actions.

That's okay. Determinism only has one rule: that each event is reliably caused by prior events. And, like free will, determinism is not a causal agent. It does not enforce this rule. It simply notes that all events appear to be following the rule.

This rule is fully satisfied in the restaurant example. In each case, the dinner ordered will be the reliable product of the customer's choosing process. The outcome will be causally necessitated by their own criteria, such as their personal tastes and their nutrition goals (if they have any). Each person's criteria will be the necessary result of their genetic dispositions and their prior life experiences (good ol' nature and nurture). These will in turn have their own history of causation going back as far as anyone wants to imagine. And the waiter is tapping his pencil on his order pad as he waits eternally for each customer to explore their own infinitely long causal chain. This is why it is never appropriate to bring up causal necessity.

That the brain is doing it doesn't make it free will.

Correct. But the brain doing it while free of coercion and other undue influences does make it free will. And the brain doing it while someone is pointing a gun at it is not free will.

Nothing is being freely willed.

I'll repeat this again. The brain may either make its choice while free of coercion and undue influence or it may make its choice while being coerced by the guy with the gun. One is a freely chosen will. The other is not.

A brain can do nothing that is not enabled by the circuitry of its neural networks, performing its evolutionary function as determined by architecture, memory and inputs. A failure of any of these elements disrupts rational function.

Absolutely correct. So, let's hope that the brains of all the restaurant customers are working well enough to make rational choices.

The issue here is a question of the right kind of regulative control.

So far, we've established that everyone in the restaurant is sane and has a brain capable of deciding what they would order. That is sufficient regulative control. But I see you've brought up an example where that is not the case:

Prefrontal Cortex damage:
''The 20-year-old female subject studied by Damasio et al. was intelligent and academically competent, but she stole from her family and other children, abused other people both verbally and physically, lied frequently, and was sexually promiscuous and completely lacking in empathy toward her illegitimate child. In addition, the researchers say, "She never expressed guilt or remorse for her misbehavior'' ''Both of the subjects performed well on measures of intellectual ability, but, like people with adult-onset prefrontal cortex damage, they were socially impaired, failed to consider future consequences when making decisions, and failed to respond normally to punishment or behavioral interventions. "Unlike adult-onset patients, however," the researchers say, "the two patients had defective social and moral reasoning, suggesting that the acquisition of complex social conventions and moral rules had been impaired." While adult-onset patients possess factual knowledge about social and moral rules (even though they often cannot follow these rules in real life), Damasio et al.'s childhood-onset subjects appeared unable to learn these rules at all. This may explain, the researchers say, why their childhood-onset subjects were much more antisocial, and showed less guilt and remorse, than subjects who suffered similar damage in adulthood.''

Right. This is a case where the patient's choices are unduly influenced by a significant mental illness. And those with such mental impairments will be treated medically and psychiatrically rather than as if they had acted deliberately, of their own free will.

And this is another reason for the distinction between a choice of one's own free will versus a choice resulting from a mental impairment.

This is why we must not sweep meaningful distinctions under the rug of the general determinism. All actions are always the result of prior causes, without distinction. But we need to make distinctions to deal with distinct realities, like the normal brain making normal decisions versus the abnormal brain making abnormal decisions.

The choice is not subject to will or conscious veto, it is determined by elements beyond the ability of will to regulate or control.

Once the choice reaches conscious awareness, it is subject to conscious veto. In your special case of the abnormal brain, the desire to veto a bad decision before acting on it was impaired. But that is a special case, not a normal case.

The state of the system determines outcome, not will.

If it were the state of the system then the patient would be dead. The system is a process that is never static until we die.

The process includes unconscious activity as well as conscious awareness. It will smoothly shift between functional areas, including conscious and unconscious functions, throughout the process of choosing what we will have for dinner.

You are merely applying the free will label without regard for the ingredients.

There is no argument as to how the brain works. The free will label is applied when the brain belongs to a sane adult who is deciding for his or her self what they will have for dinner. The issue is whether the ingredients happen to include a guy with a gun forcing his will upon them.

In other words:
''The brain is a physical system whose operation is governed solely by the laws of chemistry and physics. What does this mean?"

You will not find the restaurant menu in any textbook on physics or chemistry. Nor can you construct, or even predict, that menu by all of the knowledge found in the books covering the physical sciences.

You have to move up to the biological sciences to know that living organisms require food to survive, thrive, and reproduce. That's one of the laws of biology. Biological organisms run upon systems made of physics and chemistry, but their behavior cannot be predicted without adding the laws of biology. And you have to move up one more level to the social sciences to understand the psychological laws covering people choosing from that menu, and then there are the laws of economics for running a restaurant.

The laws of physics and chemistry are an insufficient base for determinism. Physical causation is but one causal mechanism. Biological causation is another mechanism. Rational causation is a third causal mechanism.

I think we both know enough about the brain to know that it is a physical structure in which multiple processes are constantly running. And we both know that one of these functions is choosing what the body as a whole will do (including choosing what the brain itself will be working on, like reducing that menu to a single choice so we can order dinner).

Free will is about the specific circumstances of that choosing. Are we sane adults deliberately deciding for ourselves what we will do, or is the choice being imposed upon us by someone or something else, something that is not us.

The argument against free will is built upon the notion that our past and the laws of nature are somehow separate from us, and that the prior causes of us are more responsible for our choices than our own current deliberations over what we should do. And that argument fails. All of the effects of the past that can affect our decision are now properties of our current self. They are integral parts of who and what we are right now. Our past experiences are obviously a part of who we are right now. And the laws of nature are embodied within us, not working upon us as external agents.

So, the end result is that our choices are truly caused by us, by who and what we happen to be right now. And, if we choose to order a salad for dinner, we will be held responsible for the bill.
 
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IOW free will?

Our brains are conditioned by experience, I do not think there is any absolute unconditioned free will. Causality IMO precludes that.
 
An effect within a series of causes and effects cannot, by definition, escape causal necessity. Freedom entails the ability to do otherwise, which causal necessity does not permit
 
IOW free will?

Our brains are conditioned by experience, I do not think there is any absolute unconditioned free will. Causality IMO precludes that.
Free will is a causally necessary event, just like every other event. Coercion is also a causally necessary event. In the case of free will, it was inevitable that you would be doing what you chose to do.
In the case of coercion, it was inevitable that you would be doing what the guy with a gun told you to do.

Causal necessity makes no distinction between these two events. That is why we have the notions of "free will" and "coercion", in order to make that distinction.
 
IOW free will?

Our brains are conditioned by experience, I do not think there is any absolute unconditioned free will. Causality IMO precludes that.
Free will is a causally necessary event, just like every other event. Coercion is also a causally necessary event. In the case of free will, it was inevitable that you would be doing what you chose to do.
In the case of coercion, it was inevitable that you would be doing what the guy with a gun told you to do.

Causal necessity makes no distinction between these two events. That is why we have the notions of "free will" and "coercion", in order to make that distinction.
Causality is what it is regardless of how you frame. It is not neccesary, it just is. There are no known exceptions.
 
An effect within a series of causes and effects cannot, by definition, escape causal necessity.

Exactly. Fortunately, no one ever experiences causal necessity as a constraint. So, they never feel any need to be free of it.

Freedom entails the ability to do otherwise, which causal necessity does not permit

The notion of an "ability" suggests something that we could do if we chose to. But it never implies that we are actually going to do it.

It will either be causally necessary that we actually do it, or, it will be causally necessary that we do not actually do it. We retain the "ability" to do it in either case.

So, causal necessity does not remove any abilities. It only determines what will actually happen.
 
Causality is what it is regardless of how you frame. It is not necessary, it just is. There are no known exceptions.

Correct. Causality is just the notion of reliable cause and effect. I think "necessity" was added to refer specifically to a chain of causes and effects, where one event causes the next event which causes the next event, etc. If A causes B, and B causes C, then if A happens C will necessarily happen.

However, we cannot say that A "causes" C, because B must happen in order for C to happen. For example, suppose
A is purchasing a dozen eggs at the store,
B is soft boiling three eggs, and
C is eating the soft boiled eggs.

Purchasing the eggs will cause the eggs to be eventually cooked and eaten (or they will be thrown out). But purchasing the eggs is insufficient to cause them to be eaten, because they will not be eaten raw.
 
When one drinks the Kool Aide one is lost. The Kool Aide is that one need not justify things based on material reality
It is MATERIAL reality that people have plans. My neurons have a configuration which creates an inevitablity, and an outside observer can take knowledge of that plan and assess it objectively to find out what that inevitability is.

We call that a plan.

The plan is a real, material part of the thing, same as a circuit diagram is a real and demonstrable part in the material configuration that makes a circuit an inevitablity.

Things would not happen without the plan.

You're trying to say thoughts don't exist, just because we can only talk about them using words rather than directly observe them despite the fact that they can also be directly observed from the graph properties of the network, and despite the fact that humans directly observe these things inside their own heads.
No Jarhyn. I'm saying that you saying that you have thoughts that you then describe some fantasy about what your brain and neurons are doing to produce such is BS. Even my limited research of afferent neural functions tell me something completely different is happening which I know that, too, is fantasy.

We're stuck with some evidence we bring inputs and existing states into a conscious stream, probably through a mechanism of sub-vocalization primarily, so we invent what we think is going on. We create will to explain mood and direction of behavior, mind to explain the overall process we label as thinking but we know not the mechanisms or actual processes by and through which we come to do these things.

People like Chomsky invent fantastic evolutionary mechanisms whereby we come to be able to generate, articulate, and control speech which are patently false and unscientific.

It is obvious to most of us we are toolmakers, that we have developed and improved mechanisms to visualize, and execute tool design. We know that speech was among those things that made our tool making possible and practicable, that with increased memory freed our hands up to accomplish these tasks.

I prefer finding actual mechanisms developed to produce thought and creativity and memory and history and faith. And I am willing to wait for research that defines the bases and mechanism for these attributes before I claim mind, thought, religiosity, and civilization have operable physical bases.

Don't jump the gun on what constitutes what. Sure, keep placeholders for these categories but don't go filling them up with attributes you think we need to have in them when you don't have even a vague notion of about what you are talking.

We're still at the Martians dropping a microphone into Times Square to pick up our behavior level of investigating mind function mechanization.
 
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