Compatibilism: What's that About?

[pood]

The fact that a person will not do otherwise does not logically imply that they cannot do otherwise. The conflation of what "will" happen with what "can" happen is a logical, linguistic, and semantic error. One that I've described in detail.

Me, too!

 

[pood]

Here is DBT’s argument. It appears to be both valid and sound, yet its conclusion is false:

1. If determinism is true, then if I order eggs for breakfast tomorrow I have to have eggs.
2. Determinism is true
3. Therefore, I have to have eggs for breakfast tomorrow.

Rendered more formally, but dispensing with formal modal symbology, the above argument goes:

1. If determinism, then necessarily eggs
2. Determinism
3. Therefore, necessarily eggs.

The problem is that P1 of his argument is false. Here is the corrected argument:

1. Necessarily (if determinism, then eggs).
2. Determinism
3. Therefore, eggs

So under determinism, my having eggs is not necessary but is, was, and always will be, a contingently true proposition. Who or what decides whether it is true? Me. What is necessary is only that, if determinism is true and if I order eggs tomorrow, then I WILL NOT MUST order eggs tomorrow.

 

[steve_bank]

Causality is what it is regardless of how you frame. It is not necessary, it just is. There are no known exceptions.

Correct. Causality is just the notion of reliable cause and effect. I think "necessity" was added to refer specifically to a chain of causes and effects, where one event causes the next event which causes the next event, etc. If A causes B, and B causes C, then if A happens C will necessarily happen.

However, we cannot say that A "causes" C, because B must happen in order for C to happen. For example, suppose
A is purchasing a dozen eggs at the store,
B is soft boiling three eggs, and
C is eating the soft boiled eggs.

Purchasing the eggs will cause the eggs to be eventually cooked and eaten (or they will be thrown out). But purchasing the eggs is insufficient to cause them to be eaten, because they will not be eaten raw.

As a pragmatic engineer I was solely concerned with understanding specific causalities.

Causality is embedded in the Laws Of Thermodynamics, the foundation of all science and technology. Conservation of mass and energy. In basic texts it is stated that conservation can not be proven, only that no exceptions have been observed.

Conservation, causality, as we have it in thermodynamics today came out of the development of steam engines in the 19th century. People tried to make pep[etual motion machines.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Causality is what it is regardless of how you frame. It is not necessary, it just is. There are no known exceptions.

Correct. Causality is just the notion of reliable cause and effect. I think "necessity" was added to refer specifically to a chain of causes and effects, where one event causes the next event which causes the next event, etc. If A causes B, and B causes C, then if A happens C will necessarily happen.

However, we cannot say that A "causes" C, because B must happen in order for C to happen. For example, suppose
A is purchasing a dozen eggs at the store,
B is soft boiling three eggs, and
C is eating the soft boiled eggs.

Purchasing the eggs will cause the eggs to be eventually cooked and eaten (or they will be thrown out). But purchasing the eggs is insufficient to cause them to be eaten, because they will not be eaten raw.

As a pragmatic engineer I was solely concerned with understanding specific causalities.

Causality is embedded in the Laws Of Thermodynamics, the foundation of all science and technology. Conservation of mass and energy. In basic texts it is stated that conservation can not be proven, only that no exceptions have been observed.

Conservation, causality, as we have it in thermodynamics today came out of the development of steam engines in the 19th century. People tried to make perpetual motion machines.

All of the laws of science are derived from observing the behavior of objects. The physical sciences observe and describe the behavior of inanimate objects. The life sciences observe and describe the behavior of living organisms. The social sciences observe and describe the behavior of intelligent species.

Each science derives it laws from the reliable patterns of behavior of the objects it observes. The Laws of Thermodynamics, and all other physical laws, "govern" only inanimate objects.

With the appearance of living organisms we get a new set of behavior governed by a new set of laws. We get single celled amoeba's defying the law of inertia by projecting a pseudopod and then dragging itself along the ground in search of food. We get trees defying the law of gravity by growing upward. Generally speaking, with living organisms we get purposeful or goal-directed instinctual behavior which physics knows nothing about.

With the appearance of intelligent species we get a highly evolved brain with the ability to imagine, evaluate, and choose. It is neither governed by gravity nor by biological instinct, but can deliberately choose when, where, and how to go about satisfying its biological needs. It can expand its possibilities with imagination and invention.

So, there are essentially three very distinct causal mechanisms: physical, biological, and rational.

The key distinction is that we can observe physical processes and use this knowledge to serve our own interests, like building and flying airplanes, etc. We have the ability to use physics, but physics has no ability to use us.

 

[steve_bank]

One escapes causality when one reaches causal escape velocity. You will feel a kick in the butt before somebody kicks yiu in the butt.

 

[fromderinside]

You build your model

And there it is, acknowledgement that there is a model in my head.

I don't need to measure the neurons to know this (yes you do) it is made apparent by the existence of the plan written down on the paper that other people can observe.

It is proof that there is some geometry of connectivity which encodes and implements it physically. (woo woo)

I need no more than this: the plan, the model, can be objectively evaluated, and so the plan, the model, the will, objectively exists. (poof)

And whether the model this will is reliant on is accurate enough to accomplish the goal, determines whether it is "free". (from the mouths of the converted)

Sorry Jarhyn. Everything you claim is subjective, based on your impressions which you know nothing about how they arise or are propagated. What you call objective is the paper you create from what you think. Writing down what you think is subjective. Ergo a subjective product. Step up. Do the experiment. Invest in material evidence outside yourself. You may have operations available to you but you are too lazy, apparently, to use them to justify what you claim. Paper and pencil claims are worth no more than the struck match to make them disappear.

 

[Jarhyn]

You build your model

And there it is, acknowledgement that there is a model in my head.

I don't need to measure the neurons to know this (yes you do) it is made apparent by the existence of the plan written down on the paper that other people can observe.

It is proof that there is some geometry of connectivity which encodes and implements it physically.

I need no more than this: the plan, the model, can be objectively evaluated, and so the plan, the model, the will, objectively exists.

And whether the model this will is reliant on is accurate enough to accomplish the goal, determines whether it is "free".

Sorry Jarhyn. Everything you claim is subjective, based on your impressions which you know nothing about how they arise...

No, everything in claim here is a fact. The plan on the paper that I wrote that someone else managed to interpret as a plan, that is objective.

I do know how they arise to the extent of "it's a neural network, but it doesn't really matter how it is represented by the material, only that it is, and it is, observably, by the fact it translates."

You are here, after acknowledging the existence of this model, claiming it does not exist.

The model exists just as much as the automation script, the plan that the machine I made executes, exists.

I can absolutely take that one from script to transistors, but I don't have to. I know that it works from script to transistors on the basis of a plan because I hit the button and it does what I expect!

I don't need to know specifically how they arise any more than I need to know exactly what series of events life was spawned completely on accident on to know that it was some complete accident some few billion years ago, and that we all evolved since then from some common ancestor.

I need to know that neurons can create systems capable of modelling and holding a plan, and I need to know my brain runs on a neuron infrastructure, and this is enough to know I am capable of modelling and holding plans; knowing I am capable of modelling and holding plans gets me to "my models and the plans within them can be evaluated", and the capability of OBJECTIVE evaluation means objective reality to the idea of a "free" will versus a constrained one.

My stochastic inability to say where between the posts my ball just flew does not in any way invalidate the fact that I got it between the posts.

 

[DBT]

Whatever people thought in the past was necessitated by the conditions of the time, the world, the environment and personal circumstances which determined the range and content of thought during any given period, ie, an ancient Roman citizen was incapable of thinking about Astrophysics because that information did not exist at the time.

Yes. But a simpler explanation of a history of causation is, well, history. Astronomy was studied in ancient times because it helped trace the seasons for planting and harvesting. There were reading stones leading to eyeglasses leading to the telescope leading to Astrophysics.

The key element in this natural progression of events was human curiosity and imagination. The biological drive to survive, thrive, and reproduce followed by the intelligence to imagine new possibilities from current facts.

Causal necessity played no role, because, well it is descriptive and not causative. Biological drives and Intelligence are causative. The evolution of ideas and new inventions are the necessary result of curiosity and imagination.

So, to the extent that the progress of science is a good thing, it is not happening due to causal necessity, but rather happening because of us.

It's evolution at work, environmental Pressure. Other species have evolved speed, strength, the ability to fly, super eyesight, etc.

Being unaware or aware of the process of necessitation, determinism or causality (whatever suits) doesn't free anyone from it.

Fortunately, no one experiences causal necessitation, determinism, or causality as something that we need to be free of. Well, at least they never experienced it prior to the creation of the paradox.

Instead they experienced the specific effects of specific causes. Some of these causes, like viral diseases, actually constrained them. Some of them, like medical discoveries, freed them from diseases.

Right now, we need to be set free from the stupid forking paradox.

Nobody can be free of the world or how it works. We are imbedded in it, an inseparable part of it.

Evolution gave us intelligence, curiosity, thought, reason, etc.....

 

[fromderinside]

You build your model

And there it is, acknowledgement that there is a model in my head.

I don't need to measure the neurons to know this (yes you do) it is made apparent by the existence of the plan written down on the paper that other people can observe.

It is proof that there is some geometry of connectivity which encodes and implements it physically.

I need no more than this: the plan, the model, can be objectively evaluated, and so the plan, the model, the will, objectively exists.

And whether the model this will is reliant on is accurate enough to accomplish the goal, determines whether it is "free".

Sorry Jarhyn. Everything you claim is subjective, based on your impressions which you know nothing about how they arise...

No, everything in claim here is a fact. The plan on the paper that I wrote that someone else managed to interpret as a plan, that is objective.

I do know how they arise to the extent of "it's a neural network, but it doesn't really matter how it is represented by the material, only that it is, and it is, observably, by the fact it translates."

Let's take an example of what I mean. Everybody can see an airplane in the air and see that it its flying. But what does it mean to see an airplane in the air? What causes flight? Comparably everyone can see you have a game that is played by a set of rules. But what does it mean to see a game played by a set of rules? What causes game?

Flight and games are similar in that they both need to be explained in terms of material law. It the case of your game you need to set down the a set of operations that need be carried out as rules else no one can play the game. The closer you make your rules to those explaining how to produce flight the better your experimental design to explaining how to produce game.

Your swimming around in unknowing waters is a serious flaw in your thinking about why one needs to do experiments and what it means to explain in terms of material law.

 

[DBT]

compatibilism, which means..

No, compatibilism does not mean linking anything to anything.

If your claims are relevant to the debate, you need to explain how and why they are relevant.

Otherwise, you are merely handwaving.

Compatibilism just says "this idea remains compatible with this other idea."

Of course it does. And a theist can just say ''God created the heavens and the Earth.''

Compatibilism just says "this thing can exist alongside or during this other condition/property"

A Christian can just say 'salvation is through Jesus.'

There is no "implies" relationship as comes from "determinism" properties there is no link, they are independent aspects of the system.

A deterministic system may not feature free will if the system evolution were in "constant time", but it is not: one cannot know the current state and next state without having calculated current state and all preceding states. Y = x+2, for example, is a system which allows no freedom.

A stochastic system may not feature free will if 100% of the input to system states is within the domain of randomness. Snakes and ladders offers no freedom either.

A car with power windows is compatible, as a concept, with having seat heaters. Having seat heaters is compatible with power windows. Most cars with heated seats do have power windows, but it one is not required by the other. Power Windows are compatible with Seat Heaters.

These properties are simply not dependent nor implied. They are merely "compatible".

As it happens that it was you who made references to Godels Theorem, stochastic subsystems, etc, it is up to you to explain how this is relevant to the issue of free will in relation to determinism.

Can you do that or not?

 

[DBT]

I can only point out the problems with compatibilism as I see it. The opposition argues from their perspective. Whether someone is convinced or not is a matter of how they perceive the issue. And around and around it goes.

It’s true the discussion goes round and round, because you draw inferences from empirical facts, but these inferences have no empirical justification.

There are two sides of the debate. Each side argues for their own position.

You continue to suppose that the “laws” of nature are prescriptive, when in fact they are descriptive. Descriptions of nature cannot cause ANYTHING to happen; it is the other way around: The descriptions take their truth from the way the world is. The way that the world is, causes the descriptions to be true.

Both sides here agree on the nature of determinism. Each participant has given essentially the same definition of determinism.

Hence there is full agreement on the definition of determinism.

I have quoted both Marvin Edwards and Jarhyn's definitions several times.

Second, you continually commit the modal fallacy of claiming that because we DID NOT do x, then we COULD NOT HAVE DONE x.

Determinism, by definition, does not permit 'could have done otherwise' - to make that claim is itself a fallacy;

Quote;
''Having made my choice or decision and acted upon it, could I have chosen otherwise or not? [. . . ] Here the [compatibilist], hoping to surrender nothing and yet to avoid the problem im-plied in the question, bids us not to ask it; the question itself, he announces, is without meaning. For to say that I could have done otherwise, he says, means only that I would have done otherwise, if those inner states that determined my action had been different; if, that is, I had decided or chosen differently.

To ask, accordingly, whether I could have chosen or decided differently is only to ask whether, had I decided to decide differently, or chosen to choose differently, or willed to will differently, I would have decided or chosen or willed differently. And this, of course, is unintelligible nonsense [. . . ] But it is not nonsense to ask whether the cause of my actions my own inner choices, decisions, and desires are themselves caused.

And of course, they are, if determinism is true, for on that thesis everything is caused and determined. And if they are, then we cannot avoid concluding that, given the causal conditions of those inner states, I could not have decided, willed, chosen, or desired other than I, in fact, did, for this is a logical consequence of the very definition of determinism. Of course, we can still say that, if the causes of those inner states, whatever they were, had been different, then their effects, those inner states themselves, would have been different, and that in this hypothetical sense I could have decided, chosen, willed, or desired differently but that only pushes our problem back still another step [Italics added].

For we will then want to know whether the causes of those inner states were within my control, and so on ad infinitum. We are, at each step, permitted to say could have been otherwise, only in a provision sense provided, that is, that something else had been different but must then retract it and replace it with could not have been otherwise as soon as we discover, as we must at each step, that whatever would have to have been different could not have been different (Taylor, 1992: 45-46).''

You quote philosophers like Hoefer and experimentalists like Libet in support of your position, but overlook the fact that neither agrees with your position. That’s OK; you’re free to use their definitions and experiments in support of your claims, while perhaps averring that they themselves have come to faulty conclusions based on their own definitions and experiments. But the fact that they disagree with you might at least give you pause, it seems to me.

Libet, et al, have tried to salvage free will, but failed. I've already explained why Libet's 'veto function' does not work. Basically, veto is not an independent agent vetoing decision, just new information acting upon the system, altering information processing activity, a train of thought is altered if there is sufficient time, which is experienced in conscious form as a change of mind.

It's no more a matter of free will than the original thought. Same mechanism, same processes.

Why is this ignored?

 

[DBT]

The fact that a person will not do otherwise does not logically imply that they cannot do otherwise. The conflation of what "will" happen with what "can" happen is a logical, linguistic, and semantic error. One that I've described in detail.

Me, too!

Nope;

''For we will then want to know whether the causes of those inner states were within my control, and so on ad infinitum. We are, at each step, permitted to say could have been otherwise, only in a provision sense provided, that is, that something else had been different but must then retract it and replace it with could not have been otherwise as soon as we discover, as we must at each step, that whatever would have to have been different could not have been different'' (Taylor, 1992: 45-46).

Pretty much everything I have said, described, quoted and cited conflicts with the notion of free will.

But nothing you've said conflicts with the notion of a choice being made while free of coercion and undue influence.

Your "free will" always seems to require being free of something else, like freedom from causation or freedom from oneself, or freedom from ones brain, etc.

If you define "free will" as something that you know to be impossible, then it appears to me to be a strawman. Why would you choose a definition of free will that you know is impossible?

Determinism by nature and definition eliminates freedom of will.

But a choice we make while free of coercion and undue influence is deterministic by any rational definition of determinism. All of the events in the choosing process follow one upon the other through natural cause and effect. The restaurant menu requires us to make a choice. The choosing necessarily leads to a specific choice.

So, my question here is, are you are using a definition of determinism that is designed to eliminate free will? If so, then that definition would also be a strawman.

It basically comes down to a lack of the necessary regulatory control for will to qualify as being free.

And yet we have sufficient regulatory control to decide for ourselves what we will order for dinner. This would seem to refute the claim that we lack sufficient regulatory control for a choice that is free of coercion and undue influence.

Still a matter of the right kind of regulative control to qualify as free will, and always was;

To recap the consequence argument again;

Quote:
''The consequence argument can be viewed as part of a more general incompatibilist argument. This standard incompatibilist argument can be stated as follows (see Kane, 2002):

(1) The existence of alternative possibilities (or the agent's power to do otherwise) is a necessary condition for acting freely.

(2) Determinism is not compatible with alternative possibilities (it precludes the power to do otherwise).

(3) Therefore, determinism is not compatible with acting freely.

The consequence argument can be seen as a defense of premise (2), the crucial premise, since it maintains that, if determinism is true, the future is not open but is rather the consequence of the past (going back before we were born) and the laws of nature.''

Now, we would indeed lack sufficient regulatory control to make this choice while "free of our brains", or "free of our prior causes", or otherwise "free of our selves". But, again, those are impossible freedoms. So, if you attach any of those "freedoms", to the notion of free will, a strawman, something that you know cannot exist, is created.

No, it's matter of inner necessitation; the state of the system determining behavioral: thought and action.

From the consequence argument; (1) The existence of alternative possibilities (or the agent's power to do otherwise) is a necessary condition for acting freely.''

Freedom

If something is determined/necessitated, it is not free to choose or do otherwise.

The fact that a person will not do otherwise does not logically imply that they cannot do otherwise. The conflation of what "will" happen with what "can" happen is a logical, linguistic, and semantic error. One that I've described in detail.

Can you recall the explanation I gave, and explain what it is you find wrong with it?

The consequences of determinism are that nothing can possibly be different. A person cannot do otherwise within a determined system;

Again;
''We are, at each step, permitted to say ''could have been otherwise'' only in a provision sense provided, that is, that something else had been different but must then retract it and replace it with ''could not have been otherwise'' as soon as we discover, as we must at each step, that whatever would have to have been different could not have been different'' (Taylor, 1992: 45-46).

I'll have to leave the rest, I'm in a busy period for the next few days.

That's essentially the heart of the issue anyway.

 

[Jarhyn]

, it is up to you to explain how this is relevant to the issue of free will in relation to determinism.

Can you do that or not?

I did. Repeatedly. You are apparently either too religious or have too many difficulties in picking up new understanding to read through some posts in what is admittedly college level English.

 

[Jarhyn]

games are similar in that they both need to be explained in terms of material law

No, games are interesting here and this reveals an interesting failure to your perspective in that games, the theory behind them, does not need to be explained by material law. Games are CREATED by the invention of physical law.

This is that whole "descriptive" "prescriptive" thing.

The game "Nim" would exist in any universe no matter it's physics as long as that universe is capable of being modeled by math.

It doesn't require even that universe be made of quarks or photons or gluons or baryons.

This is nothing more than a lame "hard determinism of the gaps".

As it is neural networks are well explained by natural law, and as demonstrated, we don't need everything to be explained by natural law with all the fuzzy parts filled in to observe something like evolution.

Fuck, Darwin didn't even know DNA existed when he described evolution, yet pretty much everyone knew he was right about things since he first proposed his theory.

You don't need to know neurons exist to know something in the body is taking information, translating it somehow to meat format, and then operating on that as a template for action, a recipe for behavior.

You don't need to know how neurons generate transitive effects or how switching systems give rise to implementation of such plans to see that they do, or to actually pick apart the plan and analyze it.

To say that we do is merely hand-waving hard determinism of the gaps.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It's evolution at work, environmental Pressure. Other species have evolved speed, strength, the ability to fly, super eyesight, etc. ... Evolution gave us intelligence, curiosity, thought, reason, etc.....

Well, evolution doesn't actually do any work. Instead it describes how species with beneficial genetic mutations gain a survival advantage over prior versions of their species. Thus the mutations that aid survival remain while detrimental mutations die out. All of this happens without intention.

Instinctual intentions show up with the first living organisms. Deliberate intentions show up with the first intelligent species.

Only intelligent species can imagine alternatives, estimate the likely outcomes of their options, and thus choose the option that it believes will produce the best outcome.

Nobody can be free of the world or how it works.

Exactly! And that is why freedom from reality is an impossible freedom. So, it cannot be used as a requirement of free will or free speech or free of charge or any other form of freedom. It would be silly to expect any of those freedoms to require freedom from how the world works.

We are imbedded in it, an inseparable part of it.

Well, no. We are actually a distinct part of the world. We are one of those parts of the world that have the ability to form deliberate intentions that result in deliberate actions that change some other parts of the world in some way. And, hopefully, we will not be imbedded in it until we're dead.

 

[Jarhyn]

We are imbedded in it, an inseparable part of it

Embedded in, but "inseparable" is heavily contextual if it can ever be considered true.

We can absolutely make evaluations of parts of the whole "separately" from the rest.

I do not need to know what black holes are merging on the far side of Andromeda to make a plan on what to eat for breakfast this morning.

I evaluate separately from those things; they have no leverage on my decisions.

There is still locality.

 

[fromderinside]

games are similar in that they both need to be explained in terms of material law

No, games are interesting here and this reveals an interesting failure to your perspective in that games, the theory behind them, does not need to be explained by material law. Games are CREATED by the invention of physical law.

This is that whole "descriptive" "prescriptive" thing.

The game "Nim" would exist in any universe no matter it's physics as long as that universe is capable of being modeled by math.

It doesn't require even that universe be made of quarks or photons or gluons or baryons.

This is nothing more than a lame "hard determinism of the gaps".

As it is neural networks are well explained by natural law, and as demonstrated, we don't need everything to be explained by natural law with all the fuzzy parts filled in to observe something like evolution.

Fuck, Darwin didn't even know DNA existed when he described evolution, yet pretty much everyone knew he was right about things since he first proposed his theory.

You don't need to know neurons exist to know something in the body is taking information, translating it somehow to meat format, and then operating on that as a template for action, a recipe for behavior.

You don't need to know how neurons generate transitive effects or how switching systems give rise to implementation of such plans to see that they do, or to actually pick apart the plan and analyze it.

To say that we do is merely hand-waving hard determinism of the gaps.

No. Games in an alternative universe with alternative physical laws would likely be different from games in our physical universe. I take your game approach to arrive at that conclusion. That approach was taken to arrive at a many world interpretation in quantum mechanics.

Mind is a fictional bit player in discovering what is the world. One that needs re-interpretation every time another approach is taken to explain existence. Maths need matter, a variable that is different in every multiple worlds theory, to be meaningful. "When you wish upon a star ...."

 

[Marvin Edwards]

''For we will then want to know whether the causes of those inner states were within my control, and so on ad infinitum. "

No! Taylor is making the same mistake as many others. And I've mention this to you when you made the same error. It is never required that we be the cause of ourselves in order for us to be the meaningful and relevant cause of what we do!

I did not need to micromanage my neural activity, because I happened to BE that neural activity ordering the salad for dinner! The flaw in your logic and Taylor's is a false dualism, an attempt to separate me from my own brain. And that's pretty forked up, don't you think?

"We are, at each step, permitted to say could have been otherwise, only in a provision sense provided, that is, that something else had been different but must then retract it and replace it with could not have been otherwise as soon as we discover, as we must at each step, that whatever would have to have been different could not have been different'' (Taylor, 1992: 45-46).

Geez. Taylor is about to blow a gasket trying to conflate "can" with "will". The notion of "could have" is ALWAYS provisional! It never stops being provisional in any literal usage. That innate "provided that things were otherwise" is logically embodied in every use of "could have".

That's why no one can claim that determinism rules out "could have done otherwise", because "could have" always implies "provided that things were otherwise". And that is perfectly consistent with deterministic causal necessity.

But nothing you've said conflicts with the notion of a choice being made while free of coercion and undue influence.

Your "free will" always seems to require being free of something else, like freedom from causation or freedom from oneself, or freedom from ones brain, etc.

If you define "free will" as something that you know to be impossible, then it appears to me to be a strawman. Why would you choose a definition of free will that you know is impossible?

Still a matter of the right kind of regulative control to qualify as free will, and always was;

Then what is the "right" kind of regulative control needed to qualify as a choice that is free of coercion and undue influence? Are you still talking about the phony control of my own neurons as they make my choice?

To recap the consequence argument again;

Quote:
''The consequence argument can be viewed as part of a more general incompatibilist argument. This standard incompatibilist argument can be stated as follows (see Kane, 2002):
(1) The existence of alternative possibilities (or the agent's power to do otherwise) is a necessary condition for acting freely.
(2) Determinism is not compatible with alternative possibilities (it precludes the power to do otherwise).
(3) Therefore, determinism is not compatible with acting freely.
The consequence argument can be seen as a defense of premise (2), the crucial premise, since it maintains that, if determinism is true, the future is not open but is rather the consequence of the past (going back before we were born) and the laws of nature.''

From the consequence argument; (1) The existence of alternative possibilities (or the agent's power to do otherwise) is a necessary condition for acting freely.''

Hello, Gregg Caruso. He's the one suggesting that we apply a hospital's notion of quarantining to justify imprisoning criminal offenders. But here he's simply arguing for incompatibilism.

We've already discussed in detail why his second premise is false. Determinism is not only compatible with alternate possibilities, but it actually makes them causally necessary every time a person makes a choice. If it was determined that we would eat in the restaurant, then it was also determined that we would have to deal with a menu of alternate possibilities, and reduce that set of possibilities to a single dinner order.

All of the elements of that scenario are equally deterministic and equally causally necessary, including every possibility on the menu.

You seem to think that Gregg has a valid argument for incompatibilism. But, as you can see now, he does not.

The fact that a person will not do otherwise does not logically imply that they cannot do otherwise. The conflation of what "will" happen with what "can" happen is a logical, linguistic, and semantic error. One that I've described in detail.

Can you recall the explanation I gave, and explain what it is you find wrong with it?

The consequences of determinism are that nothing can possibly be different. A person cannot do otherwise within a determined system;

Apparently you did not understand my explanation. If you did then you would realize that the consequences of determinism is that nothing will be different, despite the fact that many things could have been different.

If I have to choose between A and B, then it is logically required that "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" are both true. However, it is the opposite with "I will choose A" and "I will choose B" because only one of them is true.

If "I will choose A" is true, then "I could have chosen B" will also be true.
If "I will choose B" is true, then "I could have chosen A" will also be true.

That's how these words work. They must not be confused by figurative statements like "If I will choose A then it is AS IF I could not have chosen B". The figurative statement is literally false.

 

[Jarhyn]

games are similar in that they both need to be explained in terms of material law

No, games are interesting here and this reveals an interesting failure to your perspective in that games, the theory behind them, does not need to be explained by material law. Games are CREATED by the invention of physical law.

This is that whole "descriptive" "prescriptive" thing.

The game "Nim" would exist in any universe no matter it's physics as long as that universe is capable of being modeled by math.

It doesn't require even that universe be made of quarks or photons or gluons or baryons.

This is nothing more than a lame "hard determinism of the gaps".

As it is neural networks are well explained by natural law, and as demonstrated, we don't need everything to be explained by natural law with all the fuzzy parts filled in to observe something like evolution.

Fuck, Darwin didn't even know DNA existed when he described evolution, yet pretty much everyone knew he was right about things since he first proposed his theory.

You don't need to know neurons exist to know something in the body is taking information, translating it somehow to meat format, and then operating on that as a template for action, a recipe for behavior.

You don't need to know how neurons generate transitive effects or how switching systems give rise to implementation of such plans to see that they do, or to actually pick apart the plan and analyze it.

To say that we do is merely hand-waving hard determinism of the gaps.

No. Games in an alternative universe with alternative physical laws would likely be different from games in our physical universe. I take your game approach to arrive at that conclusion. That approach was taken to arrive at a many world interpretation in quantum mechanics.

Mind is a fictional bit player in discovering what is the world. One that needs re-interpretation every time another approach is taken to explain existence. Maths need matter, a variable that is different in every multiple worlds theory, to be meaningful. "When you wish upon a star ...."

Then you misunderstand math. Math discusses sets of "things". The things described by it are abstract, and don't require a specific kind of matter.

Physics does not have to conform to descriptions possible by math, but the math may still be valid within the axioms.

And worse you do not see your own circularity, that you ascribe a word of math "deterministic" as a description of the universe, and then deny that math is metaphysically descriptive rather than merely physically so.

 

[fromderinside]

Maths need matter, a variable that is different in every multiple worlds theory, to be meaningful. "When you wish upon a star ...."

Then you misunderstand math. Math discusses sets of "things". The things described by it are abstract, and don't require a specific kind of matter.

Physics does not have to conform to descriptions possible by math, but the math may still be valid within the axioms. (Or not)

And worse you do not see your own circularity, that you ascribe a word of math "deterministic" as a description of the universe, and then deny that math is metaphysically descriptive rather than merely physically so.

We are physical entities in a particular location talking about something we can't envision. We can experience determinism but we can't specify what is actually determined. It's the us here in this corner of the universe claiming we know what we can't know.

I deny your claim of my circularity.

I am here, this is what I experience. I see deterministic as how the world (my world) operates. As such it has nothing to do with maths, actually abstractions. Abstractions are less than the whole, cutting corners where desirable rather than where as necessary.