Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Jarhyn]

Maths need matter, a variable that is different in every multiple worlds theory, to be meaningful. "When you wish upon a star ...."

Then you misunderstand math. Math discusses sets of "things". The things described by it are abstract, and don't require a specific kind of matter.

Physics does not have to conform to descriptions possible by math, but the math may still be valid within the axioms. (Or not)

And worse you do not see your own circularity, that you ascribe a word of math "deterministic" as a description of the universe, and then deny that math is metaphysically descriptive rather than merely physically so.

We are physical entities in a particular location talking about something we can't envision. We can experience determinism but we can't specify what is actually determined. It's the us here in this corner of the universe claiming we know what we can't know.

I deny your claim of my circularity.

I am here, this is what I experience. I see deterministic as how the world (my world) operates. As such it has nothing to do with maths, actually abstractions. Abstractions are less than the whole, cutting corners where desirable rather than where as necessary.

Just... Look up the topic of a complex manifold some time.

Math models things that are the very definition of imaginary.

Math can describe a number greater than the sum total of elementary quantum numbers available across the whole cosmic cycle as pertains to our reference frame.

Math can describe things that are not "real"

Interestingly, math cannot describe randomness other than to describe "what happened", not why. Randomness is the one thing outside math's grasp.

You can deny your circularity all you wish, as that is, in fact, what religious people do and people have a right to be religious.

But everyone else has the right to say "that's religious, not rational!" In the places you speak it. And so I say thusly.

At any rate, the bolded portion is what you should focus on because that is infact the basis of my cause for understanding wills as free: because we cannot specify what is determined, we are limited to incomplete, imperfect wills that are subject to freedom or constraint as they may be. This is where Godel's Incompleteness Theorem comes in, and what it demands.

Your inconsistent ability to deny that people plan plans and that these plans are views into (generally fairly accurate) depictions of possible futures as extends from the plan, and that people may hold more than one of these, and that they can be accurate enough to get the goal or that they can be so inaccurate as to be hopeless, tells me that there may be a fundamental difference in the nature by which you experience the universe versus the way I do.

 

[steve_bank]

Reductionism is an expression of causality.

 

[fromderinside]

Not going down the rabbit hole. there is the world in which we live, the physical world, and there is the symbolic world which we use.

Everything that exists is matter and energy everything that is represented about the world as far as we know is symbolic. I'm sticking to the physical since we are talking about how matter and energy play.

Whether there are maths for all things physical we cannot be sure since we don't know the extent of what we mean by physical. Also we don't know the extent things can be represented since information, which Shannon and others claim is analogous to thermodynamics, is a statistical expression of symbol delineation beyond the range of maths. At best maths are an aspect of information.

In spite of the recent explosion of games plans are just an aspect of mathematics which is further an outgrowth of our attempts to quantify matter, energy, and now information.

 

[DBT]

It's evolution at work, environmental Pressure. Other species have evolved speed, strength, the ability to fly, super eyesight, etc. ... Evolution gave us intelligence, curiosity, thought, reason, etc.....

Well, evolution doesn't actually do any work. Instead it describes how species with beneficial genetic mutations gain a survival advantage over prior versions of their species.

Sure, that's how it works.

Thus the mutations that aid survival remain while detrimental mutations die out. All of this happens without intention.

Instinctual intentions show up with the first living organisms. Deliberate intentions show up with the first intelligent species.

Only intelligent species can imagine alternatives, estimate the likely outcomes of their options, and thus choose the option that it believes will produce the best outcome.

Deliberate intention is the work of a neural network with sufficient complexity to acquire and process information. An intention is formed according to a set of criteria.

Nobody can be free of the world or how it works.

Exactly! And that is why freedom from reality is an impossible freedom. So, it cannot be used as a requirement of free will or free speech or free of charge or any other form of freedom. It would be silly to expect any of those freedoms to require freedom from how the world works.

Freedom is a relative term. If will is unable to regulate or choose alternate actions in any given instance, it is not free.

We are imbedded in it, an inseparable part of it.

Well, no. We are actually a distinct part of the world. We are one of those parts of the world that have the ability to form deliberate intentions that result in deliberate actions that change some other parts of the world in some way. And, hopefully, we will not be imbedded in it until we're dead.

I didn't say that we don't have form and function, nor did I suggest that we are not distinct physical organisms.

 

[DBT]

We are imbedded in it, an inseparable part of it

Embedded in, but "inseparable" is heavily contextual if it can ever be considered true.

We can absolutely make evaluations of parts of the whole "separately" from the rest.

I do not need to know what black holes are merging on the far side of Andromeda to make a plan on what to eat for breakfast this morning.

I evaluate separately from those things; they have no leverage on my decisions.

There is still locality.

We didn't pop down from Mars. We evolved through an interaction of biology and the environment, the planet, its ecosystems, we acquire information from the external world and we respond to it according to our hierarchy of need and wants.....

 

[DBT]

, it is up to you to explain how this is relevant to the issue of free will in relation to determinism.

Can you do that or not?

I did. Repeatedly. You are apparently either too religious or have too many difficulties in picking up new understanding to read through some posts in what is admittedly college level English.

I don't see that you have provided anything that remotely ties Godels Theorem, stochastic subsystems, etc, to free will. You may think you have, of course you do, but that's far from being true.

Where is it? All I've seen is hand waving.

Rather than making vague references that you believe mean something, provide a formal argument that actually explains free will in relation to Godels Theorem or stochastic subsystems.

 

[DBT]

''For we will then want to know whether the causes of those inner states were within my control, and so on ad infinitum. "

No! Taylor is making the same mistake as many others. And I've mention this to you when you made the same error. It is never required that we be the cause of ourselves in order for us to be the meaningful and relevant cause of what we do!

It's not a matter of causing ourselves. The issue is the right kind of regulative control. That without the ability to choose alternate actions, we don't have free will.


If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

I did not need to micromanage my neural activity, because I happened to BE that neural activity ordering the salad for dinner! The flaw in your logic and Taylor's is a false dualism, an attempt to separate me from my own brain. And that's pretty forked up, don't you think?

We are the result of our neural activity. Whatever the brain is doing, that is what we are. The illusion of conscious control or will is exposed when things go wrong with the brain.

The state of the brain determines output, thought and action, which is clearly not an example of free will, if free will is meant to be significant or mean something.

"We are, at each step, permitted to say could have been otherwise, only in a provision sense provided, that is, that something else had been different but must then retract it and replace it with could not have been otherwise as soon as we discover, as we must at each step, that whatever would have to have been different could not have been different'' (Taylor, 1992: 45-46).

Geez. Taylor is about to blow a gasket trying to conflate "can" with "will". The notion of "could have" is ALWAYS provisional! It never stops being provisional in any literal usage. That innate "provided that things were otherwise" is logically embodied in every use of "could have".

That's why no one can claim that determinism rules out "could have done otherwise", because "could have" always implies "provided that things were otherwise". And that is perfectly consistent with deterministic causal necessity.

Different outcomes are impossible within a determined system, simple as that. An action, being determined, is the only possible action. There is no ''might have'' or ''could have'' - what has been determined is fixed, unchangeable, set.

But nothing you've said conflicts with the notion of a choice being made while free of coercion and undue influence.

Just that inconvenient little thing called ''inner necessitation.'' Whatever the system is doing in terms of [unconscious] information processing, we think and do. We don't consciously choose how we think, what we think or respond....that is determined unconsciously milliseconds before being brought to conscious attention.

Consciousness is always milliseconds after the event.

Still a matter of the right kind of regulative control to qualify as free will, and always was;

Then what is the "right" kind of regulative control needed to qualify as a choice that is free of coercion and undue influence? Are you still talking about the phony control of my own neurons as they make my choice?

If neural activity determines an outcome, the outcome is not freely chosen. Without being freely chosen, an outcome is not freely willed.

It is an action based on brain state, not will.



Decision-Making
''Decision-making is such a seamless brain process that we’re usually unaware of it — until our choice results in unexpected consequences. Then we may look back and wonder, “Why did I choose that option?” In recent years, neuroscientists have begun to decode the decision-making process. What they’re learning is shedding light not only on how the healthy brain performs complex mental functions, but also on how disorders, such as stroke or drug abuse, affect the process.''

''Researchers can study decision-making in animals. As monkeys decide which direction a moving target is headed, researchers record the activity in brain cells called neurons. These studies have helped to reveal the basis for how animals and humans make everyday decisions.''

Thanks to advances in technology, researchers are beginning to unravel the mysterious processes by which humans make decisions. New research is helping scientists develop:

A deeper understanding of how the human brain reasons, plans, and solves problems. Greater insight into how sleep deprivation, drug abuse, neurological disorders, and other factors affect the decision-making process, suggesting new behavioral and therapeutic approaches to improve health.

Our brains appear wired in ways that enable us, often unconsciously, to make the best decisions possible with the information we’re given. In simplest terms, the process is organized like a court trial. Sights, sounds, and other sensory evidence are entered and registered in sensory circuits in the brain. Other brain cells act as the brain’s “jury,” compiling and weighing each piece of evidence. When the accumulated evidence reaches a critical threshold, a judgment — a decision — is made.''

To recap the consequence argument again;

Quote:
''The consequence argument can be viewed as part of a more general incompatibilist argument. This standard incompatibilist argument can be stated as follows (see Kane, 2002):
(1) The existence of alternative possibilities (or the agent's power to do otherwise) is a necessary condition for acting freely.
(2) Determinism is not compatible with alternative possibilities (it precludes the power to do otherwise).
(3) Therefore, determinism is not compatible with acting freely.
The consequence argument can be seen as a defense of premise (2), the crucial premise, since it maintains that, if determinism is true, the future is not open but is rather the consequence of the past (going back before we were born) and the laws of nature.''

From the consequence argument; (1) The existence of alternative possibilities (or the agent's power to do otherwise) is a necessary condition for acting freely.''

Hello, Gregg Caruso. He's the one suggesting that we apply a hospital's notion of quarantining to justify imprisoning criminal offenders. But here he's simply arguing for incompatibilism.

Whatever else he is doing is irrelevant to the free will debate. The consequence argument is not unique. It's been around long before him. It occurred to me long ago, but I quote because it saves time, and free will debates are repetitive.

We've already discussed in detail why his second premise is false. Determinism is not only compatible with alternate possibilities, but it actually makes them causally necessary every time a person makes a choice. If it was determined that we would eat in the restaurant, then it was also determined that we would have to deal with a menu of alternate possibilities, and reduce that set of possibilities to a single dinner order.

There are no realizable alternate possibilities within a determined system. That is how determinism works and how it is defined.

We, with our limited perspective, see a number of possibilities, yet only one course of action is open to us: the one we must necessarily take.

All of the elements of that scenario are equally deterministic and equally causally necessary, including every possibility on the menu.

You seem to think that Gregg has a valid argument for incompatibilism. But, as you can see now, he does not.

The fact that a person will not do otherwise does not logically imply that they cannot do otherwise. The conflation of what "will" happen with what "can" happen is a logical, linguistic, and semantic error. One that I've described in detail.

Can you recall the explanation I gave, and explain what it is you find wrong with it?

Determinism doesn't allow it. If conditions were different, a different outcome would not only be possible, it would be necessitated.

But of course, conditions within a determined system cannot be different, hence there is no possibility of an alternate action.

The consequences of determinism are that nothing can possibly be different. A person cannot do otherwise within a determined system;

Apparently you did not understand my explanation. If you did then you would realize that the consequences of determinism is that nothing will be different, despite the fact that many things could have been different.

Things ''could have been different'' if conditions were different - but as conditions were not different, post hoc references to 'could have been different' is meaningless.

If I have to choose between A and B, then it is logically required that "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" are both true. However, it is the opposite with "I will choose A" and "I will choose B" because only one of them is true.

If "I will choose A" is true, then "I could have chosen B" will also be true.
If "I will choose B" is true, then "I could have chosen A" will also be true.

That's how these words work. They must not be confused by figurative statements like "If I will choose A then it is AS IF I could not have chosen B". The figurative statement is literally false.

That argument is an expression of both the limits of our understanding of the state of the system, and the 'folk psychology of free will.'

''For we will then want to know whether the causes of those inner states were within my control, and so on ad infinitum. We are, at each step, permitted to say could have been otherwise, only in a provision sense provided, that is, that something else had been different but must then retract it and replace it with could not have been otherwise as soon as we discover, as we must at each step, that whatever would have to have been different could not have been different.'' (Taylor, 1992: 45-46).

 

[Jarhyn]

I don't see

No, you don't, which is what makes participating in this thread about as difficult as participating in a MrIntelligentDesign thread: they don't see, because they don't want to, and you similarly seem like you do not want to.

"Stochastic planners", which is all we ever can be due to Godel's Incompleteness Theorem despite the determinancy of the system (which is at best "just-so deterministic" and at worse actually stochastic, containing some true and incomprehensible source of randomness), are limited to having imperfect plans of the future.

This means plans may be evaluated objectively for conformity to stochastically modeled elements of the deterministic future.

This means that these objectively extant plans, real geometries of the stuff and part of the causal necessity to the outcome, are objective features of the system.

The will (the plan) can be objectively evaluated for freedom (conformity to reality).

We have a "will" that is real, objectively. We have "freedom" as a property of that will, objectively..

 

[Jarhyn]

and wants.....

... also known as our "wills".

And those wills can either be constrained (valid, attainable, unopposed), or free. They can be objectively evaluated as such.

I as an object have a sub object which in context to the rest of it makes it a plan and that object either objectively models the universe such that the goal is fulfilled or it objectively does not. There may even be different but still objectively real degrees but which it is free and constrained.

 

[pood]

Wrong, both Marvin Edwards and Jarhyn gave essentially the same definition that I use, which is from the Standford page on causal determinism

Sigh. Yes, I know, DBT, it’s from your precious Stanford page on causal determinism. Did you read the whole Hoefer article? He contests his own definition and concludes that causal determinism does not rule out free will. How about that, huh?

Yet compatibilists use that basic definition of determinism. The very same definition that Marvin Edwards, who argues for compatibility, gave.

The very same definition that Jarhyn gave. The very same definition that is generally accepted as being the essence of determinism, no randomness, predictable outcomes.

How about that?

That Hoefer 'contests his own definition' - which predates Hoefer and his article - does not negate its validity.

How about that?

If determinism does not involve an inherently predictable progression of events within a system, it is not ''determinism. ''

How about that?

In any case, the definition is not holy writ. It is contestable. Hoefer himself recognizes this. We’ve been over this, yet you ignore all the rebuttals and simply repeat this stuff like a mantra. Any definition of determinism that incorporates or implies no free will, which btw Hoefer’s does not, is question begging and hence useless.

So you'd like ''determinism'' to mean whatever suits your needs? Do what you like, that's determinism? Random events, well, gosh, that's determinism, Oh, yeah, sure it is.....and Pigs Fly.

Where did I ever say the above? Nowhere. Did Marvin say anything like the above? No. Did Jarhyn? No. Stuffing straw is always a pretty good indictator of a losing argument.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Deliberate intention is the work of a neural network with sufficient complexity to acquire and process information. An intention is formed according to a set of criteria.

Yes. And sometimes it even involves multiple neural networks working together. For example, 12 people enter the jury room in order to deliberate over whether the offender is (A) innocent or (B) guilty of the crime. Some may feel the evidence is convincing beyond a reasonable doubt, others may be unconvinced. They will discuss the issue, review the evidence, and try to convince others to agree with their view.

That's the thing about choosing. Everybody has done it. Everybody knows how it works. Nobody outside of a philosophy class claims that it doesn't happen or that it is just an illusion.

Freedom is a relative term. If will is unable to regulate or choose alternate actions in any given instance, it is not free.

No juror expects to simply "will" everyone to agree with them. The process of choosing inputs two or more possibilities (innocent or guilty), applies some criteria of comparative evaluation (the evidence and the law), and outputs a single choice (either innocent or guilty). And they will all be doing this as a group, communicating with each other to reach a unanimous decision.

At the beginning of the process of deliberation, it is possible that the jury may return a guilty verdict and it is also possible that they may return a verdict of innocent. We don't know what will happen, but we know for certain what can happen (the offender can be found innocent and the offender can be found guilty).

At the end of the process we will know for certain what did happen and also what could have happened had the evidence been different.

All of the events, prior to, within, and following this process, were, of course, causally necessary from any prior point in time. But this is always the case of all events, so, it never serves any practical purpose to bring it up.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

and wants.....

... also known as our "wills".

And those wills can either be constrained (valid, attainable, unopposed), or free. They can be objectively evaluated as such.

I as an object have a sub object which in context to the rest of it makes it a plan and that object either objectively models the universe such that the goal is fulfilled or it objectively does not. There may even be different but still objectively real degrees but which it is free and constrained.

A "want" is something you may desire to do, whether you should do it or not.
A "will" is the intention to actually do it, which results in you actually doing it, whether you should do it or not.
There is a moral distinction between a "want" and a "will".

 

[Jarhyn]

and wants.....

... also known as our "wills".

And those wills can either be constrained (valid, attainable, unopposed), or free. They can be objectively evaluated as such.

I as an object have a sub object which in context to the rest of it makes it a plan and that object either objectively models the universe such that the goal is fulfilled or it objectively does not. There may even be different but still objectively real degrees but which it is free and constrained.

A "want" is something you may desire to do, whether you should do it or not.
A "will" is the intention to actually do it, which results in you actually doing it, whether you should do it or not.
There is a moral distinction between a "want" and a "will".

I don't really make that distinction. What I want, I have will towards. What I well assess that I have free will towards, I achieve (unless opposed quite persistently, usually).

The question is whether that will is opposed. Sometimes it's opposed by my own good sense, and my other, more important wills. Other times it's opposed persistently enough by others to dissuade me and get me to constrain my own will.

Other times, I walk into it knowing the consequences and doing it anyway, because sometimes it be like that.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It's not a matter of causing ourselves. The issue is the right kind of regulative control. That without the ability to choose alternate actions, we don't have free will.

And yet we have the ability to choose any item on the restaurant menu. This ability is easily demonstrated by choosing the steak today and choosing the salad tomorrow. The fact that we chose the steak today had no impact at all upon our ability to choose the salad.

The fact that it was causally necessary that we would choose the steak today did not affect in any way our ability to choose the salad. We retained that ability even as we ordered the steak. To test this, simply order the salad with the steak, or directly after ordering the steak.

You'll discover that you can order the salad at anytime you want. And, of course, it will either be causally necessary that you will want to order the salad at that time, or it will be causally necessary that you won't want to order the salad at that time.

In either case, causal necessity does not make you do anything that you don't already want to do.

If you accept 'http://www.princetonphilosophy.com/background/freewillprimer.pdf'
regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

First, DBT, you really need to stop posting that link. The link always gives a 404, and if I try to find the correct link by using the root www.princetonphilosophy.com I get a page in a foreign language and a message asking if I want to translate it! It is obviously not a part of the Princeton website.

Second, we're not concerned here with items 2 and 3, because we hold the same position on those.

Third, I've addressed 1, 4, and 5 repeatedly in these discussions.
1. Whenever choosing occurs, it will always be the case that there will be one action that I could have done, but did not do.
4. The fact that there will be at least one action that I could have done, but didn't, is fixed and unchangeable by determinism!
5. Therefore determinism is compatible with free will.

So, the guys at Princeton got it wrong.

I did not need to micromanage my neural activity, because I happened to BE that neural activity ordering the salad for dinner! The flaw in your logic and Taylor's is a false dualism, an attempt to separate me from my own brain. And that's pretty forked up, don't you think?

We are the result of our neural activity. Whatever the brain is doing, that is what we are. The illusion of conscious control or will is exposed when things go wrong with the brain.

You're still overstepping neuroscience if you're suggesting that conscious awareness is never involved in decision-making. But, it is obvious that we are not consciously micromanaging the unconscious neural activities.

It is still our own brains that are performing the deliberations that causally determine our choices, and that is not in any way an illusion. The empirical fact is that the person is choosing whether to have the steak or the salad. And the person will be responsible for paying the bill.

The state of the brain determines output, thought and action, which is clearly not an example of free will, if free will is meant to be significant or mean something.

The brain making decisions while free of coercion and undue influence is exactly what free will is. And this is a significant fact, because the person will be held responsible for their deliberate acts.

Different outcomes are impossible within a determined system, simple as that. An action, being determined, is the only possible action. There is no ''might have'' or ''could have'' - what has been determined is fixed, unchangeable, set.

Within this determined system, there are humans without knowledge of what has been determined. They have evolved a set of concepts that allow them to deal with this uncertainty. When they do not know what will happen, they imagine what can happen, to prepare for what does happen.

Something that can happen is not something that necessarily will happen. Something that could have happened is not something that did happen.

I tend to go along with your suggestion that "There is no ''might have'' or ''could have'' - what has been determined is fixed, unchangeable, set." But it follows logically that if determinism has no notions of "possibilities" then it also has no notions of "impossibilities".

Determinism must limit its claims to what will happen. It must remain silent as to what can or cannot happen. It may not make any claims as to what could have happened or could not have happened.

When determinism steps outside of its domain of concern (what will happen and what would have happened), it starts saying stupid things, of which it knows nothing (what can happen and what could have happened).

Decision-Making
''Decision-making is such a seamless brain process that we’re usually unaware of it — until our choice results in unexpected consequences. Then we may look back and wonder, “Why did I choose that option?” In recent years, neuroscientists have begun to decode the decision-making process. What they’re learning is shedding light not only on how the healthy brain performs complex mental functions, but also on how disorders, such as stroke or drug abuse, affect the process.''

''Researchers can study decision-making in animals. As monkeys decide which direction a moving target is headed, researchers record the activity in brain cells called neurons. These studies have helped to reveal the basis for how animals and humans make everyday decisions.''

Thanks to advances in technology, researchers are beginning to unravel the mysterious processes by which humans make decisions. New research is helping scientists develop:

A deeper understanding of how the human brain reasons, plans, and solves problems. Greater insight into how sleep deprivation, drug abuse, neurological disorders, and other factors affect the decision-making process, suggesting new behavioral and therapeutic approaches to improve health.

Our brains appear wired in ways that enable us, often unconsciously, to make the best decisions possible with the information we’re given. In simplest terms, the process is organized like a court trial. Sights, sounds, and other sensory evidence are entered and registered in sensory circuits in the brain. Other brain cells act as the brain’s “jury,” compiling and weighing each piece of evidence. When the accumulated evidence reaches a critical threshold, a judgment — a decision — is made.''

And none of that conflicts with anything I've said. The brain inputs the menu, weighs the evidence, and outputs its choice. Neuroscience helps explain the details, but does not change anything related to our understanding that the people in the restaurant are choosing for themselves what they will have for dinner.

We, with our limited perspective, see a number of possibilities, yet only one course of action is open to us: the one we must necessarily take.

If we only knew in advance the course of action that we must necessarily take, then we would have no use for the notions of possibilities! But the reality is that we often do not know what will happen next or even what we will decide to do next.

Thus, we imagine possible futures (for example, ordering the steak and the salad), mentally evaluate them in terms of the outcomes we desire (satisfaction of our tastes and our health goals), and choose the one that we believe will best suit our interests. The salad becomes what we will do. The steak becomes what we could have done.

You cannot use the notion of determinism to eliminate the notion of possibilities, because the choosing operation has given our species certain survival advantages that we would lose without it. So, please stop trying to break it!

If conditions were different, a different outcome would not only be possible, it would be necessitated.
But of course, conditions within a determined system cannot be different, hence there is no possibility of an alternate action.

Well, once you can tell us everything that will happen and everything that we will do, we'll give up the notion of possibilities. Until then, stop forking around with the solution that we've evolved to deal with our uncertainty.

If I have to choose between A and B, then it is logically required that "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" are both true. However, it is the opposite with "I will choose A" and "I will choose B" because only one of them is true.

If "I will choose A" is true, then "I could have chosen B" will also be true.
If "I will choose B" is true, then "I could have chosen A" will also be true.

That's how these words work. They must not be confused by figurative statements like "If I will choose A then it is AS IF I could not have chosen B". The figurative statement is literally false.

That argument is an expression of both the limits of our understanding of the state of the system, and the 'folk psychology of free will.'

Exactly. And until the determinist can tell us what we are destined to do, we must continue using the the concepts we've evolved to handle our limited understanding of the state of the system. So, don't break the existing system until you have understood it enough to suggest workable changes.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

and wants.....

... also known as our "wills".

And those wills can either be constrained (valid, attainable, unopposed), or free. They can be objectively evaluated as such.

I as an object have a sub object which in context to the rest of it makes it a plan and that object either objectively models the universe such that the goal is fulfilled or it objectively does not. There may even be different but still objectively real degrees but which it is free and constrained.

A "want" is something you may desire to do, whether you should do it or not.
A "will" is the intention to actually do it, which results in you actually doing it, whether you should do it or not.
There is a moral distinction between a "want" and a "will".

I don't really make that distinction. What I want, I have will towards. What I well assess that I have free will towards, I achieve (unless opposed quite persistently, usually).

The question is whether that will is opposed. Sometimes it's opposed by my own good sense, and my other, more important wills. Other times it's opposed persistently enough by others to dissuade me and get me to constrain my own will.

Other times, I walk into it knowing the consequences and doing it anyway, because sometimes it be like that.

You may have multiple desires (wants). I want to lose some weight but I also want some potato chips. My actions have consequences, but there are no actions until I decide what I will do about my wants.

(Whenever I told my father I wanted something, he'd say, "You're old enough for your wants not to hurt you.")

 

[Jarhyn]

and wants.....

... also known as our "wills".

And those wills can either be constrained (valid, attainable, unopposed), or free. They can be objectively evaluated as such.

I as an object have a sub object which in context to the rest of it makes it a plan and that object either objectively models the universe such that the goal is fulfilled or it objectively does not. There may even be different but still objectively real degrees but which it is free and constrained.

A "want" is something you may desire to do, whether you should do it or not.
A "will" is the intention to actually do it, which results in you actually doing it, whether you should do it or not.
There is a moral distinction between a "want" and a "will".

I don't really make that distinction. What I want, I have will towards. What I well assess that I have free will towards, I achieve (unless opposed quite persistently, usually).

The question is whether that will is opposed. Sometimes it's opposed by my own good sense, and my other, more important wills. Other times it's opposed persistently enough by others to dissuade me and get me to constrain my own will.

Other times, I walk into it knowing the consequences and doing it anyway, because sometimes it be like that.

You may have multiple desires (wants). I want to lose some weight but I also want some potato chips. My actions have consequences, but there are no actions until I decide what I will do about my wants.

(Whenever I told my father I wanted something, he'd say, "You're old enough for your wants not to hurt you.")

Oh, you're talking about "say it" wants. mere thoughts that have no Intent behind them.

I'm talking about things that have active wells of intent drawing one to them. There is indeed a difference; perhaps "moral" is the world to describe it but I have never used that idea at quite that angle in quite that position before?

When I just say "I want this thing" without there being a clear well of intent, it's more a probe, a question of whether I actually want it, sometimes; I speak the words in my head to test them and no more.

 

[Jarhyn]

Not going down the rabbit hole. there is the world in which we live, the physical world, and there is the symbolic world which we use...

Which is made of stuff of the physical world and interacts with other stuff of the physical world so as to act as a template of action.

It is the same kind of relationship as happens between DNA and the proteins that convert RNA of the DNA into other shit: there is a token stream, and there is an interpreter.

And the token stream as interpreted by the interpretor will either represent a behavior that will yield a success, as defined in a portion of the token stream, or by an observer, or by any game theoretic measure, or will yield failure.

This part of the geometry of reality, of that interplay, is what compatibilist are discussing as regards "free will within determinism".

 

[fromderinside]

Not going down the rabbit hole. there is the world in which we live, the physical world, and there is the symbolic world which we use...

Which is made of stuff of the physical world and interacts with other stuff of the physical world so as to act as a template of action.

Symbolic stuff is something that stands, for, can be expressed by, used to model the physical, it not something that is physical.

It is the same kind of relationship as happens between DNA and the proteins that convert RNA of the DNA into other shit: there is a token stream, and there is an interpreter.

You used a token stream, information, and an interpreter, information as a caricature of DNA metabolic processes which are all matter and energy processes, all physical characterized as models by information in the form of symbols. No identities here.

And the token stream as interpreted by the interpretor will either represent a behavior that will yield a success, as defined in a portion of the token stream, or by an observer, or by any game theoretic measure, or will yield failure.

Physical processes evolve to achieve function. Symbolic processes are created in models to mimic, test, or reflect what others think the physical processes they are modelled after do. Again not the same thing.

This part of the geometry of reality, of that interplay, is what compatibilist are discussing as regards "free will within determinism".

In summary you are saying you have models you think reflect what humans, material beings do.

I say you are all wet. No physical evidence for soul, mind, consciousness, choice, beyond models created by people based on what some humans think they understand about people without actually getting inside and finding such.

Until you get down to the level where you can do the maths based on the totality of physical evidence you have no argument. So far I see claims for equivalence and materiality that aren't.

Found empty vessel. Sank same. JP Jones.

Seems you need to use symbols to make a material thing and not some simulation to prove your case. ...and it has to be more than printing a gun. It has to be something that obeys the laws of evolution as does man that creates symbols. Have fun.

 

[Jarhyn]

Symbolic stuff is something that stands, for, can be expressed by, it not something that is physical

Every symbol on earth is something physical. The fact that it is symbolic means there is a physical interpreter.

you used a token stream, information, and an interpreter, information as a caricature of DNA metabolic processes which are all matter and energy processes, all physical characterized as models by information in the form of symbols. No identities here.

Nice word salad! MrIntelligentDesign would be proud.

Until you get down to the level

"Until you get down to the level where you explain every last bit and tittle and mutation through all history I won't believe evolution!!!"

Some other folks play that game too.

You have a model, you have an interpreter. I work with manmade model interpreters 8+ hours a day. I write source, I hit compile, that ends up as a machine code extension of the template, then the metal interprets that physically by having physics switches pulled by high and low charges that are the machine code in memory, as it indexes through that.

I can assess whether those plans will work just as easily as I can assess whether someone's less rigorously defined plans will work.

Do you or do you not agree that plans can be assessed as to whether they will work?

 

[fromderinside]

Symbolic stuff is something that stands, for, can be expressed by, it not something that is physical

Every symbol on earth is something physical. The fact that it is symbolic means there is a physical interpreter.

you used a token stream, information, and an interpreter, information as a caricature of DNA metabolic processes which are all matter and energy processes, all physical characterized as models by information in the form of symbols. No identities here.

Nice word salad! MrIntelligentDesign would be proud. (parse it then!)

Until you get down to the level

"Until you get down to the level where you explain every last bit and tittle and mutation through all history I won't believe evolution!!!"

Some other folks play that game too.

You have a model, you have an interpreter. I work with manmade model interpreters 8+ hours a day. I write source, I hit compile, that ends up as a machine code extension of the template, then the metal interprets that physically by having physics switches pulled by high and low charges that are the machine code in memory, as it indexes through that.

I can assess whether those plans will work just as easily as I can assess whether someone's less rigorously defined plans will work.

Do you or do you not agree that plans can be assessed as to whether they will work?

Its a matter of properties. As for "all of evolution" that one hell of an extrapolation Especially when the forces and materiality of the simulations are completely different material and energy. You have to get past "like' and on to 'unto' before you will be eating the breakfast of champions. Simulations, executed plans, aren't using the same properties to accomplish their approximations of what they are simulating.

I really don't care if a plan works. I care if a plan is being. Unless it can produce the exact results, it isn't the same. I have never seen a plan reproduce even an amoeba. I've actually run ant nervous system programs, plans that use and act the same as the neurons in an ant it it has yet to be an ant. Its a f**king program. It is run on a computer. The materiality is completely different.

I know plans work. I've designed and run A/C simulations as operator (pilot). It didn't actually fly. It just made me fell a little like I was flying. Not the same thing. Still, they are plans they aren't the actual things they lack some attributes as a result.

In your imaginary world we don't need a Hadron Collider we just need a plan. Sleep peacefully sweet prince. -30 -