Compatibilism: What's that About?

[DBT]

It's a cognitive process. Inputs acting upon the system, the system processes acquired information, each step determines the next.

Yes. My system cognitively processes the menu, considers its options, and determines my choice, "each step determines the next".

Yet, this has nothing to do with free will. Cognition - a physical process - does not automatically equate to free will. Cognition, therefore free will is a fallacy.

Cognition does not equate to free will. Two entirely different things, one physical the other conceptual.

Everything that we know of, is both physical and conceptual. The choosing operation is both a physical process as well as a logical process. And everything we have to say about any physical processes is a matter of logically processing information about it. We only know of physical processes through logical concepts. So, don't criticize our model of reality for being conceptual, because that is the only way that anything real is understood.

That something is a physical process does not equate to free will. That something is conceptual does not equate to free will.

For something to qualify as free will requires the ability to have done otherwise. To regulate decision making in the right kind of way, through the agency of will.

As determinism doesn't allow alternate actions and will is not the executive of cognition or decision making, free will does not exist.

 

[DBT]

Wrong, both Marvin Edwards and Jarhyn gave essentially the same definition that I use, which is from the Standford page on causal determinism

Sigh. Yes, I know, DBT, it’s from your precious Stanford page on causal determinism. Did you read the whole Hoefer article? He contests his own definition and concludes that causal determinism does not rule out free will. How about that, huh?

Yet compatibilists use that basic definition of determinism. The very same definition that Marvin Edwards, who argues for compatibility, gave.

The very same definition that Jarhyn gave. The very same definition that is generally accepted as being the essence of determinism, no randomness, predictable outcomes.

How about that?

That Hoefer 'contests his own definition' - which predates Hoefer and his article - does not negate its validity.

How about that?

If determinism does not involve an inherently predictable progression of events within a system, it is not ''determinism. ''

How about that?

In any case, the definition is not holy writ. It is contestable. Hoefer himself recognizes this. We’ve been over this, yet you ignore all the rebuttals and simply repeat this stuff like a mantra. Any definition of determinism that incorporates or implies no free will, which btw Hoefer’s does not, is question begging and hence useless.

So you'd like ''determinism'' to mean whatever suits your needs? Do what you like, that's determinism? Random events, well, gosh, that's determinism, Oh, yeah, sure it is.....and Pigs Fly.

Where did I ever say the above? Nowhere. Did Marvin say anything like the above? No. Did Jarhyn? No. Stuffing straw is always a pretty good indictator of a losing argument.

It's implied in argument being asserted;

''If I have to choose between A and B, then it is logically required that "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" are both true. However, it is the opposite with "I will choose A" and "I will choose B" because only one of them is true.

If "I will choose A" is true, then "I could have chosen B" will also be true.
If "I will choose B" is true, then "I could have chosen A" will also be true.'' - Marvin Edwards.

You yourself have supported this.

Of course I support it. I argue in the same way. How in the world does it relate to your assertion that I said random events are deterministic, or that pigs can fly?

I didn't say that random events are deterministic, or that you said it. If something I said suggested such a thing, it was not intended. I have said that random, probabilistic or probabilistic events no more allow free will than determinism.

I maintain that free will is an incoherent notion, an ideology.

 

[DBT]

The menu has multiple items, but as the choice we make is determined, it is the only option that is realizable.

To realize something means to make it real. If you have the ability to make it real, then it is realizable, even if you never choose to make it real. Your dream house is realizable if you have the means to realize it, even if you never decide to actually realize it.

All of the items on the restaurant menu are realizable, even though you will only make one of them real.

They are all realizable, just not all in any given instance in time, where only only one thing is realizable with no possible alternate decision in that instance in time.

That is the point.

That is the crux of the matter.

The decision you make in that instance is the only option open to you, you have no alternate option. A moment later, conditions are different and of course different conditions produce/determine a different outcome.

Step by determined step as events unfold deterministically, not through the agency of will

That is the point where free will fails.

''Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation").'' - Marvin Edwards

''Without deviation'' means no possible alternate action.

You're not taking determinism as seriously as I am. "Without deviation" means that every possible alternate action that appeared on the menu for my consideration was causally necessary from any prior point in eternity. It means that every thought I had about the steak was equally necessary, and every thought I had about the salad was also necessary, and that I would necessarily find that the salad would meet my needs better than the steak, such that I would necessarily tell the waiter, "I will have the salad, please."

I am taking determinism far more seriously than you, for the given reasons (outlined above) right to the point of the inevitability of incompatibilism.

But here's the kicker, it would be causally necessary from any prior point in eternity that I would be making this choice while free of coercion and undue influence, in other words, of my own freely chosen will.

Not "freely" as in "free from causal necessity" (because that's foolishness), but only "freely" as in "free from coercion and undue influence".

Necessitation is the killer of free will. Necessitated thoughts and actions are not freely willed thoughts and actions.

They are just thoughts and actions, however wonderful the ability to think and act is.

Choosing the salad was necessitated, therefore inevitable, you could not have not chosen the salad.

I could choose any item on the menu, but I would only choose the salad. Determinism cannot speak to what I could have done, but only to what I will and what I would have done.

Right, the determined decision/action is inevitably realized as it must.

For example, determinism can assert that I would face an issue that required me to make a decision, that I would consider the options on the menu, that I would choose the salad, and that during these inevitable choosing events I would be free of coercion and undue influence.

But not necessitation.

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

You can choose the salad when it is determined that you choose the salad.

I can choose the salad whenever I want. Determinism may assert precisely when I will choose it, but not when I can choose it.

Your want is formed by neural information processing, antecedents, milliseconds prior to being aware of your own decision.

Necessitation at work.

Dualism is not being invoked.

Whenever you suggest that I must exist separately from my brain you are invoking dualism. For example, if you say that I must be the cause of my brain before I can be the true cause of anything else, or that I must control what my brain does before I can control anything else, you are invoking dualism.

It's not that I'm invoking dualism, rather, I am pointing out the necessary conditions for freedom of will to exist.

Conditions that do not, and cannot exist within a determined system: the ability to otherwise. The ability regulate decision making where alternate actions are possible. Not dualism, an innate ability, but an ability that is not possible within the bounds of determinism.

I'm not insisting on this, just considering rules, principles and the given definitions.

Conscious awareness does play a role, just not the right kind of role to qualify as free will. That is the point. I'm not suggesting that consciousness plays no role.
...
A brain processes information unconsciously, according to its properties, nature and makeup prior to conscious representation of that information.

It seems you are still uncertain of the role of awareness in the brain. I'm not a neuroscientist, but my impression is that awareness, even after the fact, serves a necessary purpose. And unconscious activity brings in conscious awareness when necessary to input or output information during all forms of communication.

I fully consider the role of consciousness, which I have described, posted quotes from studies and cited sources.

I have not said or suggested that the conscious mind plays no role.

I'll just add this snippet;

''The compatibilist provides us with a philosophically sophisticated interpretation of could have done otherwise, but what reason do we have for believing that people actually employ such a notion? It is simply not enough to present a possible interpretation of what might be going on.

I contend that the compatibilist has to make a plausible case that people actually view matters in this way. There is, however, little empirical support for this conclusion.

Quite to the contrary, Nichols (2006b) has recently conducted a pilot study that suggests just the opposite. In the study, 75 undergraduates were given the following vignette:
On 4/13/2005, Bill filled out his tax form. At precisely 10:30 AM, he decided to lie about his income.

But of course, he didn't have to make this decision. Bill could have decided to be honest.

The subjects were then asked to judge whether a sentence sounded right or wrong (on a scale of 3 to −3).

One group got the following sentence, modeled on conditional analyses: Bill could have decided to be honest at 10:30, 4/13/2005, but only if some things had been different before the moment of his decision.

The other group got the following sentence, modeled on unconditional analyses: Bill could have decided to be honest at 10:30, 4/13/2005, even if nothing had been different before the moment of his decision.

The results were telling. Subjects were more likely to judge that the unconditional sentence sounded right. They gave higher ratings for the 68 Kriterion Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 5689 sentence modeled on unconditional analyses than for the one modeled on conditional analyses.''

Cool. Here's the thing. The unconditional analysis happens to be correct. Bill could have decided to be honest at 10:30, 4/13/2005, even if nothing had been different before the moment of his decision. This requires no philosophical analysis, as it is simply a matter of how the language logically works when communicating practical information about reality.

Given determinism, conditions - the world, the environment, the brain - at 10:30, 4/13/2005, prevented Bill from making any decision other than the decision he in fact made despite any perception to the contrary. That is the point.

''Incompatibilists (like myself) insist that, pace Frankfurt and Dennett, our ordinary notions of free will and responsibility actually do require the ability to do otherwise.

Furthermore, we maintain that our folk psychology is essentially incompatibilist in that it views determinism as being at odds with the existence of alternative possibilities and the agent's ability to do otherwise. I maintain that instead of being a rejection of our pretheoretical beliefs, compatibilism is a complex philosophical position, one that is defended by sophisticated philosophical moves. This, I believe, is witnessed by the compatibilist replies to the consequence argument discussed above.

As Thomas Pink writes: ''Compatibilism'' is not something naturally believed, but something that has to be taught by professional philosophers, in philosophy books, and through philosophy courses.'' (2004: 43).

 

[Jarhyn]

Intention is formed through a progression of antecedents, not the agency of will.

Sometimes the progression of antecedents in the development of intent is the agency of will.

What exactly do you think people are doing when they do a "ritual" besides acting silly for a while?

The whole thing is to allow the person to design and reshape their own Intentions.

Have you never once even done this?

Like I describe it here for Keith, intention is absolutely something a human being can control. And even if it were not, the intention, regardless of whether I put it there on purpose, is still a part of "me" that is "choosing" based on that intention: the "agency of will" (misused the terms here you did) is part of that progression of antecedents.

Even if I didn't regularly muck about with my intents, they are still MY intents and determine MY choice function on information.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Yet, this has nothing to do with free will.

Well, free will is not what this topic is about. The theme of this thread is causal necessity. The question here is whether causal necessity is something we can or even need to be "free of".

No one experiences causal necessity as a constraint until they get suckered into the paradox. Then they acquire the false sense that causal necessity is something one must be free of in order to be "truly" free. It's an "absolutist" position that in order to be "truly" free one must be free of every imaginable constraint. For example, one could make a similar claim that "in order to be truly free we must be free of gravity". Or one might claim that "in order to be truly free we must be free of all our human wants and desires".

With the invention of the airplane and the hot air balloon we do get some degree of freedom from gravity. With discipline we do get some freedom from human wants and desires.

But we never get any freedom from causal necessity. The question of this thread is "Should that bother us?". I'm suggesting that, no, it should not bother us at all. Causal necessity is an imaginary constraint, one that does not prevent us from doing anything we want to do, because our own wants and our own actions and our own choices are all part of causal necessity, and are not impeded in any way by it.

So, my conclusion is that causal necessity is nothing that should concern us. It does not constrain us in any meaningful fashion. Specific constraints, like a being in handcuffs, would bother us, and we would want to be free of them. But we have no real need to be free of reliable cause and effect itself, but only specific causes that apply some specific constraint.

All of the freedoms that we enjoy require the ability to reliably cause some effect, whether it is walking, thinking, or anything else we do. So, being free of reliable causation would remove all of our freedoms.

Should it bother us that there are prior causes that result in us being who and what we are? No, not really. There is nothing we can do about our past, other than to learn from it how we happened to be who we are now. As to our future, well, that is still up to us. In fact it is causally necessary that it will be our own imagined possibilities and our own choices that will determine what that future will be.

 

[Jarhyn]

I get that putting down a lifetime of defense mechanisms against what is usually an experience that is very hard to accept was "chosen" and "unnecessary" is very painful. Finding new perspectives that resolve the existential questions that are created in such an event are painful and hard and disruptive. I expect that is what this is.

If you were to talk about that, I would offer you all the support and help in the world at finding different answers to those questions that you can exist on the other side of just as well as you can with "causal necessity".

But you can never get there if you refuse to open the wound to clear the infection and leave it open and hurting until it heals.

 

[Jarhyn]

Your want is formed by neural information processing, antecedents, milliseconds prior to being aware of your own decision.

Ok, this is just dumb. Usually, my will is formed days, hours, weeks, months, or even years before the actual decision is made to consummate my will into "did".

Oftentimes I put the intent there based on other intents, and I put it there conscientiously. I go through a bunch of absurd rigamarole to make that happen sometimes but it works all the same.

Of course that is "by neural processing" but the neurons processing it are are being driven by "me". I am the neurons in question doing that processing, and so I am the thing making the choice. The fact that the decision is "past the point of no return" apparently slightly before I get the feeling that it has, which happens apparently slightly before the action occurs makes no difference to that.

 

[Jarhyn]

And before you even ask, @DBT, yes: I did a Tually sit down one day (ok, across many days) hammering out what my will would be, what would be important to me, how I wanted my choice functions to, well, function, how I would evaluate people, where I would point my eyes in social interactions, where I drive myself to when I walk near someone on the sidewalk, and I do the series of things required so as to make those designed reactions trump out whatever was there.

The choice I make to block a punch was not made when the fist came at me. That choice was made many years ago, when I decided to stand in front of an oncoming fist until I would block it.

It would in fact take much work to unmake such a choice.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

They are all realizable, just not all in any given instance in time, where only only one thing is realizable with no possible alternate decision in that instance in time.
That is the point. That is the crux of the matter.

I'm sorry but it is logically impossible to have "no possible alternate decision" at any point in time. A decision requires at least two alternatives, at least two options that are both possible (realizable).

Why? Because no one can choose between a single possibility. For example:

Customer (hungry): "Waiter, what are my possibilities for dinner tonight?"
Waiter (a hard determinist): "Given a deterministic world, there is never more than one possibility."
Customer (disappointed): "Oh. Then what is my single possibility?"
Waiter: "How should I know, I can't read your mind!".

The decision you make in that instance is the only option open to you, you have no alternate option.

Actually, I will always have another option open to me, otherwise I would not be in the process of making a decision. The choosing operation logically REQUIRES that there be at least two real possibilities and that I am able to choose either one, even though I will only choose one.

And this requirement applies whenever we are speaking of the physical process logically.

A moment later, conditions are different and of course different conditions produce/determine a different outcome.

Of course.

Step by determined step as events unfold deterministically, not through the agency of will

I willingly entered the restaurant. I willingly picked up the menu. I willingly considered my options. I willingly made my choice. So, I really don't understand in what sense you are claiming that willing lacked any agency in this deterministic process.

Are you returning to the argument that I must somehow will each neuron to do its job? Because I am the neurons doing the willing. They are me.

Necessitation is the killer of free will. Necessitated thoughts and actions are not freely willed thoughts and actions.

Apparently you are mistaken.

They are just thoughts and actions, however wonderful the ability to think and act is.

Things are as they are, like it or not. Free will is a choice we make while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Free will is NOT freedom from causal necessity, because there is no such freedom.

For example, determinism can assert that I would face an issue that required me to make a decision, that I would consider the options on the menu, that I would choose the salad, and that during these inevitable choosing events I would be free of coercion and undue influence.

But not necessitation.

And why would I ever need to be free of causal necessitation? What I will inevitably do is exactly identical to what I would have done anyway. It is not a meaningful constraint. It is not something that anyone needs to be free of. And it is not a relevant constraint, because there is nothing that can be done about it (We can arrest the bank robber, but we cannot arrest causal necessity).

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

Derk is simply claiming that, due to universal causal necessity, there is no difference between a choice you make for yourself and a choice forced upon you by the guy with a gun. Do you agree with Mr. Pereboom on this?

Personally, I think Mr. Pereboom holds a very silly and harmful view. One ought not destroy meaningful distinctions with a meaningless generality.

Conditions that do not, and cannot exist within a determined system: the ability to otherwise.

Apparently that belief is false, because we find ourselves able to choose from many possibilities on the restaurant menu. We are able to choose the steak and we are also able to choose the salad. One ability does not contradict the other ability. The steak is otherwise of the salad. The salad is otherwise of the steak.

So, the ability to do otherwise comes with the system, even a perfectly deterministic system.

Of course, we will do only one or the other. But we can order the steak is true, and we can order the salad is also true, and we can even order both if we want. But we will never do what we will not do, even though we can do any number of things.

Given determinism, conditions - the world, the environment, the brain - at 10:30, 4/13/2005, prevented Bill from making any decision other than the decision he in fact made despite any perception to the contrary. That is the point.

Given determinism, Bill would decide to lie on his tax form, even though he could have told the truth.

''Incompatibilists (like myself) insist that, pace Frankfurt and Dennett, our ordinary notions of free will and responsibility actually do require the ability to do otherwise.

Furthermore, we maintain that our folk psychology is essentially incompatibilist in that it views determinism as being at odds with the existence of alternative possibilities and the agent's ability to do otherwise. I maintain that instead of being a rejection of our pretheoretical beliefs, compatibilism is a complex philosophical position, one that is defended by sophisticated philosophical moves. This, I believe, is witnessed by the compatibilist replies to the consequence argument discussed above.

As Thomas Pink writes: ''Compatibilism'' is not something naturally believed, but something that has to be taught by professional philosophers, in philosophy books, and through philosophy courses.'' (2004: 43).

I broke out laughing when I read Thomas Pink's comment at the end! Philosophy created the stupid paradox that created the myth of determinism "versus" free will in the first place.

 

[fromderinside]

[Something I would expect from a third grader, really. Or MrIntelligentDesign.]

you won't rid yourself of this meddlesome wizard

Knowing every thing about reality omnisciently is not necessary to know some things well enough to do static analysis on a plan.

Agreed. However that is not enough to claim physical or certainty in any way.

Just sayin'

 

[DBT]

Intention is formed through a progression of antecedents, not the agency of will.

Sometimes the progression of antecedents in the development of intent is the agency of will.

What exactly do you think people are doing when they do a "ritual" besides acting silly for a while?

The whole thing is to allow the person to design and reshape their own Intentions.

Have you never once even done this?

Like I describe it here for Keith, intention is absolutely something a human being can control. And even if it were not, the intention, regardless of whether I put it there on purpose, is still a part of "me" that is "choosing" based on that intention: the "agency of will" (misused the terms here you did) is part of that progression of antecedents.

Even if I didn't regularly muck about with my intents, they are still MY intents and determine MY choice function on information.

You have no idea. Surely by now you'd understand that information acquisition and processing is the work of neural networks prior to conscious experience and will?

Apparently not. You haven't understood anything that's been said.

It's a waste of time dealing with your childish attitude, however, once again;

Decision-Making
''Decision-making is such a seamless brain process that we’re usually unaware of it — until our choice results in unexpected consequences. Then we may look back and wonder, “Why did I choose that option?” In recent years, neuroscientists have begun to decode the decision-making process. What they’re learning is shedding light not only on how the healthy brain performs complex mental functions, but also on how disorders, such as stroke or drug abuse, affect the process.''


''In neuroscientific circles, it is simply commonsense physicalism that the brain conducts business on its own. It doesn’t need a further, non-physical agent to orchestrate the dauntingly complex operations that constitute awareness, cognition, and control of behavior. Nevertheless, it’s also become clear that for us to successfully navigate the world, the brain must conjure a stable sense of a self, acting within an environment represented as distinctly non-self. Even though there’s no one in charge of its operations, the brain generates a strong intuition of personal agency, borne out by the obvious fact that persons accomplish all sorts of things in all manner of ways.''

Take note that no one is in charge of the process, least of all will.

Will is a part of the end result, not the orchestrator or director.

 

[DBT]

Yet, this has nothing to do with free will.

Well, free will is not what this topic is about. The theme of this thread is causal necessity. The question here is whether causal necessity is something we can or even need to be "free of".

It's implied in the title. It seems to me to be just another approach, another argument for compatibilism.

I don't want to get bogged down here because the same issues are coming up.

There may as well be one mega thread on the question of free will.

 

[DBT]

Your want is formed by neural information processing, antecedents, milliseconds prior to being aware of your own decision.

Ok, this is just dumb.

That's been you all along. [removed]

Usually, my will is formed days, hours, weeks, months, or even years before the actual decision is made to consummate my will into "did".

Your reply doesn't relate to what I said. Which indicates that you didn't understand a word I said. An inability to grasp the nature of cognitions despite countless explanations and quotes from neuroscience.

Oftentimes I put the intent there based on other intents, and I put it there conscientiously. I go through a bunch of absurd rigamarole to make that happen sometimes but it works all the same.

You should know by now that information is acquired and processed milliseconds prior to awareness. But apparently not.

Of course that is "by neural processing" but the neurons processing it are are being driven by "me". I am the neurons in question doing that processing, and so I am the thing making the choice. The fact that the decision is "past the point of no return" apparently slightly before I get the feeling that it has, which happens apparently slightly before the action occurs makes no difference to that.

You as a conscious entity are not controlling what happens on a cellular level. Not only that, you have no awareness of what 'your' cells are doing.

Without awareness or control of cognition, you as a conscious entity cannot claim free will.

Brain cells themselves have function. Function is not will, especially not 'free will.'

 

[DBT]

They are all realizable, just not all in any given instance in time, where only only one thing is realizable with no possible alternate decision in that instance in time.
That is the point. That is the crux of the matter.

I'm sorry but it is logically impossible to have "no possible alternate decision" at any point in time. A decision requires at least two alternatives, at least two options that are both possible (realizable).

Then you are not talking about determinism. Nor did I say that multiple options don't exist, just that only one course of action is realizable in any given instance, the determined option.

Why? Because no one can choose between a single possibility. For example:

Customer (hungry): "Waiter, what are my possibilities for dinner tonight?"
Waiter (a hard determinist): "Given a deterministic world, there is never more than one possibility."
Customer (disappointed): "Oh. Then what is my single possibility?"
Waiter: "How should I know, I can't read your mind!".

Determined is not chosen. The decision is determined before you even look at the menu. What you choose has no alternative. It can only be that and nothing else, until conditions change the dynamic.

The decision you make in that instance is the only option open to you, you have no alternate option.

Actually, I will always have another option open to me, otherwise I would not be in the process of making a decision. The choosing operation logically REQUIRES that there be at least two real possibilities and that I am able to choose either one, even though I will only choose one.

The critical point being ''I will only choose one'' - the determined one - which means that there was never the possibility of choosing the other.

That is how determinism works.

A moment later, conditions are different and of course different conditions produce/determine a different outcome.

Of course.

Which means that conditions set the actions, brain/environment/proclivities, not our will. If will cannot control actions to enable the ability to do otherwise, will is not free.

Step by determined step as events unfold deterministically, not through the agency of will

I willingly entered the restaurant. I willingly picked up the menu. I willingly considered my options. I willingly made my choice. So, I really don't understand in what sense you are claiming that willing lacked any agency in this deterministic process.

Are you returning to the argument that I must somehow will each neuron to do its job? Because I am the neurons doing the willing. They are me.

These are all actions that have antecedents. Your neurons are not subject to control or regulation through the agency of will.

Neural architecture determines behaviour, not will.

Sufficiently damaged, regardless of will, the system ceases to act rationally.

''I don't think "free will" is a very sensible concept, and you don't need neuroscience to reject it -- any mechanistic view of the world is good enough, and indeed you could even argue on purely conceptual grounds that the opposite of determinism is randomness, not free will! Most thoughtful neuroscientists I know have replaced the concept of free will with the concept of rationality -- that we select our actions based on a kind of practical reasoning. And there is no conflict between rationality and the mind as a physical system -- After all, computers are rational physical systems! - Martha Farah, director of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Cognitive Neuroscience and a prominent neuroethicist.

Necessitation is the killer of free will. Necessitated thoughts and actions are not freely willed thoughts and actions.

Apparently you are mistaken.

How can thoughts, being shaped, formed, necessitated by elements beyond the awareness or control of conscious will be an example of free will?

If will cannot control neural information processing, how is it free?

They are just thoughts and actions, however wonderful the ability to think and act is.

Things are as they are, like it or not. Free will is a choice we make while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Free will is NOT freedom from causal necessity, because there is no such freedom.

Then there is no free will. Being caused does not equate to freedom.

For example, determinism can assert that I would face an issue that required me to make a decision, that I would consider the options on the menu, that I would choose the salad, and that during these inevitable choosing events I would be free of coercion and undue influence.

Set by circumstance and conditions, including the brain, not the agency of will. Will is the prompt for what has already been decided.

But not necessitation.

And why would I ever need to be free of causal necessitation? What I will inevitably do is exactly identical to what I would have done anyway. It is not a meaningful constraint. It is not something that anyone needs to be free of. And it is not a relevant constraint, because there is nothing that can be done about it (We can arrest the bank robber, but we cannot arrest causal necessity).

Freedom requires the ability and freedom to have done otherwise. Determinism eliminates all possibility of doing otherwise.

Which makes determinism and freedom incompatible.

Determined actions, of course, proceed without restraint or restriction (being determined).

''Incompatibilists (like myself) insist that, pace Frankfurt and Dennett, our ordinary notions of free will and responsibility actually do require the ability to do otherwise.

Furthermore, we maintain that our folk psychology is essentially incompatibilist in that it views determinism as being at odds with the existence of alternative possibilities and the agent's ability to do otherwise. I maintain that instead of being a rejection of our pretheoretical beliefs, compatibilism is a complex philosophical position, one that is defended by sophisticated philosophical moves. This, I believe, is witnessed by the compatibilist replies to the consequence argument discussed above.

As Thomas Pink writes: ''Compatibilism'' is not something naturally believed, but something that has to be taught by professional philosophers, in philosophy books, and through philosophy courses.'' (2004: 43).

I broke out laughing when I read Thomas Pink's comment at the end! Philosophy created the stupid paradox that created the myth of determinism "versus" free will in the first place.

Pink is essentially right. Compatibilism requires very carefully worded terms and conditions.

The 'paradox' itself is formed by nature and the definition of determinism....hence the question, if all actions are determined, how is freedom possible?

So, we have compatibilism in several variations; Hobbs, Hume, Dennett, etc

 

[Jarhyn]

that is not enough to claim physical

Dude, our whole reality is physical. You can ot say "the universe is deterministic" if you cannot already start with "everything within it obeys physical law on a fixed and sequential way".

YOU started with physical by starting with "determinism".

What gets me to physical is the fact that I have done exactly this thing with full physical surety as regards a machine.

I have actually designed a processor before, designed an assembly, designed a compiler, and compiled language through the compiler, into an assembly, and executed it on the processor.

I have taken things end to end, from plan, through plan translation/compilation to execution of plan.

Once you've seen the process it is not hard to do the analogical transform to see a similar process is going on inside our meat.

You are using your god-of-the-gaps argument to try to claim that something that clearly exists as a function of a more simple system that very clearly exists in our universe does not occur and cannot in a much more built-up system, despite the fact that we designed computers based on ourselves and how we seemed to process information at the time.

The only difference really is that our process has a process that gets all meta about the process.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... intention is absolutely something a human being can control. And even if it were not, the intention, regardless of whether I put it there on purpose, is still a part of "me" that is "choosing" based on that intention: the "agency of will" (misused the terms here you did) is part of that progression of antecedents.

Even if I didn't regularly muck about with my intents, they are still MY intents and determine MY choice function on information.

Decision-Making
''Decision-making is such a seamless brain process that we’re usually unaware of it — until our choice results in unexpected consequences. Then we may look back and wonder, “Why did I choose that option?” In recent years, neuroscientists have begun to decode the decision-making process. What they’re learning is shedding light not only on how the healthy brain performs complex mental functions, but also on how disorders, such as stroke or drug abuse, affect the process.''

Your reference demonstrates that most people are unfamiliar with the inner workings of their brain. However, it also demonstrates that people are correct in their observation that their brain does, in fact, make decisions. And that their assumption that it is their own brain that is doing the deciding is empirically correct.

It is not someone else's brain, and it is not determinism, and it is not causal necessity, that is doing the deciding. It is the person themselves that is making the choice.

Neuroscience can enlighten us as to how this is going on in the brain, but every new thing it learns further confirms the fact that it is our own brain that is doing the choosing. Not someone or something else.

Oh! Except of course if it actually is someone or something else, like a guy holding a gun and forcing us to do what his own brain has decided we will do. Or, our own brain's decision-making process is impaired by brain injury or illness that significantly prevents our brain from exercising rational control.

''In neuroscientific circles, it is simply commonsense physicalism that the brain conducts business on its own. It doesn’t need a further, non-physical agent to orchestrate the dauntingly complex operations that constitute awareness, cognition, and control of behavior. Nevertheless, it’s also become clear that for us to successfully navigate the world, the brain must conjure a stable sense of a self, acting within an environment represented as distinctly non-self. Even though there’s no one in charge of its operations, the brain generates a strong intuition of personal agency, borne out by the obvious fact that persons accomplish all sorts of things in all manner of ways.''

Take note that no one is in charge of the process, least of all will.

Will is a part of the end result, not the orchestrator or director.

This reference is from Tom Clark's review of Daniel Weger's book "The Illusion of Conscious Will". And it further confirms that it is really us (our own brain) that is both aware and in control of our behavior. The "strong intuition of personal agency" is more than a mere "intuition" or feeling. It is proven to us by our simple observation of ourselves doing what we chose to do. Our intuition is "borne out by the obvious fact that persons accomplish all sorts of things in all manner of ways.''

And it is further confirmed by statements like this: "The feeling of conscious will is a reliable, if not infallible, guide that an action is indeed our action, one that resulted from our character, motives, concerns, and plans."

However, Wegner's thesis, that this is simply about a "feeling", is misguided. Clark says, "His thesis is that our feeling of will doesn’t reflect the underlying causes of behavior, rather it’s an 'emotion of authorship' that usefully tags actions as ours, not someone else’s."

But this 'emotion of authorship' is usually supported by our observation of our own behavior. If I observe myself doing what I decided I would do, then that is objective evidence that it was actually me, regardless of any feelings.

It is the same when we observe others. We observe someone in the restaurant, browsing the menu, and then placing their order. It is rational for us to conclude that they made a choice, by themselves and for themselves, and conveyed their choice to the waiter. This is not a matter of how we feel, but rather what we objectively observed.

If the waiter brings them what they ordered and they claim they never ordered it, and we had seen and heard them order it, then it would be reasonable to assume they had a mental illness. Neuroscience can help us to assess the nature of a mental illness and how it affects a person's behavior.

But it is not up to neuroscience to define "free will". They can clarify that it is the brain's own physical processing, and not some ethereal soul, that is in charge. But they have never asserted that it is anything other than our own brain that is doing the choosing.

Operational free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence (significant mental illness, hypnosis, manipulation, authoritative command, etc.).

Free will has never required that we be free of our own brain. And that is why the argument from neuroscience fails to contradict operational free will.

 

[Jarhyn]

prior to conscious experience and will

Experience and will are neural processes.

Nothing you have said changes that, nothing that I have said changes that.

As I said, I can map exactly when I made the decision "to block a punch", and it happened about 13 years ago. I fully recognize that sometimes the subvocalizations take a bit to bubble up past the actual moment I make the decision, but I also recognize that it is not about the subvocalizations layer to the experience stack, it's about the... Well, I can't describe emotions without them to others.

non-physical agent

[removed]

You... What? Believe that compatibilist think that the agent is nonphysical?

[removed]

I have never once proposed agency is nonphysical. WE ARE MACHINES! Entirely and physically.

What I have is a will, that will is a physical set of tokens which will physically be interpreted by my physical meat which will physically squish and zap and squirt various ways that will take that signal, that plan so as to evaluate it for errors and determine a preliminary "freedom estimation" on the will. Ultimately the rest of it's "real freedom" is in whether I manage to execute the plan.

Some parts of the plan may even expect a likelihood of that bit of the will being constrained, around which I must execute a secondary will that maintains freedom overall.

 

[Jarhyn]

You have no awareness of what 'your' cells are doing

You do know that one of my primary interests is in neural math ya? Like... Writing algorithms that execute neural behavioral patterns, manually defining biases and values on the neural equation (it's pretty simple linear algebra), and then assembling those neurons specifically to accomplish simple data filtration machines?

But moreover, I am my cells. I have an awareness of what they are doing from the inside because what they do, I am, and I experience it to the extent that it is orthogonal to the part of the nervous system I am implemented in...

As I said, I know when I decided to block the punch: 13 years ago. I know when I decided to follow up a haymaker with an uppercut, and I know when I decided to watch for a gut punch after pulling in for said uppercut.

It doesn't mean I didn't put that there. It just means that my subvocalization (really it's just an indexing system) lagged a few MS behind ME when I was deciding.

It still happened 13 years ago, and choosing not to would take a lot of work I'm just not going to do.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Then you are not talking about determinism.

The foundation of determinism is the assumption of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Every event is the reliable result of prior events, from the motion of the planets to the thoughts going through our heads right now.

This would necessarily include all of the options on the menu and our ability to order any of those items for dinner. It would necessarily include the imagining of new possibilities, such as the Wright brothers inventing a flying machine.

It would necessarily include my consideration of the steak versus the salad for dinner, and my choosing the salad.

It would necessarily include the fact that no one was holding a gun to my head and that I was a sane adult making this choice for myself. Thus, it would necessarily be the case that I would be free to choose for myself what I would have for dinner.

And, just as it was necessary that I would choose the salad, it was also necessary that I could have chosen the steak.

Nor did I say that multiple options don't exist, just that only one course of action is realizable in any given instance, the determined option.

You are not talking about determinism. You are talking of an implication falsely derived from determinism. You see, every option on the menu was realizable, even after the single inevitable option was realized.

If you use the language correctly, you'll find that "I chose the salad, even though I could have chosen the steak" is true in both parts. The fact that I chose the salad is never a contradiction of the fact that I could have chosen the steak.

The "I could have" refers to an option that (a) was not chosen, but which (b) may have been chosen under different circumstances. And both of these facts are consistent with what actually happened and with everything happening consistent with determinism.

The only reason that anyone thinks otherwise is due to the forking paradox. It is a self-induced hoax brought on by a few false but believable suggestions. You are effectively manipulated by the paradox.

Determined is not chosen. The decision is determined before you even look at the menu. What you choose has no alternative. It can only be that and nothing else, until conditions change the dynamic.

And, being under the influence of one false conclusion leads to additional false conclusions. For example:

DBT: "Determined is not chosen". -- Really? Then how is it that the customers each chose what they would have for dinner? The correct statement is that the process of choosing is a necessitated event within a deterministic system and the process of choosing will itself be deterministic. But you cannot falsely claim that choosing doesn't happen. We've seen it happen. All of the neuroscience experiments about decision making confirm that it is a real event that takes place within the brain.

DBT: "The decision is determined before you even look at the menu." -- Really? Are you suggesting some kind of omniscience in the human brain? I'm pretty sure neuroscience will not back you up on that.

DBT: "What you choose has no alternative". -- The alternative to the steak is the salad. The alternative to the salad is the steak. Choosing itself requires at least two alternatives, so it will always be the case that every choice will have at least one alternative.

DBT: "It can only be that and nothing else, until conditions change the dynamic." -- As you should know by now, the true statement is that "It will only be that and nothing else". To claim that "It can only be that and nothing else" creates a logical absurdity, because one cannot choose between a single possibility.

The critical point being ''I will only choose one'' - the determined one

CORRECT!

- which means that there was never the possibility of choosing the other.

INCORRECT! There was in fact the possibility of choosing the steak instead of the salad. "I could have chosen the steak" is a true statement! It means that (a) I did not choose the steak and (b) that I would have chosen the steak only under different circumstances. So, again, there is no contradiction between determinism and what I "could have" done.

That's how the language works. And that is also how determinism works.

Which means that conditions set the actions, brain/environment/proclivities, not our will.

Human actions. What causes them? Some are autonomic, like our heart beat. Some are reflexive, like the patella reflex or automatically jerking our hand away from a sharp pain. Some are instinctive, like behaviors and reactions hard coded into our neural firmware, such as our empathy when seeing our pet harmed. And, some are deliberate, motivated and directed by our chosen intent, like deciding to have dinner at the restaurant.

Free will is concerned with deliberate actions, actions that we can choose to do, or, choose not to do. So, when deep diving into the neural architecture it is necessary to return to the surface before discussing our freely chosen intentions.

If will cannot control actions to enable the ability to do otherwise, will is not free.

Deliberately chosen will controls our deliberate actions. We set our intent upon doing something, and that intention marshals our resources in service of that chosen task.

In the restaurant example, our goal is to have a nice dinner. So, we willingly enter the restaurant, picked up the menu, consider our options, and give the waiter our orders. All of these actions serve our intention (our will) to satisfy our hunger with a good dinner.

The necessitating cause of a deliberate will is the choosing process. The necessitating cause of our deliberate action is that will. You know, it's that determinism thing, one event causally necessitating the next.

Free will does not mean that the will is some free-floating entity. That's a silly notion. So, please stop floating the strawman argument that free will means that the will is uncaused. Everyone knows that free will means they were free to decide for themselves what they would do.

Free will is about the choosing of the will, specifically whether the choosing was free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

Your neurons are not subject to control or regulation through the agency of will.

It still has not occurred to you that the "will" and the "neurons" are made of the same stuff?

''I don't think "free will" is a very sensible concept, and you don't need neuroscience to reject it -- any mechanistic view of the world is good enough, and indeed you could even argue on purely conceptual grounds that the opposite of determinism is randomness, not free will! Most thoughtful neuroscientists I know have replaced the concept of free will with the concept of rationality -- that we select our actions based on a kind of practical reasoning. And there is no conflict between rationality and the mind as a physical system -- After all, computers are rational physical systems! - Martha Farah, director of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Cognitive Neuroscience and a prominent neuroethicist.

Hello, Dr. Farah. You are absolutely correct that free will is not the opposite of determinism (the literal opposite of determinism is indeterminism, and randomness is just a problem of prediction, not causation). I disagree with your solution to the problem, though. There is no need to replace the term "free will" if we define it as you suggest: "that we select our actions based on a kind of practical reasoning. And there is no conflict between rationality and the mind as a physical system."

That's pretty much what I am doing here. Free will is when a person's own practical reasoning is free to determine what they will do. Free will is absent when their choice is subject to coercion and undue influence.

How can thoughts, being shaped, formed, necessitated by elements beyond the awareness or control of conscious will be an example of free will?

It's simple. The elements involved happen to include awareness and intent. They are not excluded from the neural activity. They are neural activity. The question is, how do you justify the view that they are somehow separate from the brain's own functioning.

If will cannot control neural information processing, how is it free?

I assure you that will IS neural information processing. How is it free? Well, it certainly is not free of neural information processing, because it is itself a specific function within that processing.

Free will is when someone decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. This the the operational definition that is used when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions. And it is the only definition of free will that actually makes sense.

Compatibilism requires very carefully worded terms and conditions.

Actually, it's very simple. I ordered the salad, but I could have had the steak instead. This is just how the words actually work when in actual usage.

The 'paradox' itself is formed by nature and the definition of determinism....hence the question, if all actions are determined, how is freedom possible?

Freedom is possible by not attempting to make it absolute. Freedom is possible by referencing only meaningful and relevant constraints, things we might want to be free of, and things that we actually can be free of. It is not hard to avoid creating a paradox. And if you find yourself in one, the best tools are pragmatism and empiricism, because they bring you back to reality.

 

[fromderinside]

that is not enough to claim physical

Dude, our whole reality is physical. You can ot say "the universe is deterministic" if you cannot already start with "everything within it obeys physical law on a fixed and sequential way".

YOU started with physical by starting with "determinism".

What gets me to physical is the fact that I have done exactly this thing with full physical surety as regards a machine.

I have actually designed a processor before, designed an assembly, designed a compiler, and compiled language through the compiler, into an assembly, and executed it on the processor.

I have taken things end to end, from plan, through plan translation/compilation to execution of plan.

Once you've seen the process it is not hard to do the analogical transform to see a similar process is going on inside our meat.

You are using your god-of-the-gaps argument to try to claim that something that clearly exists as a function of a more simple system that very clearly exists in our universe does not occur and cannot in a much more built-up system, despite the fact that we designed computers based on ourselves and how we seemed to process information at the time.

The only difference really is that our process has a process that gets all meta about the process.

First logic is a tool misused by many.

The distinction is between activity based on physical verification and activity base on self-verification. When you understand your models logic are based on "ideals' and presumptions you will be on the road to understanding why science is based on physical verification. That your brain is a physical organ is not assurance that what it produces is physically verifiable.