Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Jarhyn]

I care if a plan is being

Like, I hit compile+debug and watched a plan get translated into behavior.

We are not talking about simulation here, we are talking about the actual. Fucking. Thing.

I tell the thing "raise the thing the distance". I put a bar there, and the motor goes "sorry, can't do that boss!"

I did it specifically knowing it would evaluate it's behavior and report the lack of it's freedom to move in that direction, a lack of freedom as executed by a written will!

That is a plan, being.

Unless it can produce the exact results, it isn't the same

It does not have to be and I don't get why you think it does.

Stochastic prediction systems have error bars.

I have seen plenty of plans, in conjunction with their interpreter objects, reproduce many things. Because that's what DNA is, a plan existing next to interpreter proteins.

Just like an automations script is just a plan existing next to interpreter metal.

Just like a blueprint is just a plan existing next to some interpreter meat.

I can say "that DNA does not represent a free will; copying will end here and there will be no reproduction nor contribution to such caused here."

I can say "that automations script will fail here because this sensor will be deadlocked."

I can say "this joint will not support this weight and the structure will fall before completion".

I can identify that the wills are not free before their results are ever achieved, and sit back and watch the glorious trainwreck of all that happening.

 

[fromderinside]

Getting tired of chasing you around a tree. If your plan is soo f**king good why are we messing with Hadron Colliders, launching Webb Telescopes and the like. No need to perform studies. Jarhyn will write a program and presto no problem.

No need to continue any scientific pursuit. Problems are all solved. Jarhyn sez so.

We are at this juncture because Jarhyn is one of those rain maker gees. Yanno the ones who'll solve all yer problems by doing a dance on a computer or launch Frozen Carbon dioxide into the Texas sky.

No we'll muddle on doing the hard work inventing new maths to attack ever increasingly complex problems because, well we're not Gods.

Move Lizzie, er, manifolds over, Woo woo needs to get a grip.

The misuse of reality and the material has gone beyond the pale. There are differences between what one does with a plan and what nature dos IAW physical law. They aren't the same and Jarhyn's new wave is an illusion. It's just he won't say so.

Well played. A gotcha here an a gotcha there and nothing is meaningful any more.

I still think what you are talking about is giving the feeling one may actually be flying.

 

[DBT]

and wants.....

... also known as our "wills".

And those wills can either be constrained (valid, attainable, unopposed), or free. They can be objectively evaluated as such.

I as an object have a sub object which in context to the rest of it makes it a plan and that object either objectively models the universe such that the goal is fulfilled or it objectively does not. There may even be different but still objectively real degrees but which it is free and constrained.

Will is not the driver.

 

[DBT]

and wants.....

... also known as our "wills".

And those wills can either be constrained (valid, attainable, unopposed), or free. They can be objectively evaluated as such.

I as an object have a sub object which in context to the rest of it makes it a plan and that object either objectively models the universe such that the goal is fulfilled or it objectively does not. There may even be different but still objectively real degrees but which it is free and constrained.

A "want" is something you may desire to do, whether you should do it or not.
A "will" is the intention to actually do it, which results in you actually doing it, whether you should do it or not.
There is a moral distinction between a "want" and a "will".

A want or a need, through the agency of a brain, generates the will to obtain whatever is wanted or needed.

 

[DBT]

I don't see

No, you don't, which is what makes participating in this thread about as difficult as participating in a MrIntelligentDesign thread: they don't see, because they don't want to, and you similarly seem like you do not want to.

I can say the same about you. You participate for your own reasons. I am not forcing you. You have no idea. You engage with insults and hand waving and imagine that you have made some sort of point.

"Stochastic planners", which is all we ever can be due to Godel's Incompleteness Theorem despite the determinancy of the system (which is at best "just-so deterministic" and at worse actually stochastic, containing some true and incomprehensible source of randomness), are limited to having imperfect plans of the future.

This means plans may be evaluated objectively for conformity to stochastically modeled elements of the deterministic future.

This means that these objectively extant plans, real geometries of the stuff and part of the causal necessity to the outcome, are objective features of the system.

The will (the plan) can be objectively evaluated for freedom (conformity to reality).

We have a "will" that is real, objectively. We have "freedom" as a property of that will, objectively..

That's not an explanation for decision making as performed by a brain, the nature of free will or how it's supposed to work. You are hand waving.

Nothing relevant, not even in the ball park. You still haven't realized that compatibilism is related to determinism?

And, seeing that you want to trade insults, look in the mirror, Sunshine, you yourself are the equivalent of MrIntelligentDesign.

Basically, clueless.

 

[DBT]

Wrong, both Marvin Edwards and Jarhyn gave essentially the same definition that I use, which is from the Standford page on causal determinism

Sigh. Yes, I know, DBT, it’s from your precious Stanford page on causal determinism. Did you read the whole Hoefer article? He contests his own definition and concludes that causal determinism does not rule out free will. How about that, huh?

Yet compatibilists use that basic definition of determinism. The very same definition that Marvin Edwards, who argues for compatibility, gave.

The very same definition that Jarhyn gave. The very same definition that is generally accepted as being the essence of determinism, no randomness, predictable outcomes.

How about that?

That Hoefer 'contests his own definition' - which predates Hoefer and his article - does not negate its validity.

How about that?

If determinism does not involve an inherently predictable progression of events within a system, it is not ''determinism. ''

How about that?

In any case, the definition is not holy writ. It is contestable. Hoefer himself recognizes this. We’ve been over this, yet you ignore all the rebuttals and simply repeat this stuff like a mantra. Any definition of determinism that incorporates or implies no free will, which btw Hoefer’s does not, is question begging and hence useless.

So you'd like ''determinism'' to mean whatever suits your needs? Do what you like, that's determinism? Random events, well, gosh, that's determinism, Oh, yeah, sure it is.....and Pigs Fly.

Where did I ever say the above? Nowhere. Did Marvin say anything like the above? No. Did Jarhyn? No. Stuffing straw is always a pretty good indictator of a losing argument.

It's implied in argument being asserted;

''If I have to choose between A and B, then it is logically required that "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" are both true. However, it is the opposite with "I will choose A" and "I will choose B" because only one of them is true.

If "I will choose A" is true, then "I could have chosen B" will also be true.
If "I will choose B" is true, then "I could have chosen A" will also be true.'' - Marvin Edwards.

You yourself have supported this.

 

[Jarhyn]

That's not an explanation for decision making as performed by a brain

Understanding decision making as performed by the brain would require YOU to sit through a capstone level undergraduate class on intelligence and machine learning (because this takes the model of a neuron and divorces it from the unimportant wet bits).

I explained as much to you.

I even tried to point out the principle in action in systems entirely designed by people, but you also do not understand that.

You don't even understand that "I could have but I didn't" is entirely valid.

I could prove out, quite clearly, how I could accomplish either thing, before I try to accomplish that thing. I can solve the system entirely for all the options in are about before I decide for "freedom of will", and I can do this without the universe being deterministic at all.

Determinism wages that the whole system of the universe has only a single, fixed, destined resolution pattern for seemingly stochastic elements. It's a bit of religious hand-waving but we're not really limited by it since Godel's Incompleteness Theorem protects free will for all denizens of all systems which are neither absolutely random nor "fixed trivial progression/count"

Hard determinism adds something to this and says "and no free will" completely out of the blue, despite the fact that our universe is neither of those two things.

It is called "static analysis" to solve options for freedom before resolution rather than at, and a level of real-time static analysis is often used in such settings as melee combat (doing static analysis on posture and position to determine and "play against" the identified will, thus having freedom to constrain it).

The existence of such a thing means I can look at a piece of source code and know all the way through the dance of the metal exactly why the program won't work.

You are here saying "explain all the mechanics of evolution, show me the DNA or it's not true!!!11!1oneoneone" but for neurons and decision, as if I owe you over 20 credit hours of university level education on the matter.

Go back to school and quit making god of the gaps arguments.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

and wants.....

... also known as our "wills".

And those wills can either be constrained (valid, attainable, unopposed), or free. They can be objectively evaluated as such.

I as an object have a sub object which in context to the rest of it makes it a plan and that object either objectively models the universe such that the goal is fulfilled or it objectively does not. There may even be different but still objectively real degrees but which it is free and constrained.

A "want" is something you may desire to do, whether you should do it or not.
A "will" is the intention to actually do it, which results in you actually doing it, whether you should do it or not.
There is a moral distinction between a "want" and a "will".

A want or a need, through the agency of a brain, generates the will to obtain whatever is wanted or needed.

And, typically, the process that the brain uses to generate the will is choosing to do something about it. It may be as simple as choosing between doing and not doing, or it can be as complex as sorting out multiple wants and needs, prioritizing which to satisfy in what order, etc.

And then there is habitual behavior, based upon prior choices that save us time by not having to make the choice again.

 

[DBT]

It's not a matter of causing ourselves. The issue is the right kind of regulative control. That without the ability to choose alternate actions, we don't have free will.

And yet we have the ability to choose any item on the restaurant menu. This ability is easily demonstrated by choosing the steak today and choosing the salad tomorrow. The fact that we chose the steak today had no impact at all upon our ability to choose the salad.

The menu has multiple items, but as the choice we make is determined, it is the only option that is realizable.


''Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation").'' - Marvin Edwards

''Without deviation'' means no possible alternate action
.

The fact that it was causally necessary that we would choose the steak today did not affect in any way our ability to choose the salad. We retained that ability even as we ordered the steak. To test this, simply order the salad with the steak, or directly after ordering the steak.

Choosing the salad was necessitated, therefore inevitable, you could not have not chosen the salad.

You'll discover that you can order the salad at anytime you want. And, of course, it will either be causally necessary that you will want to order the salad at that time, or it will be causally necessary that you won't want to order the salad at that time.

In either case, causal necessity does not make you do anything that you don't already want to do.

You can choose the salad when it is determined that you choose the salad. Otherwise, if something else is determined, that is what you do.

You not only can choose the salad if determined, but must necessarily choose the salad because it is determined that you choose the salad.

As you said - ''(as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation").'' - Marvin Edwards.

If you accept 'http://www.princetonphilosophy.com/background/freewillprimer.pdf'
regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

First, DBT, you really need to stop posting that link. The link always gives a 404, and if I try to find the correct link by using the root www.princetonphilosophy.com I get a page in a foreign language and a message asking if I want to translate it! It is obviously not a part of the Princeton website.

It's an old file from past debates. No luck with a search.

However, the argument is sound. I'll drop the link in future.

Second, we're not concerned here with items 2 and 3, because we hold the same position on those.

Third, I've addressed 1, 4, and 5 repeatedly in these discussions.
1. Whenever choosing occurs, it will always be the case that there will be one action that I could have done, but did not do.
4. The fact that there will be at least one action that I could have done, but didn't, is fixed and unchangeable by determinism!
5. Therefore determinism is compatible with free will.

So, the guys at Princeton got it wrong.

Not really, the argument begins with ''regulative control as a necessary part of free will'' - which of course is correct - therefore the rest follows.

The right kind of control is a necessary requirement for freedom.

Free;
a: the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action - Merrium Webster

I did not need to micromanage my neural activity, because I happened to BE that neural activity ordering the salad for dinner! The flaw in your logic and Taylor's is a false dualism, an attempt to separate me from my own brain. And that's pretty forked up, don't you think?

Dualism is not being invoked. The argument is that free will is incompatible with determinism.

As determinism doesn't allow alternate actions or the right kind of regulative control - the ability to do otherwise - means that free will is impossible within a determined system.

Incompatibilists are not arguing for free will.

We are the result of our neural activity. Whatever the brain is doing, that is what we are. The illusion of conscious control or will is exposed when things go wrong with the brain.

You're still overstepping neuroscience if you're suggesting that conscious awareness is never involved in decision-making. But, it is obvious that we are not consciously micromanaging the unconscious neural activities.

Conscious awareness does play a role, just not the right kind of role to qualify as free will. That is the point. I'm not suggesting that consciousness plays no role.

It is still our own brains that are performing the deliberations that causally determine our choices, and that is not in any way an illusion. The empirical fact is that the person is choosing whether to have the steak or the salad. And the person will be responsible for paying the bill.

Everything in the Universe has features and properties and acts according to its nature and makeup and the elements that act upon it.

A brain processes information unconsciously, according to its properties, nature and makeup prior to conscious representation of that information.

I'm out of time.

I'll just add this snippet;

''The compatibilist provides us with a philosophically sophisticated interpretation of could have done otherwise, but what reason do we have for believing that people actually employ such a notion? It is simply not enough to present a possible interpretation of what might be going on.

I contend that the compatibilist has to make a plausible case that people actually view matters in this way. There is, however, little empirical support for this conclusion.

Quite to the contrary, Nichols (2006b) has recently conducted a pilot study that suggests just the opposite. In the study, 75 undergraduates were given the following vignette:
On 4/13/2005, Bill filled out his tax form. At precisely 10:30 AM, he decided to lie about his income.

But of course, he didn't have to make this decision. Bill could have decided to be honest.

The subjects were then asked to judge whether a sentence sounded right or wrong (on a scale of 3 to −3).

One group got the following sentence, modeled on conditional analyses: Bill could have decided to be honest at 10:30, 4/13/2005, but only if some things had been different before the moment of his decision.

The other group got the following sentence, modeled on unconditional analyses: Bill could have decided to be honest at 10:30, 4/13/2005, even if nothing had been different before the moment of his decision.

The results were telling. Subjects were more likely to judge that the unconditional sentence sounded right. They gave higher ratings for the 68 Kriterion Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 5689 sentence modeled on unconditional analyses than for the one modeled on conditional analyses.''

 

[Jarhyn]

and wants.....

... also known as our "wills".

And those wills can either be constrained (valid, attainable, unopposed), or free. They can be objectively evaluated as such.

I as an object have a sub object which in context to the rest of it makes it a plan and that object either objectively models the universe such that the goal is fulfilled or it objectively does not. There may even be different but still objectively real degrees but which it is free and constrained.

A "want" is something you may desire to do, whether you should do it or not.
A "will" is the intention to actually do it, which results in you actually doing it, whether you should do it or not.
There is a moral distinction between a "want" and a "will".

A want or a need, through the agency of a brain, generates the will to obtain whatever is wanted or needed.

And, typically, the process that the brain uses to generate the will is choosing to do something about it. It may be as simple as choosing between doing and not doing, or it can be as complex as sorting out multiple wants and needs, prioritizing which to satisfy in what order, etc.

This is slightly confused from my perspective.

First there is the "question" or sometimes just the knowledge of intent. "Do I want this goal?"

Then once there is intent, I say "how do I get there," and then plan my plans. Many plans are developed, usually, and each is evaluated for whether it may succeed.

There is first the invasive, then the determination of Intent, and then the design of Will, and finally a second determination this time of Freedom.

If I only know moves that will "get me closer" in the moment, the plans are a little more haphazard, but this just means I'm breaking process into shorter steps with wills that bring me towards an intent that is not the final goal quite yet.

 

[DBT]

and wants.....

... also known as our "wills".

And those wills can either be constrained (valid, attainable, unopposed), or free. They can be objectively evaluated as such.

I as an object have a sub object which in context to the rest of it makes it a plan and that object either objectively models the universe such that the goal is fulfilled or it objectively does not. There may even be different but still objectively real degrees but which it is free and constrained.

A "want" is something you may desire to do, whether you should do it or not.
A "will" is the intention to actually do it, which results in you actually doing it, whether you should do it or not.
There is a moral distinction between a "want" and a "will".

A want or a need, through the agency of a brain, generates the will to obtain whatever is wanted or needed.

And, typically, the process that the brain uses to generate the will is choosing to do something about it. It may be as simple as choosing between doing and not doing, or it can be as complex as sorting out multiple wants and needs, prioritizing which to satisfy in what order, etc.

And then there is habitual behavior, based upon prior choices that save us time by not having to make the choice again.

It's a cognitive process. Inputs acting upon the system, the system processes acquired information, each step determines the next.

Cognition does not equate to free will. Two entirely different things, one physical the other conceptual.

 

[Jarhyn]

a cognitive process. Inputs acting upon the system, the system processes acquired information, each step determines the next.

Yes, and I can show quite clearly how there is a "intended destination" on that path of each step continuing to the next BECAUSE the universe is so deterministic (not absolutely deterministic, it's got this whole MASSIVE layer of stochastic behavior; that's another one of your religious beliefs), that I can objectively declare "that will is not free: he has stated 'finish line' but the wall in his path constrains him" and then watch as the runner barrels into the wall.

Each step determines the next does not itself mean that each step determining the next does not in the localities of each step where each part is determined is being determined by its own locality.

Me being local to the universe means that any wills, plans, or whatever you wish to call them are "mostly here", and are secret and hidden from you. You could not calculate what I am typing for instance, where you are sitting, even if you had the most powerful supercomputer ever made by humans. You simply do not hold enough information locally, and cannot re: Godel's Incompleteness Theorem.

It seems your belief is centered around a failure in your concept of locality.

 

[Jarhyn]

Jarhyn

Hmm, looks like I'm striking a nerve.

The ability to evaluate a plan does not require your hyperbolic demands that I know all of physics.

Of course understanding more about physics and the universe is great and important to do. It lets us plan better plans less subject to constraints against our wills.

But not knowing all the messy details about quantum physics, for example does nothing to bar us from doing static analysis on our plans to what are altogether sufficient extents on the basis of our given wills:

If I wish to make a Time Crystal, I need to know a lot about how quantum states switch, about spin coefficients, etc.

But if I wish to know how to get an apple in my face hole, I merely need to know where there are apples, and then some Newtonian level physics that most people understand intrinsically on some level.

You have not answered ANY of this

I care if a plan is being

Like, I hit compile+debug and watched a plan get translated into behavior.

We are not talking about simulation here, we are talking about the actual. Fucking. Thing.

I tell the thing "raise the thing the distance". I put a bar there, and the motor goes "sorry, can't do that boss!"

I did it specifically knowing it would evaluate it's behavior and report the lack of it's freedom to move in that direction, a lack of freedom as executed by a written will!

That is a plan, being.

Unless it can produce the exact results, it isn't the same

It does not have to be and I don't get why you think it does.

Stochastic prediction systems have error bars.

I have seen plenty of plans, in conjunction with their interpreter objects, reproduce many things. Because that's what DNA is, a plan existing next to interpreter proteins.

Just like an automations script is just a plan existing next to interpreter metal.

Just like a blueprint is just a plan existing next to some interpreter meat.

I can say "that DNA does not represent a free will; copying will end here and there will be no reproduction nor contribution to such caused here."

I can say "that automations script will fail here because this sensor will be deadlocked."

I can say "this joint will not support this weight and the structure will fall before completion".

I can identify that the wills are not free before their results are ever achieved, and sit back and watch the glorious trainwreck of all that happening.

Knowing every thing about reality omnisciently is not necessary to know some things well enough to do static analysis on a plan.

And you won't rid yourself of this meddlesome wizard just by sub-mentioning me and not quoting me.

I am bored oftentimes, and this is part of my recreational loop.

 

[pood]

Wrong, both Marvin Edwards and Jarhyn gave essentially the same definition that I use, which is from the Standford page on causal determinism

Sigh. Yes, I know, DBT, it’s from your precious Stanford page on causal determinism. Did you read the whole Hoefer article? He contests his own definition and concludes that causal determinism does not rule out free will. How about that, huh?

Yet compatibilists use that basic definition of determinism. The very same definition that Marvin Edwards, who argues for compatibility, gave.

The very same definition that Jarhyn gave. The very same definition that is generally accepted as being the essence of determinism, no randomness, predictable outcomes.

How about that?

That Hoefer 'contests his own definition' - which predates Hoefer and his article - does not negate its validity.

How about that?

If determinism does not involve an inherently predictable progression of events within a system, it is not ''determinism. ''

How about that?

In any case, the definition is not holy writ. It is contestable. Hoefer himself recognizes this. We’ve been over this, yet you ignore all the rebuttals and simply repeat this stuff like a mantra. Any definition of determinism that incorporates or implies no free will, which btw Hoefer’s does not, is question begging and hence useless.

So you'd like ''determinism'' to mean whatever suits your needs? Do what you like, that's determinism? Random events, well, gosh, that's determinism, Oh, yeah, sure it is.....and Pigs Fly.

Where did I ever say the above? Nowhere. Did Marvin say anything like the above? No. Did Jarhyn? No. Stuffing straw is always a pretty good indictator of a losing argument.

It's implied in argument being asserted;

''If I have to choose between A and B, then it is logically required that "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" are both true. However, it is the opposite with "I will choose A" and "I will choose B" because only one of them is true.

If "I will choose A" is true, then "I could have chosen B" will also be true.
If "I will choose B" is true, then "I could have chosen A" will also be true.'' - Marvin Edwards.

You yourself have supported this.

Of course I support it. I argue in the same way. How in the world does it relate to your assertion that I said random events are deterministic, or that pigs can fly?

 

[Jarhyn]

As determinism doesn't allow alternate actions or the right kind of regulative control

Ok, so, you are saying what determinism allows. Can you show us, in any kind of system with a fixed history, what you think free will would look like?

No?

Perhaps that means you don't understand what people are talking about when they say "free will".

I can draw the shape of the causally necessary chain of events before they strictly become causally necessary based on the information in the constrained network.

This information, this locality, chooses. It chooses because it encodes a will. That will is either free or constrained by circumstances.

Oftentimes the determinant of which actually gets executed is the one which offers the clearest path to whatever success condition is held by the interpretor.

This is a process called a "choice function" or "selection" function, or even perhaps "executive function". It doesn't matter that it is complicated, merely that you have a bin of "in" and a selected "out".

Executive action does not forbid choice, it IS choice.

At any rate, the will can be evaluated objectively, and the evaluation of the will can itself be evaluated by observing the "DID?"

This is all part of the model of a neural network, between it's biases and backprop and training algos.

You reference "regulative control" as if you know what that even means. You sure as heck haven't described the properties of system theory which discuss such "regulative control" that you invoke your no-true-scotsman on and say needs to be there.

You just hand wave away actual approaches from math and graph theory because you don't want to take on the 20-some odd credit hours of work.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The menu has multiple items, but as the choice we make is determined, it is the only option that is realizable.

To realize something means to make it real. If you have the ability to make it real, then it is realizable, even if you never choose to make it real. Your dream house is realizable if you have the means to realize it, even if you never decide to actually realize it.

All of the items on the restaurant menu are realizable, even though you will only make one of them real.

''Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation").'' - Marvin Edwards

''Without deviation'' means no possible alternate action.

You're not taking determinism as seriously as I am. "Without deviation" means that every possible alternate action that appeared on the menu for my consideration was causally necessary from any prior point in eternity. It means that every thought I had about the steak was equally necessary, and every thought I had about the salad was also necessary, and that I would necessarily find that the salad would meet my needs better than the steak, such that I would necessarily tell the waiter, "I will have the salad, please."

But here's the kicker, it would be causally necessary from any prior point in eternity that I would be making this choice while free of coercion and undue influence, in other words, of my own freely chosen will.

Not "freely" as in "free from causal necessity" (because that's foolishness), but only "freely" as in "free from coercion and undue influence".

Choosing the salad was necessitated, therefore inevitable, you could not have not chosen the salad.

I could choose any item on the menu, but I would only choose the salad. Determinism cannot speak to what I could have done, but only to what I will and what I would have done.

For example, determinism can assert that I would face an issue that required me to make a decision, that I would consider the options on the menu, that I would choose the salad, and that during these inevitable choosing events I would be free of coercion and undue influence.

You can choose the salad when it is determined that you choose the salad.

I can choose the salad whenever I want. Determinism may assert precisely when I will choose it, but not when I can choose it.

Otherwise, if something else is determined, that is what you do.

Of course, how could it be otherwise? If it is determined that I will do it, then I will certainly do it, and I will even want to do it (Schopenhauer and Kane), even though I could have done other things instead, like ordering the steak.

You not only can choose the salad if determined, but must necessarily choose the salad because it is determined that you choose the salad.

I can choose the salad whether it is determined or not. But if it is determined that I will choose the salad, then I certainly will choose it, regardless what I could have chosen instead.

As you said - ''(as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation").'' - Marvin Edwards.

Correct! All events are always causally necessary, including the mental events that we call "possibilities", things that "can" happen even if they don't happen.

As you can see, universal causal necessity/inevitability doesn't actually change anything. There are the possibilities, and they will always be there whenever we need them to help us figure things out.

If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

I've addressed 1, 4, and 5 repeatedly in these discussions.
1. Whenever choosing occurs, it will always be the case that there will be one action that I could have done, but did not do.
4. The fact that there will be at least one action that I could have done, but didn't, is fixed and unchangeable by determinism!
5. Therefore determinism is compatible with free will.

Not really, the argument begins with ''regulative control as a necessary part of free will'' - which of course is correct - therefore the rest follows. The right kind of control is a necessary requirement for freedom.

I've addressed regulatory control in detail as well. I do not need to micromanage my neural activity, because I happen to BE that neural activity ordering the salad for dinner! The flaw in your logic and Taylor's is a false dualism, an attempt to separate me from my own brain. And that's pretty forked up, don't you think?

Dualism is not being invoked.

Whenever you suggest that I must exist separately from my brain you are invoking dualism. For example, if you say that I must be the cause of my brain before I can be the true cause of anything else, or that I must control what my brain does before I can control anything else, you are invoking dualism.

Conscious awareness does play a role, just not the right kind of role to qualify as free will. That is the point. I'm not suggesting that consciousness plays no role.
...
A brain processes information unconsciously, according to its properties, nature and makeup prior to conscious representation of that information.

It seems you are still uncertain of the role of awareness in the brain. I'm not a neuroscientist, but my impression is that awareness, even after the fact, serves a necessary purpose. And unconscious activity brings in conscious awareness when necessary to input or output information during all forms of communication.

The key thing here is that it doesn't really matter whether a decision is made unconsciously and then later becomes conscious. I know that I am consciously aware of the restaurant menu. I know that I am consciously aware of placing the salad order. And I know that I am responsible for paying the bill for my dinner.

I'll just add this snippet;

''The compatibilist provides us with a philosophically sophisticated interpretation of could have done otherwise, but what reason do we have for believing that people actually employ such a notion? It is simply not enough to present a possible interpretation of what might be going on.

I contend that the compatibilist has to make a plausible case that people actually view matters in this way. There is, however, little empirical support for this conclusion.

Quite to the contrary, Nichols (2006b) has recently conducted a pilot study that suggests just the opposite. In the study, 75 undergraduates were given the following vignette:
On 4/13/2005, Bill filled out his tax form. At precisely 10:30 AM, he decided to lie about his income.

But of course, he didn't have to make this decision. Bill could have decided to be honest.

The subjects were then asked to judge whether a sentence sounded right or wrong (on a scale of 3 to −3).

One group got the following sentence, modeled on conditional analyses: Bill could have decided to be honest at 10:30, 4/13/2005, but only if some things had been different before the moment of his decision.

The other group got the following sentence, modeled on unconditional analyses: Bill could have decided to be honest at 10:30, 4/13/2005, even if nothing had been different before the moment of his decision.

The results were telling. Subjects were more likely to judge that the unconditional sentence sounded right. They gave higher ratings for the 68 Kriterion Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 5689 sentence modeled on unconditional analyses than for the one modeled on conditional analyses.''

Cool. Here's the thing. The unconditional analysis happens to be correct. Bill could have decided to be honest at 10:30, 4/13/2005, even if nothing had been different before the moment of his decision. This requires no philosophical analysis, as it is simply a matter of how the language logically works when communicating practical information about reality.

 

[fromderinside]

I am bored oftentimes, and this is part of my recreational loop

....5,6,7,8, ...

one little two little three little willies ....

Still your interpreter lacks credibility for that. If you don't have a physical base you don't have substance and it's not physical at all.





rat tat bumpf.

 

[Jarhyn]

[Something I would expect from a third grader, really. Or MrIntelligentDesign.]

you won't rid yourself of this meddlesome wizard

Knowing every thing about reality omnisciently is not necessary to know some things well enough to do static analysis on a plan.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It's a cognitive process. Inputs acting upon the system, the system processes acquired information, each step determines the next.

Yes. My system cognitively processes the menu, considers its options, and determines my choice, "each step determines the next".

Cognition does not equate to free will. Two entirely different things, one physical the other conceptual.

Everything that we know of, is both physical and conceptual. The choosing operation is both a physical process as well as a logical process. And everything we have to say about any physical processes is a matter of logically processing information about it. We only know of physical processes through logical concepts. So, don't criticize our model of reality for being conceptual, because that is the only way that anything real is understood.

 

[DBT]

a cognitive process. Inputs acting upon the system, the system processes acquired information, each step determines the next.

Yes, and I can show quite clearly how there is a "intended destination" on that path of each step continuing to the next BECAUSE the universe is so deterministic (not absolutely deterministic, it's got this whole MASSIVE layer of stochastic behavior; that's another one of your religious beliefs), that I can objectively declare "that will is not free: he has stated 'finish line' but the wall in his path constrains him" and then watch as the runner barrels into the wall.

Intention is formed through a progression of antecedents, not the agency of will.