Consciousness

[untermensche]

OK.

So there is that which experiences: consciousness. And to experience always means to experience in a particular way.

You don't know that there is something which experiences apart from the qualia themselves. I accept that it's the usual perspective but we don't know whether it's valid.

We most definitely do know.

If there is experience there MUST be BOTH that which is experienced AND that which experiences it. This is a truism that cannot be surmounted by words.

And ALL experience is experience in a specific manner.

There is never just "experience". There is always experience of a specific kind. There is never just the experience of blue. There is always the experience of blue in a particular way. So-called "qualia" or quality of experience.

So "qualia" is not something outside of experience. It is how experience occurs. It is actually a redundant concept. All one need say is "experience" and "qualia" is always included.

Descartes got it right. I am my thought, meaning that I am not some putative subject experiencing his thought.

Nobody IS their thoughts.

People are aware of their thoughts.

So if there is a thought there must be something aware of it.

And we don't experience anything but qualia so we don't experience the supposed subject you're talking about.

The subject is not experienced. It is that which experiences.

Without something capable of experiencing there is no experience.

 

[DBT]

There is a common fallacy: The argument from ignorance. Just because you don't understand it does not mean it is not understood.

Do you understand the explanation of "The Dress" picture? People experience the same physical phenomenon differently.

We do know that consciousness -- first person experience -- exists.

We do know why consciousness is an advantage to survival. And thus why it has evolved.

We do know how consciousness arises to some degree by experimenting on human beings. We know that stimulation of certain brain areas by electric probes yields a conscious experience that is not reflective of local reality. We know that disease and trauma affects consciousness.

No, sir, we do not need a perfect model. However you reveal your lack of knowledge in this area by claiming that "We do not know where to even begin to create one." What an ignorant statement. The problem is we have too many models from Penrose and his quantum consciousness to neural nets. We know that an entire computer can be created using exactly one logical operation: NAND. (Proof on request.) Further we know that neurology can implement a NAND gate. So it is possible that you have an on-board computer realized in your brain.

That on-board computer may be the entity that observes qualia. You seem to need an observer of qualia to be satisfied that it is a possible model of consciousness. So here is one. No psychic magic. No soul separate from the brain to experience.

Are you going to continue to play the psychological game called "Yes, But"? It goes like this: A person asks a question. All responses are met with "Yes, but that is insufficient." The questioner wins his game when the responder gives up. It is the game internet trolls play. They don't address issues but instead dismiss them with a few lines. It can be a fun game, but it is merely a game.

This is clueless.

A model is explaining in some way how the activity in cells arrives at conscious experience. We don't even know what conscious experience is in terms of brain physiology. How can we model the creation of it?

Yes of course conscious experience exists.

But that in itself is not a model of anything.

You really need to stop and have a good hard look at questioning your own beliefs. George S gave a good summary but you just dismissed it out of hand. It wasn't clueless. Your response was.

 

[DBT]

Panpsychism I suppose? In relation to the idea of panpsychism it's not the AI as a system that is forming and generating conscious activity but acting as a receiver for some sort of universal consciousness...is that right?

Well, I have heard of receiver theories. They seem kind of interesting, but I have never argued for them or even brought them up to you. I think you were talking to untemensche about that a while ago.

Anyways, I feel like the more reductionistic the theory can be the better. If consciousness were a fundamental/intrinsic property of matter, and possibly even universal, it would seem to normalize its existence with physical properties of matter.

Yes this kind of property would be immaterial. But it's not like it can affect anything like a ghost popping in and out of existence to scare people. It would just be philosophically theorized to be there where there is matter or certain kinds of matter, the more complex the activity the more complex the consciousness.

I don't understand how that relates to your proposal of emergence of consciousness in artificial intelligence. Are you saying that you believe that it is possible for IE circuitry to form conscious representation of the world and self comparable to human consciousness?

 

[untermensche]

This is clueless.

A model is explaining in some way how the activity in cells arrives at conscious experience. We don't even know what conscious experience is in terms of brain physiology. How can we model the creation of it?

Yes of course conscious experience exists.

But that in itself is not a model of anything.

You really need to stop and have a good hard look at questioning your own beliefs. George S gave a good summary but you just dismissed it out of hand. It wasn't clueless. Your response was.

None of it is a model for how cellular activity gives rise to conscious experience.

It is hand waving.

Pretending to have some knowledge beyond subjective experience.

A neural net is not a model of anything.

Electricity traveling down some neural net is not a model of anything.

 

[bilby]

You don't know that there is something which experiences apart from the qualia themselves. I accept that it's the usual perspective but we don't know whether it's valid.

We most definitely do know.

If there is experience there MUST be BOTH that which is experienced AND that which experiences it. This is a truism that cannot be surmounted by words.

Except the words "They could be the same thing".

Yet again we are expected to accept from you a declaration of 'the obvious' which is only obvious to you because you haven't thought it through.

The only thing stopping the experience and experiencer from being the same thing, is your inability to understand that it could be so - that is, this problem exists only in your head.

Being slow on the uptake is commonplace; and being arrogant is commonplace. But being both at once is laughable - and so people are laughing at you.

 

[DBT]

You really need to stop and have a good hard look at questioning your own beliefs. George S gave a good summary but you just dismissed it out of hand. It wasn't clueless. Your response was.

None of it is a model for how cellular activity gives rise to conscious experience.

It is hand waving.

Pretending to have some knowledge beyond subjective experience.

A neural net is not a model of anything.

Electricity traveling down some neural net is not a model of anything.

That's according to your proclamations. You are wrong. Neuroscience, in case you don't know, is a field of science that studies the brain, its neural networks, structures, and electrochemical activity as a means to understand both the brain as a mechanism, structure and function and behavior in relation to conscious and unconscious activity.

 

[untermensche]

We most definitely do know.

If there is experience there MUST be BOTH that which is experienced AND that which experiences it. This is a truism that cannot be surmounted by words.

Except the words "They could be the same thing".

Yet again we are expected to accept from you a declaration of 'the obvious' which is only obvious to you because you haven't thought it through.

The only thing stopping the experience and experiencer from being the same thing, is your inability to understand that it could be so - that is, this problem exists only in your head.

Being slow on the uptake is commonplace; and being arrogant is commonplace. But being both at once is laughable - and so people are laughing at you.

No they cannot be the same thing. They are not the same thing.

One is an ability. The ability to experience. There must be that which has the ability to experience. I say it has the ability to move the arm too.

And the other are mere objects. The representations created by the brain. That which can be experienced.

Somebody is slow here.

 

[untermensche]

None of it is a model for how cellular activity gives rise to conscious experience.

It is hand waving.

Pretending to have some knowledge beyond subjective experience.

A neural net is not a model of anything.

Electricity traveling down some neural net is not a model of anything.

That's according to your proclamations. You are wrong. Neuroscience, in case you don't know, is a field of science that studies the brain, its neural networks, structures, and electrochemical activity as a means to understand both the brain as a mechanism, structure and function and behavior in relation to conscious and unconscious activity.

I am not wrong.

The term "neural network" is an anatomical term with no known function. Yes neural networks exist. That does not mean we understand the first thing about how they relate to consciousness.

You have hand waving and absurd claims on your side.

Nothing else.

Not one physiological explanation for one aspect of consciousness.

You don't even know what it is. You think the representations that consciousness is aware of is the same thing as consciousness.

You could not be more lost.

 

[PyramidHead]

You don't know that there is something which experiences apart from the qualia themselves. I accept that it's the usual perspective but we don't know whether it's valid.

We most definitely do know.

If there is experience there MUST be BOTH that which is experienced AND that which experiences it. This is a truism that cannot be surmounted by words.

And ALL experience is experience in a specific manner.

There is never just "experience". There is always experience of a specific kind. There is never just the experience of blue. There is always the experience of blue in a particular way. So-called "qualia" or quality of experience.

So "qualia" is not something outside of experience. It is how experience occurs. It is actually a redundant concept. All one need say is "experience" and "qualia" is always included.

Descartes got it right. I am my thought, meaning that I am not some putative subject experiencing his thought.

Nobody IS their thoughts.

People are aware of their thoughts.

So if there is a thought there must be something aware of it.

And we don't experience anything but qualia so we don't experience the supposed subject you're talking about.

The subject is not experienced. It is that which experiences.

Without something capable of experiencing there is no experience.

That may be true as far as language is concerned, but I'm skeptical that it must necessarily be true. You may be describing a fact about grammar and not a fact about the world.

 

[untermensche]

We most definitely do know.

If there is experience there MUST be BOTH that which is experienced AND that which experiences it. This is a truism that cannot be surmounted by words.

And ALL experience is experience in a specific manner.

There is never just "experience". There is always experience of a specific kind. There is never just the experience of blue. There is always the experience of blue in a particular way. So-called "qualia" or quality of experience.

So "qualia" is not something outside of experience. It is how experience occurs. It is actually a redundant concept. All one need say is "experience" and "qualia" is always included.

Descartes got it right. I am my thought, meaning that I am not some putative subject experiencing his thought.

Nobody IS their thoughts.

People are aware of their thoughts.

So if there is a thought there must be something aware of it.

And we don't experience anything but qualia so we don't experience the supposed subject you're talking about.

The subject is not experienced. It is that which experiences.

Without something capable of experiencing there is no experience.

That may be true as far as language is concerned, but I'm skeptical that it must necessarily be true. You may be describing a fact about grammar and not a fact about the world.

That seems a last refuge.

If you (that which can experience) and the representation of the tree were the same thing how could you be aware of it?

The act of awareness implies a separation between that which is aware and that which it is aware of.

This is language describing the situation, not creating it.

 

[ryan]

Well, I have heard of receiver theories. They seem kind of interesting, but I have never argued for them or even brought them up to you. I think you were talking to untemensche about that a while ago.

Anyways, I feel like the more reductionistic the theory can be the better. If consciousness were a fundamental/intrinsic property of matter, and possibly even universal, it would seem to normalize its existence with physical properties of matter.

Yes this kind of property would be immaterial. But it's not like it can affect anything like a ghost popping in and out of existence to scare people. It would just be philosophically theorized to be there where there is matter or certain kinds of matter, the more complex the activity the more complex the consciousness.

I don't understand how that relates to your proposal of emergence of consciousness in artificial intelligence. Are you saying that you believe that it is possible for IE circuitry to form conscious representation of the world and self comparable to human consciousness?

Assuming you meant AI, yes, absolutely I believe that AI can be conscious the way humans are. Functionalism and panpsychism together would allow it.

 

[PyramidHead]

That seems a last refuge.

If you (that which can experience) and the representation of the tree were the same thing how could you be aware of it?

There wouldn't be an "I" to be aware of it, I'd just be the content of my consciousness, which is the subjective impression of observing a tree.

The act concept of awareness implies a separation between that which is aware and that which it is aware of.

This is language describing the situation, not creating it.

My modification to your sentence could also be true. Apart from just re-stating how the semantics work, what's your evidence that it's a real phenomenon?

Not that it makes any difference, but some languages don't have a subject all the time. Japanese, for example, drops the subject entirely in normal communication. Even in English, there are fuzzy subjects. Consider the following exchange:

"Is it nice out today?"
"No, it's cloudy and rainy."

If I were to take your approach, I'd be forced to conclude that the physical phenomenon of weather requires two components: the weather itself, and this 'it' entity that is doing all the weathering. But in reality, there is no 'it'. There's just clear skies, or the process of precipitation, or air currents. Relying too heavily on verbal expression leads to a false impression of reality.

I'm not saying this is definitely the case with experience, just that it's a possibility that shouldn't be dismissed. Maybe my experience of a loud noise is akin to the state of the 'weather' in my brain. If our language were more like Japanese, we might say "it's loud inside" instead of "I hear something loud".

 

[untermensche]

Assuming you meant AI, yes, absolutely I believe that AI can be conscious the way humans are. Functionalism and panpsychism together would allow it.

Shouldn't that be in the religion section?

Faith is something some humans give value to there.

 

[untermensche]

There wouldn't be an "I" to be aware of it, I'd just be the content of my consciousness, which is the subjective impression of observing a tree.

The second you say "impression" you imply a separation between something capable of having impressions and the impression itself.

The act concept of awareness implies a separation between that which is aware and that which it is aware of.

This is language describing the situation, not creating it.

My modification to your sentence could also be true. Apart from just re-stating how the semantics work, what's your evidence that it's a real phenomenon?

The use of "concept" here again merely reflects the situation. It does not create it.

To be aware of a representation there must be a separation from it.

And if there is awareness there must be something capable of being aware.

If there is flight there must be something capable of flying.

The question is: What is this thing capable of being aware?

Not: Is there such a thing that is capable? That is beyond doubt. Once you have awareness there must be something capable of being aware.

And if it is aware of something it must be separated from it. That is the only way to be aware of it.

Not that it makes any difference, but some languages don't have a subject all the time. Japanese, for example, drops the subject entirely in normal communication. Even in English, there are fuzzy subjects. Consider the following exchange:

"Is it nice out today?"
"No, it's cloudy and rainy."

If I were to take your approach, I'd be forced to conclude that the physical phenomenon of weather requires two components: the weather itself, and this 'it' entity that is doing all the weathering. But in reality, there is no 'it'. There's just clear skies, or the process of precipitation, or air currents. Relying too heavily on verbal expression leads to a false impression of reality.

That is not my approach.

The "it" in both sentences refers to the same thing.

"Is the weather nice out today?"

"No, the weather is cloudy and rainy."

I'm not saying this is definitely the case with experience, just that it's a possibility that shouldn't be dismissed. Maybe my experience of a loud noise is akin to the state of the 'weather' in my brain. If our language were more like Japanese, we might say "it's loud inside" instead of "I hear something loud".

To say "It is loud inside" implies both something that can be aware of the loudness AND the loudness.

You cannot escape the dichotomy of subject and object.

That is consciousness. Dividing the universe between subject and object.

 

[ryan]

Assuming you meant AI, yes, absolutely I believe that AI can be conscious the way humans are. Functionalism and panpsychism together would allow it.

Shouldn't that be in the religion section?

Faith is something some humans give value to there.

Functionalism and panpsychism aren't philosophy? You better tell every university, philosopher and library in the world this insight.

Stop wasting time and space on posts you know absolutely nothing about.

 

[untermensche]

Shouldn't that be in the religion section?

Faith is something some humans give value to there.

Functionalism and panpsychism aren't philosophy? You better tell every university, philosopher and library in the world this insight.

Stop wasting time and space on posts you know absolutely nothing about.

I was referring to the AI part.

Sure, there is philosophy.

But it will never produce consciousness.

 

[ryan]

Functionalism and panpsychism aren't philosophy? You better tell every university, philosopher and library in the world this insight.

Stop wasting time and space on posts you know absolutely nothing about.

I was referring to the AI part.

Sure, there is philosophy.

But it will never produce consciousness.

You really don't know how huge of a topic of the prospect of AI having consciousness is in philosophy?! You may be quite interested in functionalism.

What if I replaced my cells one by one with tiny machines that provide the exact same function as my cells; in other words, at exactly what point would I go from a conscious human to unconscious robot?

When I am total AI, I would be exactly like ryan, and wouldn't I claim I to have consciousness the same way? Would you have any reason to think that I were a zombie?

 

[untermensche]

I was referring to the AI part.

Sure, there is philosophy.

But it will never produce consciousness.

You really don't know how huge of a topic of the prospect of AI having consciousness is in philosophy?! You may be quite interested in functionalism.

What if I replaced my cells one by one with tiny machines that provide the exact same function as my cells; in other words, at exactly what point would I go from a conscious human to unconscious robot?

When I am total AI, I would be exactly like ryan, and wouldn't I claim I to have consciousness the same way? Would you have any reason to think that I were a zombie?

I've known about this for a long time.

As soon as there were computers there was the attempt to mimic human capacities with computers.

But modeling cellular activity with a computer is like building a blueprint.

And no matter how good a blueprint you make you only still have a blueprint. You don't ever have the real thing.

 

[PyramidHead]

The second you say "impression" you imply a separation between something capable of having impressions and the impression itself.

The act concept of awareness implies a separation between that which is aware and that which it is aware of.

This is language describing the situation, not creating it.

My modification to your sentence could also be true. Apart from just re-stating how the semantics work, what's your evidence that it's a real phenomenon?

The use of "concept" here again merely reflects the situation. It does not create it.

To be aware of a representation there must be a separation from it.

And if there is awareness there must be something capable of being aware.

If there is flight there must be something capable of flying.

The question is: What is this thing capable of being aware?

Not: Is there such a thing that is capable? That is beyond doubt. Once you have awareness there must be something capable of being aware.

And if it is aware of something it must be separated from it. That is the only way to be aware of it.

That sounds very much like just re-stating how the semantics work. You're spot-on about the concept of awareness, but not all concepts are accurate reflections of reality. Let's break this down a little further.

You start with the premise: To be aware of a representation there must be a separation from it. This is true when the representation is in the outside world, like a neon sign. A sign without anybody looking at it is not the same situation as a sign with somebody looking at it.

But what does it mean when the representation is generated internally? Here, it's harder to make the distinction. If a mental representation of my kitchen is successfully created by my brain via sensory inputs and neural connections, the result is my experience of being in the kitchen. There is no intermediary step of me being aware of the representation; in fact, I can't NOT be aware of it. The moment it is created, the experience of being in the kitchen occurs automatically.

The same is true of thoughts. Can you even coherently imagine having a thought, but not being aware of it? All thoughts are instantaneously acknowledged in consciousness as they occur. It's not like I can form a thought and somehow fail to observe it.

The perfect correlation between the internal representation of something and my awareness of the representation suggests that one of these elements is redundant.

All of this is just linguistic/conceptual convenience that aids communication anyway. Whether there is one thing or two things is a matter of interpretation; in reality, there's just a universe-spanning quantum field with localized disturbances, some of which are associated with awareness.

 

[ryan]

You really don't know how huge of a topic of the prospect of AI having consciousness is in philosophy?! You may be quite interested in functionalism.

What if I replaced my cells one by one with tiny machines that provide the exact same function as my cells; in other words, at exactly what point would I go from a conscious human to unconscious robot?

When I am total AI, I would be exactly like ryan, and wouldn't I claim I to have consciousness the same way? Would you have any reason to think that I were a zombie?

I've known about this for a long time.

As soon as there were computers there was the attempt to mimic human capacities with computers.

But modeling cellular activity with a computer is like building a blueprint.

And no matter how good a blueprint you make you only still have a blueprint. You don't ever have the real thing.

Can you answer my question about why or why I wouldn't be conscious if you were to replace my cells with synthetic ones that function the same way? I may not have the same consciousness but it is at least reasonable to think I might have a consciousness.

Or, what if I somehow replaced each carbon atom with silicon atoms. Since they have similar functional roles as carbon, why wouldn't I be conscious?