Consciousness

[untermensche]

You start with the premise: To be aware of a representation there must be a separation from it. This is true when the representation is in the outside world, like a neon sign. A sign without anybody looking at it is not the same situation as a sign with somebody looking at it.

This is never the case. The real sign is in the outside world. Consciousness has no awareness of it.

What consciousness is aware of is a representation of the sign created in some way by the brain.

But what does it mean when the representation is generated internally? Here, it's harder to make the distinction. If a mental representation of my kitchen is successfully created by my brain via sensory inputs and neural connections, the result is my experience of being in the kitchen. There is no intermediary step of me being aware of the representation; in fact, I can't NOT be aware of it. The moment it is created, the experience of being in the kitchen occurs automatically.

You are not the internal representation of your kitchen.

You are that which is able to be aware of the internal representation.

Even internally the dichotomy between subject and object exists. It must exist. A separation must exist.

There are the internal representations (the objects) AND that which is capable of experiencing them (the subject).

This is not some trick of language.

This is language describing the situation.

 

[PyramidHead]

This is never the case. The real sign is in the outside world. Consciousness has no awareness of it.

What consciousness is aware of is a representation of the sign created in some way by the brain.

But what does it mean when the representation is generated internally? Here, it's harder to make the distinction. If a mental representation of my kitchen is successfully created by my brain via sensory inputs and neural connections, the result is my experience of being in the kitchen. There is no intermediary step of me being aware of the representation; in fact, I can't NOT be aware of it. The moment it is created, the experience of being in the kitchen occurs automatically.

You are not the internal representation of your kitchen.

You are that which is able to be aware of the internal representation.

Even internally the dichotomy between subject and object exists. It must exist. A separation must exist.

There are the internal representations (the objects) AND that which is capable of experiencing them (the subject).

This is not some trick of language.

This is language describing the situation.

How do you know? I could replace every sentence you wrote with its literal negation. What process would you use to tell which set of sentences is true?

 

[untermensche]

I've known about this for a long time.

As soon as there were computers there was the attempt to mimic human capacities with computers.

But modeling cellular activity with a computer is like building a blueprint.

And no matter how good a blueprint you make you only still have a blueprint. You don't ever have the real thing.

Can you answer my question about why or why I wouldn't be conscious if you were to replace my cells with synthetic ones that function the same way? I may not have the same consciousness but it is at least reasonable to think I might have a consciousness.

Or, what if I somehow replaced each carbon atom with silicon atoms. Since they have similar functional roles as carbon, why wouldn't I be conscious?

You wouldn't replace the cells. You would model them.

That is not replacing them. That is having a model that shares some behavioral characteristics.

You are claiming a perfect model is possible in the absence of any working model.

We don't know what consciousness even is. How are we going to model it?

 

[untermensche]

This is never the case. The real sign is in the outside world. Consciousness has no awareness of it.

What consciousness is aware of is a representation of the sign created in some way by the brain.

You are not the internal representation of your kitchen.

You are that which is able to be aware of the internal representation.

Even internally the dichotomy between subject and object exists. It must exist. A separation must exist.

There are the internal representations (the objects) AND that which is capable of experiencing them (the subject).

This is not some trick of language.

This is language describing the situation.

How do you know? I could replace every sentence you wrote with its literal negation. What process would you use to tell which set of sentences is true?

Just explain how there is awareness without both something that is aware and the things it can be aware of.

Saying it is possible is not explaining anything.

How is it possible?

 

[ryan]

Can you answer my question about why or why I wouldn't be conscious if you were to replace my cells with synthetic ones that function the same way? I may not have the same consciousness but it is at least reasonable to think I might have a consciousness.

Or, what if I somehow replaced each carbon atom with silicon atoms. Since they have similar functional roles as carbon, why wouldn't I be conscious?

You wouldn't replace the cells. You would model them.

That is not replacing them. That is having a model that shares some behavioral characteristics.

You are claiming a perfect model is possible in the absence of any working model.

We don't know what consciousness even is. How are we going to model it?

Okay nevermind the replacing thought experiment; let's not get hung up on that.

Just imagine a silicon-based clone of me. The clone would be heavier (of course) and have other slightly different properties of its whole body, but assume that you generally could not tell us apart.

The argument from functionalism is that if there exists mental states in humans, there should also be mental states with, say, a silicon "AI" clone. Note that functionalism does not require or imply the existence of the consciousness, but the idea is that function is how systems are defined not necessarily what the functions are composed of.

 

[fromderinside]

Re: untermenche response to my last post: Not at all. All the brain has to do is pass it's activities through remembered sequences.

 

[PyramidHead]

How do you know? I could replace every sentence you wrote with its literal negation. What process would you use to tell which set of sentences is true?

Just explain how there is awareness without both something that is aware and the things it can be aware of.

Saying it is possible is not explaining anything.

How is it possible?

It's been discussed quite a bit since Hume and even prior to that by the Buddhists. The basic idea is that you are just a loose 'bundle' of experiences arranged in time. An experience is simply the kind of thing that necessarily includes the subjective sensation of being an experiencer that persists through time, but no such entity can be detected by science.

Experiences appear and disappear. They are sometimes associated with other experiences through memory, or indirectly through verbal descriptions. Beyond that, your experiences are no different in kind from mine. The separation between your experience and mine is exactly the same as the separation between your experience yesterday and your experience today. The notion that there is an uncrossable gulf due to us being distinct 'experiencers' is useful for communication but not supported by any evidence other than intuition.

 

[untermensche]

Re: untermenche response to my last post: Not at all. All the brain has to do is pass it's activities through remembered sequences.

If there is memory there is that which is remembered and that which remembers it.

You cannot by some magic remove the subject from the situation.

 

[untermensche]

Just explain how there is awareness without both something that is aware and the things it can be aware of.

Saying it is possible is not explaining anything.

How is it possible?

...The basic idea is that you are just a loose 'bundle' of experiences arranged in time. An experience is simply the kind of thing that necessarily includes the subjective sensation of being an experiencer that persists through time, but no such entity can be detected by science....

You haven't explained anything.

Saying the things we experience are a "loose bundle" does not explain experience in any way. It is hand waving.

And yes experience involves the sense of being a subject experiencing things.

But the sense is there because that is the only way to experience something.

You cannot experience something unless there is some separation from it.

Experiencing something is not reacting to something. It is knowing it is there. The experience is there. The pain in the leg is there. It is experienced.

I think therefore I am. If the experience is there that which experiences it is there too.

Experiences appear and disappear.

But the experiencer remains.

 

[PyramidHead]

...The basic idea is that you are just a loose 'bundle' of experiences arranged in time. An experience is simply the kind of thing that necessarily includes the subjective sensation of being an experiencer that persists through time, but no such entity can be detected by science....

You haven't explained anything.

Saying the things we experience are a "loose bundle" does not explain experience in any way. It is hand waving.

You didn't ask for an explanation, you asked for a possibility.

And yes experience involves the sense of being a subject experiencing things.

But the sense is there because that is the only way to experience something.

You cannot experience something unless there is some separation from it.

What separation is there between you and your thoughts? Is it a spatial separation, a temporal separation? No and no; a thought and your experience of it always occur at exactly the same place and the same time. So in what sense are they separate? One answer is that they are separate concepts, but is there another sense? If so, what is it?

Experiencing something is not reacting to something. It is knowing it is there. The experience is there. The pain in the leg is there. It is experienced.

I think therefore I am. If the experience is there that which experiences it is there too.

Experiences appear and disappear.

But the experiencer remains.

Where exactly does it remain? When there are no experiences, what actually is this 'experiencer' in practice?

 

[untermensche]

You haven't explained anything.

Saying the things we experience are a "loose bundle" does not explain experience in any way. It is hand waving.

You didn't ask for an explanation, you asked for a possibility.

I asked for a rational possibility.

Not just a story and a claim it is possible.

What separation is there between you and your thoughts?

That is a good question.

And something that has to be explained if consciousness is explained.

Because awareness is always awareness of something.

And if there is awareness there must be that which is capable of being aware of things.

...a thought and your experience of it always occur at exactly the same place and the same time. So in what sense are they separate?...

I am aware of it. It is not aware of me.

We are very different things. We must be.

Awareness is an ability, not an object.

Sights and sounds and emotions and sensations are objects, not abilities.

I am that which is capable of being aware. I am not that which I am aware of. Even when I turn my thoughts on myself it is an abstraction, a memory of this or that, not anything real.

But the experiencer remains.

Where exactly does it remain?

Another good question, but if there is an ability there must be something with that ability.

So it must be somewhere.

 

[untermensche]

You wouldn't replace the cells. You would model them.

That is not replacing them. That is having a model that shares some behavioral characteristics.

You are claiming a perfect model is possible in the absence of any working model.

We don't know what consciousness even is. How are we going to model it?

Okay nevermind the replacing thought experiment; let's not get hung up on that.

Just imagine a silicon-based clone of me. The clone would be heavier (of course) and have other slightly different properties of its whole body, but assume that you generally could not tell us apart.

The argument from functionalism is that if there exists mental states in humans, there should also be mental states with, say, a silicon "AI" clone. Note that functionalism does not require or imply the existence of the consciousness, but the idea is that function is how systems are defined not necessarily what the functions are composed of.

The question is: Is a silicon-clone of you a possibility?

I doubt it.

Not a physical impossibility, a technical impossibility.

 

[ryan]

Okay nevermind the replacing thought experiment; let's not get hung up on that.

Just imagine a silicon-based clone of me. The clone would be heavier (of course) and have other slightly different properties of its whole body, but assume that you generally could not tell us apart.

The argument from functionalism is that if there exists mental states in humans, there should also be mental states with, say, a silicon "AI" clone. Note that functionalism does not require or imply the existence of the consciousness, but the idea is that function is how systems are defined not necessarily what the functions are composed of.

The question is: Is a silicon-clone of you a possibility?

I doubt it.

Not a physical impossibility, a technical impossibility.

Never mind, you are just completely missing the point.

 

[fromderinside]

Re: untermenche response to my last post: Not at all. All the brain has to do is pass it's activities through remembered sequences.

If there is memory there is that which is remembered and that which remembers it.

You cannot by some magic remove the subject from the situation.

There was no subject there with which to begin. Input is input repeated input is input input again.

 

[PyramidHead]

You didn't ask for an explanation, you asked for a possibility.

I asked for a rational possibility.

Not just a story and a claim it is possible.

You do this all the time. You answer a question with another question, and then when your question is answered you move the goalposts. What about my original question?

How do you know? I could replace every sentence you wrote with its literal negation. What process would you use to tell which set of sentences is true?

What separation is there between you and your thoughts?

That is a good question.

And something that has to be explained if consciousness is explained.

Because awareness is always awareness of something.

And if there is awareness there must be that which is capable of being aware of things.

So you can't identify any separation between you and your thoughts, but nevertheless you know that they must be separate.

...a thought and your experience of it always occur at exactly the same place and the same time. So in what sense are they separate?...

I am aware of it. It is not aware of me.

We are very different things. We must be.

Well, now you're just begging the question. What is the 'me' that is aware of a thought, apart from just the experience of that thought (including the sense of being a subject)?

Where exactly does it remain?

Another good question, but if there is an ability there must be something with that ability.

So it must be somewhere.

You sound like George W. Bush looking for WMDs under the tablecloth. For someone who acknowledges the glaring questions that come up when you insist on Cartesian distinctions, you seem to completely lack any hint of skepticism about your intuition. You should try imagining that you don't exist as an unchanging watcher of your experiences. Reflect on the fact that nothing essential about you persists from moment to moment. A distinct, indivisible consciousness cannot be found anywhere in your brain. You can't even conceive of an experience separate from your awareness of it, despite maintaining they must be separate. These problems stem entirely from how you verbally describe the immediate impressions you regard as gospel truths.

 

[untermensche]

If there is memory there is that which is remembered and that which remembers it.

You cannot by some magic remove the subject from the situation.

There was no subject there with which to begin. Input is input repeated input is input input again.

There was no brain there to begin with.

But when there is the objects of experience are not the same thing as that which experiences them.

I cannot experience something unless I can make some distinction between it and me.

 

[untermensche]

So you can't identify any separation between you and your thoughts, but nevertheless you know that they must be separate.

How is there an experience if there is nothing that has the experience?

Just answer that.

My explanation makes sense. When there is experience there is both that which can experience AND the things it experiences.

You make no sense.

Explain.

 

[PyramidHead]

So you can't identify any separation between you and your thoughts, but nevertheless you know that they must be separate.

How is there an experience if there is nothing that has the experience?

Just answer that.

My explanation makes sense. When there is experience there is both that which can experience AND the things it experiences.

You make no sense.

Explain.

The brain is both. Everything is happening in one place at the same time. What do you imagine is experiencing the representations created by the brain, if not the brain itself? What is this mysterious other party?

 

[bilby]

Except the words "They could be the same thing".

Yet again we are expected to accept from you a declaration of 'the obvious' which is only obvious to you because you haven't thought it through.

The only thing stopping the experience and experiencer from being the same thing, is your inability to understand that it could be so - that is, this problem exists only in your head.

Being slow on the uptake is commonplace; and being arrogant is commonplace. But being both at once is laughable - and so people are laughing at you.

No they cannot be the same thing. They are not the same thing.

So you are saying that you don't experience yourself?

I wish the rest of us were so fortunate.

 

[DBT]

That's according to your proclamations. You are wrong. Neuroscience, in case you don't know, is a field of science that studies the brain, its neural networks, structures, and electrochemical activity as a means to understand both the brain as a mechanism, structure and function and behavior in relation to conscious and unconscious activity.

I am not wrong.

Of course you are. For the reasons given by several posters, articles, research, experiments, evidence, etc.

Your assertions on the other hand rest on faith

The term "neural network" is an anatomical term with no known function. Yes neural networks exist. That does not mean we understand the first thing about how they relate to consciousness.

Another assertion. And completely wrong.

You have hand waving and absurd claims on your side.

Nothing else.

No, that's still you. Any objective reader can see your errors, assert, conflate, misdirect, deny.