Definition of Consciousness: 2nd Poll

[ruby sparks]

To say that conscious decisions involve consciousness is not saying all that much.

 

[untermensche]

To say that conscious decisions involve consciousness is not saying all that much.

It is saying where the decision begins and what makes it.

That sounds like a lot.

 

[untermensche]

I move my arms in my sleep. Just sayin'.

There is reflexive movement, not very productive, good enough for rolling over, and purposeful movement, very productive, good enough to survive.

We remember dreams too.

It means we are still there experiencing and perhaps guiding to some degree when asleep.

I'd say it was productive of me staying asleep. As is jumping out of the way of an oncoming truck productive for survival. If I waited for conscious instructions on that, I probably wouldn't be here to tell you about it...

The issue is whether the movement is not controlled by the same consciousness that is aware of dreams.

And a person can train themselves to make better decisions when confronted with an oncoming train. Or angry human. Many people freeze or do something stupid because of the switch to reflexive behavior. One reflex is to freeze in place. But in the wrong situation it can kill you.

 

[ruby sparks]

To say that conscious decisions involve consciousness is not saying all that much.

It is saying where the decision begins and what makes it.

That sounds like a lot.

Not really. It excludes non-conscious causes of actions.

What you are limiting yourself to talking about is decisions in which consciousness is involved, that's all, so to say that consciousness is involved in decisions in which consciousness is involved is arguably just a tautology.

Your arms are caused to move for a lot of reasons. Ditto your legs. Do you consciously decide to instruct your legs to move every time you walk? No. You probably don't even issue the conscious instruction 'walk' in principle on certain occasions, never mind instructing each step.

Essentially, you are not thinking of those as 'decisions'. That's fine. It just excludes an awful lot of the reasons you do actions. Consciousness is not always needed.

 

[ruby sparks]

By the way, does anyone here think of consciousness as an epiphenomenon, a byproduct of processes to which it does not contribute in any causal way (a bit like the sound of the whistle on the steam train)?

 

[untermensche]

To say that conscious decisions involve consciousness is not saying all that much.

It is saying where the decision begins and what makes it.

That sounds like a lot.

Not really. It excludes non-conscious causes of actions.

What causes are those?

When somebody decides to buy a pair of speakers what non-conscious process is involved?

Your arms are caused to move for a lot of reasons.

I'm talking about deciding on a motion of the arm in the mind then causing that motion with the mind. Something people that move can easily do.

What non-conscious process is involved?

Please be specific.

 

[Speakpigeon]

It seems we're not going anywhere with this poll.

Not enough voters, perhaps still too many options, and in any case not one that could please most people.

Those who can't find any one option they would be pleased to vote for could perhaps try to explain what they think is missing.

Thank you for your efforts.
EB

 

[untermensche]

Too ambitious a task at this point.

We know the experience of having a consciousness but nearly nothing objectively about one.

 

[DBT]

Well that didn't take long to degenerate into mud slinging.

Idiotic pests are hard to control.

They do not listen or learn.

They have no rational arguments or thoughtful opinions.

Again.

You have the brain, a bunch of cells, and you have the consciousness, whatever it is made of.

Consciousness is the thing that orders the brain to move the arm.

Two different entities.

Which implies duality, that consciousness is independent from the brain. There is no evidence for this supposition, All the evidence supports the observation that brain forms and generates consciousness as an evolved means of interacting with environment.

 

[Subsymbolic]

I am a duelist.

The brain and consciousness are two distinct things.

They are not the same thing.

Sure, but are you a substance dualist (there are actually two distinct substances) or a property dualist (there is actually only one substance but it has some interesting and perhaps irreducible emergent properties).

- - - Updated - - -

Too ambitious a task at this point.

We know the experience of having a consciousness but nearly nothing objectively about one.

How could we know something objective about a subjective experience? This isn't a scientific problem, it's a philosophical one.

 

[ruby sparks]

I'm talking about deciding on a motion of the arm in the mind then causing that motion with the mind. Something people that move can easily do.

What non-conscious process is involved?

Please be specific.

When you decide to move your finger, for example, there are non-conscious processes going along in tandem with all the conscious ones, and often before them:

https://vimeo.com/90101368

(Note that I am not making a claim about he free will implications in that video, just the non-conscious activity which precedes both the action and even the conscious awareness of intention to act)

 

[Elixir]

I would contend that the only actual free will we (sometimes) possess is our own attention. I.e. the ability to direct our attention inward or outward toward specific stimulae.

 

[fromderinside]

Anybody explains subjective experience in scientific terms, do you know?
EB

I don't think so. However this seems a good place to begin barking about consciousness being activity at places in the Cortex, primarily, and to a lesser extent in centers summarizing sense conditions which are connected to places where arousal begins, is connected to regions needed for there to be a first person which, I believe, are the source or reflector of subjective experience. I'm gong to place two references before you and then dive in to what I consider is the important state of the nervous system that probably drives resultant consciousness.

The references that need consideration.Biophysics Of Consciousness: A Foundational Approach https://books.google.com/books?hl=e...0Q#v=onepage&q=neuroscience of qualia&f=false

This is a book published in 2017 with an introduction written by John Searle which lays out his concept for "Accessing The Hard Problem of Consciousness


Cortical Neural Synchronization Underlies Primary Visual Consciousness of Qualia: Evidence from Event-Related Potentialshttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4927634/

Abstract: [FONT=&quot]This article reviews three experiments on event-related potentials (ERPs) testing the hypothesis that primary visual consciousness (stimulus self-report) is related to enhanced cortical neural synchronization as a function of stimulus features. ERP peak latency and sources were compared between “seen” trials and “not seen” trials, respectively related and unrelated to the primary visual consciousness. Three salient features of visual stimuli were considered (visuospatial, emotional face expression, and written words). Results showed the typical visual ERP components in both “seen” and “not seen” trials. There was no statistical difference in the ERP peak latencies between the “seen” and “not seen” trials, suggesting a similar timing of the cortical neural synchronization regardless the primary visual consciousness. In contrast, ERP sources showed differences between “seen” and “not seen” trials. For the visuospatial stimuli, the primary consciousness was related to higher activity in dorsal occipital and parietal sources at about 400 ms post-stimulus. For the emotional face expressions, there was greater activity in parietal and frontal sources at about 180 ms post-stimulus. For the written letters, there was higher activity in occipital, parietal and temporal sources at about 230 ms post-stimulus. These results hint that primary visual consciousness is associated with an enhanced cortical neural synchronization having entirely different spatiotemporal characteristics as a function of the features of the visual stimuli and possibly, the relative qualia (i.e., visuospatial, face expression, and words). In this framework, the dorsal visual stream may be synchronized in association with the primary consciousness of visuospatial and emotional face contents. Analogously, both dorsal and ventral visual streams may be synchronized in association with the primary consciousness of linguistic contents. In this line of reasoning, the ensemble of the cortical neural networks underpinning the single visual features would constitute a sort of multi-dimensional palette of colors, shapes, regions of the visual field, movements, emotional face expressions, and words. The synchronization of one or more of these cortical neural networks, each with its peculiar timing, would produce the primary consciousness of one or more of the visual features of the scene.

[/FONT]My comments: We know the brain is always communicating up and down from sense to effector, act to sense, chemical communication to neural or other chemical processes. What this provides is a continuous progressing stage from whence consciousness arises probably engaging primarily cortical status from frontal and other integrative areas in the brain. This was evident to Koch as early as the late eighties when he began proposing necessary brain structure to support consciousness.

If you interpret the book and study in the context I suggest above you'll probably agree we are on the way to defining the neuroscience of consciousness. If not, I and probably others would appreciate your criticisms and suggestions along these lines.

 

[untermensche]

I'm talking about deciding on a motion of the arm in the mind then causing that motion with the mind. Something people that move can easily do.

What non-conscious process is involved?

Please be specific.

When you decide to move your finger, for example, there are non-conscious processes going along in tandem with all the conscious ones, and often before them:

https://vimeo.com/90101368

(Note that I am not making a claim about he free will implications in that video, just the non-conscious activity which precedes both the action and even the conscious awareness of intention to act)

These experiments rely on the narrowing of options to two choices and the stereotypical movement patterns people have acquired over a lifetime.

All they show is that people generally make the same kinds of decisions when choices are artificially narrowed.

But if the subject is allowed to in the end make no decision that cannot be predicted by any researcher. If the person were allowed to end the experiment at any time that could not be predicted.

Only the very narrowest of choices could be predicted.

None of these experiments say anything about consciousness or what makes decisions.

What was that activity 6 seconds before some artificial decision was forced? Consciousness doing something or not?

Who is to say?

 

[fromderinside]

It's exactly what you say. Experiments are run with the least amount of variation possible. It's called experimental control not 'what if'. What is being captured is not proof of anything beyond what is reliably demonstrated.

You choose to find exceptions. Your what ifs are irrelevant. You design the experiments and arrive at a confidence variables are controlled.

I could jab at the work I did if I chose to allow what ifs. But they aren't jabbed at because my work demonstrated well defined control over well defined variables.

Wave your grubby little hands in the air. Blather about 'what if' Show us you know better. Design and execute an experiment. You will only prove your point when you run your experiments and we agree it is well designed and well controlled.

 

[DBT]

I would contend that the only actual free will we (sometimes) possess is our own attention. I.e. the ability to direct our attention inward or outward toward specific stimulae.

Still a brain function...the perceived ability to consciously direct attention being lost whenever the neural activity responsible for directing attention breaks down. Consciousness not having access to its own means of production forms an impression (perception loop) of conscious agency.....an illusion that is exposed in the presence of brain damage, tangles, lesions, chemical imbalances, and so on. Everything comes down to brain function.

 

[ruby sparks]

I'm talking about deciding on a motion of the arm in the mind then causing that motion with the mind. Something people that move can easily do.

What non-conscious process is involved?

Please be specific.

When you decide to move your finger, for example, there are non-conscious processes going along in tandem with all the conscious ones, and often before them:

https://vimeo.com/90101368

(Note that I am not making a claim about he free will implications in that video, just the non-conscious activity which precedes both the action and even the conscious awareness of intention to act)

These experiments rely on the narrowing of options to two choices and the stereotypical movement patterns people have acquired over a lifetime.

All they show is that people generally make the same kinds of decisions when choices are artificially narrowed.

But if the subject is allowed to in the end make no decision that cannot be predicted by any researcher. If the person were allowed to end the experiment at any time that could not be predicted.

Only the very narrowest of choices could be predicted.

None of these experiments say anything about consciousness or what makes decisions.

What was that activity 6 seconds before some artificial decision was forced? Consciousness doing something or not?

Who is to say?

You asked me about deciding on a motion of the arm in the mind then causing that motion with the mind. So the options were 'move' or 'don't move' the arm. I showed you a relevant example related to moving a finger instead. The bottom line is consciousness is involved in some of the reasons you move your arm or finger but not all. Therefore, there are, de facto, non-conscious processes causing you to act. It's that simple. And it happens every second. Your body is, let's say for the sake of argument, doing a thousand different things right now, and only a tiny proportion of them are 'waiting' for conscious instruction, including your arm or finger movements.

None of these experiments say anything about consciousness or what makes decisions.

If you say so. I still think all you're saying is that consciousness is involved in those decisions in which consciousness is involved. Either that or you are limiting the meaning of 'decisions' to 'only conscious decisions' in which case of course consciousness is involved because it's in your definition. Either way, you have a tautology.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I'm gong to place two references before you and then dive in to what I consider is the important state of the nervous system that probably drives resultant consciousness.

The references that need consideration.Biophysics Of Consciousness: A Foundational Approach https://books.google.com/books?hl=e...0Q#v=onepage&q=neuroscience of qualia&f=false

This is a book published in 2017 with an introduction written by John Searle which lays out his concept for "Accessing The Hard Problem of Consciousness

See the very last bit of the abstract:

consciousness and subjectivity are neurontologically irreducible.

This sounds to me like an admission science is terminally scotched...

It's one thing to investigate how the brain works and relate what the subject is experiencing to what the brain is doing. Not necessarily easy but I expect doable.

It would be very different to understand the nature of subjective experience.
EB

 

[DBT]

Free will as the possibility to have chosen to do otherwise:

''The compatibalist's argument that the concept of ''can choose otherwise '' is analytically definable in terms of the hypothetical notion that agents would have chosen otherwise. ''He could have done otherwise'' is false. That is to say, our man might be such that, if he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise, and yet also such that could not have done otherwise. Suppose, after all, that our murderer could not have chosen, or could not have decided, to do otherwise. Then the fact that he happens also to be a man such that, if he had chosen not to shoot he would not have shot, would make no difference. For if he could not have chosen not to shoot, then he would could not have done anything other than just what it was that he did do. Chisholm (1964, 27)


''What I cannot understand is how I could have reasonably chosen to do otherwise, how I could have reasonably chosen B, given exactly the same prior deliberation that led me to choose A, the same information deployed, the same consequences considered, the same assessments made, and so on. Kane (57)''

 

[ruby sparks]

Free will as the possibility to have chosen to do otherwise:

''The compatibalist's argument that the concept of ''can choose otherwise '' is analytically definable in terms of the hypothetical notion that agents would have chosen otherwise. ''He could have done otherwise'' is false. That is to say, our man might be such that, if he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise, and yet also such that could not have done otherwise. Suppose, after all, that our murderer could not have chosen, or could not have decided, to do otherwise. Then the fact that he happens also to be a man such that, if he had chosen not to shoot he would not have shot, would make no difference. For if he could not have chosen not to shoot, then he would could not have done anything other than just what it was that he did do. Chisholm (1964, 27)


''What I cannot understand is how I could have reasonably chosen to do otherwise, how I could have reasonably chosen B, given exactly the same prior deliberation that led me to choose A, the same information deployed, the same consequences considered, the same assessments made, and so on. Kane (57)''

As far as I am concerned, the idea that we can do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances is...impossible to explain, using current knowledge. And that's arguably quiite a low bar. A higher one that would arguably be needed for free will would be "freely willing to decide to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances".

So, what some compatibilists say is that the capacities for agency we have (which they call free will but which I prefer not to) allow us to choose to do otherwise in different circumstances.

And this, they say, and I largely agree, is where the capacity to churn out (in a determined and/or random way) future virtual scenarios, does change the game somewhat. I think this holds whether the scenarios are experienced consciously or not.