Demystifying Determinism

[Marvin Edwards]

If all actions within deterministic system are determined before they happen, inputs delivered as outputs without deviation, including thoughts as a part of this process, where lies the choice? It's not as if an alternative is a possibility. Choice means the possibility of taking a different option, yet none exist within a deterministic system.

The choosing still lies right there in front of us, in the restaurant as people decide what they will order from a menu of alternate possibilities. The possibilities exist as tokens in the brain's logical operation of resolving its uncertainty, as it reduces the menu to a single dinner order. There are multiple things that "can" be done, and these are resolved into the single thing that "will" be done. Decision making is one of the brain's primary functions, and it requires the notion of possibilities to perform this function.

The function of choosing, like every other event, is itself deterministic. The choice will be reliably caused by the brain according to its own goals and reasons, thoughts and feelings, etc.

The necessity of choosing is also deterministic. The choosing event will be reliably caused and will proceed without deviation. We will have no choice but to choose. (Try going into a restaurant and seeing how long you can get away without choosing).

 

[Kylie]

What I'm saying is that your position seems to be that being able to make such a prediction can only be done by the alleged entity outside our universe. Since I have rejected that as unfalsifiable and thus utterly useless, it follows that such predictions can never be made at all. Since these predictions can never be made, claiming that it's possible to make them is nothing more than wishful thinking.

No, it's simply a statement about what can be predicted in principle given a theoretical external observer not part of the universe. If it's of no interest to you, fine.

And how can this alleged external observe be falsified, even in principle?

It's true that that absolute prediction is not possible in all cases from within a deterministic system. Specifically, cases in which a response to the the prediction itself is part of the prediction are problematic (in all other cases prediction appears to be perfectly perfectly possible). However this says nothing about the veracity of determinism itself.

And why should these special cases be excluded? You can't exclude them simply because they're paradoxical.

That's nothing more than sweeping it under the rug.

They're different because they're specific types of predictions that simply can't be made. (explained at length in the link I gave you).

So this paper says the predictions can't be made because the measurements are impossible. "These epistemic limitations arise, for instance, because a finite subsystem of the universe is unable to make the required accurate measurements of the initial conditions of the universe, or because such a subsystem is unable to represent fully accurately the initial value of a variable, if this value is a (non-computable) irrational number (requiring an infinite string of digits)."

If the predictions are impossible, how then can we be justified in saying that the universe IS deterministic?

But how do you believe this inherent unpredictability manifests itself in our day-to-day life? Science, medicine, engineering etc all proceed on the basis that things are inherently predictable. It seems to me that if there is any inherent unpredictability then it's, as I suggested) negligible.

There are (figuratively) infinite ways this might happen. You seem quite unfamiliar with the Butterfly effect. An atom moving in a random way in January could result in the weather being different in December, resulting in rain instead of sunshine. As a result, I might decide to drive to work instead of catching the bus.

So your example of a manifestation of inherent indeterminacy is unexpected weather?

How do you differentiate events which are inherently indeterministic (fundamentally unpredictable) from deterministic events for which we have insufficient data/computing power (difficult to predict accurately)?

No, my example of a manifestation of inherent indeterminacy was pinpointing exactly when a particular atom would move in a particular direction. As I spelled out, that indeterminate movement could, later down the line, result in significant changes.

 

[Jarhyn]

Embedded predictability (absolute predictability within our universe) is not possible.

This was in fact one of my points about the future sight post. Embedded predictability is in fact possible for some manners of deterministic systems...

I agree completely (I think!).

I'm talking specifically about the situation where we're attempting to predict the response of a subsystem and that subsystem uses the prediction to do the opposite.

As for the rest of your post I'm afraid it's well over my pay grade, but thanks for trying.

Yeah, so most of the post is on the computational complexity of the recursion implied by two people having futures sight.

Recursion is hard on the best of days and recursive math processes are gross. It takes me about a day and a half to understand a single recursive function, method, or class, since it requires visualizing a tree of execution of the same execution within the execution.

I'm not sure if that's two or three abstractions, but it's one of the things computer science professors use to convince those who can't abstract heavily enough to drop courses.

As to @Kylie and their butterfly effect posts, I'm expecting that a lot of it has to do with the boundary at which people have a hard time distinguishing between "large, but finite" and "infinite, but well defined", and then "infinite and whose definition is strongly inaccessible".

That's one of the reasons I bring up future sight as a functional description of a system that meets the definition of "deterministic", just so we can talk about how even if you could see exactly which wills are free of that finite but large set, you cannot avoid having to enter a point in which the past is made singular and determined.

As a result, the non-falsifiability of superdeterminism (thanks to FDI and Wiki for that btw) implies that ALL free will in ALL systemic models with singular pasts MUST satisfy  compatibilist definitions to operate as a system that coherently encodes freedom and it's absence.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

How can it be a choice if it is set in stone and the outcome can't be any different?

"I have two ice cream cones. One is chocolate and the other is vanilla. You can choose the one you want and I'll take the other."

For whatever reason, you choose the chocolate, so I get the vanilla.

First, the outcome "can" be different, even though it "will not" be different. You had your reasons for choosing the chocolate, and they caused you to choose it. Given the same person, the same conditions, and the same possibilities, you would have always chosen the chocolate.

But, can we logically conclude from this that you "could not" choose the vanilla? No. You could have chosen the vanilla, even though you would not choose it. That's the difference between "would" and "could". I told you at the beginning that "You can choose the one you want". So I cannot truthfully say "you could not have chosen the vanilla". Either I would be lying then or I would be lying now.

"Could have" if just the past tense of "can". If "You can choose vanilla" was ever true at some point in the past, then "You could have chosen vanilla" will be forever true of that event in the future. That's simply the way that verb tenses work. It's built into the logic of the language and especially into the logic of the choosing operation.

In every choosing operation there will be at least two things that you can choose. At the end of choosing there will always be the single thing that you "will" do and at least one other thing that you "could have done".

So, despite the traditional assertion that determinism means "we could not have done otherwise", it is logically incorrect. All that determinism may correctly assert is that we "would not have done otherwise".

Confusing what "can" happen with what "will" happen creates nonsensical paradoxes. For example:
Waiter (a hard determinist): "What will you have for dinner, sir?"
Customer (hungry): "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Because the universe is deterministic, there is only one thing that you can order."
Customer: "Oh. Well. Okay then, what is the single thing that I can order?"
Waiter: "How should I know? You haven't told me yet!"

The word "choice" by definition implies that it's not set in stone.

I disagree. The word "choice", by definition implies: "1.a. The act of choosing; preferential determination between things proposed; selection, election." (Oxford English Dictionary).

If our choice was set in stone from the beginning of time it is still by definition a choice. An inevitable choosing is still a choosing, and the inevitable choice is no less an actual choice.

You can't say, "It's set in stone that he would go with Obi-Wan, so that was always going to happen no matter what," and then turn around and say, "Well, there was a point where something different MIGHT have happened..."

"It was set in stone that he would go with Obi-Wan" but we cannot add "no matter what". For example, one of those "what's" would be "What if it were set in stone that he would decide to stay on Tatooine?" That is something that MIGHT have happened.

Luke was always bound to do what the script said he would do. Even if he thought he was making a choice, he wasn't actually.

Ah. Then he would have thought he was reading the script and not making a choice. That's the problem with analogies. They only work if they are true to the analog.

Once the race is over and the result has actually occurred, the result is set in stone. But BEFORE it has occurred, it is not set in stone.

Agreed. No event is fully caused until its final prior causes have played themselves out. It may be predicted in advance, but it cannot happen in advance (future events would be colliding with current events, and no one wants to clean up that mess).

It is true to say that his horse "could have" won because there were events that could have happened that would have stopped the other horses from winning. Once his horse has lost, those events have a probability of 0%, but there was a point in time when those events could have happened.

Yes. And it will be forever true that those events "could" have happened, even if it is never true that they "would" have happened.

 

[The AntiChris]

No, it's simply a statement about what can be predicted in principle given a theoretical external observer not part of the universe. If it's of no interest to you, fine.

And how can this alleged external observe be falsified, even in principle?

I assume you mean the claim that certain predictions are not possible from within a deterministic system.

All you'd have to do is create a closed deterministic system containing a predictor and counter-predictor (a subsystem which will always respond counter to the prediction). If the predictor makes accurate predictions in all possible situations then the claim is falsified.

So this paper says the predictions can't be made because the measurements are impossible. "These epistemic limitations arise, for instance, because a finite subsystem of the universe is unable to make the required accurate measurements of the initial conditions of the universe, or because such a subsystem is unable to represent fully accurately the initial value of a variable, if this value is a (non-computable) irrational number (requiring an infinite string of digits)."

In the piece you quote, the authors are describing previous attempts to show the epistemic limitations of predictability. The authors themselves make it clear that they "argue for the stronger claim that embedded predictability cannot obtain in a deterministic universe even on the idealizing assumption that the epistemic limitations at issue are removed" - they show that the problem is not epistemic but a matter of logic.

how then can we be justified in saying that the universe IS deterministic?

I tried to address this earlier: I'll try again.

Determinism is the theory that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature. It is not a theory about what can or cannot be predicted.

As I said earlier, we have intuitions about what this might mean for the predictability of deterministic systems. Some of these intuitions turn out to be mistaken on deeper examination.

So your example of a manifestation of inherent indeterminacy is unexpected weather?

How do you differentiate events which are inherently indeterministic (fundamentally unpredictable) from deterministic events for which we have insufficient data/computing power (difficult to predict accurately)?

No, my example of a manifestation of inherent indeterminacy was pinpointing exactly when a particular atom would move in a particular direction. As I spelled out, that indeterminate movement could, later down the line, result in significant changes.

I think we're talking past each other here. If you're simply saying that "indeterminate movement could, later down the line, result in significant changes" then I don't disagree. I'm just not sure that we actually do see such changes.

 

[SIB]

I Guess for forum life sake we just don't say "determinism is possible" and "Maybe something is going on at the fundamental level that will show it can't be known in its entirety so to some degree, its indeterministic".

Both are true today.

As far as "outside of this universe", we will never know. That being us alive today. But we can describe what we see and experience to some degree past "Nobody knows everything". We can describe events past the special pleading of "We don't make any claims.".

 

[Jarhyn]

In the piece you quote, the authors are describing previous attempts to show the epistemic limitations of predictability. The authors themselves make it clear that they "argue for the stronger claim that embedded predictability cannot obtain in a deterministic universe even on the idealizing assumption that the epistemic limitations at issue are removed" - they show that the problem is not epistemic but a matter of logic

You should check out Swammerdami's thread on the Axiom of Choice over in math.

I would argue that embedded predictability can obtain in a Deterministic system, but only of some supervised subset, and not of the whole, assuming the system itself requires no strongly unapproachable cardinals.

 

[The AntiChris]

You should check out Swammerdami's thread on the Axiom of Choice over in math.

I'm afraid the discussion there is way outside my area of expertise.

I would argue that embedded predictability can obtain in a Deterministic system...

And so would I, but not in certain very specific situations.

 

[Jarhyn]

You should check out Swammerdami's thread on the Axiom of Choice over in math.

I'm afraid the discussion there is way outside my area of expertise.

I would argue that embedded predictability can obtain in a Deterministic system...

And so would I, but not in certain very specific situations.

Indeed. It's just not what's happening here was the whole thrust of that. What's happening here is the scattershot, "not drawing entirely inside the lines" version done by neurons -- by openly interconnected subsystems of a correlated system, not by a supervisor of an otherwise isolated subsystem.

 

[Kylie]

How can it be a choice if it is set in stone and the outcome can't be any different?

"I have two ice cream cones. One is chocolate and the other is vanilla. You can choose the one you want and I'll take the other."

For whatever reason, you choose the chocolate, so I get the vanilla.

First, the outcome "can" be different, even though it "will not" be different. You had your reasons for choosing the chocolate, and they caused you to choose it. Given the same person, the same conditions, and the same possibilities, you would have always chosen the chocolate.

[/QUOTE]
If it WILL NOT be different, how can you say that it CAN be different? If it will not be different, then it can't be different. And the "can" and the "can't contradict each other.

But, can we logically conclude from this that you "could not" choose the vanilla? No. You could have chosen the vanilla, even though you would not choose it. That's the difference between "would" and "could". I told you at the beginning that "You can choose the one you want". So I cannot truthfully say "you could not have chosen the vanilla". Either I would be lying then or I would be lying now.

It seems to be much the same thing.

You said I WOULD not choose it. To be able to say that requires knowledge, and if you had enough knowledge to know that I would not choose it, you would also know that I COULD not choose it.

"Could have" if just the past tense of "can". If "You can choose vanilla" was ever true at some point in the past, then "You could have chosen vanilla" will be forever true of that event in the future. That's simply the way that verb tenses work. It's built into the logic of the language and especially into the logic of the choosing operation.

I agree. However, please note that if it was true that I COULD have chosen Vanilla, that requires that my choosing chocolate was not set in stone.

In every choosing operation there will be at least two things that you can choose. At the end of choosing there will always be the single thing that you "will" do and at least one other thing that you "could have done".

So, despite the traditional assertion that determinism means "we could not have done otherwise", it is logically incorrect. All that determinism may correctly assert is that we "would not have done otherwise".

Confusing what "can" happen with what "will" happen creates nonsensical paradoxes. For example:
Waiter (a hard determinist): "What will you have for dinner, sir?"
Customer (hungry): "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Because the universe is deterministic, there is only one thing that you can order."
Customer: "Oh. Well. Okay then, what is the single thing that I can order?"
Waiter: "How should I know? You haven't told me yet!"

The "could not have done otherwise" is simply a result of the deterministic nature of the universe that has one outcome locked in. In your example, the waiter would actually be able to answer the question. All he has to do is look at the different events, and figure out what they will cause. You can't argue that the universe is completely deterministic in nature and then turn around and say future events can't be determined ahead of time.

The word "choice" by definition implies that it's not set in stone.

I disagree. The word "choice", by definition implies: "1.a. The act of choosing; preferential determination between things proposed; selection, election." (Oxford English Dictionary).

If our choice was set in stone from the beginning of time it is still by definition a choice. An inevitable choosing is still a choosing, and the inevitable choice is no less an actual choice.

If it is set in stone, then there are no actual options. We only think there are.

You can't say, "It's set in stone that he would go with Obi-Wan, so that was always going to happen no matter what," and then turn around and say, "Well, there was a point where something different MIGHT have happened..."

"It was set in stone that he would go with Obi-Wan" but we cannot add "no matter what". For example, one of those "what's" would be "What if it were set in stone that he would decide to stay on Tatooine?" That is something that MIGHT have happened.

But it didn't happen, and no matter how many times you watch it, Luke never will stay on Tatooine. It is set in stone that he will go, and he does every single time. He has no choice in the matter. So yes, we are justified in saying that Luke would go with Obi Wan, no matter what.

Luke was always bound to do what the script said he would do. Even if he thought he was making a choice, he wasn't actually.

Ah. Then he would have thought he was reading the script and not making a choice. That's the problem with analogies. They only work if they are true to the analog.

You think Luke has seen the script?

Mark Hammill, yes, he saw the script. But Luke Skywalker never saw it.

Once the race is over and the result has actually occurred, the result is set in stone. But BEFORE it has occurred, it is not set in stone.

Agreed. No event is fully caused until its final prior causes have played themselves out. It may be predicted in advance, but it cannot happen in advance (future events would be colliding with current events, and no one wants to clean up that mess).

Please don't try to move the goalposts. I'm not talking about when an event is actually CAUSED, I'm talking about when it is set in stone. And my position is that it is not set in stone until it has actually happened.

It is true to say that his horse "could have" won because there were events that could have happened that would have stopped the other horses from winning. Once his horse has lost, those events have a probability of 0%, but there was a point in time when those events could have happened.

Yes. And it will be forever true that those events "could" have happened, even if it is never true that they "would" have happened.

But if it was set in stone that Horse A would win the race, then that was ALWAYS true, and there was never any chance that Horse B could win instead. So it was never true that some other horse COULD have won.

 

[Kylie]

No, it's simply a statement about what can be predicted in principle given a theoretical external observer not part of the universe. If it's of no interest to you, fine.

And how can this alleged external observe be falsified, even in principle?

I assume you mean the claim that certain predictions are not possible from within a deterministic system.

All you'd have to do is create a closed deterministic system containing a predictor and counter-predictor (a subsystem which will always respond counter to the prediction). If the predictor makes accurate predictions in all possible situations then the claim is falsified.

Well, I was actually talking about the idea of a theoretical observer that is not a part of the universe.

But even your idea is flawed. In order to justify that it was always right, you'd need to run an infinite number of tests. I mean, how could you actually test all possible situations in any practical sense? You literally can't.

So this paper says the predictions can't be made because the measurements are impossible. "These epistemic limitations arise, for instance, because a finite subsystem of the universe is unable to make the required accurate measurements of the initial conditions of the universe, or because such a subsystem is unable to represent fully accurately the initial value of a variable, if this value is a (non-computable) irrational number (requiring an infinite string of digits)."

In the piece you quote, the authors are describing previous attempts to show the epistemic limitations of predictability. The authors themselves make it clear that they "argue for the stronger claim that embedded predictability cannot obtain in a deterministic universe even on the idealizing assumption that the epistemic limitations at issue are removed" - they show that the problem is not epistemic but a matter of logic.

So even if the universe is deterministic, they can't prove it?

how then can we be justified in saying that the universe IS deterministic?

I tried to address this earlier: I'll try again.

Determinism is the theory that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature. It is not a theory about what can or cannot be predicted.

As I said earlier, we have intuitions about what this might mean for the predictability of deterministic systems. Some of these intuitions turn out to be mistaken on deeper examination.

And, if all events are the result of antecedent events and the laws of nature, why shouldn't we be able to predict everything given sufficient knowledge about what the antecedent events are and the laws of nature?

So your example of a manifestation of inherent indeterminacy is unexpected weather?

How do you differentiate events which are inherently indeterministic (fundamentally unpredictable) from deterministic events for which we have insufficient data/computing power (difficult to predict accurately)?

No, my example of a manifestation of inherent indeterminacy was pinpointing exactly when a particular atom would move in a particular direction. As I spelled out, that indeterminate movement could, later down the line, result in significant changes.

I think we're talking past each other here. If you're simply saying that "indeterminate movement could, later down the line, result in significant changes" then I don't disagree. I'm just not sure that we actually do see such changes.

There have been many examples of the butterfly effect in reality. In his book Chaos, James Gleick describes a situation in which scientists would run simulations of the weather on supercomputers. They would run a situation, then start the simulation again. But when they ran it a second time, they saw that the weather patterns being simulated would be the same at first, then a little bit different, and then rapidly diverge into completely different resu7lts than the first simulation. The cause, they discovered, was that the computer made calculations based on something like ten digits after the decimal place, but when it saved the earlier states, it would only save eight digits. So, the first time, the computer was running off a value of, say, 4.73957653674, but when they ran the simulation again, the computer was starting from the same point with a value of 4.739576537. That tiny change was enough to send the simulation to a completely different result. So we have seen that small changes at one point can lead to very different results down the line. If such small events can happen in reality (and the random movement of atoms is, I think such an event), then we need to conclude that drastic differences can result.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

If it WILL NOT be different, how can you say that it CAN be different?

Because CAN and WILL do not mean the same thing. Many things can happen even if only one thing will happen. And there are multiple possible futures even if there is only one actual future.

The notion of possibility evolved to deal with matters of uncertainty. When we do not know what will happen, we imagine what can happen, to be better prepared for what does happen.

However, please note that if it was true that I COULD have chosen Vanilla, that requires that my choosing chocolate was not set in stone.

Actually not. You see "I COULD have chosen Vanilla" was also set in stone. Common understanding is that "I chose chocolate even though I could have chosen vanilla", is true in both parts. All our options are accounted for. One is accounted for in the "would have done" and the rest are accounted for in the "could have done".

And, to rescue determinism, both the "would have" and the "could have's" were set in stone. Determinism cannot make one truth inevitable without also making the other truths inevitable.

When we conflate "can" with "will" (or "possibility" with "actuality"), it totally gums up the works, as we demonstrated here:

Waiter (a hard determinist): "What will you have for dinner, sir?"
Customer (hungry): "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Because the universe is deterministic, there is only one thing that you can order."
Customer: "Oh. Well. Okay then, what is the single thing that I can order?"
Waiter: "How should I know? You haven't told me yet!"

The "could not have done otherwise" is simply a result of the deterministic nature of the universe that has one outcome locked in.

Nope. The things we "could have done" were just as locked in as the thing that we "would do". So, "could not have done otherwise" is silly nonsense, as we've just demonstrated.

In your example, the waiter would actually be able to answer the question. All he has to do is look at the different events, and figure out what they will cause.

And, how would that conversation play out?

You can't argue that the universe is completely deterministic in nature and then turn around and say future events can't be determined ahead of time.

Determine has two meanings. For example, "We could not determine (know) whether it was the increased temperature or the increased pressure that determined (caused) when the chemical reaction would take place".

Prediction is a matter of knowing in advance. And there are many events that can be predicted in advance, such as the time the sun rises and sets each day.

Causal necessity is a matter of causing in advance. But given that the causal chain is infinitely long, which of the events in this chain are the most meaningful and relevant causes?

A cause is meaningful if it efficiently explains why an event happened.
A cause is relevant if we can do something about it.

Usually the most direct causes, those closest to the event, are the most meaningful and relevant causes. For example, the act of deliberation is the most meaningful and relevant cause of a deliberate act. As we move backward through the chain of prior causes, the causes become more incidental, less meaningful, and less relevant.

For example, the Big Bang is an incidental cause that is part of every causal chain. But it is not the meaningful or relevant cause of our dinner order in the restaurant. The waiter brings the dinner and the bill to the person who placed the order. (Rumor has it that the Big Bang is a lousy tipper).

If it is set in stone, then there are no actual options. We only think there are.

But it turns out that the actual options are also set in stone (hmm, it's like we're eating at Moses' Restaurant tonight, and the menu is chiseled onto small stone tablets).

Determinism doesn't actually change anything. There is the menu of options. It was causally determined from any prior point in eternity that we would have to consider the restaurant menu and choose something from it, in order to have dinner tonight.

Please don't try to move the goalposts. I'm not talking about when an event is actually CAUSED, I'm talking about when it is set in stone. And my position is that it is not set in stone until it has actually happened.

The only events that are actually set in stone are sculptures and patios. "Set in stone" is a metaphor for reliable causation.

All events are reliably caused by prior events, such that every event is causally necessary and inevitably will happen from any prior point in eternity.

Now, the question is this: Why you think this limits your freedom in any way?

But if it was set in stone that Horse A would win the race, then that was ALWAYS true, and there was never any chance that Horse B could win instead. So it was never true that some other horse COULD have won.

How would you go about proving that no other horse COULD have won? (Keep in mind that "could have" always implies that (1) the horse did not win and (2) that the horse only would have won under different circumstances).

 

[Kylie]

If it WILL NOT be different, how can you say that it CAN be different?

Because CAN and WILL do not mean the same thing. Many things can happen even if only one thing will happen. And there are multiple possible futures even if there is only one actual future.

The notion of possibility evolved to deal with matters of uncertainty. When we do not know what will happen, we imagine what can happen, to be better prepared for what does happen.

That is irrelevant.

If it WILL be one way, it is incorrect to say that it CAN be different.

However, please note that if it was true that I COULD have chosen Vanilla, that requires that my choosing chocolate was not set in stone.

Actually not. You see "I COULD have chosen Vanilla" was also set in stone. Common understanding is that "I chose chocolate even though I could have chosen vanilla", is true in both parts. All our options are accounted for. One is accounted for in the "would have done" and the rest are accounted for in the "could have done".

And, to rescue determinism, both the "would have" and the "could have's" were set in stone. Determinism cannot make one truth inevitable without also making the other truths inevitable.

When we conflate "can" with "will" (or "possibility" with "actuality"), it totally gums up the works, as we demonstrated here:

Waiter (a hard determinist): "What will you have for dinner, sir?"
Customer (hungry): "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Because the universe is deterministic, there is only one thing that you can order."
Customer: "Oh. Well. Okay then, what is the single thing that I can order?"
Waiter: "How should I know? You haven't told me yet!"

If "I could have chosen vanilla" was set in stone, then it requires that choosing vanilla was possible.

If it is set in stone that I would choose chocolate, then choosing vanilla was never an option.

The "could not have done otherwise" is simply a result of the deterministic nature of the universe that has one outcome locked in.

Nope. The things we "could have done" were just as locked in as the thing that we "would do". So, "could not have done otherwise" is silly nonsense, as we've just demonstrated.

Again "could have done" requires that those things be possible outcomes.

If I could have done X, then X must be a possible outcome. If "I will do Y," is also valid, then that means that X was never a possible outcome, since there was no way that X could have been the outcome. How could X be a possible outcome when Y was always set in stone?

In your example, the waiter would actually be able to answer the question. All he has to do is look at the different events, and figure out what they will cause.

And, how would that conversation play out?

Waiter (a hard determinist): "What will you have for dinner, sir?"
Customer (hungry): "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Because the universe is deterministic, there is only one thing that you can order."
Customer: "Oh. Well. Okay then, what is the single thing that I can order?"
Waiter: "With my complete knowledge of all events leading up to the instant you place your order, as well as my total understanding of the laws of nature, I have performed the required calculations and figured out that you are going to order the steak."

You can't argue that the universe is completely deterministic in nature and then turn around and say future events can't be determined ahead of time.

Determine has two meanings. For example, "We could not determine (know) whether it was the increased temperature or the increased pressure that determined (caused) when the chemical reaction would take place".

Prediction is a matter of knowing in advance. And there are many events that can be predicted in advance, such as the time the sun rises and sets each day.

Causal necessity is a matter of causing in advance. But given that the causal chain is infinitely long, which of the events in this chain are the most meaningful and relevant causes?

A cause is meaningful if it efficiently explains why an event happened.
A cause is relevant if we can do something about it.

Usually the most direct causes, those closest to the event, are the most meaningful and relevant causes. For example, the act of deliberation is the most meaningful and relevant cause of a deliberate act. As we move backward through the chain of prior causes, the causes become more incidental, less meaningful, and less relevant.

For example, the Big Bang is an incidental cause that is part of every causal chain. But it is not the meaningful or relevant cause of our dinner order in the restaurant. The waiter brings the dinner and the bill to the person who placed the order. (Rumor has it that the Big Bang is a lousy tipper).

Irrelevant. If everything that happens is determined (caused) by all previous events, then there is nothing in principle that is stopping us from calculating the outcome of the future.

Can you describe the mechanism by which the universe renders such calculations impossible?

If it is set in stone, then there are no actual options. We only think there are.

But it turns out that the actual options are also set in stone (hmm, it's like we're eating at Moses' Restaurant tonight, and the menu is chiseled onto small stone tablets).

Determinism doesn't actually change anything. There is the menu of options. It was causally determined from any prior point in eternity that we would have to consider the restaurant menu and choose something from it, in order to have dinner tonight.

And as I've pointed out before, in a deterministic universe, us thinking we are making a choice does not mean we are making a choice.

Please don't try to move the goalposts. I'm not talking about when an event is actually CAUSED, I'm talking about when it is set in stone. And my position is that it is not set in stone until it has actually happened.

The only events that are actually set in stone are sculptures and patios. "Set in stone" is a metaphor for reliable causation.

Oh ha ha, such witty wordplay. *rolls eyes*

All events are reliably caused by prior events, such that every event is causally necessary and inevitably will happen from any prior point in eternity.

Now, the question is this: Why you think this limits your freedom in any way?

Because in order to have freedom, I must be able to make decisions myself.

If the outcome of anything I "decide" has been set in stone since the big bang, then I am not making any decisions at all, and therefore I am not free.

But if it was set in stone that Horse A would win the race, then that was ALWAYS true, and there was never any chance that Horse B could win instead. So it was never true that some other horse COULD have won.

How would you go about proving that no other horse COULD have won? (Keep in mind that "could have" always implies that (1) the horse did not win and (2) that the horse only would have won under different circumstances).

That's on you, you're the one arguing that there is a deterministic universe.

If you can show that a different horse winning was a possibility - an actual possibility, not just that we thought it was possible - then the universe is not deterministic.

You say the other horse could only have won under different circumstances, but since your universe is deterministic, such different circumstances were always impossible, weren't they?

 

[The AntiChris]

In the piece you quote, the authors are describing previous attempts to show the epistemic limitations of predictability. The authors themselves make it clear that they "argue for the stronger claim that embedded predictability cannot obtain in a deterministic universe even on the idealizing assumption that the epistemic limitations at issue are removed" - they show that the problem is not epistemic but a matter of logic.

So even if the universe is deterministic, they can't prove it?

You've misunderstood. That's not what the authors were attempting to do.

Neither determinism nor indeterminism can ever be definitively 'proven'.

Determinism is the theory that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature. It is not a theory about what can or cannot be predicted.

As I said earlier, we have intuitions about what this might mean for the predictability of deterministic systems. Some of these intuitions turn out to be mistaken on deeper examination.

And, if all events are the result of antecedent events and the laws of nature, why shouldn't we be able to predict everything given sufficient knowledge about what the antecedent events are and the laws of nature?

This is explained clearly and at length in the paper we've discussed that I linked to a couple of days ago.

There have been many examples of the butterfly effect in reality. In his book Chaos, James Gleick describes a situation in which scientists would run simulations of the weather on supercomputers. They would run a situation, then start the simulation again. But when they ran it a second time, they saw that the weather patterns being simulated would be the same at first, then a little bit different, and then rapidly diverge into completely different resu7lts than the first simulation. The cause, they discovered, was that the computer made calculations based on something like ten digits after the decimal place, but when it saved the earlier states, it would only save eight digits. So, the first time, the computer was running off a value of, say, 4.73957653674, but when they ran the simulation again, the computer was starting from the same point with a value of 4.739576537. That tiny change was enough to send the simulation to a completely different result. So we have seen that small changes at one point can lead to very different results down the line. If such small events can happen in reality (and the random movement of atoms is, I think such an event), then we need to conclude that drastic differences can result.

 Butterfly effect:

In chaos theory, the butterfly effect is the sensitive dependence on initial conditions in which a small change in one state of a deterministic nonlinear system can result in large differences in a later state.

The existence of the butterfly effect tells us nothing about whether the universe is deterministic or not (the butterfly effect would be apparent in both deterministic and indeterministic universes).

 

[Jarhyn]

If it WILL be one way, it is incorrect to say that it CAN be different.

This is a bald assertion that violates the definitions presented. Maybe under some alternative definition that does not model reality and in fact commits a couple fallacies it would be so incorrect, but you would have to logically show a contradiction besides this mere assertion.

You have no basis for this declaration provided here, yet you make it anyway. Why must it be so incorrect?

The point Marvin makes is to prove it is not, in fact, incorrect, on account of "can" discusses hypothetical universes we know make perfect logical sense from some assumptions, some which make absolute perfect logical sense, and some which we know do not make perfect logical sense, and that specific boundary between making logical sense as a hypothetical universe inflects the freedom of a will.

I sit here and I think "I CAN get off the bus here. That makes logical sense under the assumption I wanted to, but this assumption is wrong: I do not wish to. Therefore I WILL NOT."

I sit at the next stop and repeat this observation.

I come to the stop after that and I say "... And I DO wish to, therefore I WILL." But the bus does not stop because the driver did not hear. I thought it made perfect logical sense, but alas it did not because I assumed "the bus driver shall stop" and this was false. I was wrong about "can".

Finally, I get off at the next stop because ALL requirements were satisfied. The will was free in that I was wrong about neither my model nor my predicate variables.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

If it WILL be one way, it is incorrect to say that it CAN be different.

The problem is that, lacking omniscience, we often DO NOT KNOW what will happen. When we do not know what will happen, we imagine what can happen to prepare for what does happen.

And every case of CHOOSING begins with the same UNCERTAINTY. When we do not know what we will do, we imagine what we can do, evaluate those options, and by that evaluation we DECIDE what we will do.

Whenever faced with such an uncertainty, we STOP speaking of what WILL happen or what we WILL choose, and switch to the context of possibilities. In the context of possibilities we have certainty as to what CAN happen and what we CAN choose, while still being uncertain as to what WILL happen or what we WILL choose.

Now, if we always KNEW what WILL happen, we could dispense with the notion of possibility. But we don't, so we can't.

Thus, despite the logical fact that things WILL only happen one way, we still must be able to say that events CAN be different, and COULD HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE.

Otherwise we BREAK THE LOGIC that we humans have evolved to deal with our uncertainty.

Breaking that logic creates nonsense, like in the example:

Waiter (a hard determinist): "What will you have for dinner, sir?"
Customer (hungry): "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Because the universe is deterministic, there is only one thing that you can order."
Customer: "Oh. Well. Okay then, what is the single thing that I can order?"
Waiter: "How should I know? You haven't told me yet!"

In your example, the waiter would actually be able to answer the question. All he has to do is look at the different events, and figure out what they will cause.

And, how would that conversation play out?

Waiter (a hard determinist): "What will you have for dinner, sir?"
Customer (hungry): "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Because the universe is deterministic, there is only one thing that you can order."
Customer: "Oh. Well. Okay then, what is the single thing that I can order?"
Waiter: "With my complete knowledge of all events leading up to the instant you place your order, as well as my total understanding of the laws of nature, I have performed the required calculations and figured out that you are going to order the steak."

So, your solution is to simply give the Waiter omniscience? How would we go about doing that?

If everything that happens is determined (caused) by all previous events, then there is nothing in principle that is stopping us from calculating the outcome of the future.

Wow. You actually are suggesting we make the Waiter omniscient!

Can you describe the mechanism by which the universe renders such calculations impossible?

Well, we can start with the limited size of the Waiter's brain. Then there is the problem of capturing the total relevant causal history of the Customer's prior dinner choices. But no restaurant has attempted this beyond offering the option, "Your usual, sir?", which still allows the customer other real possibilities.

And as I've pointed out before, in a deterministic universe, us thinking we are making a choice does not mean we are making a choice.

Why would you insist that in a deterministic universe we would have a different set of NAMES for common events? "Choosing" is the proper name for an operation that inputs multiple options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice. The only reason that we think we are making a choice is that we just observed ourselves doing exactly that. And we can eliminate subjective feelings by walking into a restaurant and watching other people doing exactly that.

Determinism doesn't actually change anything. We are still doing the same things that we always have done. Determinism simply makes note of the fact that each event was the inevitable result of prior events. The choice to have dinner at the restaurant led us to travel to the restaurant, walk in the door, sit at a table, pick up the menu, consider the MANY things that we CAN order, and decide the SINGLE thing that we WILL order. That is the way that everything would necessarily happen.

If that is the way that things are determined to work, then that is exactly the way things will happen. And, given determinism, they must necessarily work out exactly that way, without deviation. Determinism doesn't actually change anything.

All events are reliably caused by prior events, such that every event is causally necessary and inevitably will happen from any prior point in eternity. Now, the question is this: Why you think this limits your freedom in any way?

Because in order to have freedom, I must be able to make decisions myself.

And determinism guarantees that we inevitably will make the decision ourselves. Within the entire physical universe, the only object that will be choosing for us what we will order for dinner will actually be us.

If the outcome of anything I "decide" has been set in stone since the big bang, then I am not making any decisions at all, and therefore I am not free.

So, the question is why you think that you are not free to make the choice yourself? After all, determinism has guaranteed that it will inevitably be you and no one else that will be making that choice at that time and place.

Universal causal necessity/inevitability is neither a meaningful nor a relevant constraint. What you will inevitably do is exactly identical to you just being you, choosing to do what you choose to do. It is basically, "what you would have done anyway".

If you can show that a different horse winning was a possibility - an actual possibility, not just that we thought it was possible - then the universe is not deterministic.

So, what is an "actual possibility"? An actual possibility exists solely within the imagination. We cannot walk across the possibility of a bridge. We can only walk across an actual bridge. But we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining the possibility of a bridge. Possibilities are necessary parts of the real function of creating new actualities, like that actual bridge that wasn't there before and now is there for us to walk across.

A possible bridge is a bridge that we are ABLE to actualize IF WE CHOOSE TO DO SO. The fact that we do not choose a specific option does not mean it was ever "impossible" to actualize. It only means that we did not choose to actualize it. It is something that we COULD HAVE DONE, but simply did not do.

Our ability to make that possibility really happen is what makes the mere thought of a possibility an "actual" or "real" or "true" possibility.

And, within a deterministic universe, every thought that we experience is causally necessary from any prior point in eternity and inevitably will happen. So, determinism doesn't actually change anything.

You say the other horse could only have won under different circumstances, but since your universe is deterministic, such different circumstances were always impossible, weren't they?

Different circumstances are always possible. They are just never actualized.

 

[Kylie]

If it WILL be one way, it is incorrect to say that it CAN be different.

This is a bald assertion that violates the definitions presented. Maybe under some alternative definition that does not model reality and in fact commits a couple fallacies it would be so incorrect, but you would have to logically show a contradiction besides this mere assertion.

[/QUOTE]
The definitions are contradictory.

You have no basis for this declaration provided here, yet you make it anyway. Why must it be so incorrect?

Because on one hand you are saying, "The future is determined to be this one particular way, it is set ins tone and nothing can alter it," and they you are saying, "it could be something different, there are lots of different possibilities."

The point Marvin makes is to prove it is not, in fact, incorrect, on account of "can" discusses hypothetical universes we know make perfect logical sense from some assumptions, some which make absolute perfect logical sense, and some which we know do not make perfect logical sense, and that specific boundary between making logical sense as a hypothetical universe inflects the freedom of a will.

I sit here and I think "I CAN get off the bus here. That makes logical sense under the assumption I wanted to, but this assumption is wrong: I do not wish to. Therefore I WILL NOT."

I sit at the next stop and repeat this observation.

I come to the stop after that and I say "... And I DO wish to, therefore I WILL." But the bus does not stop because the driver did not hear. I thought it made perfect logical sense, but alas it did not because I assumed "the bus driver shall stop" and this was false. I was wrong about "can".

Finally, I get off at the next stop because ALL requirements were satisfied. The will was free in that I was wrong about neither my model nor my predicate variables.

Or you could just call out to the driver, "Hey, I pulled the cord/pressed the button/activated whatever signal is used to indicate that a passenger wishes to leave the bus. Please stop the bus as soon as you can do so!" I've done it myself.

 

[Kylie]

If it WILL be one way, it is incorrect to say that it CAN be different.

The problem is that, lacking omniscience, we often DO NOT KNOW what will happen. When we do not know what will happen, we imagine what can happen to prepare for what does happen.

Irrelevant. Our not knowing does not change the fact that we do not have a choice and MUST do what is the only option for us.

And every case of CHOOSING begins with the same UNCERTAINTY. When we do not know what we will do, we imagine what we can do, evaluate those options, and by that evaluation we DECIDE what we will do.

Again, if there is only one possible outcome, it's not a choice.

Whenever faced with such an uncertainty, we STOP speaking of what WILL happen or what we WILL choose, and switch to the context of possibilities. In the context of possibilities we have certainty as to what CAN happen and what we CAN choose, while still being uncertain as to what WILL happen or what we WILL choose.

Now, if we always KNEW what WILL happen, we could dispense with the notion of possibility. But we don't, so we can't.

Again, the fact we don't know is irrelevant.

Thus, despite the logical fact that things WILL only happen one way, we still must be able to say that events CAN be different, and COULD HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE.

So what? Saying it doesn't make it true.

Otherwise we BREAK THE LOGIC that we humans have evolved to deal with our uncertainty.

Breaking that logic creates nonsense, like in the example:

Waiter (a hard determinist): "What will you have for dinner, sir?"
Customer (hungry): "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Because the universe is deterministic, there is only one thing that you can order."
Customer: "Oh. Well. Okay then, what is the single thing that I can order?"
Waiter: "How should I know? You haven't told me yet!"

Again, that example just doesn't work.

Waiter (a hard determinist): "What will you have for dinner, sir?"
Customer (hungry): "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Because the universe is deterministic, there is only one thing that you can order."
Customer: "Oh. Well. Okay then, what is the single thing that I can order?"
Waiter: "While it is theoretically possible for that determination to be made, I lack both the required information and the ability to make such a calculation. Therefore the only practical way that this determination can be reached by the two of us is for you to actually place the order. Perhaps, if we had access to some entity of greater ability and knowledge, they could do it for us, but I doubt such an entity will make itself known to us in "

Waiter (a hard determinist): "What will you have for dinner, sir?"
Customer (hungry): "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Because the universe is deterministic, there is only one thing that you can order."
Customer: "Oh. Well. Okay then, what is the single thing that I can order?"
Waiter: "With my complete knowledge of all events leading up to the instant you place your order, as well as my total understanding of the laws of nature, I have performed the required calculations and figured out that you are going to order the steak."

So, your solution is to simply give the Waiter omniscience? How would we go about doing that?

Irrelevant. You are the one who posited an entity outside the universe, or at least an entity with such knowledge. Now that I have provided one to you, you complain?

Can you describe the mechanism by which the universe renders such calculations impossible?

Well, we can start with the limited size of the Waiter's brain. Then there is the problem of capturing the total relevant causal history of the Customer's prior dinner choices. But no restaurant has attempted this beyond offering the option, "Your usual, sir?", which still allows the customer other real possibilities.

Irrelevant. That does not show that the calculations are impossible, it simply shows that Walter is incapable of doing them.

And as I've pointed out before, in a deterministic universe, us thinking we are making a choice does not mean we are making a choice.

Why would you insist that in a deterministic universe we would have a different set of NAMES for common events? "Choosing" is the proper name for an operation that inputs multiple options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice. The only reason that we think we are making a choice is that we just observed ourselves doing exactly that. And we can eliminate subjective feelings by walking into a restaurant and watching other people doing exactly that.

But as I've said, we AREN'T making a choice if it can only ever end one way and one way only.

Determinism doesn't actually change anything. We are still doing the same things that we always have done. Determinism simply makes note of the fact that each event was the inevitable result of prior events. The choice to have dinner at the restaurant led us to travel to the restaurant, walk in the door, sit at a table, pick up the menu, consider the MANY things that we CAN order, and decide the SINGLE thing that we WILL order. That is the way that everything would necessarily happen.

If that is the way that things are determined to work, then that is exactly the way things will happen. And, given determinism, they must necessarily work out exactly that way, without deviation. Determinism doesn't actually change anything.

All events are reliably caused by prior events, such that every event is causally necessary and inevitably will happen from any prior point in eternity. Now, the question is this: Why you think this limits your freedom in any way?

Because the outcome is inevitable. It can only happen ONE WAY. You said it yourself. it can never be any different. I can not choose to make it different. If it is inevitable that I will order the chicken I can not CHOOSE to order the steak instead. Any appearance that I can is an illusion, because the probability of me actually choosing the steak is 0%!

Because in order to have freedom, I must be able to make decisions myself.

And determinism guarantees that we inevitably will make the decision ourselves. Within the entire physical universe, the only object that will be choosing for us what we will order for dinner will actually be us.

How can we be making the decisions ourselves when the outcome was set in stone ages ago?

If the outcome of anything I "decide" has been set in stone since the big bang, then I am not making any decisions at all, and therefore I am not free.

So, the question is why you think that you are not free to make the choice yourself? After all, determinism has guaranteed that it will inevitably be you and no one else that will be making that choice at that time and place.

But it's not actually a CHOICE.

Universal causal necessity/inevitability is neither a meaningful nor a relevant constraint. What you will inevitably do is exactly identical to you just being you, choosing to do what you choose to do. It is basically, "what you would have done anyway".

If it's not meaningful or relevant, how could you possibly test it and why do you even care?

If you can show that a different horse winning was a possibility - an actual possibility, not just that we thought it was possible - then the universe is not deterministic.

So, what is an "actual possibility"? An actual possibility exists solely within the imagination. We cannot walk across the possibility of a bridge. We can only walk across an actual bridge. But we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining the possibility of a bridge. Possibilities are necessary parts of the real function of creating new actualities, like that actual bridge that wasn't there before and now is there for us to walk across.

Actual possibility means that the outcome has a non-zero probability.

Now, if it is INEVITABLE that Horse A wins the race, please show me how Horse B's chances are ever non-zero.

A possible bridge is a bridge that we are ABLE to actualize IF WE CHOOSE TO DO SO. The fact that we do not choose a specific option does not mean it was ever "impossible" to actualize. It only means that we did not choose to actualize it. It is something that we COULD HAVE DONE, but simply did not do.

Our ability to make that possibility really happen is what makes the mere thought of a possibility an "actual" or "real" or "true" possibility.

And, within a deterministic universe, every thought that we experience is causally necessary from any prior point in eternity and inevitably will happen. So, determinism doesn't actually change anything.

But we don't have that ability to make that possibility real if it is INEVITABL:E that something else would happen.

You say the other horse could only have won under different circumstances, but since your universe is deterministic, such different circumstances were always impossible, weren't they?

Different circumstances are always possible. They are just never actualized.

No, they are never possible. If One set of circumstances is INEVITABLY going to happen (that means a probability of 100%), then all different circumstances are inevitably NOT going to happen (they have a probability of 0%).

 

[bilby]

Or you could just call out to the driver, "Hey, I pulled the cord/pressed the button/activated whatever signal is used to indicate that a passenger wishes to leave the bus. Please stop the bus as soon as you can do so!" I've done it myself.

I hate it when that happens.

 

[fromderinside]

Past and practicing bus drivers. Can't do without them, can't do with them.

I couldn't find them on the evolutionary tree though.