Demystifying Determinism

[Jarhyn]

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person,

No they wouldn't. I explained this to you in post #876:

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.

I would say morally significant influences are ones which we take into account when determining additional responsible parties.

The agent is ALWAYS responsible for doing the things they did and receiving any additional education that is recommended by that exact fuckup (which may not be very much depending on what, exactly they did).

The question is where the buck stops. They might not be the only one who fucked up -- someone may have behaved in a far worse way, in fact.

Not sure what you mean here.

All I'm saying is that coercion, for instance, is nearly always deemed to be a morally significant influence in that that it mitigates culpability whereas ambient temperature, for instance, is rarely an influence that factors into our deliberations over culpability.

My point is that traditional notions of culpability are not entirely accurate in compatibilism.

DBT argues in some respects that "because the child did not choose to be abused, they did not choose to become a child abuser therefore they do not deserve whatever it is we do to child abusers."

I argue that it does not matter why he is a child abuser. All that matters is that in this moment now, they are a child abuser. It does not in one iota change the fact that they must be made to no longer be a child abuser or not have access to abuse children.

The only thing that knowledge of why the abuser abused children does is informs how to remedy the situation of future abuse. It does not impact that the situation needs remedy.

 

[The AntiChris]

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person,

No they wouldn't. I explained this to you in post #876:

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.

I would say morally significant influences are ones which we take into account when determining additional responsible parties.

The agent is ALWAYS responsible for doing the things they did and receiving any additional education that is recommended by that exact fuckup (which may not be very much depending on what, exactly they did).

The question is where the buck stops. They might not be the only one who fucked up -- someone may have behaved in a far worse way, in fact.

Not sure what you mean here.

All I'm saying is that coercion, for instance, is nearly always deemed to be a morally significant influence in that that it mitigates culpability whereas ambient temperature, for instance, is rarely an influence that factors into our deliberations over culpability.

My point is that traditional notions of culpability are not entirely accurate in compatibilism.

DBT argues in some respects that "because the child did not choose to be abused, they did not choose to become a child abuser therefore they do not deserve whatever it is we do to child abusers."

I argue that it does not matter why he is a child abuser. All that matters is that in this moment now, they are a child abuser. It does not in one iota change the fact that they must be made to no longer be a child abuser or not have access to abuse children.

The only thing that knowledge of why the abuser abused children does is informs how to remedy the situation of future abuse. It does not impact that the situation needs remedy.

I broadly agree with you. I don't think this conflicts with my original comment.

 

[Jarhyn]

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person,

No they wouldn't. I explained this to you in post #876:

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.

I would say morally significant influences are ones which we take into account when determining additional responsible parties.

The agent is ALWAYS responsible for doing the things they did and receiving any additional education that is recommended by that exact fuckup (which may not be very much depending on what, exactly they did).

The question is where the buck stops. They might not be the only one who fucked up -- someone may have behaved in a far worse way, in fact.

Not sure what you mean here.

All I'm saying is that coercion, for instance, is nearly always deemed to be a morally significant influence in that that it mitigates culpability whereas ambient temperature, for instance, is rarely an influence that factors into our deliberations over culpability.

My point is that traditional notions of culpability are not entirely accurate in compatibilism.

DBT argues in some respects that "because the child did not choose to be abused, they did not choose to become a child abuser therefore they do not deserve whatever it is we do to child abusers."

I argue that it does not matter why he is a child abuser. All that matters is that in this moment now, they are a child abuser. It does not in one iota change the fact that they must be made to no longer be a child abuser or not have access to abuse children.

The only thing that knowledge of why the abuser abused children does is informs how to remedy the situation of future abuse. It does not impact that the situation needs remedy.

I broadly agree with you. I don't think this conflicts with my original comment.

I guess my point is more, and not at you, that all this DOES have an impact on the broad notion of desert responsibility. The nonsensical idea of responsibility was paired with a nonsensical idea of what responsibility implies to desert: punishment.

One of the things that initially informed my movement from incompatibilist libertarian desert responsibility was this notion that punishment was just masturbatory and thus is ineffective.

It was the ineffectiveness of treatment of punishment that really drove me towards understanding ethics more strongly and that led me in turn to compatibilist choice basis modification as desert.

 

[DBT]

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person,

No they wouldn't. I explained this to you in post #876:

Crock.

You know that I meant the given definition of compatibilism, basically 'acting without being forced, coerced or unduly influenced.'

These are all external factors. Being forced by someone or something is external input. Being coerced or unduly influenced by someone or something is external input.

Acting without these elements is deemed to be free will, that it is 'us doing it.'

The point being, that defining free will as 'us doing it' is flawed.

It is flawed for reasons that have been explained to you every day for several years... the consequence argument, inner necessitation, absence of regulatory control, no choice principle, etc, etc.

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.

For heaven's sake,....being forced, coerced or unduly influenced involves external elements, someone or something doing the forcing, coercing or applying excessive influence.

''According to [/url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/]one strand[/url] within classical compatibilism, freedom is nothing more than an agent’s ability to do what she wishes in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in her way.''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person,

No they wouldn't. I explained this to you in post #876:

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.

I would say morally significant influences are ones which we take into account when determining additional responsible parties.

The agent is ALWAYS responsible for doing the things they did and receiving any additional education that is recommended by that exact fuckup (which may not be very much depending on what, exactly they did).

The question is where the buck stops. They might not be the only one who fucked up -- someone may have behaved in a far worse way, in fact.

Not sure what you mean here.

All I'm saying is that coercion, for instance, is nearly always deemed to be a morally significant influence in that that it mitigates culpability whereas ambient temperature, for instance, is rarely an influence that factors into our deliberations over culpability.

My point is that traditional notions of culpability are not entirely accurate in compatibilism.

DBT argues in some respects that "because the child did not choose to be abused, they did not choose to become a child abuser therefore they do not deserve whatever it is we do to child abusers."

I argue that it does not matter why he is a child abuser. All that matters is that in this moment now, they are a child abuser. It does not in one iota change the fact that they must be made to no longer be a child abuser or not have access to abuse children.

The only thing that knowledge of why the abuser abused children does is informs how to remedy the situation of future abuse. It does not impact that the situation needs remedy.

I broadly agree with you. I don't think this conflicts with my original comment.

I guess my point is more, and not at you, that all this DOES have an impact on the broad notion of desert responsibility. The nonsensical idea of responsibility was paired with a nonsensical idea of what responsibility implies to desert: punishment.

One of the things that initially informed my movement from incompatibilist libertarian desert responsibility was this notion that punishment was just masturbatory and thus is ineffective.

It was the ineffectiveness of treatment of punishment that really drove me towards understanding ethics more strongly and that led me in turn to compatibilist choice basis modification as desert.

It boils down to a question of justice rather than a question of free will. What does the criminal offender justly deserve? One of the things they deserve is an opportunity to reform, if they are willing to take it.

We create a system of justice to protect everyone's rights. So, a just penalty would include (a) repairing the harm done to the victim if possible, (b) correcting the offender's future behavior if corrigible, (c) protecting others from harm by securing the offender until his behavior is corrected, and (d) doing no more harm to the offender or his rights than is reasonably required to accomplish (a), (b), and (c).

 

[The AntiChris]

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.

For heaven's sake,....being forced, coerced or unduly influenced involves external elements, someone or something doing the forcing, coercing or applying excessive influence.

Yes, so?

I didn't say or imply otherwise.

The distinction isn't between external and internal influences, it's between morally relevant and morally neutral influences.

 

[Jarhyn]

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.

For heaven's sake,....being forced, coerced or unduly influenced involves external elements, someone or something doing the forcing, coercing or applying excessive influence.

Yes, so?

I didn't say or imply otherwise.

The distinction isn't between external and internal influences, it's between morally relevant and morally neutral influences.

To be fair, though, the only relevant moral influences are the ones that can be accessed for adjustment after the event.

I can be adjusted. My historical upbringing cannot.

It's the accessibility for impacting future behavior that creates this relevance.

DBT wishes to avoid the responsibility by pointing at a large pile of things which hold no immediate relevance and then pretend like these account for all possible objects of relevance.

The problem is that all these past ethical relevancies are in fact dwarfed by the immediate relevance of the individual being as they are right now, and the power to regulate individuals as they are in the moment, irrespective of their histories.

 

[The AntiChris]

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.

For heaven's sake,....being forced, coerced or unduly influenced involves external elements, someone or something doing the forcing, coercing or applying excessive influence.

Yes, so?

I didn't say or imply otherwise.

The distinction isn't between external and internal influences, it's between morally relevant and morally neutral influences.

To be fair, though, the only relevant moral influences are the ones that can be accessed for adjustment after the event.

I can be adjusted. My historical upbringing cannot.

It's the accessibility for impacting future behavior that creates this relevance.

DBT wishes to avoid the responsibility by pointing at a large pile of things which hold no immediate relevance and then pretend like these account for all possible objects of relevance.

The problem is that all these past ethical relevancies are in fact dwarfed by the immediate relevance of the individual being as they are right now, and the power to regulate individuals as they are in the moment, irrespective of their histories.

Once again, I find myself puzzled by exactly what it is I said that you're taking issue with.

 

[Jarhyn]

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.

For heaven's sake,....being forced, coerced or unduly influenced involves external elements, someone or something doing the forcing, coercing or applying excessive influence.

Yes, so?

I didn't say or imply otherwise.

The distinction isn't between external and internal influences, it's between morally relevant and morally neutral influences.

To be fair, though, the only relevant moral influences are the ones that can be accessed for adjustment after the event.

I can be adjusted. My historical upbringing cannot.

It's the accessibility for impacting future behavior that creates this relevance.

DBT wishes to avoid the responsibility by pointing at a large pile of things which hold no immediate relevance and then pretend like these account for all possible objects of relevance.

The problem is that all these past ethical relevancies are in fact dwarfed by the immediate relevance of the individual being as they are right now, and the power to regulate individuals as they are in the moment, irrespective of their histories.

Once again, I find myself puzzled by exactly what it is I said that you're taking issue with.

You're so used to people disagreeing and arguing that apparently you failed to notice someone taking the conversation towards a detailed discussion of mostly-agreement in the direction of the actual point of all this: why it matters when someone is acting under their own will verses an externally forced/coerced/leveraged will.

 

[The AntiChris]

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.

For heaven's sake,....being forced, coerced or unduly influenced involves external elements, someone or something doing the forcing, coercing or applying excessive influence.

Yes, so?

I didn't say or imply otherwise.

The distinction isn't between external and internal influences, it's between morally relevant and morally neutral influences.

To be fair, though, the only relevant moral influences are the ones that can be accessed for adjustment after the event.

I can be adjusted. My historical upbringing cannot.

It's the accessibility for impacting future behavior that creates this relevance.

DBT wishes to avoid the responsibility by pointing at a large pile of things which hold no immediate relevance and then pretend like these account for all possible objects of relevance.

The problem is that all these past ethical relevancies are in fact dwarfed by the immediate relevance of the individual being as they are right now, and the power to regulate individuals as they are in the moment, irrespective of their histories.

Once again, I find myself puzzled by exactly what it is I said that you're taking issue with.

You're so used to people disagreeing and arguing that apparently you failed to notice someone taking the conversation towards a detailed discussion of mostly-agreement in the direction of the actual point of all this: why it matters when someone is acting under their own will verses an externally forced/coerced/leveraged will.

Ok.

 

[Jarhyn]

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.

For heaven's sake,....being forced, coerced or unduly influenced involves external elements, someone or something doing the forcing, coercing or applying excessive influence.

Yes, so?

I didn't say or imply otherwise.

The distinction isn't between external and internal influences, it's between morally relevant and morally neutral influences.

To be fair, though, the only relevant moral influences are the ones that can be accessed for adjustment after the event.

I can be adjusted. My historical upbringing cannot.

It's the accessibility for impacting future behavior that creates this relevance.

DBT wishes to avoid the responsibility by pointing at a large pile of things which hold no immediate relevance and then pretend like these account for all possible objects of relevance.

The problem is that all these past ethical relevancies are in fact dwarfed by the immediate relevance of the individual being as they are right now, and the power to regulate individuals as they are in the moment, irrespective of their histories.

Once again, I find myself puzzled by exactly what it is I said that you're taking issue with.

You're so used to people disagreeing and arguing that apparently you failed to notice someone taking the conversation towards a detailed discussion of mostly-agreement in the direction of the actual point of all this: why it matters when someone is acting under their own will verses an externally forced/coerced/leveraged will.

Ok.

I guess my thought was that if DBT won't deign to ask the question of why the foundation of compatibilism makes solid contact with responsibility, I would just discuss that without their credulity, as if such was ever necessary.

 

[DBT]

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.

For heaven's sake,....being forced, coerced or unduly influenced involves external elements, someone or something doing the forcing, coercing or applying excessive influence.

Yes, so?

I didn't say or imply otherwise.

The distinction isn't between external and internal influences, it's between morally relevant and morally neutral influences.

Yet again;
''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '

 

[Jarhyn]

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.

For heaven's sake,....being forced, coerced or unduly influenced involves external elements, someone or something doing the forcing, coercing or applying excessive influence.

Yes, so?

I didn't say or imply otherwise.

The distinction isn't between external and internal influences, it's between morally relevant and morally neutral influences.

Yet again;
''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '

You have made in this post an unargued assertion.

There is a thread of discussion about the link between Compatibilist choices, free will and the immediate state, and where this ties into responsibility.

It is thus:

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.

For heaven's sake,....being forced, coerced or unduly influenced involves external elements, someone or something doing the forcing, coercing or applying excessive influence.

Yes, so?

I didn't say or imply otherwise.

The distinction isn't between external and internal influences, it's between morally relevant and morally neutral influences.

To be fair, though, the only relevant moral influences are the ones that can be accessed for adjustment after the event.

I can be adjusted. My historical upbringing cannot.

It's the accessibility for impacting future behavior that creates this relevance.

DBT wishes to avoid the responsibility by pointing at a large pile of things which hold no immediate relevance and then pretend like these account for all possible objects of relevance.

The problem is that all these past ethical relevancies are in fact dwarfed by the immediate relevance of the individual being as they are right now, and the power to regulate individuals as they are in the moment, irrespective of their histories.

If you wish to discuss the links between compatibilism and responsibility, that's where you will start rather than making unargued assertions.

 

[The AntiChris]

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.

For heaven's sake,....being forced, coerced or unduly influenced involves external elements, someone or something doing the forcing, coercing or applying excessive influence.

Yes, so?

I didn't say or imply otherwise.

The distinction isn't between external and internal influences, it's between morally relevant and morally neutral influences.

Yet again;
''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '

This is a strawman argument. No one here is arguing for "basic-desert responsibility".

When we, compatibilists, talk of responsibility we're talking about ordinary, everyday moral responsibility. This is the kind of responsibility fully accepted by the hard determinist you're fond of quoting, Galen Strawson:

I just want to stress the word “ultimate” before “moral responsibility.” Because there’s a clear, weaker, everyday sense of “morally responsible” in which you and I and millions of other people are thoroughly morally responsible people.

This is from An Interview with Galen Strawson

 

[DBT]

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.

For heaven's sake,....being forced, coerced or unduly influenced involves external elements, someone or something doing the forcing, coercing or applying excessive influence.

Yes, so?

I didn't say or imply otherwise.

The distinction isn't between external and internal influences, it's between morally relevant and morally neutral influences.

Yet again;
''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '

This is a strawman argument. No one here is arguing for "basic-desert responsibility".

No, it's just the basics of inner necessity, its implications and consequences.

It's not hard to grasp;

''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen


Choice; an act of choosing between two or more possibilities.

1) Determinism, by definition, does not permit alternative actions.

2) No alternative actions negate freedom of choice.

3) Absence of choice (no possible alternate actions) negates freedom of will.

4) Will does not, and cannot, make a difference to what are determined outcomes.

5) Free will is incompatible with determinism.

When we, compatibilists, talk of responsibility we're talking about ordinary, everyday moral responsibility. This is the kind of responsibility fully accepted by the hard determinist you're fond of quoting, Galen Strawson:

I just want to stress the word “ultimate” before “moral responsibility.” Because there’s a clear, weaker, everyday sense of “morally responsible” in which you and I and millions of other people are thoroughly morally responsible people.

This is from An Interview with Galen Strawson

'Ultimate' is a moot point when whatever happens must necessarily happen without deviation, a system where will makes no difference, where will itself is fixed antecedents. A system whenever and whatever point that happens, it is a 'determined outcome.'



Determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.'' - Britannica.

 

[Jarhyn]

''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something I have no choice about?

Indeed, how could a machine build something if the machine didn't build itself

It is a mystery!

 

[Marvin Edwards]

1) Determinism, by definition, does not permit alternative actions.

We have no alternative but to consider the alternatives on the restaurant menu to be real alternatives. You are confusing one kind of alternative with an entirely different kind of alternative.

If this is intentional, then you are using wordplay, the very thing you argue that compatibilists are doing.

2) No alternative actions negate freedom of choice.

As just pointed out, obviously there are alternative actions listed on the restaurant menu. We can order the Salad. We can order the Steak. And we can order each and every item on the menu if we've got the cash. We've got alternative actions coming out of our ears (figuratively speaking). But we only want one dinner, so we must necessarily choose whether we will order the Salad, or the Steak, or something else.

And, since no one is preventing us from making this choice, we obviously have freedom of choice in the restaurant.

3) Absence of choice (no possible alternate actions) negates freedom of will.

As described above, we have plenty of alternatives to choose from, so there is no "absence of choice", and we're free to make this choice for ourselves, so freedom of will is also confirmed.

4) Will does not, and cannot, make a difference to what are determined outcomes.

Will, our specific intention to have dinner tonight in this restaurant, is the driver of the entire process. We're hungry. We want dinner. We decided that we will have dinner at this restaurant. That set our intention. That intent (aka, "will") caused us to get in the car, drive to the restaurant, look through the menu, and place our orders. Will is right there in the driver's seat.

5) Free will is incompatible with determinism.

We have yet to see that. In fact, we have seen that determinism results in us being in that restaurant, each of us choosing a dinner from the menu, of our own free will. Free will is just another event, causally determined by a chain of prior events, stretching back to any prior point in time.

Determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. - Britannica.

Correct.

Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.'' - Britannica.

Incorrect. You see:

The proper understanding of "actuality" and "possibility" is this: There is a single actuality, but there are multiple possibilities.

The proper understanding of "will" and "can" is this: There is a single thing that the person will do (and would have done), but there are multiple things that a person can do (and could have done).

 

[The AntiChris]

Yet again;......

Once again, an off-the-shelf response complete with multiple random quotes and no attempt whatsoever to engage with what I actually posted.

 

[bilby]

How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something I have no choice about?

I have no choice about what is on the menu; It was decided before I ever even heard of the restaurant, and nobody ever consulted me in any way.

Yet, when I arrive at the restaurant, the waiter bizarrely seems to hold the delusion that it's possible for me to choose from this menu, whose contents (and indeed, existence) are an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about.

What's wrong with that guy? No wonder he got a job as a waiter; He's obviously not cut out for philosophy.

 

[DBT]

''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something I have no choice about?

Indeed, how could a machine build something if the machine didn't build itself

It is a mystery!

Well, being the expert in machine consciousness, you should know.

''I think you are entirely unfounded in the assumption that some form of consciousness does not automatically arise, after some form or another, from any confluence of switching objects.'' - Jarhyn.