Demystifying Determinism

[Jarhyn]

I will point out it is not subjective when a process hits a breakpoint. It is objectively true, an event proving a will was free to execution on a specific line.

All that is necessary from there to prove the special will, the "will to decide for oneself" is free unto the point where the signal "it is!" Is generated.

Is it capable to have a will, a script that monitors as to whether or not that which it has access and connection to has leverage over the script being acted upon? The answer is YES.

I in fact have encountered in my career a piece of software that calculated whether it's own will to send a message could possibly be free to complete before the realtime scheduler would constrain it, and to instead be constrained of its own free will, to constrain it's activity rather than being constrained by the system monitor, an external system outside of the process's control.

Further, when a schedule miss is detected, the process has knowledge that it did not have free will to continue at all.

Depending on whether the software constrains itself or is forcibly constrained determines whether the software is slain or continues freely.

In various ways we see, clearly, that "the will to decide for oneself", at least in some fairly trivial examples, may be observed freely being exercised in the universe.

Bending this this to humans -- to our much more feature-rich examples of validating that "one is deciding for oneself" -- and even creating models and wills to preserve this state is just a matter of scale and layered application.

All the parts are right fucking there. Pick them up and put them together! That's all you have to do!

 

[DBT]

Of course it's not a real free will. It is a definition. A definition that fails to establish free will as real free will

you realize this is the very heart of the No-True-Scotsman, no?

You realize that you have yet to grasp the difference between reality and fantasy? You should be able to grasp the terms and references and why the definition fails to establish its proposition. A clue, acting in accordance with one's will does not mean that will itself is free. That is the problem, that will itself is entailed by antecedents and has no freedom. You do know what 'free' means? I'd say you don't.

 

[DBT]

Usage gives words meaning, I agree. But only when it relates to someting observable.

I cut my finger and it hurts. I see somebody else cut a finger ad say it hurts. I conclude the experience is probably the same and I use the word pain accordingly.

Christians make liberal use of the word god without any definition at all.

Common usage does not validate anything.

By design our culture enforces the right of free choice. No individual or the govenmnet can tell you what to choose. Uncoerced free choice is observed,

We can see free choice does not exist in places like Saudi Arabia nd Iran.

Free will is not observable and is not testable. Free choice is observable and testable.

Like Chrtians talking about god, free will is discussed as if we inherently know what it means.

Yep, pity that some are not able to grasp the fallacy.

 

[DBT]

Of course it's not a real free will. It is a definition.

A definition is a description of usage. Usage is what gives words their meaning. Frequently words have multiple meanings. In these cases, no single definition is the 'real' meaning.

How did you arrive at the belief that your notion of free will is the one true 'real' free will and all others are not real?

Word meaning doesn't establish the reality of something. There is plenty of word usage around 'God' or divine will, angels, demons, salvation, etc, yet none of this talk, definitions, agonizing rationales or debate establishes the reality of these things.

You can talk about 'free will' for centuries, claim that free will is this or free will that, and it still won't establish the reality of free will in terms of will being truly or actually free.

And given therole and nature of will and its lack of agency and lack of freedom, that is not very likely.

 

[DBT]

The best argument for compatibilism is empirical observation, and we can observe determinism and free will simultaneously in the same event:

When a person decides for themselves what they will do, according to their own goals and reasons, it is free will.
When a person decides for themselves what they will do, according to their own goals and reasons, it is determinism.

It is free will because they were free from coercion and undue influence, which is all that free will requires.
It is determinism because the choice was caused by goals and reasons that have a reliable history of prior causes, which is all that determinism requires.

Neither you nor Bruce Silverstein have been able to refute these simple facts.

It has been refuted. What we observe is not complete. We do not have access to the necessary information to form a more complete understanding of the system or make predictions on its fixed evolution.

We presume that the event was reliably caused by prior events which can theoretically be traced back in time to the Big Bang (and earlier if your cosmology permits). Determinism is not an issue to the compatibilist.

And given determinism, fixed evolution it is; no deviation, no alternate actions, no choice, no free will.

That claim is refuted twice, once as a false dichotomy, and once again as a contradiction of empirical reality.

That claim is refuted as a false dichotomy. Free will does not require freedom from all prior causes. It only requires freedom from coercion and undue influence, which are certain specific causes. Where coercion or undue influence apply, the choice is not freely made, and thus not free will. But when coercion and undue influence are absent, we are free to make the choice for ourselves, and it is free will. Because we find examples of both free choices and unfree choices within our deterministic universe, we must conclude that determinism does not rule out either event. And, because we get both entailment and free will, simultaneously in the same causally necessary event, there is no "either one or the other". So, the dichotomy is false.

The claim that choosing does not happen is empirically refuted by neuroscience, which affirms the brain's decision making function. And it is also empirically refuted by simply watching the people in a restaurant, browsing the menu and placing their orders. Each diner is logically reducing a literal menu of alternate possibilities to a single dinner order. The logical operation is choosing.

It is surface appearance. When someone orders a meal, there are no observers to the underlying process that brought about that action, not even the customer her or himself, where thoughts and feeling emerge into conscious mind in response to the information acquired from the menu...

If you like, we can locate our restaurant in a hotel hosting two annual conventions, a convention of neuroscientists and a convention of physicists. We may assume that either one or the other will have the most detailed understanding of the underlying mechanisms of choice. But the empirical events will remain the same. Each diner will be presented with a literal menu of alternate possibilities, each will choose for themselves what they will have for dinner, and each will tell their waiter their intent.

"I will have the Salad, please" says one. "I will have the Steak dinner, please", says another. All of them are adults with their own prior histories and their own reasons for ordering what they will order tonight. So, all of these orders are deterministically caused. None of the diners are coerced or unduly influenced to order something that goes against their own goals and their own reasoning. So, all of them are acting of their own free will.

And the waiters, empirically observing and writing down the orders, will later return to these diners with their meals, and the bill that they must pay before leaving.

We might wonder what other thoughts go through the heads of the neuroscientist as they are making their choice. Are they recalling the specific neural pathways involved in their own decision making? And we may wonder how the physicist interprets this event in terms of atomic interactions. Perhaps the waiters wonder why these diners seem to be taking longer to choose their dinners.

But, no matter, because they each still order their dinners, and each will responsibly pay the cashier on the way out. And this is all that is required for us to understand what free will and responsibility are about.

...or innate proclivities determining what is to be selected ahead of time, ie, you go in knowing exactly what you want.

Obviously, if I already know what I will order before I enter the restaurant, then I won't be looking at the menu. The "innate proclivity" would be the habit I acquired through my prior choices. On the other hand, if you're speaking of genetic dispositions for fat and protein, then those proclivities will not have any knowledge of what specific forms these substances take, but I will discover that over time by sampling different foods.

In any case, there can be no doubt that I actually can order any item on the menu, and that every item on the menu is a realizable alternative.

Of course you can order. In fact, if determined, you must order, if determined, you cannot will not not order (events fixed, no deviation)....yet at no point in time can will an alternate action be taken. That is according to your own definition of determinism.

It is never logically valid to force a "can" or a "cannot" into the definition of determinism. Please stop trying to do that and claiming it is my definition of determinism. It is not. It is dishonest to continually attribute that trope to me.

Determinism is not about what can and cannot happen. Determinism is about what will happen. Note the corrections I've made in your statement above.

The events, of course, will always only happen one way, and will not happen any other way. But when speaking of how things can happen or could have happened, we are assuming the condition "If it had been determined another way".

IF it had been determined to happen another way, then it would have happened that way instead. Saying that we "could have done otherwise" never implies that we "would have done otherwise". In fact, when we say that we "could have" done something, we are logically implying that (a) we did not do it, and (b) that we only would have done it under different circumstances.

It is important to keep the distinction between what we "can" do and what we "will" do. There are always multiple things that we "can" do, but only a single thing that we "will" do. If we conflate the two, and insist that, we only can do what we will do, we create paradoxes. Such as this one, which you should know well by now:

Waiter: "What will you have for dinner tonight?"
Diner: "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Given determinism, there is only one possibility, and only one thing that you can order."
Diner: "Oh. Okay. Then what is the one thing that I can order?"
Waiter: "The one thing you can order is the same as the one thing you will order. So, if you tell me first what you will order, then I can tell you what you can order."
Diner: "But how can I tell you what I will order if I don't know what I can order?!"

That's been addressed a number of times.

No. It hasn't. If it had, then you could have simply cut-n-pasted your response here, instead of merely claiming it had been addressed.

The illusion is the perception that you could have taken any of the options on the menu at any point in time.

It is not an illusion. It is a fact that I could have taken any of the options on the menu at any point in time. It is also a fact that I would not have taken any other option at any point in time. Both are undeniable facts.

Choice requires the possibility of taking any one of a number of options,

There are multiple possibilities, corresponding to the multiple things that we can choose, but only one actuality, corresponding to the single thing that we will choose. If we conflate possibility with actuality, or conflate can with will, we create the paradox I described above.

The human species has evolved these two separate notions, and the distinct logic and language for each of them, in order to deal with matters of uncertainty. When we do not know what will actually happen, we imagine what can possibly happen, to better prepare for what does happen. For example, people expecting a hurricane will board up their windows, even though there is a slim chance that the hurricane will never hit their home.

while determinism only permits one: determined action, fixed by antecedents.

Determinism only permits one actuality. Determinism permits multiple possibilities, as we can easily see by looking at the restaurant menu.

However, it is a bit weak to say "permits". Determinism necessitates that there will be a single actuality. Determinism necessitates that there will be multiple possibilities.

Which is not a matter of choice, but entailment. Which is why the decision-making process in determinism is entailment.

Again, it is not an either entailment or choice, but both entailment and choice. Choosing is a real physical event that, like all events, is causally necessitated (entailed) by prior events.

Computers select options, not on the basis of will or free will, but straight-out information processing. What is selected is determined by the criteria.

So, you admit then that choosing is an actual event that takes place in physical reality. I'm glad we've settled that.

A Libet-styled experiment does not enlighten us on free will. It is quite sufficient that everyone understands what we mean when we ask "Were the student subjects required to participate in the experiment in order to pass the course, or did they choose to participate of their own free will?"

It shows that thoughts and actions are formed and generated prior to conscious representation and the will to act, that will is not the agency of thought and action, that nothing is being freely willed.

And there you are once again substituting "freedom from causation" and "freedom from our brain" for freedom from coercion and undue influence. Free will does not require freedom from our brain's normal decision making function. Such a requirement is irrational.

Free will only requires freedom from coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.

We observe people going about their business, responding to the world around them, their environment...which is precisely the evolutionary role and function of the brain. What we don't observe, and cannot observe, is the nature and the means by which all this is achieved.

Fortunately, we do not need to know the details of the how our brains work in order to determine who chose the Salad and who chose the Steak for dinner, and who is responsible for paying for each meal. In the restaurant, we can observe that no one was coerced or unduly influenced, and that each diner chose their dinner of their own free will, and is now responsible for their bill.

Too much to deal with. Most of it repeat.

Rather than 'needing to know how the brain works,' it's a question of how the brain works in relation to a deterministic system as you yourself define it.

Where, events being fixed by prior states of the system, every incremental step in the process of cognition, rather than freely willed or even willed, is fixed by antecedents and the outcome inevitable before the process of response was even initiated.

The bottom line is, this has nothing to do with free will, yet the label is being applied through a carefully selected set of terms and conditions.

Where unforced or uncoerced actions are held up as examples of this wonderful thing called 'free will'

Actions performed without external force or coercion are not freely willed, they are entailed by a web of both external and internal events that have nothing to do with will, where will has absolutely no agency.....yet regardless of inner necessity, we are enthusiastically told by compatibilists, yes, yes, this is free will.

Inner necessity is not free will, sorry.

''If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things are not up to us.'' - Van Inwagen

 

[Jarhyn]

You realize that you have yet to grasp the difference between reality and fantasy

You have yet to realize how brains use "fantasies" modeled after reality, how they use the reality of having such fantasies, to choose the future.

You are committing a No-True-Scotsman in declaring the usage others apply as invalid a-priori.

Despite the fact that there is only one actual future, that one actual future can ONLY be reached, MUST only be reached, given our presence as beings that do so, through so doing.

One cannot order a dinner until after they have learned the menu and rendered a decision. Without the deliberation and eventual choice -- the action, the reaction to that menu that compiles a list, and returns a subset of it -- no order will be made and no food will be brought.

These are simple facts.

 

[The AntiChris]

Of course it's not a real free will. It is a definition.

A definition is a description of usage. Usage is what gives words their meaning. Frequently words have multiple meanings. In these cases, no single definition is the 'real' meaning.

How did you arrive at the belief that your notion of free will is the one true 'real' free will and all others are not real?

Word meaning doesn't establish the reality of something. There is plenty of word usage around 'God' or divine will, angels, demons, salvation, etc, yet none of this talk, definitions, agonizing rationales or debate establishes the reality of these things.

I guess what you're trying to say is that defining a concept doesn't establish its existence in reality and, of course, you're right, But it depends totally on the definition.

If you define God as a supernatural entity, then many reasonable people would agree God doesn't exist. However, if God were defined as Eric Clapton, then, given that definition, God undoubtedly exists.

Similarly, if free will is defined as 'acting while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence' then, given that definition, free will undoubtedly exists (it's undeniable that people do act while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence).

It's indisputable that, given the comptatibilist definition, free will exists.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Too much to deal with. Most of it repeat.

Indeed. But the real problem is that the compatibilist position is solid, while the incompatibilist argument is caught up in metaphors that, like sand castles, are easily swept away.

Rather than 'needing to know how the brain works,' it's a question of how the brain works in relation to a deterministic system as you yourself define it.

Determinism is not a "system" that operates as a whole according to some design, or purpose, or reason. That would be a metaphor.

Determinism is simply a comment about the behavior of the objects and forces that make up the physical universe. Determinism asserts that these objects and forces interact naturally and in a reliable fashion as they cause events to happen. These interactions are so perfectly reliable that it is theoretically possible, with sufficient knowledge of the current state and events, to predict any future state and events with 100% accuracy.

While "theoretically" possible, it is certainly not possible in any "practical" way to get 100% accurate predictions of all future states and events. At best, we can only get probabilistic estimates of a small set of events.

A very good carpenter can drive a nail accurately enough to build a house, but even she will occasionally hit a knot in the wood that bends the nail. But generally, by practice and experience, she is able to cause a nail to pierce through two boards and effectively bind them together. She is reliably causing an effect. And this ability to reliably cause an effect gives her control of the nail and the wood. This reliability enables her to realize the possibility of the house that she imagined, designed, and planned, and to change that possibility into an actuality.

Reliable cause and effect makes the consequences of her actions predictable in a practical way, that gives her control over other objects (the nails, the boards, the tools, etc.) that enables her to build a house. Other people, without her skills, are not able to do this. She is free to build a house, but they are not. Freedom is the ability to do what you want.

Where, events being fixed by prior states of the system, every incremental step in the process of cognition, rather than freely willed or even willed, is fixed by antecedents and the outcome inevitable before the process of response was even initiated.

All events are the reliable result of prior events. But that doesn't tell us anything useful. It simply states what we all take for granted, the notion of reliable cause and effect. Our carpenter skillfully hits the nail causing the nail to pierce the wood which causes the boards to stick together the way our carpenter wants them to, in order to build the house of her dreams.

The ultimate cause of the house was the carpenter's desire to build this house that she imagined. She considered what materials and tools she would need, the costs in time and money, what subcontractors she would need for the plumbing, electrical, and any other tasks outside of her specialty. She worked it out in her head and on paper, making many detailed design decisions along the way.

Was her dream house a real possibility, something she could actually do if she decided to go ahead with her plan? Yes. Having gone through the details, she believed that it was really possible, so she decided that she would build the house.

That decision to build the house fixed and sustained her intention, her will, upon actually building it. And it was that intent that motivated and directed her subsequent thoughts and actions as she carried out her plan in real life. Her will to complete the house, to actualize her dream, saw her through all of the rough spots and surprises she encountered along the way, until the final touches were made and she had the house she wanted.

This will, to build the house, was chosen by the carpenter herself. No one forced this choice upon her against her will. She freely chose to go ahead, to do all that was necessary to get it done. And without this freely chosen "Yes, I will build this house", the house would never have been built.

This is how things actually happen in reality.

And none of this is changed by the fact that all events are reliably caused by prior events in our deterministic reality. All of the causal forces are located in the objects and the forces between them. Our carpenter is one of those objects, which happens to be a living organism of an intelligent species. Her natural behavior includes choosing for herself what she will do. And when she decides what she will do, and acts upon it, she is a force of nature, able to cause significant events, like building a house.

The fact that her central nervous system operates via reliable causal mechanisms, that enable her to think, imagine, and choose, and to move around and wield a hammer effectively, does not in any way diminish the fact that it is she, herself, that is willfully doing these things.

The logical fact of universal causal necessity/inevitability (determinism) does not alter any other empirical fact, such as the fact that she is deciding for herself what she will do, free of coercion and undue influence (free will).

The bottom line is, this has nothing to do with free will, yet the label is being applied through a carefully selected set of terms and conditions.

Hopefully, all of our definitions will be carefully selected and described, in order that our words and terms will have clear and significant meaning, so that we can all know what we are talking about.

Free will, as a choice someone makes for themselves while free of coercion and undue influence, is meaningful, because it describes how we assess a person's responsibility for their deliberate actions. Both coercion and undue influence have clear examples which flesh out the meaning of our term.

Actions performed without external force or coercion are not freely willed, they are entailed by a web of both external and internal events that have nothing to do with will, where will has absolutely no agency.....yet regardless of inner necessity, we are enthusiastically told by compatibilists, yes, yes, this is free will.

To replace freedom from coercion and undue influence with "freedom from a web of both external and internal events that have nothing to do with will, where will has absolutely no agency", which boils down to "freedom from causal necessity" and "freedom from our own brain", presents us with an impossible, "absolutists" version of freedom, which half of the proponents of such a definition already agree are impossible freedoms!

So, I'm sorry, but the incompatibilist definition of free will is impossible, and therefore an irrational choice for the definition of free will.

''If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things are not up to us.'' - Van Inwagen

So, Peter, explain to our carpenter how her dream house was built by events that occurred before she was born and by laws of nature that somehow don't involve her dreams and desires, and her decision to set her intent upon building that house. And, good luck with that.

 

[steve_bank]

To Christians god is observable.

No, I don't think so. No Christian is going to say that they can actually see God. Instead, they describe God as like the wind, in that we cannot see the wind, but can see the wind's effects.

There number of forces that can come in when claiming free will is observable.

Sure. There are physical forces, like gravity. There are biological forces, like the drives to survive, thrive, and reproduce. And there are rational forces, such as our will to do something, set by our own deliberate choice to do it. For example, I decide (rational) to go to the kitchen to get something to eat (biological), but my toe catches in the rug (physical) and I fall (physical) and scratch my arm (biological) causing it to bleed (biological). So I decide (rational) to clean and bandage my arm (biological), before going to the kitchen.

For determinism to hold, we assume that each of these forces are deterministic in their own domain, and that every event is reliably caused by some combination of the three.

Like seeing god in the world, free will is subjective interpretation.

No. Free will is an event, like hitting a ball with bat, or walking from one place to another, or totaling a column of numbers. The free will event is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, and that is what we observe the people in the restaurant doing, choosing for themselves, from a literal menu of possibilities, what they will order for dinner. Go to any restaurant near you, and you can watch it happening.

When thinking about the universe causality does not necessarily equate to deterministic.

When causality is perfectly reliable, it is called "deterministic". When causality is unreliable, it is called "indeterministic".

Quantum mechanics is causal but not deterministic.

I find it simpler to assume that quantum events are deterministic, and that they appear to be indeterministic due to our inability to predict what will happen next at that very small scale.

Causal meaning no violation of conservation.

If whenever A happens then B must also happen, we say that A "causes" B, and that B is the "effect" of A happening. Causation implies that there is something about A happening that "brings about" event B.

Given the exact same initial conditions will the neurons in the brain always force in exactly the same way? Probably not.

What will "cause" them to act differently?

The old question in QM is whether the uncertainty in QM is a measurement problem or inherent to the universe.

Well, when we flip a coin, we also face uncertainty. But we also know that how the coin lands will be reliably caused by the forces applied at a given angle by the thumb under the coin in a certain spot, and the force applied by the thumb, and the air resistance that slows the spin, and the force of gravity as the coin falls, and the angle that it hits the floor, etc. And, we presume we can build a machine that will reliably flip a coin such that it will always land heads or tails up.

So, indeterminism (or true randomness) can be a simple matter of not having sufficient knowledge to correctly determine how the coin will land, rather than a problem of unreliable causation.

Put an ordinary motor on a battery and it will appear to be unchanging. Increase the resolution and there will always be noise from quantum effects.

And, we may assume that those quantum effects are reliably caused by prior quantum events.

Think you miss the point.

From a QM view causality does not neccesrily mean deterministic predetermination of our brains and choices.

We do not really know how the universe works.

Free wuill may exist, but there is no experiment to test it objectly.

The end result a believer in free will like a theist bases belief in subjective inerpretation.


If I kick you in the butt was it predetermined I did so, or did I do it based on my free will?

 

[pood]

To Christians god is observable.

No, I don't think so. No Christian is going to say that they can actually see God. Instead, they describe God as like the wind, in that we cannot see the wind, but can see the wind's effects.

There number of forces that can come in when claiming free will is observable.

Sure. There are physical forces, like gravity. There are biological forces, like the drives to survive, thrive, and reproduce. And there are rational forces, such as our will to do something, set by our own deliberate choice to do it. For example, I decide (rational) to go to the kitchen to get something to eat (biological), but my toe catches in the rug (physical) and I fall (physical) and scratch my arm (biological) causing it to bleed (biological). So I decide (rational) to clean and bandage my arm (biological), before going to the kitchen.

For determinism to hold, we assume that each of these forces are deterministic in their own domain, and that every event is reliably caused by some combination of the three.

Like seeing god in the world, free will is subjective interpretation.

No. Free will is an event, like hitting a ball with bat, or walking from one place to another, or totaling a column of numbers. The free will event is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, and that is what we observe the people in the restaurant doing, choosing for themselves, from a literal menu of possibilities, what they will order for dinner. Go to any restaurant near you, and you can watch it happening.

When thinking about the universe causality does not necessarily equate to deterministic.

When causality is perfectly reliable, it is called "deterministic". When causality is unreliable, it is called "indeterministic".

Quantum mechanics is causal but not deterministic.

I find it simpler to assume that quantum events are deterministic, and that they appear to be indeterministic due to our inability to predict what will happen next at that very small scale.

Causal meaning no violation of conservation.

If whenever A happens then B must also happen, we say that A "causes" B, and that B is the "effect" of A happening. Causation implies that there is something about A happening that "brings about" event B.

Given the exact same initial conditions will the neurons in the brain always force in exactly the same way? Probably not.

What will "cause" them to act differently?

The old question in QM is whether the uncertainty in QM is a measurement problem or inherent to the universe.

Well, when we flip a coin, we also face uncertainty. But we also know that how the coin lands will be reliably caused by the forces applied at a given angle by the thumb under the coin in a certain spot, and the force applied by the thumb, and the air resistance that slows the spin, and the force of gravity as the coin falls, and the angle that it hits the floor, etc. And, we presume we can build a machine that will reliably flip a coin such that it will always land heads or tails up.

So, indeterminism (or true randomness) can be a simple matter of not having sufficient knowledge to correctly determine how the coin will land, rather than a problem of unreliable causation.

Put an ordinary motor on a battery and it will appear to be unchanging. Increase the resolution and there will always be noise from quantum effects.

And, we may assume that those quantum effects are reliably caused by prior quantum events.

Think you miss the point.

From a QM view causality does not neccesrily mean deterministic predetermination of our brains and choices.

We do not really know how the universe works.

Free wuill may exist, but there is no experiment to test it objectly.

The end result a believer in free will like a theist bases belief in subjective inerpretation.


If I kick you in the butt was it predetermined I did so, or did I do it based on my free will?

Predetrerminism is not the same thing as determinism. Moreover, is not predeterminism itself a theistic viewpoint? Sure, it is. It’s called Calvinism.

Does the person who believes he himself decides what to have for dinner espousing a faith-based, theistic attitude, or the person who believes that the big bang selects his dinner for him?

 

[Jarhyn]

To Christians god is observable.

No, I don't think so. No Christian is going to say that they can actually see God. Instead, they describe God as like the wind, in that we cannot see the wind, but can see the wind's effects.

There number of forces that can come in when claiming free will is observable.

Sure. There are physical forces, like gravity. There are biological forces, like the drives to survive, thrive, and reproduce. And there are rational forces, such as our will to do something, set by our own deliberate choice to do it. For example, I decide (rational) to go to the kitchen to get something to eat (biological), but my toe catches in the rug (physical) and I fall (physical) and scratch my arm (biological) causing it to bleed (biological). So I decide (rational) to clean and bandage my arm (biological), before going to the kitchen.

For determinism to hold, we assume that each of these forces are deterministic in their own domain, and that every event is reliably caused by some combination of the three.

Like seeing god in the world, free will is subjective interpretation.

No. Free will is an event, like hitting a ball with bat, or walking from one place to another, or totaling a column of numbers. The free will event is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, and that is what we observe the people in the restaurant doing, choosing for themselves, from a literal menu of possibilities, what they will order for dinner. Go to any restaurant near you, and you can watch it happening.

When thinking about the universe causality does not necessarily equate to deterministic.

When causality is perfectly reliable, it is called "deterministic". When causality is unreliable, it is called "indeterministic".

Quantum mechanics is causal but not deterministic.

I find it simpler to assume that quantum events are deterministic, and that they appear to be indeterministic due to our inability to predict what will happen next at that very small scale.

Causal meaning no violation of conservation.

If whenever A happens then B must also happen, we say that A "causes" B, and that B is the "effect" of A happening. Causation implies that there is something about A happening that "brings about" event B.

Given the exact same initial conditions will the neurons in the brain always force in exactly the same way? Probably not.

What will "cause" them to act differently?

The old question in QM is whether the uncertainty in QM is a measurement problem or inherent to the universe.

Well, when we flip a coin, we also face uncertainty. But we also know that how the coin lands will be reliably caused by the forces applied at a given angle by the thumb under the coin in a certain spot, and the force applied by the thumb, and the air resistance that slows the spin, and the force of gravity as the coin falls, and the angle that it hits the floor, etc. And, we presume we can build a machine that will reliably flip a coin such that it will always land heads or tails up.

So, indeterminism (or true randomness) can be a simple matter of not having sufficient knowledge to correctly determine how the coin will land, rather than a problem of unreliable causation.

Put an ordinary motor on a battery and it will appear to be unchanging. Increase the resolution and there will always be noise from quantum effects.

And, we may assume that those quantum effects are reliably caused by prior quantum events.

Think you miss the point.

From a QM view causality does not neccesrily mean deterministic predetermination of our brains and choices.

We do not really know how the universe works.

Free wuill may exist, but there is no experiment to test it objectly.

The end result a believer in free will like a theist bases belief in subjective inerpretation.


If I kick you in the butt was it predetermined I did so, or did I do it based on my free will?

It's ridiculously easy to make a test for the existence of a "will".

Put together a list of stuff in plain, precise language. Present that list of stuff in plain language to a system which may interpret it into an assembled series of objects which are instructive to a processor. Describe the output of the system for an input without having run the system. Validate that output matches prediction of function on input for arbitrary inputs.

This validates that "will: an ordered set of instructions to be executed by an interpreter" is real.

Then setting up a value in the system to be some way if and only if some line of the will is executed, and observing that when the input would not carry the processor to execution of that line, the output is not set, and observing when the input is such that it would carry to the execution of the line the output IS set, would prove that there is a coherent idea of "freedom".

It's all right there. You can do it on a Turing machine with MS Visual Studio, for free, right now.

Observe wills.

Observe freedom of will with respect to a given state.

It's really that easy.

The problem is that this makes assumptions humans have tried to tie to "free will" rather messy in their own right.

Oftentimes I think that the metric of the freedom that ought be offered to an entity with the ability to hold a will is directly proportional to the ability of that entity to reject holding socially destructive wills.

 

[bilby]

If I kick you in the butt was it predetermined I did so, or did I do it based on my free will?

According to the cops, the judge, and the jurors in your assault and battery trial, you did it of your own free will, and are going to jail.

That's because they all know that "free will" is a matter of freedom from force or coercion, and not freedom from reliable cause and effect. They don't need to know nor care about either determinism or predetermination in order to reach their completely correct and widely accepted verdict, which depends upon their using the most common meaning of the phrase "free will", and not DBT's rather bizarre, contradictory, and paradox inducing "real free will", which as far as I can tell, even he believes to be impossible.

 

[steve_bank]

I keep trying to bend th thread to my views by sheer force of willpower, but it doesn't seem to work.

May I suggest the trusty old syllogism.

P1...
P2...
P3...
C Free will therefore exists.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I keep trying to bend th thread to my views by sheer force of willpower, but it doesn't seem to work.

May I suggest the trusty old syllogism.

P1...
P2...
P3...
C Free will therefore exists.

P1 Free will is the event where a person chooses for themselves what they will do while free of coercion and undue influence.
P2 In the restaurant we observe people choosing for themselves what they will do while free of coercion and undue influence.
C Therefore free will exists.

 

[Jarhyn]

I keep trying to bend th thread to my views by sheer force of willpower, but it doesn't seem to work.

May I suggest the trusty old syllogism.

P1...
P2...
P3...
C Free will therefore exists.

Wills exist: see "program; script; DNA amid proteins."
Freedom exists (with respect to lines in wills): see "proof of execution; breakpoints; output spits; logic analyzers"
The will to choose for oneself exists in various things: the line of a program to terminate ongoing activity rather than have some other programmatic element interrupt and terminate that activity is an observed phenomena.

Therefore will to choose for oneself may be free with respect to the element which identifies that freedom.

When it is, it is called "free will".

I positively can identify that I have observed such a will maintaining it's freedom through such means.

Therefore "free will", exists.

Clearly not everywhere and clearly not with respect to every instantiation but there it is.

One of the interesting parts here is that this clearly proves free will itself is not sufficient to establish ethical considerations, since ostensibly I have no obligation to ethically consider an aircraft...

 

[DBT]

You realize that you have yet to grasp the difference between reality and fantasy

You have yet to realize how brains use "fantasies" modeled after reality, how they use the reality of having such fantasies, to choose the future.

You have yet to realize that what is fantasized is just as subject to entailment as what went before and what comes after.

Saying what you did shows that you have yet to grasp the principles of your own definition of determinism.

You are committing a No-True-Scotsman in declaring the usage others apply as invalid a-priori.

Nah. It's just that you need to grasp the basics of determinism. You really do.

Despite the fact that there is only one actual future, that one actual future can ONLY be reached, MUST only be reached, given our presence as beings that do so, through so doing.

Which.....wait for it, pay attention now....is entailed by prior states of the system as it evolves from past to present and future states without deviation.

One cannot order a dinner until after they have learned the menu and rendered a decision. Without the deliberation and eventual choice -- the action, the reaction to that menu that compiles a list, and returns a subset of it -- no order will be made and no food will be brought.

These are simple facts.

Lordy, Lordy, lordy.

 

[DBT]

Of course it's not a real free will. It is a definition.

A definition is a description of usage. Usage is what gives words their meaning. Frequently words have multiple meanings. In these cases, no single definition is the 'real' meaning.

How did you arrive at the belief that your notion of free will is the one true 'real' free will and all others are not real?

Word meaning doesn't establish the reality of something. There is plenty of word usage around 'God' or divine will, angels, demons, salvation, etc, yet none of this talk, definitions, agonizing rationales or debate establishes the reality of these things.

I guess what you're trying to say is that defining a concept doesn't establish its existence in reality and, of course, you're right, But it depends totally on the definition.

If you define God as a supernatural entity, then many reasonable people would agree God doesn't exist. However, if God were defined as Eric Clapton, then, given that definition, God undoubtedly exists.

Similarly, if free will is defined as 'acting while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence' then, given that definition, free will undoubtedly exists (it's undeniable that people do act while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence).

It's indisputable that, given the comptatibilist definition, free will exists.

Definitions alone don't prove anything. For that you need references. The nature of cognition, action initiation, or in this instance ''will'' is determined by research into the role of 'will' in terms of its function in terms of response. And of course, how this relates to determinism.

As you can see, the prospects are not good;


The Neural Correlates of Consciousness

''The Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) can be defined as the minimal neuronal mechanisms jointly sufficient for any one specific conscious percept (Crick & Koch 1990).''

''Progress in addressing the mind-body problem has come from focusing on empirically accessible questions rather than on eristic philosophical arguments. Key is the search for the neuronal correlates - and ultimately the causes - of consciousness.''

''The question of interest is which of its subcomponents are essential to produce a conscious experience (Fig.1). For instance, it is likely that neural activity in the cerebellum does not underlie any conscious perception, and thus is not part of the Neural Correlates of Consciousness. That is, trains of spikes in Purkinje cells (or their absence) will not induce a sensory percept although they may ultimately affect some behaviors (such as eye movements).''

''Every phenomenal, subjective state will have associated Neural Correlates of Consciousness: one for seeing a red patch, another one for seeing grandmother, yet a third one for hearing a siren, etc. Perturbing or inactivating the Neural Correlates of Consciousness for any one specific conscious experience will affect the percept or cause it to disappear. If the Neural Correlates of Consciousness could be induced artificially, for instance by cortical microstimulation in a prosthetic device or during neurosurgery, the subject would experience the associated percept. ''

More;

''Direct electrical brain stimulation during neurosurgery (Fried et al. 1991) as well as fMRI experiments implicate medial pre-motor and anterior cingulate cortices in generating the subjective feeling of triggering an action (Lau et al. 2004). In other words, the neural correlate for the feeling of apparent causation involves activity in these cortical regions''

 

[DBT]

Too much to deal with. Most of it repeat.

Indeed. But the real problem is that the compatibilist position is solid, while the incompatibilist argument is caught up in metaphors that, like sand castles, are easily swept away.

Rather than 'needing to know how the brain works,' it's a question of how the brain works in relation to a deterministic system as you yourself define it.

Determinism is not a "system" that operates as a whole according to some design, or purpose, or reason. That would be a metaphor.

Determinism is simply a comment about the behavior of the objects and forces that make up the physical universe. Determinism asserts that these objects and forces interact naturally and in a reliable fashion as they cause events to happen. These interactions are so perfectly reliable that it is theoretically possible, with sufficient knowledge of the current state and events, to predict any future state and events with 100% accuracy.

While "theoretically" possible, it is certainly not possible in any "practical" way to get 100% accurate predictions of all future states and events. At best, we can only get probabilistic estimates of a small set of events.

A very good carpenter can drive a nail accurately enough to build a house, but even she will occasionally hit a knot in the wood that bends the nail. But generally, by practice and experience, she is able to cause a nail to pierce through two boards and effectively bind them together. She is reliably causing an effect. And this ability to reliably cause an effect gives her control of the nail and the wood. This reliability enables her to realize the possibility of the house that she imagined, designed, and planned, and to change that possibility into an actuality.

Reliable cause and effect makes the consequences of her actions predictable in a practical way, that gives her control over other objects (the nails, the boards, the tools, etc.) that enables her to build a house. Other people, without her skills, are not able to do this. She is free to build a house, but they are not. Freedom is the ability to do what you want.

Where, events being fixed by prior states of the system, every incremental step in the process of cognition, rather than freely willed or even willed, is fixed by antecedents and the outcome inevitable before the process of response was even initiated.

All events are the reliable result of prior events. But that doesn't tell us anything useful. It simply states what we all take for granted, the notion of reliable cause and effect. Our carpenter skillfully hits the nail causing the nail to pierce the wood which causes the boards to stick together the way our carpenter wants them to, in order to build the house of her dreams.

The ultimate cause of the house was the carpenter's desire to build this house that she imagined. She considered what materials and tools she would need, the costs in time and money, what subcontractors she would need for the plumbing, electrical, and any other tasks outside of her specialty. She worked it out in her head and on paper, making many detailed design decisions along the way.

Was her dream house a real possibility, something she could actually do if she decided to go ahead with her plan? Yes. Having gone through the details, she believed that it was really possible, so she decided that she would build the house.

That decision to build the house fixed and sustained her intention, her will, upon actually building it. And it was that intent that motivated and directed her subsequent thoughts and actions as she carried out her plan in real life. Her will to complete the house, to actualize her dream, saw her through all of the rough spots and surprises she encountered along the way, until the final touches were made and she had the house she wanted.

This will, to build the house, was chosen by the carpenter herself. No one forced this choice upon her against her will. She freely chose to go ahead, to do all that was necessary to get it done. And without this freely chosen "Yes, I will build this house", the house would never have been built.

This is how things actually happen in reality.

And none of this is changed by the fact that all events are reliably caused by prior events in our deterministic reality. All of the causal forces are located in the objects and the forces between them. Our carpenter is one of those objects, which happens to be a living organism of an intelligent species. Her natural behavior includes choosing for herself what she will do. And when she decides what she will do, and acts upon it, she is a force of nature, able to cause significant events, like building a house.

The fact that her central nervous system operates via reliable causal mechanisms, that enable her to think, imagine, and choose, and to move around and wield a hammer effectively, does not in any way diminish the fact that it is she, herself, that is willfully doing these things.

The logical fact of universal causal necessity/inevitability (determinism) does not alter any other empirical fact, such as the fact that she is deciding for herself what she will do, free of coercion and undue influence (free will).

The bottom line is, this has nothing to do with free will, yet the label is being applied through a carefully selected set of terms and conditions.

Hopefully, all of our definitions will be carefully selected and described, in order that our words and terms will have clear and significant meaning, so that we can all know what we are talking about.

Free will, as a choice someone makes for themselves while free of coercion and undue influence, is meaningful, because it describes how we assess a person's responsibility for their deliberate actions. Both coercion and undue influence have clear examples which flesh out the meaning of our term.

Nope, this whole 'a choice someone makes for themselves' is bogus.

Again:
The choices you make are an expression of how you think.

How you think is an expression of who you are.

Who you are depends on your genetic makeup, social circumstances, family, nation, culture, life experiences, etcetera.

''The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

Actions performed without external force or coercion are not freely willed, they are entailed by a web of both external and internal events that have nothing to do with will, where will has absolutely no agency.....yet regardless of inner necessity, we are enthusiastically told by compatibilists, yes, yes, this is free will.

To replace freedom from coercion and undue influence with "freedom from a web of both external and internal events that have nothing to do with will, where will has absolutely no agency", which boils down to "freedom from causal necessity" and "freedom from our own brain", presents us with an impossible, "absolutists" version of freedom, which half of the proponents of such a definition already agree are impossible freedoms!

So, I'm sorry, but the incompatibilist definition of free will is impossible, and therefore an irrational choice for the definition of free will.

The point is, the term 'free will' is incoherent when it's related to determinism as that is being defined. Which is why compatibilists try to redefine both the nature of freedom and will.

''If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things are not up to us.'' - Van Inwagen

So, Peter, explain to our carpenter how her dream house was built by events that occurred before she was born and by laws of nature that somehow don't involve her dreams and desires, and her decision to set her intent upon building that house. And, good luck with that.

You tell me, it's your definition:

''However, in order for determinism to be true, it must include all events. For example, determinism cannot exclude the effects of natural forces, like volcanoes and tidal waves or a meteor hitting the Earth. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of biological organisms that transform their environments, like tree seedlings changing bare land into a forest. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of deliberate choices, like when the chef prepares me the salad that I chose for lunch.

All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

Keep in mind that that the desire to build a house and the associated mental image of how the house will look does not pop out of a vacuum. Nor is it freely willed, it's a progression of events that bring you to that point in time and the things you feel, think, plan and do...just as you describe determinism, except for the matter of ''choosing,'' which implies the possibility of doing otherwise when we know that alternate actions are not possible within the deterministic system as you describe it

 

[The AntiChris]

Of course it's not a real free will. It is a definition.

A definition is a description of usage. Usage is what gives words their meaning. Frequently words have multiple meanings. In these cases, no single definition is the 'real' meaning.

How did you arrive at the belief that your notion of free will is the one true 'real' free will and all others are not real?

Word meaning doesn't establish the reality of something. There is plenty of word usage around 'God' or divine will, angels, demons, salvation, etc, yet none of this talk, definitions, agonizing rationales or debate establishes the reality of these things.

I guess what you're trying to say is that defining a concept doesn't establish its existence in reality and, of course, you're right, But it depends totally on the definition.

If you define God as a supernatural entity, then many reasonable people would agree God doesn't exist. However, if God were defined as Eric Clapton, then, given that definition, God undoubtedly exists.

Similarly, if free will is defined as 'acting while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence' then, given that definition, free will undoubtedly exists (it's undeniable that people do act while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence).

It's indisputable that, given the comptatibilist definition, free will exists.

Definitions alone don't prove anything.

You've missed the point completely.

What you're responding to was not a claim to have proven anything. The only claim I made was that whether or not X exists, depends on how one defines X.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Nope, this whole 'a choice someone makes for themselves' is bogus.

An extraordinary claim would require extraordinary evidence. One cannot disprove the fact that our carpenter decided for herself that she would build the house. She discussed her idea with others. She drew up the plans that everyone can see. She hired the subcontractors, purchased the materials, and did the carpentry work herself. No one forced her to take on such a task. She decided for herself that she would do it.

Obviously, the claim, that she made this choice for herself, is valid. To believe this claim is 'bogus' would require ignoring what is there for all to see, and instead constructing a delusion based upon metaphors and figurative thinking. Which we are about to see.

The choices you make are an expression of how you think. How you think is an expression of who you are. Who you are depends on your genetic makeup, social circumstances, family, nation, culture, life experiences, etcetera.

Of course. And this genetic makeup includes the carpenter's body and brain, which have been who and what she was from the day she was born. It was she, herself, that interacted with her family, nation, and culture. Those life experiences changed her over time, resulting in the person she is today.

One of the things that she is today, is an independent woman, with a marketable skill in carpentry, who can pretty much build anything she wants. Right now she wants to build a house. It's a big job, that will take a lot of time and effort. So, she takes all of this into account while deciding whether to take on this project now, or whether to wait until she is in a better position to carry it out.

After working out a detailed plan of action, and estimating the time and costs of the materials and labor, she decides that she can and will do this now.

Her choice to build the house now, motivates and directs her subsequent thoughts and actions as she carries out her plan from start to finish, until she has her new house.

That is how things happened in empirical reality.

''The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

The "outside" versus "inside" is not a problem for the compatibilist. Where are those prior influences at the time of our carpenter's decision to build the house? Her parents, schools, and other prior influences are not there in the room to help her decide. All of her prior life experiences are now within her, integral parts of who and what she is right now. She is making this choice, and is making the choice for herself, and not for them.

It is she, and not them, that will do the work and pay the bills for her new house.

The point is, the term 'free will' is incoherent when it's related to determinism as that is being defined.

Only the incompatibilist notion of free will is incoherent when related to determinism, because their notion of free will is a choice "free of deterministic causal necessity", which is irrational.

Our notion of free will is simply an event in which a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. We do not require any irrational freedoms.

Which is why compatibilists try to redefine both the nature of freedom and will.

The compatibilists have no need to redefine anything. Our notions of freedom and will and free will are all based on common usage.

It is the incompatibilists who attempt to redefine freedom, will, and free will out of existence, by requiring that they be free of deterministic causal necessity, an irrational requirement.

Keep in mind that that the desire to build a house and the associated mental image of how the house will look does not pop out of a vacuum. Nor is it freely willed, it's a progression of events that bring you to that point in time and the things you feel, think, plan and do...just as you describe determinism, except for the matter of ''choosing,'' which implies the possibility of doing otherwise when we know that alternate actions are not possible within the deterministic system as you describe it

Deterministic causal necessity is indeed a simple progression of events. One event leads naturally to the next event. Our young woman, when faced with the important choice of careers, decided to enter trade school to become a carpenter. And there were reasons that reliably brought her to that decision, just as there are reasons that reliably bring about everyone else's decisions. If we ask her "Why did you choose to become a carpenter?", she can probably explain the other jobs she considered and why she chose this one. Each person will have their own reasons for their own choices. In any case there will be a reliable history of prior causes that led them to making that choice rather than another.

This simple progression of events brings all of us to many situations where we must make choices before we continue forward. And, as adults, we will be making most of these choices for ourselves, and we will be free of coercion and undue influence as we go about deciding what we will do. This is what most people call "free will", the ability to decide for ourselves what we will do.

The incompatibilist, through metaphors and figurative thinking, attempts to convince us that choosing is not actually happening, which contradicts empirical reality, and contradicts neuroscience which tells us that our brains actually does make decisions. I would also add that it contradicts deterministic causal necessity, because it denies the inevitable progression of events which lead to, and include, our choosing.