Angra Mainyu
Veteran Member
You're welcome.Just a clarification point: I'm replying to the argument as presented in this thread. I know that some theologians make a more sophisticated argument - probably Feser too -, addressing some of my points.
Those arguments fail as well, but the reply would have to be modified to some extent (e.g., different examples, limiting the number of objections), and be tailored to each variant.
But if you bring a specific variant of the argument, I'll debunk it.
Thanks, Angra, your response was very helpful. So far as I know, Feser has not given this more context, but I don't always read his blog so I'm not sure. But thanks again.
A common argument by so-called "natural law" Thomists (a problem with the name is that it's a specific type of theory; one may as well subscribe to a theory that holds that there is a natural law, but it's not like that proposed by Thomists) is that somehow gay sex - or some other form of non-reproductive sex, depending on the case - frustrates the purpose of sex - which is reproduction, or reproduction + unity between man and woman, or something like that -, whereas using blinking to communicate is a use that, while not part of the purpose of blinking, it does not frustrate it - since blinking is still spreading tears, etc.
They would also say that - for example - using earplugs blocks or reduces the hearing function, but it does not use it for a purpose that is deviant, or perverse.
An example of that is Timothy Hsiao's paper "Why Homosexual Sex is Immoral".
Part of the reply to that is to reject the claim that sex, or sexual organs, etc., have purposes, even if they have biological functions.
But that aside, there are a number of ways you could reply.
One is the "one person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens" way: given that it's obviously not the case that gay sex (or masturbation, oral sex, etc.) is always or generally immoral, then the so-called "natural law" theory is false.
Another reply is to consider chewing sugar-free gum. That would allegedly be just as "perverse" if this "natural law" theory were correct, since that would engage our masticatory faculty but in a way that is intrinsically not nutritious, while the biological function of that faculty is to begin digestion.
If the Thomist says that even sugar-free gums have a few calories, that would only expose the Thomistic moral theory as even more clearly ridiculous, since it's obviously not the case that chewing gum would become immoral if those very few calories are removed. Additionally, one might use the examples of chewing on something else with no calories, like a (unused!) chew toy for dogs. That would be odd, but not immoral (e.g., maybe someone does it just to make a point about Thomism ).
If the Thomist replies that chewing also has a function not related to nourishment, then one may say there is no particular reason why that's not so of sex and sexual organs. For example, sex may have the function of reducing stress and/or giving pleasure and/or enhance the bonds between two people, regardless of their sex or gender. The Thomist will reject that, but there is no particular reason to believe there is no such function of sex but there is such function of chewing - i.e., the Thomist would have no good reason for his belief.