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Gender Roles


I'm probably Europeansplaining as much as mansplaining here, but granted, I need to tread lightly here. I'm not saying doors remove all points of contention, but that they will take out much of the heat from that particular argument, and I fail to understand why anyone would think not having them is a good idea. I'm no social historian of bathrooms by any stretch of imagination, but if I have to take a guess, the original motivation was probably, perversly, puritanism: to minimise opportunities for nefarious acts between consenting adults.
I wouldn't be surprised, but I can see a practical use for having a bit of space: It allows figuring out whether a stall is occupied or not even if something has happened to the occupant. I think the doors could be bigger and still serve this purpose, but I can see merit in a way to check.
In other countries, they have a little hole in the die itself that's covered by the latch, and the back of the latch painted in red and green such that it'll show as read when someone has locked it from the inside. Works like a charm ;)
So... yeah... the spacing around restroom doors in the US is largely driven by our tendency to build to the stupidest denominator. It's generally intended to allow someone to access a child who has locked themselves in or someone experiencing a medical situation in a stall. We have better ways we could do that now... but you know, we've been doing it that way for so long and change is hard. Plus the cost of retrofitting.
 
BTW, have you read up on Niko Tinbergen"s "Four Questions"? Please do, it'll make this discussion much more transparent and productive.
A discussion of animal behavior has fuck all to do with a discussion of anatomical systems.
That would be true of it weren't so that both are the product of evolution constrained by development. It is, however, and the scat and questions can be asked about aspects of both, and the answers will differ in the exact same ways.
 
A person whose cognition is 3% of the way from male-typical to female-typical might well perceive himself to have "a more female-like cognition" because he's comparing his cognition with those of typical males, and has precious little understanding of how people whose brains are 100% female think.
Possible. Also, in case that was unclear, I didn't want to imply that the description above fits all trans women, just that it is biologically entirely plausible that such people exist at rates well above the rates for trivially visibly identifiably anatomically intersex individuals.
Fixed.
Cognition is an emergent property of neural and endocrine anatomy, sure. But then again, the features of neural and endocrine anatomy are an emergent property of the weak nuclear force, the the strong nuclear force, and electromagnetism in an environment modified by gravity ;)

I think what you mean to say that there may be aspects of brain anatomy in transgender individuals that are detectably more like those of the sex they identify with, or at least significantly different from the mean of the sex they display down there. That may well be so, but I feel those are less relevant than differences and similarities in cognition itself (except maybe as an argument to convince detractors who will brush away psychological data saying they're faking it, whether or not that's plausible given the method).
Oh no, Jarhyn genuinely argues that transwomen have girly brains, and that's what makes them female instead of male, regardless of whether or not they have entirely typical male anatomies. Because, you know, beliefs are physical.
Whether "girly brains" are real or not, you are misrepresenting him. A brain is an aspect of anatomy as much as a gondar or a pelvis. One thing a brain definitely isn't is a belief.
 
Human women, in contrary, don't show when they are are ovulating
We do, actually, but it's not nearly as obvious as it is in other mammals.

When we're ovulating, our skin and hair will be smoother and shinier, our lips and cheeks will be more pink, our breasts swell slightly and our nipples spend a larger portion of time erect. We also have increased vaginal discharge that usually has a different scent, although that's not usually visible ;)
True, and a minority of men even claim they can sniff out their partners fertility and/or the onset of menstruation. That residual detectibilty need not be adaptive, however. It could just as well be the product of an evolutionary history in which the mammalian female has been under selection pressure for visible estrus for over 100 million years and which produced pathways too deeply entrenched for a couple million years (and potentially less than that) of a counteracting selection to entirely undo them.
Oh, I'm aware that you probably don't really believe that, i assume you have that much common sense. It does however logically follow from combining Emily's definition and your claim that "everyone else [uses it] virtually all the time". Your feeble attempts to define the edge cases that disprove your definition's universal applicability out of existence aren't empirical science, they belong to the realm of religion.
Within any anisogamous species, there are two reproductive phenotypes. Members of the species who have the reproductive phenotype that has evolved to support the production of large sessile gametes are called "females". Members of the species who have the reproductive phenotype that has evolved to support the production of small motile gametes are called "males". Actual production of gametes is not required for these phenotypes to define sex within each species, nor is a complete or unambiguous reproductive tract. But within each anisogamous species there are only two evolved reproductive phenotypes, thus there are only two sexes.

What is in the realm of religion is imagineering a gendered brain into the mix and then arguing that such speculative minds supercede the phenotypes that define our sex.
(Emphasis added) That's like saying: the tiger has evolved stripes to be less conspicuous. Therefore, it is invisible.
No, that's inane of you to say.

Show me the reproductive phenotype that has evolved in an anisogamous species that supports a third gamete, or which has evolved to support a sperg. That's the only thing you need to do to change my mind. That's all. Go on, I'll wait.
You continue to confound selection targets with realised phenotypes. The target of selection of sex differentiation in a non-eusocial anisogamous species is, abstractly, two morphs that are mutually compatible in producing offspring and efficient at doing so (additional morphs can become targets of selection under eusociality; and while I remain unconvinced, humans as an eusocial species, or in the process of evolving into one, is a sound scientific hypothesis that can only be decided empirically and must not be discarded by fiat, and that has been proposed in all seriousness by none other than one of the world's leading experts on eusociality, the late EO Wilson). Similarly, the target of selection for the mammalian immune system during pregnancy is to continue protecting the mother from pathogens without attacking the placenta and fetus. And the target of selection for the tiger's fur pattern is to make it invisible.

The realised phenotype for a pregnant woman's immune system, however, is one that kind of sucks at both, just not badly enough to be reliably lethal. The realised phenotype for a tiger's fur is one that imperfectly does what it's "meant" to do. Likewise, the realised phenotype(s) for sex in humans and other mammals is arguably a spectrum of varying proximity to one or the other of the two (or more, if indeed we are eusocial) target morphs that includes realisations that can be reasonably described as "intermediate". A "sperg" is no prerequisite for that to be a sensible and informative descriptive label. You could call them "disorders", but that's orthogonal to the current discussion. You could call them "monstrosities" or "abominations" for all it matters, they're still real, they are still part of the spectrum of realised phenotypes, and they're still the product of evolution.

What's more, the the target of selection for each of the morphs directly depends on the distribution of phenotypes (including the extended phenotype, including in humans fashion and technology) in the species at large. If you consider congenital infertility sufficient to classify a condition as a disorder (I think you still haven't really given us your definition of "disorder", please do correct me if you have!), we can derive the following rather unintuituve results: A male that is too hideous to attract (and too feeble to rape) a compatible mate is functionally infertile, ie unable to naturally produce offspring - yet a fashion change can make him "fertile" and make his "disorder" go away! A male with a penis too thick to fit into the vagina of any female of the species is infertile - but stops being so the day a female with a vagina wide enough to take it in reaches maturity! A male who produces viable sperm but lacks the apparatus to deliver it into the proximity of infertilised ova, that is sperm ducts and a penis, is infertile - but only due to the scarcity of females with a piercing tentacle with which to extract semen directly from the testes, and if we include extended phenotypes, the syringes of doctors specialising in assisted reproduction are, functionally, just such a tentacle and thus technically, we should no longer be considering him as suffering a "disorder" in 2024. I don't know about you, but I consider a definition of "disorder" that makes it so one and the same condition can stop being a disorder within an affected individual's lifetime neither useful nor intuitive. Furthermore, defining "normal males" as those compatible with "normal females" is circular reasoning unless you take the entire spectrum of variation into account.

Some "disorders" may even be frequency dependent. A "disorder" that makes a male entirely unattractive for - or even incompatible with - all but a minority of the species' females who find it the hottest thing on earth is maladaptive when the minority of females who are into that kind of thing is smaller than the minority of males who exhibit the trait, but becomes adaptive when it's larger - long before that becomes the new typical female phenotype, if it ever does; in rare cases, such a scenario can even lead to sympatric speciation in the long run (maybe not so rare in insects, actually).

These are all nuances that are lost when treating "disorders" as disjunct from "normal variation", or when confounding selection targets with realised phenotypes, but they are important building blocks for evolution!
 
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A person whose cognition is 3% of the way from male-typical to female-typical might well perceive himself to have "a more female-like cognition" because he's comparing his cognition with those of typical males, and has precious little understanding of how people whose brains are 100% female think.
Possible. Also, in case that was unclear, I didn't want to imply that the description above fits all trans women, just that it is biologically entirely plausible that such people exist at rates well above the rates for trivially visibly identifiably anatomically intersex individuals.
Fixed.
Cognition is an emergent property of neural and endocrine anatomy, sure. But then again, the features of neural and endocrine anatomy are an emergent property of the weak nuclear force, the the strong nuclear force, and electromagnetism in an environment modified by gravity ;)

I think what you mean to say that there may be aspects of brain anatomy in transgender individuals that are detectably more like those of the sex they identify with, or at least significantly different from the mean of the sex they display down there. That may well be so, but I feel those are less relevant than differences and similarities in cognition itself (except maybe as an argument to convince detractors who will brush away psychological data saying they're faking it, whether or not that's plausible given the method).
Oh no, Jarhyn genuinely argues that transwomen have girly brains, and that's what makes them female instead of male, regardless of whether or not they have entirely typical male anatomies. Because, you know, beliefs are physical.
Whether "girly brains" are real or not, you are misrepresenting him. A brain is an aspect of anatomy as much as a gondar gonad or a pelvis. One thing a brain definitely isn't is a belief.
Correct. I argue that each trans person has the brain that trans person has. Sometimes these will be more "masculine" or more "feminine" or more "something else entirely". Some of these may be more or less adaptive in certain situations, but variety is important in any population.

MOST combinations of human traits with the possible exception of "self-unaware dark triads" and other notably identifiable sorts of presentations tend towards social-technological adaptivity. In fact, I would surmise that this is a conflict directly arising from archetypes adapted to non-social evolutionary action existing as artifacts among a eusocial species.

This is to say, these traits present at the rate they are going to occur. Mostly as a social-technological group, our way of adapting tends to be to present a variety of memes and judge a person based on how socially and technologically adaptable someone ends up being as a result.

Regardless of how or why, though probably informed by some number of early natal states and blind chance, some number of late and mid natal states and blind chance, some number of early childhood states and blind chance and in some small part memes, and so on, we occasionally end up observing a person who would become more socially and technologically adaptable when given access to HRT. In this situation, further, it is generally the case this compatibility is improved further when they are handled on the basis of their hormonal and/or pregnancy-theoretic reality, especially in the context of discussing access to services or spaces.

I don't have information for, this do not have any further belief about what specific events or structures create such a reality, beyond the information that I have linked and otherwise referred to here that suggest that it is "hardware" based, owing to the structure of their neurons, their arrangement, rather than their transient environment, and that this transient arrangement is functionally impossible to address in any adaptable wau otherwise than by simply accepting that some people with penises be called "she" and be allowed to grow up expressing femininity and accessing estrogen and testosterone suppression drugs.

Arguing about the nature of belief and the physicality of it will quickly drag this thread down into the same simulation/computation /determinism discussion, and I don't think that serves here, other than to say and expect the acceptance of the statement "beliefs are theorized, and not without reason, to be the product exclusively of some physical phenomena".

If anyone here wishes to dispute that, please provide your evidence, as computational theory has revealed that very likely a "god of the gaps".
 
... I don't know about you, but I consider a definition of "disorder" that makes it so one and the same condition can stop being a disorder within an affected individual's lifetime neither useful nor intuitive...
Maybe I should clarify: a condition that stops being debilitating or maladaptive due to treatment can still be a disorder by what I would consider a useful and intuitive definition. The three scenerios I presented are all such that the change is facilitated by factors entirely extrinsic to the individual whose physical condition literally remains the same, just the context changes.
 
A person whose cognition is 3% of the way from male-typical to female-typical might well perceive himself to have "a more female-like cognition" because he's comparing his cognition with those of typical males, and has precious little understanding of how people whose brains are 100% female think.
Possible. Also, in case that was unclear, I didn't want to imply that the description above fits all trans women, just that it is biologically entirely plausible that such people exist at rates well above the rates for trivially visibly identifiably anatomically intersex individuals.
Fixed.
Cognition is an emergent property of neural and endocrine anatomy, sure. But then again, the features of neural and endocrine anatomy are an emergent property of the weak nuclear force, the the strong nuclear force, and electromagnetism in an environment modified by gravity ;)

I think what you mean to say that there may be aspects of brain anatomy in transgender individuals that are detectably more like those of the sex they identify with, or at least significantly different from the mean of the sex they display down there. That may well be so, but I feel those are less relevant than differences and similarities in cognition itself (except maybe as an argument to convince detractors who will brush away psychological data saying they're faking it, whether or not that's plausible given the method).
Oh no, Jarhyn genuinely argues that transwomen have girly brains, and that's what makes them female instead of male, regardless of whether or not they have entirely typical male anatomies. Because, you know, beliefs are physical.
Whether "girly brains" are real or not, you are misrepresenting him. A brain is an aspect of anatomy as much as a gondar gonad or a pelvis. One thing a brain definitely isn't is a belief.
I find it interesting that you would correct an autocorrect-induced typo (I don't even know what a "gondar" is!) but leave what I can only assume is a pronoun you don't go by untouched. I was tempted to write a separate post explaining how that was accidental when I realised (too late for an edit of the original post) that. Kind of counters the claim that "radical trans activists" will cancel even well- meaning individuals for accidental misgendering. Either that, or you officially don't qualify as an RTA.
Correct. I argue that each trans person has the brain that trans person has. Sometimes these will be more "masculine" or more "feminine" or more "something else entirely". Some of these may be more or less adaptive in certain situations, but variety is important in any population.

MOST combinations of human traits with the possible exception of "self-unaware dark triads" and other notably identifiable sorts of presentations tend towards social-technological adaptivity. In fact, I would surmise that this is a conflict directly arising from archetypes adapted to non-social evolutionary action existing as artifacts among a eusocial species.
I'm not entirely sure I understand. I'm going to try and rephrase as I understand it though: "we're a eusocial species, but much of our behavioral repertoire, to the extent that it's hard wired, stems from a time before we were one. To a large extentv it is thus not instinct as such but the adaptability of our primate brains that allows us to assume the rules our "new" eusocial structure provides, but not always seemlessly". How far am I off?
This is to say, these traits present at the rate they are going to occur. Mostly as a social-technological group, our way of adapting tends to be to present a variety of memes and judge a person based on how socially and technologically adaptable someone ends up being as a result.

Regardless of how or why, though probably informed by some number of early natal states and blind chance, some number of late and mid natal states and blind chance, some number of early childhood states and blind chance and in some small part memes, and so on, we occasionally end up observing a person who would become more socially and technologically adaptable when given access to HRT. In this situation, further, it is generally the case this compatibility is improved further when they are handled on the basis of their hormonal and/or pregnancy-theoretic reality, especially in the context of discussing access to services or spaces.

I don't have information for, this do not have any further belief about what specific events or structures create such a reality, beyond the information that I have linked and otherwise referred to here that suggest that it is "hardware" based, owing to the structure of their neurons, their arrangement, rather than their transient environment, and that this transient arrangement is functionally impossible to address in any adaptable wau otherwise than by simply accepting that some people with penises be called "she" and be allowed to grow up expressing femininity and accessing estrogen and testosterone suppression drugs.

Arguing about the nature of belief and the physicality of it will quickly drag this thread down into the same simulation/computation /determinism discussion, and I don't think that serves here, other than to say and expect the acceptance of the statement "beliefs are theorized, and not without reason, to be the product exclusively of some physical phenomena".

If anyone here wishes to dispute that, please provide your evidence, as computational theory has revealed that very likely a "god of the gaps".

I think I agree with most of what you're saying, but I have to give this to your detractors: I often find it quite hard to follow your exposition, and easy to misunderstand if I'm not concentrating hard. I don't think it's entirely down to English not being my first language either. I don't however know what a "pregnancy-theoretic reality" refers to, or how simulation plays into any of this.
 
I find it interesting that you would correct an autocorrect-induced typo (I don't even know what a "gondar" is!) but leave what I can only assume is a pronoun you don't go by untouched
Just correcting it because I think it's good to make it clear that I do understand what you said, and to annoy you just a little bit, so that you annoy me about such things just a little bit. Sometimes I do mangle my statements, after all, in similar ways. Rather than trying to understand them, some people try to misunderstand instead.

The fact is, I'm not going to be angry about someone doing that unless they do it on purpose, after having been told enough times that it bothers me that it's clear they do it because they don't care enough to stop, or because they do care about the endoprhine rush of making me feel bad more than they care about their obligations to not try and make others feel bad.

It's that whole "taking an effort to be callous and shitty on purpose" part, as results invalidating people's goals for themselves, the aggressively antisocial part, that part is what gets me clicking the "report" button.

You don't seem to be particularly interested in being a dick, so I care less. Thanks for noticing though.
I'm not entirely sure I understand. I'm going to try and rephrase as I understand it though: "we're a eusocial species, but much of our behavioral repertoire, to the extent that it's hard wired, stems from a time before we were one. To a large extentv it is thus not instinct as such but the adaptability of our primate brains that allows us to assume the rules our "new" eusocial structure provides, but not always seemlessly". How far am I off
Kind of close, kind of far.

I think part of the "blending" you mention with the androgen insensitivity and reduction of expression is a direct result of eusocial selection, and this has resulted in less distinctive expressions and more likely cross-expressions, and the development of new expressions all the same that lead to non-reproductive individuals.

I expect in that process a trait, arose that seeks to push androgens away entirely, and a particular behavior (seeking castration in some way) as a result that achieves that selection target reliably enough, and that when this happens the resulting individuals often exceed their peers in accomplishment, lifespan, and logical thought.

More, we have discovered new ways to make ourselves even more adaptable to technology and our social existence, such as you mention pulling out what strange tentacle to reverse some endogenous effect, and that this is often far more preferable than the more ancient route of using a knife, and discovered that this, much like cooking our food, leads to an even more fortunate result.

It used to be that cooking food was considered madness, after all, and it was... But you can't argue with the result.

I don't however know what a "pregnancy-theoretic reality" [is]
Simply, "can this person get that person pregnant, potentially against the will of the second person?"

This one question informs an entire set of social concerns, and I feel is the pivotal issue for certain space separations.

I find that the right to make decisions for oneself over pregnancy are very important, and one of the driving concerns for a number of selection targets in evolution across species.

You have discussed with Emily about the need to use appropriate considerations when dealing with particular concerns, and "pregnancy theoretics", in addition to "hormone theoretics" to address those concerns that actually touch on things that act as reasonable determinants of whether someone belongs or does not belong in some space.

Likewise, "whether a belief is some physical thing is" a question that would take such a forray to answer. I still don't know what Emily really thinks there other than that she thinks my model of consciousness as a function of computational process is somehow ridiculous; such would imply that if she doesn't believe in such physical determinism, however I have no idea what she would surmise our thoughts are the result of otherwise.
 
A person whose cognition is 3% of the way from male-typical to female-typical might well perceive himself to have "a more female-like cognition" because he's comparing his cognition with those of typical males, and has precious little understanding of how people whose brains are 100% female think.
Possible. Also, in case that was unclear, I didn't want to imply that the description above fits all trans women, just that it is biologically entirely plausible that such people exist at rates well above the rates for trivially visibly identifiably anatomically intersex individuals.
Fixed.
Cognition is an emergent property of neural and endocrine anatomy, sure. But then again, the features of neural and endocrine anatomy are an emergent property of the weak nuclear force, the the strong nuclear force, and electromagnetism in an environment modified by gravity ;)

I think what you mean to say that there may be aspects of brain anatomy in transgender individuals that are detectably more like those of the sex they identify with, or at least significantly different from the mean of the sex they display down there. That may well be so, but I feel those are less relevant than differences and similarities in cognition itself (except maybe as an argument to convince detractors who will brush away psychological data saying they're faking it, whether or not that's plausible given the method).
Oh no, Jarhyn genuinely argues that transwomen have girly brains, and that's what makes them female instead of male, regardless of whether or not they have entirely typical male anatomies. Because, you know, beliefs are physical.
Whether "girly brains" are real or not, you are misrepresenting him. A brain is an aspect of anatomy as much as a gondar or a pelvis. One thing a brain definitely isn't is a belief.
Nah, I'm not misrepresenting him. Yes, a brain is physical... but that's not Jarhyn's premise. His premise is that because beliefs exist in the brain, those beliefs are therefore physical. And because of that premise, the belief of a person that they have a mystical inner womanly essence that overrides their male body as well as their male experience in terms of both bodily phenomena and conditioning... is therefore a physical thing and means that the person as a whole is thus best considered to be a woman. Jarhyn's philosophy extends the residence of a belief being within a physical structure to imply that the belief itself is an objectively real thing.
  • Male person with male body and male experiences believes themself to be a woman, based on an internal feeling and a subjective interpretation of what that male thinks females are supposed to think and feel.
  • Because this belief resides within the brain, that belief is a physical reality.
  • Therefore that male person's belief is real, and they really are a woman in every way that matters (to that male person).
Jarhyn will wrap that up with a bunch of jargon-heavy Butleresque obfuscation...but that's what it boils down to. And then he'll take it a step further and insinuate (if not outright say multiple times) that who challenge his bespoke invention of gendery souls made flesh is an evil bigoted transphobic nazi trying to commit blood libel.
 
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Arguing about the nature of belief and the physicality of it will quickly drag this thread down into the same simulation/computation /determinism discussion, and I don't think that serves here, other than to say and expect the acceptance of the statement "beliefs are theorized, and not without reason, to be the product exclusively of some physical phenomena".
Translate this please. Because it pretty much reads like "belief in god is theorized to be the product of an actual god-like thing"
 
I expect in that process a trait, arose that seeks to push androgens away entirely, and a particular behavior (seeking castration in some way) as a result that achieves that selection target reliably enough, and that when this happens the resulting individuals often exceed their peers in accomplishment, lifespan, and logical thought.
On the other hand... I expect that a process trait arose that seeks to accept and work within the confines of one's physical reality, and that the particular behavior of not seeking to mutilate the body in order to conform to a hypothetical ideal influenced by transhumanist and post modern narratives results in individuals that exceed their peers in contentment, decision making skills, adaptability, and rationality.

Just saying. Your post might be one of the most self-congratulatory reframings of an extreme outlier behavior I've run across in a long time.
 
because they do care about the endoprhine rush of making me feel bad more than they care about their obligations to not try and make others feel bad.
I'd really appreciate you walking the walk on this, and making an effort to avoid making those who disagree with you feel bad. Perhaps by avoiding calling people nazis and accusing them of blood libel, as a starting point. Once you've got that under your belt, perhaps you could consider extending that level of courtesy to not implying that other posters are lying about their own family experiences?
 
I still don't know what Emily really thinks there other than that she thinks my model of consciousness as a function of computational process is somehow ridiculous; such would imply that if she doesn't believe in such physical determinism, however I have no idea what she would surmise our thoughts are the result of otherwise.
I think your entire model is overly simplistic, and you fail to incorporate the necessary role of an analog perception system into how you view consciousness. You severely underestimate how much the body as a physical thing influences our thoughts, and you consistently ignore the role of plasticity on cognition.

I agree that thoughts occur on a substrate of physical elements. Where we differ is that I understand that the thoughts themselves are not physical. That leads to a divergence in what the consequence of those thoughts are.

I also note that you repeatedly cherry pick the scenarios in which your model applies. For example... I suspect that you do NOT accept that a schizophrenic's belief that they are Napoleon is representative of reality in any fashion. That belief occurs within the physical structure of a brain, and I'm sure it leaves behind a pathway of neurons and connections that result from that belief. But the schizophrenic in question is still not ACTUALLY Napoleon. And that's where your jargon-laden rhetoric breaks down.

Because in some specifically chosen scenarios you argue they person actually IS Napoleon, whether you recognize that as the consequence of your argument or not.

When you argue that a belief in a gender discordant with one's physical body is a result of physical pathways in the brain, you are using that assumption of causality to support your position that such a gender belief is an aspect of sex and is simultaneously more real than and outside of the reproductive binary. Your argument rests upon the supposition that the belief creates the reality.
 
I expect in that process a trait, arose that seeks to push androgens away entirely, and a particular behavior (seeking castration in some way) as a result that achieves that selection target reliably enough, and that when this happens the resulting individuals often exceed their peers in accomplishment, lifespan, and logical thought.
On the other hand... I expect that a process trait arose that seeks to accept and work within the confines of one's physical reality, and that the particular behavior of not seeking to mutilate the body in order to conform to a hypothetical ideal influenced by transhumanist and post modern narratives results in individuals that exceed their peers in contentment, decision making skills, adaptability, and rationality.

Just saying. Your post might be one of the most self-congratulatory reframings of an extreme outlier behavior I've run across in a long time.
Jarhyn's kind of right about lifespan though. Testosterone, according to my readings, is fairly directly involved in men's lower life expectancy, and I'm not even talking about the riskier behaviour it triggers, but about physiological effects on the aging process itself. An artificial reduction of testosterone loads could very well increase life expectancy of people undergoing it as an elective treatment, if all else were equal (which, as a general rule of thumb, it never is, especially not when comparing a marginalised group with the population at large).

Not sure about "logical thought". I would argue that my thought process in this thread is more logical than Jarhyn's. But than again, I'd argue that about my thought process in relation to yours too, so maybe you'd want to argue that's just my self- perception playing games on me. At any rate, I wouldn't want to blame it on testosterone one way or the other.
 
the necessary role of an analog perception system
You proclaim without evidence that "analog" is necessary, first off.

Second, you proclaim here without evidence that I do not think that there is an analog extension of "switches". Neurons are analog switches, however even binary switches can between them suitably create floating point structures, such that it's a distinction without meaning across the boundary.

The body influences the brain in a specific way, through signals created through linkages between some systemically released chemical and some target receptor.

As such, the messages sent between such systems would necessarily be communications of vague quantities of request or report associated with specific "static values".

As such, my model natively incorporates the concept of static values, as static systemic values are important for processing unites to gain local awareness of distant information.

Still, the nature of how that can function is limited, and unmagical in nature, and in fact we're what is thought of in ARINC terms as a "sampling message", whose function is "whenever you look at this message you are subscribed to, it has its most recent value and any values you have locally buffered".

By in large these are important, but only in some abstract way, like a sense that only measures a single analog value rather than a broad surface of them like more conventional senses. Many of these senses, the functional group that renders "socially reported self-awareness" is not directly aware of at all, instead receiving much more nuanced constructions from the history of that data typified in other ways like "hungry" or "(want to eat something green)" from the parts that are directly conscious of the history of such a sampling message.

Oftentimes, the numbers reported by such systems are represented as algorithmic executions, as precise values in terms of true mathematical constants. One of the things my boss talks about on occasion is how he wrote a program to fully preserve numbers as some identity.

The fact is, people put a lot of stock around and inappropriate magical thinking behind minutae like "analogueness" or "how often they get sensory data", when they don't understand the complexities of large scale systems well enough to say, track an exception from a node that was translatably reporting that something was wrong with the avionics controls in the pitot tube software, and translate that back through the system that was aware of some initial report of incorrect sensory state.

Thoughts are physical phenomena. You could, if you had some mechanism to translate the events you see, translate those events to "they are thinking about Napoleon", or "if they 'sashay' they will feel 'feminine'" and these would easily visible as physical facts about the system.

Clearly you are misinterpreting my statement that thoughts are physical, insofar as this does not mean, as you outright declare for me (and in a way I do not appreciate) that I would state something so patently ridiculous as that one's thoughts that they are Napoleon, for example, would mean that they were; it would not. It means exactly that physically, they think they are Napoleon, and that physically, you can know because of the particular shape of the contingent mechanisms in their skull and their current physical states report in some natural language unto the utterance "I am Napoleon"; and that the fact of holding this thought is a true fact about them.

What is clear is that you don't have the least actual bit of an idea how a structure actually results in a thought being had. Unless you have actually been through a machine learning course and fully understood how neurons switch on data (generally in a continuous way; in fact activation functions must be in some way differentiable and continuous for training processes to effect them at all, which is why your expectation of "true" analog is so ridiculous as a goalpost!) to create phrases of truth about their inputs, don't. Just. Don't.

If you wish to debate the ways neurons can produce output, learn how neurons actually produce output vigorously. Pass a course on the subject with better than a B-.

Thoughts don't leave behind a pathway of neurons, they are composed as the output of a pathway of neurons from an input, owing to their existing structure.

This existing structure is responsible for the rendition of that output already, in the presence of whatever input that an analogous structure in someone else's brain doesn't produce. How it renders that statement is immaterial to whether the statement was rendered, especially once the statement leaves the black box as a thing said, and a thing it hears itself say.

Finally, you have an issue wherein you liken my arguments to the belief someone is Napoleon. I don't. In fact I don't because I specifically point out that "woman" is a concept of social construction, Napoleon is a statement of existing as an entity through history. The only references to existence as a collective entity throughout space and time that I have ever made are references to specific nutty metaphysical beliefs held by gnostics and occultists of the form I rarely associate with. I think I made a very tongue in cheek joke about that in the "inventing Jesus" thread.

I do not expect it is "more real" than gonads, though it is as real. It's just more important to a eusocial individual's place in an equal and free society than the outward and remediable, and it's just not addressable the way hormones and gonadal functions are.

Gonads are easy to deal with, you just hijack their sampling message and send a different sampling message. In fact this was how I often disconnected systems from some fault report chain: replacing messages rendered within a system.

Generally, these messages were in some "natural" format or some direct and complete representation of the natural format when I was doing that particular bit of work. I had to look at a massive set of enumerations, reconstruct smooth logical flows from very far flung bits of text, and so on.

My position on sex, however, relies on the central fact that "woman" doesn't have any single, unified meaning. It is a mere "utterance" that means many things depending on the context and it is not an appropriate concept for making decisions on separations of groups for legal purposes. It is a social concept and a social concept subject to change over time in a way that makes it unsuitable.

Instead, the law must be based on some statement of fact not directly linked to a y social concept, but grounded in facts current to "the moment of inquiry".

It, as a social concept, is simply not a useful concept for which hormones some people are allowed to access, or avoid, at select parts of their lives, and what" is endogenously" does not informed what "ought be reported".

The existence of testicles does not confer some right to be heard by the body or even remain a part of it, when the brain is that which is given power and privilege to choose.

As to the existence of the accomplishment, lifespan, and logical thought, these are also grounded in specific arguments.

The reality is that the decision that sex isn't what you are going to make your life about and not having kids are both strongly correlated, and arguably clearly causal to increased accomplishment in life.

Eunuchs of China did have a strong track record for being more concerned with logic and reason and structure and systems, and this very well was likely driven by the fact that they cared more about service and education than they cared about having penises.

As to the importance of outlier behaviors, some "outlier behaviors" (read, some uncommon behavioral phenotypes) are often very important in a population, and fill in their own behavioral mode, and this is observed clearly and directly in a number of eusocial species. Not every individual is born with an interest or knack for banging rocks, not every individual takes to weaving, and to be fair, few take to discussion of the basis for sound reasoning and thought.

Rather, I expect that the atypical are a small but vital part in the functioning of large groups of primates, and not just humans but our ancestors as far back as they've been banging rocks together. The provision of hormone modifying treatments to the gender atypical to subvert a single "sampling message" within the system to represent the same message structure and contents as in another system is specifically what I vie for. I would prefer this be easier for the people of today than the people of the past, who were often limited to castration, and had no chance to even "try before you buy".

If you would like to use your knowledge of systems theory to present some abstract concept which more correctly models the system, I'm all ears.

But please for the love of fuck don't assume the sorts of systems I have in mind are "simplistic".
 
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At this point, I have to assume you're willfully misreading me. It must have been half a dozen times I've said that the concept of disorder is a very useful one or for medicine, just that it isn't half as useful in descriptive biology and even less so for considering evolution.

Don't do this, it makes you look like you have no argument, and it's not nice. You can do better than that!
I'm talking about medical fucking conditions, Jokodo. Somehow, you keep trying to insist that those conditions are somehow an evolutionary step? I honestly don't know what you're trying to accomplish.
I refer you to this post, where I lay out why I feel whether something is or isn't a medical condition is context dependent, while whether it is or isn't (spoilers: it always is) real or the product of evolution is absolute.
You seem to have a pick-and-choose approach to this interaction, which selectively ignores some parts of it. So let's rewind to how we ended up here in the first place.

Jarhyn and some others have made the assertions that boil down to the belief that gender roles and gender identity are biological in nature, and that because they have decided that gender identity is a "physical" reality, that gender identity supersedes sex and produces a situation where sex is either a) a spectrum or b) a social construct depending on how they're feeling about the argument that day.

I have responded by pointing out that sex is an evolutionary outcome within anisogamous species, and that within such species there are only two sexes.

Jarhyn & Co's response to that is to bring people with Disorders of Sexual Development into the mix, and to claim that because some people have medical conditions that present with ambiguous, incomplete, or otherwise unusual development of the reproductive system... that sex is NOT binary, all of those medical conditions are "proof" that sex is a spectrum.

So let's just back this bus up a bit. Where do you fall on this, Jokodo? Do you fall into the camp of "sex is a spectrum" because some people have medical conditions? Do you fall into the camp of "gender identity is because of pink or blue brains and a male body can totally have a female brain in it"? What's your view?
I feel the most controversial part about the proposition that "a male body can totally have a female (or unusually female-like) brain in it" is the notion that "female brain" is a useful category*. We know that a male body can totally fail to have a penis on it (at least one that we wouldn't let pass for a clitoris if we saw it on a different body). We know that a male body can totally have female type facial and body hair pattern on it. We know that a male body can totally have undescended gonads in it. We know that a male body can totally have unfused labia on it. Why would the brain be any different? Sure you can say all of these are disorders/medical conditions, so what? Feel free to call female brains in male bodies a "disorder"; we aren't discussing whether they are healthy and what that would even mean, we are discussing whether they exist. Do you have any reason to believe that the brain correlates more strongly with sex than the actual fucking genitals we use for actual fucking, which is kind of the fucking point of sex in the first place? If you do, I'd be interested to read your arguments, it's certainly not something that's trivially or obviously true. Indeed if anything, I think there is, specifically from an evolutionary perspective, some very good reasons to predict a "male body with female brain" to be (much) more common than the other kinds of mismatches discussed, as I explained here. If you have data to counter these hypotheses or conceptual arguments that they are less plausible than I make them sound, please do present them. Not so that I can pick them apart, but so that I can learn.

*I tend to believe human cognition (at least if we could subtract it's learned component) is more like digit ratio than like the presence of absence of a beard or penis, ie a single-mode-shifted-means distribution rather than a bimodal one. I am aware of conflicting evidence, but that's yet another discussion and better suited for natural science.
 
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I'm probably Europeansplaining as much as mansplaining here, but granted, I need to tread lightly here. I'm not saying doors remove all points of contention, but that they will take out much of the heat from that particular argument, and I fail to understand why anyone would think not having them is a good idea. I'm no social historian of bathrooms by any stretch of imagination, but if I have to take a guess, the original motivation was probably, perversly, puritanism: to minimise opportunities for nefarious acts between consenting adults.
I wouldn't be surprised, but I can see a practical use for having a bit of space: It allows figuring out whether a stall is occupied or not even if something has happened to the occupant. I think the doors could be bigger and still serve this purpose, but I can see merit in a way to check.
In other countries, they have a little hole in the die itself that's covered by the latch, and the back of the latch painted in red and green such that it'll show as read when someone has locked it from the inside. Works like a charm ;)
1) What if someone messes with it? Kid's prank--lock it, scramble out.

2) Note my second one "if something has happened to the occupant". It's not exactly unusual for people to die on the toilet, far above random chance. (Plenty of things going seriously wrong can make the person think they need to take a dump.)
 
If you want to critique the red-green doorlatch thing, a valid criticism would be that it is hard on the colour blind. I could agree that red and white is superior for that reason, and that we should switch to that as our default. It already is a common alternative, I'm not actually sure which one is more common.
Agreed. Red/green on a latch won't trip me up but when it gets small I have issues. A one pixel line of FF0000 vs 00FF00 are usually indistinguishable to me. I can read resistor color band codes if I have a cheat card I can hold up next to the resistor (having it in hand isn't enough, I need them side by side), I can't read capacitor dot codes at all. I can't read the color coding of standard ethernet cable, I've never tried (or even seen) a cheat card but I doubt it would work. There are two narrow lines of color that I can't distinguish. There's no justification for such a shoddy system for ethernet, you only need 4 distinct codes plus a null.
 

I'm probably Europeansplaining as much as mansplaining here, but granted, I need to tread lightly here. I'm not saying doors remove all points of contention, but that they will take out much of the heat from that particular argument, and I fail to understand why anyone would think not having them is a good idea. I'm no social historian of bathrooms by any stretch of imagination, but if I have to take a guess, the original motivation was probably, perversly, puritanism: to minimise opportunities for nefarious acts between consenting adults.
I wouldn't be surprised, but I can see a practical use for having a bit of space: It allows figuring out whether a stall is occupied or not even if something has happened to the occupant. I think the doors could be bigger and still serve this purpose, but I can see merit in a way to check.
In other countries, they have a little hole in the die itself that's covered by the latch, and the back of the latch painted in red and green such that it'll show as read when someone has locked it from the inside. Works like a charm ;)
1) What if someone messes with it? Kid's prank--lock it, scramble out.

2) Note my second one "if something has happened to the occupant". It's not exactly unusual for people to die on the toilet, far above random chance. (Plenty of things going seriously wrong can make the person think they need to take a dump.)
Door to the floor prevents the lock and scramble.

Regular maintenance and a knock on all the doors before locking up prevents lost corpses.
 
... says the guy who just said "minimise opportunities for nefarious acts between consenting adults". Occam would turn in his grave indeed. To all explanations besides "easier to mop the floor", Sire, I have no need of that hypothesis.
I suspect that's where it started. Much less surface that needs to be durable against contact with mops.
 
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