In Free Will, What Makes it "Free"

[PyramidHead]

But earlier you said the ONLY free choice is random. Now you're saying it can't be random?

You might be mixing up the following.

Here is what I am mixing up:

Mechanically, free will seems to imply an action taken or a choice made without a reason.

and

You can't choose to do something random

If I can't choose to do something random (without a reason), then there is no free will. Or is that what you were saying all along?

If I base my choice on the randomness of a particle in a superposition of spin, say, spin up means I buy the black car and spin down means I buy the white car, then my choice to base it on chance is given by a reason and the outcome is undeterminable. The reason is the puppet master.

But if there is a choice that is fundamentally dependent on a particle in my brain with the same superposition, then my choice is free and the outcome is undeterminable.

please stop

 

[ryan]

You might be mixing up the following.

Here is what I am mixing up:

Mechanically, free will seems to imply an action taken or a choice made without a reason.

and

You can't choose to do something random

If I can't choose to do something random (without a reason), then there is no free will. Or is that what you were saying all along?

Read the differences that I gave below.

If I base my choice on the randomness of a particle in a superposition of spin, say, spin up means I buy the black car and spin down means I buy the white car, then my choice to base it on chance is given by a reason and the outcome is undeterminable. The reason is the puppet master.

But if there is a choice that is fundamentally dependent on a particle in my brain with the same superposition, then my choice is free and the outcome is undeterminable.

The first choice is made purely with classical mechanics, so obviously I couldn't choose anything but the choice I made. The second choice, however, is made by undeterminable mechanics. The choice is therefore free as far as we know.

 

[DBT]

Debatable, however, your examples of 'an action taken or a choice made without a reason' are.....?

It would probably have to be a choice that is not obvious or easy. It could be a choice like, steak or chicken if you are in the mood for both. Or it could be something like, sell stocks or hold onto them. There would probably be too much "hard wiring" that would stop us from jumping in front of a car if we did not have any desire to.

All of your exmples have underlying causes at work that determine the decision that is made, in the instance that it is made.

You do not consciously choose your mood, your impulses, your emotions, or even the thoughts that spring to mind in response to any given stimuli. Decisions such as whether to sell or hold this or that 'stock' are a matter of cost to benefit ratio considerations (neural information processing/memory function), unless you flip a coin, but even that decision has its underlying causal elements. Just because conscious awareness does not encompass the neural activity that shapes and forms conscious experience, doesn't mean that there is indeed an absence of causality.

You can't escape the fact that is brain state that is reflected in the state conscious experience, and brain state is not a conscious choice.

 

[ryan]

It would probably have to be a choice that is not obvious or easy. It could be a choice like, steak or chicken if you are in the mood for both. Or it could be something like, sell stocks or hold onto them. There would probably be too much "hard wiring" that would stop us from jumping in front of a car if we did not have any desire to.

All of your exmples have underlying causes at work that determine the decision that is made, in the instance that it is made.

You do not consciously choose your mood, your impulses, your emotions, or even the thoughts that spring to mind in response to any given stimuli. Decisions such as whether to sell or hold this or that 'stock' are a matter of cost to benefit ratio considerations (neural information processing/memory function), unless you flip a coin, but even that decision has its underlying causal elements. Just because conscious awareness does not encompass the neural activity that shapes and forms conscious experience, doesn't mean that there is indeed an absence of causality.

You can't escape the fact that is brain state that is reflected in the state conscious experience, and brain state is not a conscious choice.

Not necessarily, what about identical clones in identical environments that eventually make different decisions (assume that the environment does not have a quantum mechanical effect on either body)?

 

[bilby]

All of your exmples have underlying causes at work that determine the decision that is made, in the instance that it is made.

You do not consciously choose your mood, your impulses, your emotions, or even the thoughts that spring to mind in response to any given stimuli. Decisions such as whether to sell or hold this or that 'stock' are a matter of cost to benefit ratio considerations (neural information processing/memory function), unless you flip a coin, but even that decision has its underlying causal elements. Just because conscious awareness does not encompass the neural activity that shapes and forms conscious experience, doesn't mean that there is indeed an absence of causality.

You can't escape the fact that is brain state that is reflected in the state conscious experience, and brain state is not a conscious choice.

Not necessarily, what about identical clones in identical environments that eventually make different decisions (assume that the environment does not have a quantum mechanical effect on either body)?

What about them? How do you know that they would ever make different decisions?

This seems like an unwarranted assumption on your part.

 

[DBT]

All of your exmples have underlying causes at work that determine the decision that is made, in the instance that it is made.

You do not consciously choose your mood, your impulses, your emotions, or even the thoughts that spring to mind in response to any given stimuli. Decisions such as whether to sell or hold this or that 'stock' are a matter of cost to benefit ratio considerations (neural information processing/memory function), unless you flip a coin, but even that decision has its underlying causal elements. Just because conscious awareness does not encompass the neural activity that shapes and forms conscious experience, doesn't mean that there is indeed an absence of causality.

You can't escape the fact that is brain state that is reflected in the state conscious experience, and brain state is not a conscious choice.

Not necessarily, what about identical clones in identical environments that eventually make different decisions (assume that the environment does not have a quantum mechanical effect on either body)?

That proposition is merely a guess. Given absolutely perfect copies, they would only be absolutely perfect copies for an instant, until radiation effects a change upon one...and in the normal course of time the gap widens as time and events, as individual experiences alter each brain in different ways (each copy being an individual brain).

So it's pointless to propose that two perfectly idential but individual brains can remain perfectly identical, they cannot. Nor is it reasonable to assume that they would make different decisions given your unrealistic conditions. What type of decisions do you have in mind?

 

[ryan]

Not necessarily, what about identical clones in identical environments that eventually make different decisions (assume that the environment does not have a quantum mechanical effect on either body)?

What about them? How do you know that they would ever make different decisions?

This seems like an unwarranted assumption on your part.

Based on the probabilistic nature of any system, they would eventually have to make different desicions.

 

[ryan]

Not necessarily, what about identical clones in identical environments that eventually make different decisions (assume that the environment does not have a quantum mechanical effect on either body)?

That proposition is merely a guess. Given absolutely perfect copies, they would only be absolutely perfect copies for an instant, until radiation effects a change upon one...and in the normal course of time the gap widens as time and events, as individual experiences alter each brain in different ways (each copy being an individual brain).

We have to assume an identical environment.

So it's pointless to propose that two perfectly idential but individual brains can remain perfectly identical, they cannot. Nor is it reasonable to assume that they would make different decisions given your unrealistic conditions. What type of decisions do you have in mind?

They have to diverge eventually based on the probabilistic nature of any system.

The kind of decisions that would be altered first are probably the decisions that are "close calls"; I am guessing that these would be the most flexible, mechanically speaking. So we probably wouldn't jump in front of a car because we are wired more against that decision than a less obvious one.

 

[bilby]

What about them? How do you know that they would ever make different decisions?

This seems like an unwarranted assumption on your part.

Based on the probabilistic nature of any system, they would eventually have to make different desicions.

You said "assume that the environment does not have a quantum mechanical effect on either body"; If you are assuming no QM effect, from where does this probabilistic nature arise?

 

[ryan]

Based on the probabilistic nature of any system, they would eventually have to make different desicions.

You said "assume that the environment does not have a quantum mechanical effect on either body"; If you are assuming no QM effect, from where does this probabilistic nature arise?

In this thought experiment, the brains are the only things that are exactly like in the real world. The environment is assumed to be static, or somehow existing without quantum mechanics.

 

[bilby]

You said "assume that the environment does not have a quantum mechanical effect on either body"; If you are assuming no QM effect, from where does this probabilistic nature arise?

In this thought experiment, the brains are the only things that are exactly like in the real world. The environment is assumed to be static, or somehow existing without quantum mechanics.

Hmmm. Why?

What can we learn from adding this complexity to the thought experiment that we would not otherwise learn?

 

[ryan]

In this thought experiment, the brains are the only things that are exactly like in the real world. The environment is assumed to be static, or somehow existing without quantum mechanics.

Hmmm. Why?

It's just a way for me to focus on what I am trying to explain. Just assume that the environment does not interfere with either clone. Assume that the clones start off perfectly identical. They will eventually diverge asymmetrically because of quantum mechanics. This is exactly what I would expect would happen with some free will.

What can we learn from adding this complexity to the thought experiment that we would not otherwise learn?

nothing, other than what free will would look like

 

[DBT]

The kind of decisions that would be altered first are probably the decisions that are "close calls"; I am guessing that these would be the most flexible, mechanically speaking. So we probably wouldn't jump in front of a car because we are wired more against that decision than a less obvious one.

You aren't describing something that anyone, who happens to be arguing for the existence of free will, would define as free will.

Free will is commonly seen as the ability to make conscious choices or selections from a set of realizable alternatives. As I've pointed out, the cognitive process of consciousness is such that the information processing that shapes and forms the decisions that are made, occurs microseconds prior to the conscious experience of the experience of thinking thoughts and making decisions.

And of course, it all rests on brain condition and memory function. If memory function fails, as I mentioned, all ability to think and decide disintegrates (thought being enabled by the architecture and activity of the brain)

 

[ryan]

The kind of decisions that would be altered first are probably the decisions that are "close calls"; I am guessing that these would be the most flexible, mechanically speaking. So we probably wouldn't jump in front of a car because we are wired more against that decision than a less obvious one.

You aren't describing something that anyone, who happens to be arguing for the existence of free will, would define as free will.

Well, I don't see how free will is not solely defined as a decision made freely. I think when you actually get people to give an example of free will, they usually won't give one that is actually a free decision, at least not that I have ever read.

Free will is commonly seen as the ability to make conscious choices or selections from a set of realizable alternatives. As I've pointed out, the cognitive process of consciousness is such that the information processing that shapes and forms the decisions that are made, occurs microseconds prior to the conscious experience of the experience of thinking thoughts and making decisions.

I know about those studies that exemplify the readiness potential. It is a killer for the typical free will argument.

 

[DBT]

You aren't describing something that anyone, who happens to be arguing for the existence of free will, would define as free will.

Well, I don't see how free will is not solely defined as a decision made freely. I think when you actually get people to give an example of free will, they usually won't give one that is actually a free decision, at least not that I have ever read.

What you mean is the ability to make decisions (which is not in question). Computer software enables selections (decisions) to be made (quite freely) on the basis of whatever criteria its algorithms require...but this ability to freely make decisions/selections is certainly not ''freely willed'' nor an instance of 'free will'

There is also a distinction to be made between 'will' and the ability to freely act on the basis of one's will. Neither being an instance of 'free will' because to act is an attribute of the state of the system that produced the will or the prompt to act.

I know about those studies that exemplify the readiness potential. It is a killer for the typical free will argument.

It's just how the brain works, there is no way around it. The brain is an intelligent interactive system, but due to the sequence of cognitive steps, from input to conscious representation and actions, it is not a 'free will' system.

''So, our mind is fully determined by our brain. Brain is the cause of the existence of the mind and also the mind is a feature of brain. He states that “Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain.” (Searle, 54). Searle gives water as an example to illustrate his thesis. If we study the relations between the water (H2O) and liquidity we will find that water possess the feature of liquidity. Same the mind is the feature of brain. At the same time the feature of liquidity is determined by the molecular structure of the water. It’s not an extra-quality of the water molecules but the one of the molecularly features. “The liquid state of this water can be causally dependent on the behavior of the molecules, and can also be a feature of the system made up of the molecules?" (Searle). So, Searle describes two levels of event and phenomena and these levels and micro level and macro level. Micro level defines macro level but at the same time it is identical with it. Molecules make the micro level in the example with water while liquidity makes macro level. If we turn back to mind and brain correlation we will see that the mind is a macro level of brain and neurons make its micro level. So, if we apply Searle’s conclusion to the mind and brain correlation, we will see that the mind is caused by neurons and at the same time it is a feature of brain. Expanding these conclusions we will see that mental is also the part of the physical. There can be no division to physical and mental any more.''

A neuron has a function that has evolved over time as a strategy for the survival of the organism: processing information and initiating a physical response - the initial process is carried out without the input of outward consciousness, personality, or the imput of will. These play their part in the actual carrying out an action, rather than its initiation.

Rather than being entities in their own right, personality and will are more a description of how an organism behaves.

 

[bilby]

Hmmm. Why?

It's just a way for me to focus on what I am trying to explain. Just assume that the environment does not interfere with either clone. Assume that the clones start off perfectly identical. They will eventually diverge asymmetrically because of quantum mechanics. This is exactly what I would expect would happen with some free will.

What can we learn from adding this complexity to the thought experiment that we would not otherwise learn?

nothing, other than what free will would look like

But what you describe has nothing to do with free will.

If I set up a pair of identical robots that do nothing except roll dice, then after a while the numbers they roll will start to differ, due to the inherently probabilistic nature of reality. Radioactive decay will occur at different places in the setup, and the chaotic nature of the system means that the small differences this introduces will eventually lead to large deviations in the observed results.

Neither the robots nor the dice have free will.

If I make decisions based on the dice rolls from such a robot, then my choices will not be predictable in advance; but as they are entirely determined by the numbers on the dice, nor will they be 'free will'.

Randomness simply does not help to wedge free will into a system that doesn't already exhibit it; and if a system already exhibits free will before randomness is introduced then randomness cannot be a requirement.

Quantum effects do not, and logically cannot, be the cause of free will. So we can cross that off the list.

The complete list of things that could result in free will, as far as I can tell, now looks like this:

1) Quantum effects
2) Er,
3) That's all.

I strongly suspect, given that free will is not detectable, and given that no plausible mechanism exists to generate it, that free will is not a real thing.

 

[ryan]

Well, I don't see how free will is not solely defined as a decision made freely. I think when you actually get people to give an example of free will, they usually won't give one that is actually a free decision, at least not that I have ever read.

What you mean is the ability to make decisions (which is not in question). Computer software enables selections (decisions) to be made (quite freely) on the basis of whatever criteria its algorithms require...but this ability to freely make decisions/selections is certainly not ''freely willed'' nor an instance of 'free will'

There is also a distinction to be made between 'will' and the ability to freely act on the basis of one's will. Neither being an instance of 'free will' because to act is an attribute of the state of the system that produced the will or the prompt to act.

I am not sure what you mean or what this has to do with my post.

I know about those studies that exemplify the readiness potential. It is a killer for the typical free will argument.

It's just how the brain works, there is no way around it. The brain is an intelligent interactive system, but due to the sequence of cognitive steps, from input to conscious representation and actions, it is not a 'free will' system.

''So, our mind is fully determined by our brain. Brain is the cause of the existence of the mind and also the mind is a feature of brain. He states that “Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain.” (Searle, 54). Searle gives water as an example to illustrate his thesis. If we study the relations between the water (H2O) and liquidity we will find that water possess the feature of liquidity. Same the mind is the feature of brain. At the same time the feature of liquidity is determined by the molecular structure of the water. It’s not an extra-quality of the water molecules but the one of the molecularly features. “The liquid state of this water can be causally dependent on the behavior of the molecules, and can also be a feature of the system made up of the molecules?" (Searle). So, Searle describes two levels of event and phenomena and these levels and micro level and macro level. Micro level defines macro level but at the same time it is identical with it. Molecules make the micro level in the example with water while liquidity makes macro level. If we turn back to mind and brain correlation we will see that the mind is a macro level of brain and neurons make its micro level. So, if we apply Searle’s conclusion to the mind and brain correlation, we will see that the mind is caused by neurons and at the same time it is a feature of brain. Expanding these conclusions we will see that mental is also the part of the physical. There can be no division to physical and mental any more.''

A neuron has a function that has evolved over time as a strategy for the survival of the organism: processing information and initiating a physical response - the initial process is carried out without the input of outward consciousness, personality, or the imput of will. These play their part in the actual carrying out an action, rather than its initiation.

Rather than being entities in their own right, personality and will are more a description of how an organism behaves.

This is also confusing me. I only said that the readiness potential is a strong argument against free will.

 

[ryan]

It's just a way for me to focus on what I am trying to explain. Just assume that the environment does not interfere with either clone. Assume that the clones start off perfectly identical. They will eventually diverge asymmetrically because of quantum mechanics. This is exactly what I would expect would happen with some free will.

What can we learn from adding this complexity to the thought experiment that we would not otherwise learn?

nothing, other than what free will would look like

But what you describe has nothing to do with free will.

If I set up a pair of identical robots that do nothing except roll dice, then after a while the numbers they roll will start to differ, due to the inherently probabilistic nature of reality. Radioactive decay will occur at different places in the setup, and the chaotic nature of the system means that the small differences this introduces will eventually lead to large deviations in the observed results.

Neither the robots nor the dice have free will.

Maybe we both have different ideas about what free will is. What is you definition of it?

 

[DBT]

What you mean is the ability to make decisions (which is not in question). Computer software enables selections (decisions) to be made (quite freely) on the basis of whatever criteria its algorithms require...but this ability to freely make decisions/selections is certainly not ''freely willed'' nor an instance of 'free will'

There is also a distinction to be made between 'will' and the ability to freely act on the basis of one's will. Neither being an instance of 'free will' because to act is an attribute of the state of the system that produced the will or the prompt to act.

I am not sure what you mean or what this has to do with my post.

My reply is related to you said; ''Well, I don't see how free will is not solely defined as a decision made freely '' - which ignores the nature and the mechanisms of decision making.

Given your definition, a computer may be defined as having free will because it has the ability to make decisions freely.

This is also confusing me. I only said that the readiness potential is a strong argument against free will.

Taken to its conclusion, it virtually eliminates the idea of 'free will' (free from what, free to do what), which is a poorly defined concept in any case.

 

[bilby]

It's just a way for me to focus on what I am trying to explain. Just assume that the environment does not interfere with either clone. Assume that the clones start off perfectly identical. They will eventually diverge asymmetrically because of quantum mechanics. This is exactly what I would expect would happen with some free will.

What can we learn from adding this complexity to the thought experiment that we would not otherwise learn?

nothing, other than what free will would look like

But what you describe has nothing to do with free will.

If I set up a pair of identical robots that do nothing except roll dice, then after a while the numbers they roll will start to differ, due to the inherently probabilistic nature of reality. Radioactive decay will occur at different places in the setup, and the chaotic nature of the system means that the small differences this introduces will eventually lead to large deviations in the observed results.

Neither the robots nor the dice have free will.

Maybe we both have different ideas about what free will is. What is you definition of it?

Free will is a fictional construct in which many people believe. Like Santa Claus or God.

The details vary from believer to believer; but they are not really important, because none of them are descriptions of reality.