In Free Will, What Makes it "Free"

[DBT]

It makes no difference how quantum mechanics effects the brain (being the agent of information processing) because the effects are not chosen. Quantum probability, or randomness, being no more chosen than the events of causal determinism. Forces beyond the control of the brain, being the sole information processor, effect changes in neural mechanisms that in turn altering behaviour that is experienced in conscious form....rendering the term 'free will' irrelevant, yet it still holds an appeal for some as an ideology.

If quantum mechanics is part of making choices or anything else that has to do with the consciousness, then "I" am quantum mechanical down to the most fundamental level of what I am. My nature is quantum mechanical because my physical nature is quantum mechanical.

'You' as a conscious entity don't effect consciously made changes in wave function, probability or randomness. Can you, through an act of will, collapse wave function in order to benefit by changes you have caused in the macro world through probability wave manipulation?

 

[Juma]

If quantum mechanics is part of making choices or anything else that has to do with the consciousness, then "I" am quantum mechanical down to the most fundamental level of what I am. My nature is quantum mechanical because my physical nature is quantum mechanical.

'You' as a conscious entity don't effect consciously made changes in wave function, probability or randomness. Can you, through an act of will, collapse wave function in order to benefit by changes you have caused in the macro world through probability wave manipulation?

Even if he could collapse a wave function, which by the way is not an actual observable event but just a metaphysical interpretation, he would not control the outcome since the outcome must follolliw the probability described by the wave.

 

[Juma]

It makes no difference how quantum mechanics effects the brain (being the agent of information processing) because the effects are not chosen. Quantum probability, or randomness, being no more chosen than the events of causal determinism. Forces beyond the control of the brain, being the sole information processor, effect changes in neural mechanisms that in turn altering behaviour that is experienced in conscious form....rendering the term 'free will' irrelevant, yet it still holds an appeal for some as an ideology.

If quantum mechanics is part of making choices or anything else that has to do with the consciousness, then "I" am quantum mechanical down to the most fundamental level of what I am. My nature is quantum mechanical because my physical nature is quantum mechanical.

So fucking what? Even if your nature was "quantum mechanical" that doesnt make you "free". What really creates the illusion of free will is the seemingly possibility to observe your own thinking.
But what you observe is not the actual mechanisms but high level symbols. Its like the characters and items in a computer game, not the actual code, or even lesss: bytes and bits.

 

[ryan]

If quantum mechanics is part of making choices or anything else that has to do with the consciousness, then "I" am quantum mechanical down to the most fundamental level of what I am. My nature is quantum mechanical because my physical nature is quantum mechanical.

'You' as a conscious entity don't effect consciously made changes in wave function, probability or randomness.

I/consciousness would be the randomness. I would choose the outcome of the particle or entangled particles because I am the particles.

Can you, through an act of will, collapse wave function in order to benefit by changes you have caused in the macro world through probability wave manipulation?

Maybe, and remember the whole point is to explain why one shouldn't live life as only an observer without the possibility of free will until it is completely ruled out. Like I said earlier, there is no good reason that I can see not at least assume you have some free will.

 

[ryan]

'You' as a conscious entity don't effect consciously made changes in wave function, probability or randomness. Can you, through an act of will, collapse wave function in order to benefit by changes you have caused in the macro world through probability wave manipulation?

Even if he could collapse a wave function, which by the way is not an actual observable event but just a metaphysical interpretation, he would not control the outcome since the outcome must follolliw the probability described by the wave.

Sure there might be constraints and environmental influence on where I choose to be, but it is still indeterminable exactly "what one chooses".

 

[ryan]

If quantum mechanics is part of making choices or anything else that has to do with the consciousness, then "I" am quantum mechanical down to the most fundamental level of what I am. My nature is quantum mechanical because my physical nature is quantum mechanical.

So fucking what? Even if your nature was "quantum mechanical" that doesnt make you "free". What really creates the illusion of free will is the seemingly possibility to observe your own thinking.
But what you observe is not the actual mechanisms but high level symbols. Its like the characters and items in a computer game, not the actual code, or even lesss: bytes and bits.

We observe the outcome of our own thinking. The symbols would be functions of the qubits.

We don't have a perfect description/model of the brain, and we probably never will as long as quantum mechanics remains mysterious. And my main point is that we should not assume that we have no free will until we are absolutely positive. There doesn't seem to be any good reason why anyone wouldn't want to pretend that they have free will. Well, I guess it is a way to avoid feeling guilt and responsibilities for our actions, but we know that does not bode well in the long run.

 

[DBT]

'You' as a conscious entity don't effect consciously made changes in wave function, probability or randomness. Can you, through an act of will, collapse wave function in order to benefit by changes you have caused in the macro world through probability wave manipulation?

Even if he could collapse a wave function, which by the way is not an actual observable event but just a metaphysical interpretation, he would not control the outcome since the outcome must follolliw the probability described by the wave.

Yes, I'm surprised that QM is still being used in an attempt to support an argument for 'free will' - even as poorly defined as the term is.

 

[DBT]

Even if he could collapse a wave function, which by the way is not an actual observable event but just a metaphysical interpretation, he would not control the outcome since the outcome must follolliw the probability described by the wave.

Sure there might be constraints and environmental influence on where I choose to be, but it is still indeterminable exactly "what one chooses".

And it's back to the issue of how decisions are made, and why. What 'one' (the brain) chooses to do when presented with several options being a cost to benefit ratio based on past experience of pleasure and pain, gain and loss (enabled by memory function),considering the options that bring desirable benefits and the options that are better avoided - unless an undesirable option brings greater benefits in the longer term - do this unpleasant thing for x amount of time and reap a higher degree of reward for the suffering incurred.

 

[ryan]

Sure there might be constraints and environmental influence on where I choose to be, but it is still indeterminable exactly "what one chooses".

And it's back to the issue of how decisions are made, and why. What 'one' (the brain) chooses to do when presented with several options being a cost to benefit ratio based on past experience of pleasure and pain, gain and loss (enabled by memory function),considering the options that bring desirable benefits and the options that are better avoided - unless an undesirable option brings greater benefits in the longer term - do this unpleasant thing for x amount of time and reap a higher degree of reward for the suffering incurred.

Yes, but we choose to make choices this way. Some people choose to be self-destructive.

 

[DBT]

And it's back to the issue of how decisions are made, and why. What 'one' (the brain) chooses to do when presented with several options being a cost to benefit ratio based on past experience of pleasure and pain, gain and loss (enabled by memory function),considering the options that bring desirable benefits and the options that are better avoided - unless an undesirable option brings greater benefits in the longer term - do this unpleasant thing for x amount of time and reap a higher degree of reward for the suffering incurred.

Yes, but we choose to make choices this way. Some people choose to be self-destructive.

The brain is the sole information processor and the sole decision maker. It is the state of the brain, both in terms of architecture (the wiring) inputs and working memory (the software) that determines the choices that are made, be they adaptive and beneficial decisions, or maladaptive decisions...consequently being self destructive.

 

[ryan]

Yes, but we choose to make choices this way. Some people choose to be self-destructive.

The brain is the sole information processor and the sole decision maker. It is the state of the brain, both in terms of architecture (the wiring) inputs and working memory (the software) that determines the choices that are made, be they adaptive and beneficial decisions, or maladaptive decisions...consequently being self destructive.

You're just categorizing the different types of choices from an evolutionary point of view; either or both of our points of views are sufficient.

 

[DBT]

The brain is the sole information processor and the sole decision maker. It is the state of the brain, both in terms of architecture (the wiring) inputs and working memory (the software) that determines the choices that are made, be they adaptive and beneficial decisions, or maladaptive decisions...consequently being self destructive.

You're just categorizing the different types of choices from an evolutionary point of view; either or both of our points of views are sufficient.

Different options are presented, but the neural mechanisms of information processing and selecting options are none the less as I outlined.

Outlined in response to your comment: ''Yes, but we choose to make choices this way. Some people choose to be self-destructive''

 

[ryan]

You're just categorizing the different types of choices from an evolutionary point of view; either or both of our points of views are sufficient.

Different options are presented, but the neural mechanisms of information processing and selecting options are none the less as I outlined.

Outlined in response to your comment: ''Yes, but we choose to make choices this way. Some people choose to be self-destructive''

Scientists used to think that the universe was determinable like a clock. They didn't see much of a need for quantum mechanics. How do we know quantum mechanics does not play a bigger role with brain functions until we have ruled it out?

 

[DBT]

Different options are presented, but the neural mechanisms of information processing and selecting options are none the less as I outlined.

Outlined in response to your comment: ''Yes, but we choose to make choices this way. Some people choose to be self-destructive''

Scientists used to think that the universe was determinable like a clock. They didn't see much of a need for quantum mechanics. How do we know quantum mechanics does not play a bigger role with brain functions until we have ruled it out?

Because physical objects, their relationships and the options they present to a brain/mind (a brain being a macro scale information processor) are macro scale objects, relationships and events. The decisions that need making by a mind/brain relate to the world as it is perceived:the macro world of other people and relationships, work, houses, cars, trees, rivers, mountains, oceans, sun, moon, stars.......

 

[Togo]

I'm afraid I can't make sense of this.
...
It only demonstrates that predictability is not always possible within a closed system.

Ok, let me take another stab at it.

The kind of determinism that is unimpeded by this formula is one in which events are determined, but not necessarily predictable. However, one of the kinds of determinism being discussed is the idea that all events are not just determined, but determined by natural laws - specifically the kinds of natural laws studied by science.

The problem is that science is very much about making predictions, hence the emphasis on testability, repeatability of predicted results, and so on. On the surface this seems like a natural fit - science makes predictions, the future determined by past events, so you can kinda of handwave the idea that the predictions are the determinations, and future events are set by scientific laws.

But that isn't what we're seeing. What we're seeing is that this kind of prediction, in the case of a decision maker, may only be possible from the point of view of someone outside the system. But the 'scientific' causal determinism being mooted consists entirely of observations from within the system.

The point of thought experiments like the Gödel-Box is to show that determinism is not equivalent to causation. In particular, in a system where determinism works along the lines of causal laws, such determinism ends up actively hostile to the scientific method. Because science is about observable phenomenon being regularised into laws to make predictions, whereas determinism only survives if you assume that causal factors can not be fully understood and used to predict, even in theory.

 

[PyramidHead]

I'm afraid I can't make sense of this.
...
It only demonstrates that predictability is not always possible within a closed system.

Ok, let me take another stab at it.

The kind of determinism that is unimpeded by this formula is one in which events are determined, but not necessarily predictable. However, one of the kinds of determinism being discussed is the idea that all events are not just determined, but determined by natural laws - specifically the kinds of natural laws studied by science.

The problem is that science is very much about making predictions, hence the emphasis on testability, repeatability of predicted results, and so on. On the surface this seems like a natural fit - science makes predictions, the future determined by past events, so you can kinda of handwave the idea that the predictions are the determinations, and future events are set by scientific laws.

But that isn't what we're seeing. What we're seeing is that this kind of prediction, in the case of a decision maker, may only be possible from the point of view of someone outside the system. But the 'scientific' causal determinism being mooted consists entirely of observations from within the system.

The point of thought experiments like the Gödel-Box is to show that determinism is not equivalent to causation. In particular, in a system where determinism works along the lines of causal laws, such determinism ends up actively hostile to the scientific method. Because science is about observable phenomenon being regularised into laws to make predictions, whereas determinism only survives if you assume that causal factors can not be fully understood and used to predict, even in theory.

I think I'm starting to agree with AntiChris here; the kind of determinism that says events are determined but not necessarily predictable is still deterministic enough to rule out libertarian free will, even given the existence of a Gödel-Box. Whether or not any observer inside the system could predict my decision, it is nonetheless the case that my decision was determined, such that whatever ends up happening is completely explicable after it happens by prior conditions, none of which include contra-causal free will.

 

[The AntiChris]

I'm afraid I can't make sense of this.
...
It only demonstrates that predictability is not always possible within a closed system.

Ok, let me take another stab at it.

The kind of determinism that is unimpeded by this formula is one in which events are determined, but not necessarily predictable.

In other words your formula only challenges "the kind of determinism" which is infallibly predictable from within.

My problem with this is that I'm not aware of any kind of determinism which is infallibly predictable from within. Determinism only implies external predictability (i.e. the possibility for an external observer, not part of the
universe, to predict, in principle, all future states of the universe.)

 

[ryan]

Scientists used to think that the universe was determinable like a clock. They didn't see much of a need for quantum mechanics. How do we know quantum mechanics does not play a bigger role with brain functions until we have ruled it out?

Because physical objects, their relationships and the options they present to a brain/mind (a brain being a macro scale information processor) are macro scale objects, relationships and events. The decisions that need making by a mind/brain relate to the world as it is perceived:the macro world of other people and relationships, work, houses, cars, trees, rivers, mountains, oceans, sun, moon, stars.......

But the macro scale objects are not the micro scale parts of the brain that make choices about the macro world.

What about the possibility that two identical brains grown in a lab will eventually make different choices because of quantum effects?

 

[PyramidHead]

Because physical objects, their relationships and the options they present to a brain/mind (a brain being a macro scale information processor) are macro scale objects, relationships and events. The decisions that need making by a mind/brain relate to the world as it is perceived:the macro world of other people and relationships, work, houses, cars, trees, rivers, mountains, oceans, sun, moon, stars.......

But the macro scale objects are not the micro scale parts of the brain that make choices about the macro world.

What about the possibility that two identical brains grown in a lab will eventually make different choices because of quantum effects?

As far as anybody knows, the smallest parts of the brain responsible for decision-making are millions and millions of times larger than quantum particles.

 

[ryan]

But the macro scale objects are not the micro scale parts of the brain that make choices about the macro world.

What about the possibility that two identical brains grown in a lab will eventually make different choices because of quantum effects?

As far as anybody knows, the smallest parts of the brain responsible for decision-making are millions and millions of times larger than quantum particles.

I know. But don't you think that two identical brains grown in a lab eventually would make different choices because of quantum mechanics?