In Free Will, What Makes it "Free"

[DBT]

Nothing is further away from QM than comets and planets. I strongly don't think that's a fair comparison to the scale and intricacies of the brain.

Not according to you when you said 'everything is quantum' - so now it appears that some things can indeed be ''further away from QM''

It comes down to a thought experiment that takes two perfectly identical clones that are put into perfectly identical environments. Everything would follow classical mechanics right down to the particles except for their thinking processes. Any divergence between the two would demonstrate QM effects.

Regarding this argument, I have the luxury of saying, "I don't know if the clones would diverge". However, you and others continually choose to make the positive assumption that they wouldn't diverge. Obviously nobody knows this especially since they are working on finding evidence to the contrary.

And there are many other examples that shows that your statement, "Macro scale objects are not random or unpredictable" is flat out wrong. After all of the examples that have proven to demonstrate QM at the macro scale, how can you make such a false statement?! This makes me crazy.

I didn't say that we are always able to predict all macro scale events, something like the weather is complex, chaotic,and extremely difficult to predict, but nevertheless, deterministic.

What I meant to convey was, that macro scale object, people, animals, plants, planets, do not display superposition or quantum uncertainty, therefore macro structures are largely predicable, if we have the necessary information....which of course we may not have access to. But that's not the point.

And you still ignore the role and function of neural architecture in relation to behavioural output. That different brains produce different experiences, thoughts and decisions based on their structure, connections and memory content...regardless of the fact that all brains are composed of quantum particles (as is every object in the universe).

 

[Juma]

Here is how they are using "rational",

1. Rational Deliberation

1.1 Free Will as Choosing on the Basis of One's Desires

On a minimalist account, free will is the ability to select a course of action as a means of fulfilling some desire.

from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/#1 .

Yes? How would random input from QM effects make you fulfill desires? They wont because they will have no information about your desires.

The random input would be your desires in action.

I could stretch as far as saying that QM effects can be partly responsible for the desire felt.

I don't know what you mean here.

And I question who would say that "following your desires" really is a sign of (any type) of free will since that is totallythf opposite of how it is used.

Are you saying that free will would not give the agent the freedom to choose according to the agent's desires?

If you just act on you desires then you are obviously a slave under you desires.

 

[The AntiChris]

Why do you think the debate on free will is about? Do you think it would have carried on for centuries if the issue could be so easily resolved as saying...''oh, gee, people use the term, people refer to free will, therefore free will is proven, we have free will''

Do you really believe it's so simple?

As simple as saying ''we have free will because we say we do?''

That is what what you appear to be arguing.

I'm not making, and haven't made, a single argument for 'free will'.

What I am doing is challenging the argument you use for rejecting any and all concepts of 'free will'.

Your standard argument, "will can't be free because it's deterministic", is fine as a refutation of libertarian (non-deterministic) accounts of free will but it does not address compatibilist accounts of free will (which don't rely on non-deterministic decision-making).

As far as I can tell, your sole argument against compatibilists is that you claim they are misusing the word 'free' (in the past I've seen you claim that they redefine the word). But if you accept, as you vehemently insist you do, that meaning is derived from use, then this argument just doesn't work.

 

[ryan]

Not according to you when you said 'everything is quantum' - so now it appears that some things can indeed be ''further away from QM''

By "QM", I meant the varying randomness and unpredictability that the term "QM" usually brings with it.

It comes down to a thought experiment that takes two perfectly identical clones that are put into perfectly identical environments. Everything would follow classical mechanics right down to the particles except for their thinking processes. Any divergence between the two would demonstrate QM effects.

Regarding this argument, I have the luxury of saying, "I don't know if the clones would diverge". However, you and others continually choose to make the positive assumption that they wouldn't diverge. Obviously nobody knows this especially since they are working on finding evidence to the contrary.

And there are many other examples that shows that your statement, "Macro scale objects are not random or unpredictable" is flat out wrong. After all of the examples that have proven to demonstrate QM at the macro scale, how can you make such a false statement?! This makes me crazy.

I didn't say that we are always able to predict all macro scale events, something like the weather is complex, chaotic,and extremely difficult to predict, but nevertheless, deterministic.

Weather is not totally deterministic.

And you still ignore the role and function of neural architecture in relation to behavioural output. That different brains produce different experiences, thoughts and decisions based on their structure, connections and memory content...regardless of the fact that all brains are composed of quantum particles (as is every object in the universe).

I do not ignore the main processes and structures, which are the "classical" processes. I am only talking about the effects that QM might have on our decision making.

 

[ryan]

Are you saying that free will would not give the agent the freedom to choose according to the agent's desires?

If you just act on you desires then you are obviously a slave under you desires.

So you finally pulled this one out, must mean we are moving forward.

Since I claim that we are our desires, then I guess you could say that we are slaves to ourselves, which I am perfectly fine with.

 

[DBT]

Why do you think the debate on free will is about? Do you think it would have carried on for centuries if the issue could be so easily resolved as saying...''oh, gee, people use the term, people refer to free will, therefore free will is proven, we have free will''

Do you really believe it's so simple?

As simple as saying ''we have free will because we say we do?''

That is what what you appear to be arguing.

I'm not making, and haven't made, a single argument for 'free will'.

I am referring to what you appear to be implying...hence my use of the word ''appear''

What I am doing is challenging the argument you use for rejecting any and all concepts of 'free will'.

Which appears to imply that you believe that there may be, or is, a valid argument for free will.

And I have given arguments, reasons why semantic references and arguments alone are insufficient to prove a proposition that relate to human abilities, both physical and mental abilities.

Your standard argument, "will can't be free because it's deterministic", is fine as a refutation of libertarian (non-deterministic) accounts of free will but it does not address compatibilist accounts of free will (which don't rely on non-deterministic decision-making).

As far as I can tell, your sole argument against compatibilists is that you claim they are misusing the word 'free' (in the past I've seen you claim that they redefine the word). But if you accept, as you vehemently insist you do, that meaning is derived from use, then this argument just doesn't work.

Not just compatibalism, or libertarianism.....why do you ignore the problems with semantics? Which I have pointed out numerous times, and provided the reasons (and arguments) why semantic references and arguments are insufficient to prove the proposition: that free will is an actual attribute/ability/feature of the human mind and human behaviour, and not merely a semantic construct, such as gods and goblins.

 

[Juma]

Since I claim that we are our desires,.

You used to be anal about "and" and "is" and now say that you "are" your desires... [emoji19]

 

[DBT]

By "QM", I meant the varying randomness and unpredictability that the term "QM" usually brings with it.

Which is weak above Compton scale. Nor is QM entirely random or unpredictable Schrodinger's equation, probability wave function, etc.

It comes down to a thought experiment that takes two perfectly identical clones that are put into perfectly identical environments. Everything would follow classical mechanics right down to the particles except for their thinking processes. Any divergence between the two would demonstrate QM effects.

Even if it did, the changes are not something that was willed or chosen or controlled by the twins....so there goes your case for 'free will' based on unchosen and unwilled changes to the brain.

I do not ignore the main processes and structures, which are the "classical" processes. I am only talking about the effects that QM might have on our decision making.

It might effect decision making, and probably does....just not in any way that is chosen, desired or controlled, and probably manifests as a mental glitch.

 

[The AntiChris]

What I am doing is challenging the argument you use for rejecting any and all concepts of 'free will'.

Which appears to imply that you believe that there may be, or is, a valid argument for free will.

Of course it doesn't.

Saying that your argument is fallacious is not the same as saying that your conclusion is faulty.

Your standard argument, "will can't be free because it's deterministic", is fine as a refutation of libertarian (non-deterministic) accounts of free will but it does not address compatibilist accounts of free will (which don't rely on non-deterministic decision-making).

As far as I can tell, your sole argument against compatibilists is that you claim they are misusing the word 'free' (in the past I've seen you claim that they redefine the word). But if you accept, as you vehemently insist you do, that meaning is derived from use, then this argument just doesn't work.

Not just compatibalism, or libertarianism.....why do you ignore the problems with semantics? Which I have pointed out numerous times, and provided the reasons (and arguments) why semantic references and arguments are insufficient to prove the proposition: that free will is an actual attribute/ability/feature of the human mind and human behaviour, and not merely a semantic construct, such as gods and goblins.

I'm not ignoring "problems with semantics" - I just have no idea what this is supposed to mean.

The claims of libertarian free will and compatibilist free will are very different and cannot be dismissed with a single argument.

I understand your argument against libertarian free will but don't understand your argument against compatibilist free will. What precisely do you think compatibilists are claiming that you think is analogous to claims of "gods and goblins"?

 

[PyramidHead]

I don't think either of those are true. If you perform an action of your own free will, I would expect it to look like you carefully considered the options available, weighed the pros and cons, and then made a choice based on those parameters without someone else forcing you one way or another. I wouldn't expect you to suddenly jump out of your seat and exclaim "spaghetti!" at the top of your lungs. In fact, spontaneous behavior with no rationale is pretty much the opposite of what free will means to me, and most people I know who talk about it. Nothing about randomness is free in the same way free will is supposed to be free.

So are you saying that free will would not give me the freedom to act irrationally? I like to eat at fast food restaurants. It's not rational, but I do it anyways. I know that most of us choose to be irrational at least some of the time.

If you'd really prefer to eat healthy but your craving for greasy food brings you to McDonald's, I would say that your choice was less free than it would have been if you'd said: you know what, my stomach is really begging me for some fast food but I know it's not healthy, so I'm just gonna have a salad because it's the smarter option. That would be a lot closer to free will than letting your urge for a Big Mac get the better of your rational faculties.

Notice that we can have a perfectly sensible conversation about free will without talking about collapsing a wave function.

 

[ryan]

Since I claim that we are our desires,.

You used to be anal about "and" and "is" and now say that you "are" your desires... [emoji19]

Yes, rigour gives everybody that sad face. It's easier just to ignore the rigour, and then we can have happy faces.

 

[ryan]

Which is weak above Compton scale. Nor is QM entirely random or unpredictable Schrodinger's equation, probability wave function, etc.

Yes, there are some points in space where particles have a zero probability of being in. That's why I maintained that we wouldn't be entirely random.

It comes down to a thought experiment that takes two perfectly identical clones that are put into perfectly identical environments. Everything would follow classical mechanics right down to the particles except for their thinking processes. Any divergence between the two would demonstrate QM effects.

Even if it did, the changes are not something that was willed or chosen or controlled by the twins....

Given the possible connection between the consciousness and QM, how could you possibly know this?

I do not ignore the main processes and structures, which are the "classical" processes. I am only talking about the effects that QM might have on our decision making.

It might effect decision making, and probably does....just not in any way that is chosen, desired or controlled, and probably manifests as a mental glitch.

You don't know this; nobody does.

 

[ryan]

So are you saying that free will would not give me the freedom to act irrationally? I like to eat at fast food restaurants. It's not rational, but I do it anyways. I know that most of us choose to be irrational at least some of the time.

If you'd really prefer to eat healthy but your craving for greasy food brings you to McDonald's, I would say that your choice was less free than it would have been if you'd said: you know what, my stomach is really begging me for some fast food but I know it's not healthy, so I'm just gonna have a salad because it's the smarter option. That would be a lot closer to free will than letting your urge for a Big Mac get the better of your rational faculties.

Notice that we can have a perfectly sensible conversation about free will without talking about collapsing a wave function.

I need indeterminism to justify free will. I just don't get compatibilism.

 

[PyramidHead]

If you'd really prefer to eat healthy but your craving for greasy food brings you to McDonald's, I would say that your choice was less free than it would have been if you'd said: you know what, my stomach is really begging me for some fast food but I know it's not healthy, so I'm just gonna have a salad because it's the smarter option. That would be a lot closer to free will than letting your urge for a Big Mac get the better of your rational faculties.

Notice that we can have a perfectly sensible conversation about free will without talking about collapsing a wave function.

I need indeterminism to justify free will. I just don't get compatibilism.

It's pretty easy. You just admit that there is an important difference between asking for a bank withdrawal because you want to buy your child a new video game, versus asking for a bank withdrawal because the guy behind you has a gun to your back. There is a difference, isn't there? Isn't the difference something to do with how much you actually wanted to withdraw the money for your own purposes, and not because of someone else's threat of violence? Or are both situations exactly the same with regard to how free you are?

I am not afraid to acknowledge the obvious fact that, when my behavior is primarily governed by decisions I consider carefully before making at my leisure, I have some measure of free will, even if the neurological basis of the decision-making process is entirely determined by previous states and natural laws. I'm starting to realize that philosophical abstractions often lack explanatory power when they lose sight of ordinary life.

 

[ryan]

I need indeterminism to justify free will. I just don't get compatibilism.

It's pretty easy. You just admit that there is an important difference between asking for a bank withdrawal because you want to buy your child a new video game, versus asking for a bank withdrawal because the guy behind you has a gun to your back. There is a difference, isn't there? Isn't the difference something to do with how much you actually wanted to withdraw the money for your own purposes, and not because of someone else's threat of violence? Or are both situations exactly the same with regard to how free you are?

Just like other arguments that I have read in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, I can't even make a connection between the argument and the typical definitions for free will. One part of the more common definitions of free will is that a person could have acted differently when making a choice. Forgive my thickness, but I can't make the connection between that part of the definition and your example.

I am not afraid to acknowledge the obvious fact that, when my behavior is primarily governed by decisions I consider carefully before making at my leisure, I have some measure of free will, even if the neurological basis of the decision-making process is entirely determined by previous states and natural laws.

Let me be ignorant to the arguments for compatibilism for a moment because I fear that I will never understand them, and I am not trying to be facetious. If determinism is true, then one could look at reality as a 4 dimensional static object. A human is one extremely large 4 dimensional object from birth to death. This object does not move; it does not change in any way. To me, compatibilism is like saying a picture of a person has free will. The 4 dimensional object already exists before we are consciously aware of its entirety. It's our consciousness that "scans" the 3 other dimensions throughout the object.

 

[Juma]

It's pretty easy. You just admit that there is an important difference between asking for a bank withdrawal because you want to buy your child a new video game, versus asking for a bank withdrawal because the guy behind you has a gun to your back. There is a difference, isn't there? Isn't the difference something to do with how much you actually wanted to withdraw the money for your own purposes, and not because of someone else's threat of violence? Or are both situations exactly the same with regard to how free you are?

Just like other arguments, I can't even make a connection between the argument and the typical definitions for free will. One part of the more common definitions of free will is that a person could have acted differently when making a choice. Forgive my thickness, but I can't make the connection between that part of the definition and your example.

That is because you are talking about two very different concepts that both are called "free will". you talk about Libertarian free will and pyramid head talks about common sense free will.

 

[ryan]

Just like other arguments, I can't even make a connection between the argument and the typical definitions for free will. One part of the more common definitions of free will is that a person could have acted differently when making a choice. Forgive my thickness, but I can't make the connection between that part of the definition and your example.

That is because you are talking about two very different concepts that both are called "free will". you talk about Libertarian free will and pyramid head talks about common sense free will.

What's the difference between the two?

 

[Juma]

That is because you are talking about two very different concepts that both are called "free will". you talk about Libertarian free will and pyramid head talks about common sense free will.

What's the difference between the two?

Common sense free will just describe what was the origin of the act and is not interested in the the mechanism of how the human brain works. (If A had not forced B with threats of killing him B would not helped him)

Libertarian free will says something about the physical details of how human brain/soul make choices (with ALL things exactly the same B could have acted differently)

 

[ryan]

What's the difference between the two?

Common sense free will just describe what was the origin of the act and is not interested in the the mechanism of how the human brain works. (If A had not forced B with threats of killing him B would not helped him)

Libertarian free will says something about the physical details of how human brain/soul make choices (with ALL things exactly the same B could have acted differently)

Oh I see. That's quite interesting.

 

[DBT]

Which appears to imply that you believe that there may be, or is, a valid argument for free will.

Of course it doesn't.

Saying that your argument is fallacious is not the same as saying that your conclusion is faulty.

You appear to have little or no understanding of my argument, therefore you are not in position to say whether it is fallacious, or not. Nor have you been able to give a reasoned argument for why you believe it is fallacious. You have only made objections that have little or no relationship to my argument....which you blatantly misrepresent as 'your version of free will' As if arguing against a proposition, pointing out the flaws, is a version of that proposition.

It's like saying Atheism is a version of Theism (or a religion) because atheists argue in relation to Theism, never mind that it is in the negative position.

I'm not ignoring "problems with semantics" - I just have no idea what this is supposed to mean.

It means exactly what I have been saying, word use and common meaning do not prove the reality of the objects they refer to. Take the 'Holy Spirit' as an example, many claim to be filled with the holy spirit they speak of the will of god, the manifestation of god and the holy spirit in their lives, and how this has changed them. They have developed a whole vocabulary around their belief in the reality of these things, your common reference and meaning....but none of this actually proves that such a god exists or that the 'holy spirit' is an actual phenomena.

The same with the concept of 'free will' - just a semantic construct that is used in reference to this decision or that action, yet proves nothing in terms of some phenomena or attribute that may be defined as 'free will' - just semantics like 'god' or the being filled with the 'holy spirit'

It's meaningless. In order to understand human nature and behaviour, you need to understand both the nature and function of the brain and how people actually think and respond in any given circumstances.

The claims of libertarian free will and compatibilist free will are very different and cannot be dismissed with a single argument.

I understand your argument against libertarian free will but don't understand your argument against compatibilist free will. What precisely do you think compatibilists are claiming that you think is analogous to claims of "gods and goblins"?

You didn't address the argument against compatibalism when I gave it. It's the standard argument. Nothing new, nothing different.

Compatibalists redefine the concept of freedom, and consequently determinism in order to accommodate their idea of 'free will' when in fact both will (decisions made) and actions taken are necessitated under the definition of determinism, consequently contradicting the meaning of both freedom and determinism.