You appear to have little or no understanding of my argument.....
It's not for want of trying.
So you say, but the arguments I have given are standard arguments against free will, which I have supported with links, quotes and terms and references. Which any reasonably competent English speaker should readily grasp. I can only assume that you don't want to understand because it goes against your worldview.
Nor is it a single argument. One is related to your objection - 'that's how words are used/semantics' - and another relates to compatibalism, another to the absence of coercion and so on. Easy enough to grasp the basics without any real difficulty.
Who has claimed they do? I certainly haven't.
Sure, you haven't claimed it. You even said that usage does not prove the reality of the objects of reference....but then you appear to imply that references alone may be valid in some instance (which I've given examples of). That is the way it comes across.
And worse, I have asked for examples of what you believe to be instances of free will in relation to 'how the words are used/semantics' but to date there has been no response.
In order to justify this claim you have to demonstrate that there is a 'correct' definition of "freedom".
Are you saying the word freedom can mean whatever you like it mean in order to accommodate determinism? I gave a list of the standard meanings of the word 'free'
Free; a. Not affected or restricted by a given condition or circumstance
b. Not subject to a given condition.
5. Not subject to external restraint: Unconstrained; unconfined:
*free; unrestrained; having a scope not restricted by qualification <a free variable>
7 a: not obstructed, restricted, or impeded.
Given that freedom is state that is not constrained, restrained, bound or restricted...it is obvious that freedom is incompatible with determinism, where everything is bound or restricted by a system that is determined by antecedent events, which do not permit deviations.
As the dictionary doesn't help us we use the theory that word meaning (definitions) are derived from common usage. You say you do too but not, apparently, in this instance.
Common usage is not always wrong in terms of the things it refers to. People referring to 'the holy spirit' is not the same as common references to freedom. We cannot examine the former, but the latter relates to actual states, but not necessarily to absolute freedom.
A prisoner, for example, being free from his handcuffs (unbound, unrestrained) doesn't mean that he is free from his cell...the prisoner cannot be described as being free because he is free from the constraint of his handcuffs. I've explained this, only to have it ignored and the same objections asserted straight after.
How do you arrive at the 'correct' definition of freedom which you claim the compatibilists "redefine"?
By the commonly agreed meaning of word as it is used in references to states that are not constrained, restrained, bound or restricted...which we can observe in others or experience directly ourselves....all of which are relative to the situation - free from the restraint of this, but not that - a relative condition.
And here you demonstrate your ignorance of compatibilism.
Compatibilists use exactly the same concept of determinism as incompatibilists. In fact many compatibilists say that their concept of freedom and moral responsibility is not only compatible with determinism but
requires adequate determinism.
They do use the same definition of determinism (or profess to). But as compatibalism does not work logically, freedom being incompatible with determinism, it being conveniently ignored (apparently) that both the decision made and following action are determined by the state of the system, which consequently does not relate to
actual determinism where all events are necessitated by antecedent events and conditions.
Again:
''Notice that a
true compatibilist, who has gone on record saying that determinism is a fact of nature, must believe that the events of experiencing a desire, foreseeing the consequences of action, and forming an intention to act on the desire, are all determined. The causal chain leading a human to lift a finger is longer than the chain leading a squirrel to lift an acorn, but it is no less deterministic (he who says that it is less deterministic is not a compatibilist but a closet libertarian).''
Quote;
''Still others, most notably David Hume and some prominent contemporary social psychologists, believe they can have it both ways: accept determinism while also postulating a type of non-libertarian, straight-jacketed “free” will that still enables moral judgment [I put the “free” in quotation marks because the semantics are drained from the word].
More;
''How is this supposed to work? First, we have to accept the view that prior events have caused the person’s current desire to do X. Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms. Exceptions occur, but are swiftly dismissed as errors of anthropomorphism.''