And the reason why compatibalism is a failed argument, the reason why it's an absurd claim for free will, and why compatibilists are Libertarians, whether they realize it or not.
Here you reveal your total ignorance of compatibilism.
No, it's you who reveal your total ignorance of the implications of the compatibilist position in relation to determinism....and what's worse, completely ignore arguments that demonstrate incompatibility.
Despite crusading enthusiastically against any and all forms of 'free will' for, as far as I can tell, at least 10 years (I'm including stuff on FRDB) you still don't understand the difference between the claims of incompatibilists and compatibilists.
I am no more crusading against 'free will' than any other poster is 'crusading' for their own position, you included. It is a contentious subject and there are some who argue for the affirmative and others who argue for the negative. No big deal, one or two posts a day. Who really cares. What surprises me is the vehemence of some of those who argue for free will...as if it is vital ideology.
In a 2009
survey of professional philosophers, 59% of those who responded "Accept or lean toward: compatibilism" so there's no excuse for your ignorance - it's not as though it's a minority position within academic philosophy.
In any event this explains why your arguments against compatibilism make no sense (and have never made sense).
Oh, no..you are .not indulging in the ad populum fallacy? Surely not? Yet there it is! Add that to your unfounded proclamations and flawed interpretations of what I said and provided, including ignoring key points and quotes and links to articles posted to support what I say.
Again:
Determinism is a claim about the laws of nature: very roughly, it is the claim that everything that happens is determined by antecedent conditions together with the natural laws. Incompatibilism is a philosophical thesis about the relevance of determinism to free will: that the truth of determinism rules out the existence of free will. The incompatibilist believes that if determinism turned out to be true, it would also be true that we don't have, and have never had, free will. The compatibilist denies that determinism has the consequences the incompatibilist thinks it has. According to the compatibilist, the truth of determinism does not preclude the existence of free will. (Even if we learned tomorrow that determinism is true, it might still be true that we have free will.) The philosophical problem of free will and determinism is the problem of understanding, how, if at all, the truth of determinism might be compatible with the truth of our belief that we have free will. That is, it's the problem of deciding who is right: the compatibilist or the incompatibilist.''
Now, if you have been paying attention (which I doubt), you would already know that I incorporate quantum indeterminism, or probabilistic events as a description of the World as it is, but that QM no more allows free will than does Hard Determinism.
An example of the sheer messiness of the subject matter:
''Nevertheless, the typical argument of
determinists and compatibilists is that if our actions had random causes we could not be morally responsible.
To avoid the obvious difficulty for their position, most compatibilist philosophers simply deny the reality of chance. They hope that something will be found to be wrong with quantum mechanical indeterminism. Chance is unintelligible, they say, and thus there is no intelligible account of libertarian free will. Some dismiss free will (as many philosophers denied chance) as an illusion.
Recently, professional philosophers specializing in free will and moral responsibility have staked out nuanced versions of the familiar positions with new jargon, like broad and narrow incompatibilism, semicompatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and illusionism.
Awkwardly, the incompatibilist position includes both "hard" determinists, who deny free will, and libertarians, who deny determinism, making the category very messy. ''
And one of the reasons why I argue that term 'free will' is irrelevant as description of an actual attribute of human consciousness, and is nothing more than a semantic construct that is commonly used in reference 'conscious choice' or an absence of coercion, etc, but says nothing about the nature of volition.
In other words, the term 'free will' is largely irrelevant.
Which is what I argue.