Compatibalism is a dead duck. If determinism is true, freedom of any sort is out of the question. Freedom is not compatible with determinism, where every thought and action is shaped and formed by the process of determinism.
Dont fall into the togo trap: determinism isnt really the issue. The real issue is special pleading: for libertarian free will to work there must some sort of "free will mechanism" since cause/effect + randomsness doest support it.
The idea that all events are either determined or random is the soft determinist position. LFW is still incompatible with it.
There is never any need for a LFW to be a special case or need a special mechanism. You don't need a special mechanism to overcome determination in a special case, because you're assuming determinism is false in the first place.
This is presumably what Juma means by the 'Togo Trap' - He wants to claim that LFW requires special pleading as an exception to a more general case, but without discussing what the general case is that LFW needs to overcome. Any general case is either a variation on determinism, or is compatible with LFW.
Not because anyone is making any claims about the nature of the universe, or even about human decision making, but just because of how LFW is defined. LFW is incompatibalist free will - the decision making that is incompatible with determinism. If there is an objection, it
has to fall into one of two logically complete categories
1) Determinism or equivalent, which contradicts incompatibalist free will
2) Not determinism or equivalent, in which case it does not contradict incompatibalist free will
The only way around this is to try and redefine incompatibalist free will to have additional features, and then claim it can't exist because those additional features can be overridden.
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Compatibalism is a dead duck. If determinism is true, freedom of any sort is out of the question. Freedom is not compatible with determinism, where every thought and action is shaped and formed by the process of determinism.
Dont fall into the togo trap: determinism isnt really the issue. The real issue is special pleading: for libertarian free will to work there must some sort of "free will mechanism" since cause/effect + randomsness doest support it.
The idea that all events are either determined or random is the soft determinist position. LFW is still incompatible with it.
There is never any need for a LFW to be a special case or need a special mechanism. You don't need a special mechanism to overcome determination in a special case, because you're assuming determinism is false in the first place.
This is presumably what Juma means by the 'Togo Trap' - He wants to claim that LFW requires special pleading as an exception to a more general case, but without discussing what the general case is that LFW needs to overcome. Any general case is either a variation on determinism, or is compatible with LFW.
Not because anyone is making any claims about the nature of the universe, or even about human decision making, but just because of how LFW is defined. LFW is incompatibalist free will - the decision making that is incompatible with determinism. If there is an objection, it
has to fall into one of two logically complete categories
1) Determinism or equivalent, which contradicts incompatibalist free will
2) Not determinism or equivalent, in which case it does not contradict incompatibalist free will
The only way around this is to try and redefine incompatibalist free will to have additional features, and then claim it can't exist because those additional features can be overridden.