In Free Will, What Makes it "Free"

[Togo]

I only wish I represented that remark. Actually those of us who pile on 'choice' is because what the observer processes and what the observer acts upon are often different things suggesting that choice is a false term. No doubt people act. But that they have things called consciousness, unconsciousness, will, which can be scientifically used to interpret acting will be contested by me and my ilk until the cows come home. Nor am I all wrapped up in brain processes (see yourself here DBT) which are just another can't touch dodge used to 'explain' behavior.

At present I'm holding to a "we don't know anything more than what we can directly measure" position which is quite appropriate for both physiologists and sensory physiologists. Black boxes are nice. I use them often when setting up detection, discrimination, recognition, and capacity experiments ie "How does an observer come into a trial and what time need elapse between trials for them to be considered independent (a statistical analysis requirement - that damn empirical isolation constraint - for generating usable data for interpretation".

Not sure why the reference to me.

I think he's distinguishing between people who deny the primacy of conscious choice because they don't believe it is causally effective in behaviour, or only plays a minor role, which is where he's putting you, versus people who deny the primacy of conscious choice because ceding an active role to an presumed feature of an internal model is methodologically invalid, when you could be looking at behaviour directly, which is where he's putting himself.

I could be wrong though.

 

[rhutchin]

Libertarian Free Will seeks to avoid deterministic outcomes. Sounds nice, but how does one develop a process that does that?

Fairly easily, you just take the position that determinism is false. There is no trick, workaround or special mechanism here - the definition of a libertarian position on free will is that determinism and free will are incomptible, and that determinism is false, and free will is not.

I don't think the process you have put forth has really accomplished anything. All it did was create two labels and declare that they are incompatible because one is false and presumably, the other is true. We don't know what those things are that you have labeled. You could have called them "A" and "B" and said that "A" is defined to be incompatible with "B" because "B" is false. OK, that's a start. Now what are "A" and "B"? Other than two labels and the claim that one just happens to be false, there is no process here to show how deterministic outcomes are avoided to distinguish the label, "Libertarian Free Will."

 

[DBT]

Yes. But not only inputs, a combination of neural architecture and experience laid down as memory function (past experience) - Genetics and environment. None of this being a matter of choice. The decision making ability (neuronal information processing) being a function of the system. Intelligent, interactive, but not 'free will'

"...experience laid down as memory function (past experience)" is also information. So, basically, your point is that genetics determines "what" people decide and not just "how." However, different decisions can reflect the different information that people have with genetics affecting "how" a person is able to process that information. People make choices; regardless how one explains how those choices come about.

The issue is not what leads to choices but whether those choices are "free" and this requires that the term, "free," be defined. That seems to be the difficulty in free will issues. Your contention works only you can show that it is the cause behind decision-making. So far, you cannot, can you?

It's not 'people' (''people'' being a general reference to the person as a whole) that have information in order to make decisions, but specifically the brain. The brain itself is the sole agent of information gathering (via the senses), processing and correlating and storing this information and representing the relevant portions in the form of subjective 'mental' representation, ie, conscious form.

This information gathering and processing activity, a par of which is represented in conscious form, is not a matter of 'free' choice. It's just neural networks performing their evolved function and role in forming a internal model of the external world and responding to it in an adaptive manner... or depending on the state of the system, maladaptive response. Garbage in, garbage out.

Take away a single element such as memory function and it all falls apart, no recognition, no coherent thought, no coherent decision making process.

The state of the system, neural hardware, memory function, etc, determines output in terms of what is perceived, felt, thought and acted upon.

Hardly a matter of free will, don't you think?

Your error is still associated with an implied substance duality, some sort of undefined and undescribed separation between brain and mind.

 

[Togo]

Fairly easily, you just take the position that determinism is false. There is no trick, workaround or special mechanism here - the definition of a libertarian position on free will is that determinism and free will are incomptible, and that determinism is false, and free will is not.

I don't think the process you have put forth has really accomplished anything. All it did was create two labels and declare that they are incompatible because one is false and presumably, the other is true.

No, they're incompatible because that's the kind of free will being described and considered . Incompatibalist or libertarian free will remains incompatible with determinism, whether you think libertarian free will is true, or whether you think determinism is true. There are plenty of incompatibalist determinists out there.

... there is no process here to show how deterministic outcomes are avoided to distinguish the label, "Libertarian Free Will."

Why would you want to avoid deterministic outcomes? Again, you're asking an atheist how he avoids divine law. He doesn't avoid it, there is no explanation as to how he escapes it, avoids it, or gets around it. He just doesn't think it exists in the first place. If you believe in Determinism, then libertarian free will is false, by definition. So why do you keep asking for an explanation of how to combine them?

 

[rhutchin]

I don't think the process you have put forth has really accomplished anything. All it did was create two labels and declare that they are incompatible because one is false and presumably, the other is true.

No, they're incompatible because that's the kind of free will being described and considered. Incompatibalist or libertarian free will remains incompatible with determinism, whether you think libertarian free will is true, or whether you think determinism is true. There are plenty of incompatibalist determinists out there.

For what you say to be true, I think we need definitions of Libertarian Free Will and Incompatibilism. From the discussion here, I don't think those definitions exist. All we have are two labels and statements of how people want each to relate to the other. I have sought to work out a definition of Free Will and it has problems. Until someone works out a definition for free will, all we have is alabel. At least, that is what it seems to me.

... there is no process here to show how deterministic outcomes are avoided to distinguish the label, "Libertarian Free Will."

Why would you want to avoid deterministic outcomes? Again, you're asking an atheist how he avoids divine law. He doesn't avoid it, there is no explanation as to how he escapes it, avoids it, or gets around it. He just doesn't think it exists in the first place. If you believe in Determinism, then libertarian free will is false, by definition. So why do you keep asking for an explanation of how to combine them?

If we can avoid a deterministic outcome, then we would identify Libertarian Free Will, wouldn't we? Again, my basic problem has been that the only definition of determinism that I extract from what people write is that it excludes coercion; the only definition of Libertarian Free Will is that it is contra-causal freedom or the ability to choose otherwise. I find these meaningless leaving us with two labels that people suggest ought to mean something and no one seems able to explain what they mean.

 

[rhutchin]

"...experience laid down as memory function (past experience)" is also information. So, basically, your point is that genetics determines "what" people decide and not just "how." However, different decisions can reflect the different information that people have with genetics affecting "how" a person is able to process that information. People make choices; regardless how one explains how those choices come about.

The issue is not what leads to choices but whether those choices are "free" and this requires that the term, "free," be defined. That seems to be the difficulty in free will issues. Your contention works only you can show that it is the cause behind decision-making. So far, you cannot, can you?

It's not 'people' (''people'' being a general reference to the person as a whole) that have information in order to make decisions, but specifically the brain. The brain itself is the sole agent of information gathering (via the senses), processing and correlating and storing this information and representing the relevant portions in the form of subjective 'mental' representation, ie, conscious form.

This information gathering and processing activity, a par of which is represented in conscious form, is not a matter of 'free' choice. It's just neural networks performing their evolved function and role in forming a internal model of the external world and responding to it in an adaptive manner... or depending on the state of the system, maladaptive response. Garbage in, garbage out.

Take away a single element such as memory function and it all falls apart, no recognition, no coherent thought, no coherent decision making process.

The state of the system, neural hardware, memory function, etc, determines output in terms of what is perceived, felt, thought and acted upon.

The last statement seems to be an opinion. I don't see where it has been shown to be true.

 

[DBT]

The last statement seems to be an opinion. I don't see where it has been shown to be true.

Not at all. Basic Neuroscience, you can begin with Delgado's experiments with electrical brain stimulation and related experiments that still continue to date.

And logic logic dictates that if the brain is the sole agent of information processing and decision making, it follows that it is the information state of the system in the instance of a decision being made that determines the decision that is made.

 

[Togo]

No, they're incompatible because that's the kind of free will being described and considered. Incompatibalist or libertarian free will remains incompatible with determinism, whether you think libertarian free will is true, or whether you think determinism is true. There are plenty of incompatibalist determinists out there.

For what you say to be true, I think we need definitions of Libertarian Free Will and Incompatibilism. From the discussion here, I don't think those definitions exist. All we have are two labels and statements of how people want each to relate to the other. I have sought to work out a definition of Free Will and it has problems. Until someone works out a definition for free will, all we have is a label. At least, that is what it seems to me.

Have you never encountered such a definition? This topic has been discussed for well over a century, so there are plenty of them about...

Let's try a few sample definitions, and see if that helps you?

Libertarian Free Will
-The ability to consciously select between realisable alternatives

Compatibalist Free will
-The ability to make decisions free from coercion

Incompatibalism
-The idea that free will and determinism are ultimately incompatible, such that if one is true the other is false

Compatibalism
-The idea that free will and determinism are compatible with each other, such that if one is true, the other may be true or false.

Determinism
For every event, including human action, there exist conditions that could cause no other event.

This has many variations, one of the most common of which is:

Nomolgical determinism
The past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily, that every occurrence results inevitably from prior events.

I'd suggest that we sort out what you mean by determinism first, and then we can work out whether Compatibalism/Incompatibalism is a meaningful or useful distinction to make, given that definition.

... there is no process here to show how deterministic outcomes are avoided to distinguish the label, "Libertarian Free Will."

Why would you want to avoid deterministic outcomes? Again, you're asking an atheist how he avoids divine law. He doesn't avoid it, there is no explanation as to how he escapes it, avoids it, or gets around it. He just doesn't think it exists in the first place. If you believe in Determinism, then libertarian free will is false, by definition. So why do you keep asking for an explanation of how to combine them?

If we can avoid a deterministic outcome, then we would identify Libertarian Free Will, wouldn't we?

No, of course not. If you had a device that could generate truly random numbers, numbers not linked to any preceding event whatsoever, the box wouldn't normally be considered to have free will.

However, this raises an interesting question. If you have such events in your universe, is determinism still true?

Again, my basic problem has been that the only definition of determinism that I extract from what people write is that it excludes coercion; the only definition of Libertarian Free Will is that it is contra-causal freedom or the ability to choose otherwise. I find these meaningless leaving us with two labels that people suggest ought to mean something and no one seems able to explain what they mean.

I've never seen a definition of determinism that concerns coercion. I've only seen Libertarian free will being described as contra-causal as a confusion conflating causation with determinism. Again, it depends how you define the terms.

 

[rhutchin]

Have you never encountered such a definition? This topic has been discussed for well over a century, so there are plenty of them about...

Let's try a few sample definitions, and see if that helps you?

Libertarian Free Will
-The ability to consciously select between realisable alternatives

Compatibalist Free will
-The ability to make decisions free from coercion

Incompatibalism
-The idea that free will and determinism are ultimately incompatible, such that if one is true the other is false

Compatibalism
-The idea that free will and determinism are compatible with each other, such that if one is true, the other may be true or false.

Determinism
For every event, including human action, there exist conditions that could cause no other event.

This has many variations, one of the most common of which is:

Nomolgical determinism
The past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily, that every occurrence results inevitably from prior events.

I'd suggest that we sort out what you mean by determinism first, and then we can work out whether Compatibalism/Incompatibalism is a meaningful or useful distinction to make, given that definition.

The definitions of free will are what I have run into. I think they tell us little. When people use them, they seem to take on a magical, undefinable meaning.

I started with:


Libertarian Free Will
-The ability to consciously select between realizable alternatives

By "realizable alternatives," I figured that the person must have knowledge of those alternatives, A and ~A at the least and A or B as the choices increase.

By "consciously select," one can distinguish difference between the realizable choices - the benefits of one versus the costs of the other(s).

By "ability," one can apply the laws of logic to make a rational decision.

Thus, I got to my OP. To this you suggested that outcomes need to be included.

I find the definition of Compatibilist Free will to be worthless as even Libertarian Free Will says this, yet this is as far as people seem to get in explaining it.

I've never seen a definition of determinism that concerns coercion. I've only seen Libertarian free will being described as contra-causal as a confusion conflating causation with determinism.

Yeah, I meant ccompatibilism, not determinism. However, I think I'll have to sort out "determinism" to really flesh out compatibilism.

 

[Togo]

The definitions of free will are what I have run into. I think they tell us little. When people use them, they seem to take on a magical, undefinable meaning.

I started with:


Libertarian Free Will
-The ability to consciously select between realizable alternatives

By "realizable alternatives," I figured that the person must have knowledge of those alternatives, A and ~A at the least and A or B as the choices increase.

By "consciously select," one can distinguish difference between the realizable choices - the benefits of one versus the costs of the other(s).

By "ability," one can apply the laws of logic to make a rational decision.

Thus, I got to my OP. To this you suggested that outcomes need to be included.

Outcomes are the 'realisable' in 'realisable alternatives'.

I find the definition of Compatibilist Free will to be worthless as even Libertarian Free Will says this, yet this is as far as people seem to get in explaining it.

I've never seen a definition of determinism that concerns coercion. I've only seen Libertarian free will being described as contra-causal as a confusion conflating causation with determinism.

Yeah, I meant ccompatibilism, not determinism. However, I think I'll have to sort out "determinism" to really flesh out compatibilism.

Fair enough. That makes more sense.

If it helps, my position tends towards the idea that determinism itself is flawed, unless you weaken it to the point where it no longer conflicts with Libertarian ideas of Free Will. In my experience, most arguments about Libertarian free will tend to end up as arguments about determinism, while most arguments around compatibilist definitions of free will end up as arguments about moral agency.

 

[DBT]

Making decisions (selections) entails a set of criteria upon which the options are compared and the ideal is selected on basis of how close the option is to the set of requirements defined by the criteria.

Any form of information processor, such the neural networks of a biological brain or the microchip circuitry (and software) of a computer, is able to make selections from a set of set of realizable options based on whatever criteria governs the selection, be it past experience and need or want of a brain, or the programmed criteria of algorithms, a selection is possible and decision is made.

The ability to make decisions cannot be defined as 'free will' regardless whether the selections or decisions are experienced in conscious form or not.

The concept of 'free will' is an antiquated notion.

 

[Togo]

Making decisions (selections) entails a set of criteria upon which the options are compared and the ideal is selected on basis of how close the option is to the set of requirements defined by the criteria.

In other words, people make decisions based on reasons (criteria). Well, generally, sure. But we can both come up with situations where people appear to behave either without rational consideration, or without much consideration at all. As such, this is such a general statement, that I'm not sure it really tells us anything. It's not like people always decide what to do based purely on the situation they're in.

What this does bring up is one of the perennial issues with regarding decision making as determined. Imagine for a moment that decision making is unconscious, determined by the inputs, and that conscious consideration is just an illusion created after the fact. In such a scenario, does it really make sense to talk about having reasons for actions? The actions are being driven by the inputs, the
(conscious) reasoning is only created afterwards, and there's no real reason to presume that the unconscious processing works through anything we would recognise as reasons. Certainly there's no point in trying to consider decisions or reasons as causal. The outcome is determined, and the inputs necessarily present a more complete explanation of the outputs than any arbitrarily chosen point along the causal chain, where reasons or decisions might be located. As in the more general case, determinism works to extinguish the idea of local causation.

Any form of information processor, such the neural networks of a biological brain or the microchip circuitry (and software) of a computer, is able to make selections from a set of set of realizable options based on whatever criteria governs the selection, be it past experience and need or want of a brain, or the programmed criteria of algorithms, a selection is possible and decision is made.

Well no. In the case of a person, you're postulating that a reason must exist, and that that reason was sufficient to drive the decision. That's not a very accurate model, as previously discussed, because you're just putting the decision making into a black box and then making up how it was arrived at. Here you're taking a system where the criteria are fixed in advance, and then reasoning backwards that because they're fixed in the computer they must be fixed in the person.

If you are a determinist, holding particular a priori beliefs about how the universe operates, then yes, Free Will is one of a great many concepts that no longer make sense, along with 'reason' 'logic', 'decision' and 'cause'.

If you're not, then there isn't a conflict. This is, incidentally, why the definition includes the word 'consciously' and why so many people assume that if only a computer could demonstrate conscious thought, then it would develop free will.

 

[DBT]

In other words, people make decisions based on reasons (criteria). Well, generally, sure. But we can both come up with situations where people appear to behave either without rational consideration, or without much consideration at all. As such, this is such a general statement, that I'm not sure it really tells us anything. It's not like people always decide what to do based purely on the situation they're in.

No, you are using the general reference of 'people' - ''people decide - when it is specifically the brain and the brain alone that processes information and selects options.

Nor can the brain do anything other than what its own architecture, inputs and memory function determines in any instance of a selection being made...basically the reason why the term 'free will' is considered to be antiquated by many neuroscientists.

Well no. In the case of a person, you're postulating that a reason must exist, and that that reason was sufficient to drive the decision. That's not a very accurate model, as previously discussed, because you're just putting the decision making into a black box and then making up how it was arrived at. Here you're taking a system where the criteria are fixed in advance, and then reasoning backwards that because they're fixed in the computer they must be fixed in the person.

Again, it's not a 'person' that makes decisions but a specific part of what makes a person - the brain, the central information processor of the nervous system and the sole agent of decision making.

Nor do I say that there must always be a reason for an action, it may be a glitch within the system, a twitch, a reflex action, etc. But nevertheless, given a set of options and the desire to choose a option, the underlying processing works on a benefit to cost ratio based on past experience with the articles of choice, or something related, however loosley, pattern recognition and so on.

 

[rhutchin]

If it helps, my position tends towards the idea that determinism itself is flawed, unless you weaken it to the point where it no longer conflicts with Libertarian ideas of Free Will. In my experience, most arguments about Libertarian free will tend to end up as arguments about determinism, while most arguments around compatibilist definitions of free will end up as arguments about moral agency.

I see LFW as being necessary for moral agency and moral agency does not exist where decisions are determined. Where compatibilism allows for internal wants/desires to affect moral decisions, LFW apparently cannot allow that. Under LFW, a person must be able to choose otherwise or to act differently, apparently to choose other than that which one wants/desires, and while wants/desires can influence a person's decision they must not determine the person's decision.

As far as I can tell, the whole issue of free will comes up because of the problem of evil and the only reason that the problem of evil comes up is because of God (as philosophically defined - if God were to exist, then God would have to be X, X,...). I think people are constructing LFW from what it cannot be - it cannot be determined - rather than what it is. If a person cannot choose otherwise, then they cannot exercise LFW. I am not sure whether the ability to choose otherwise excludes the rational consideration of the costs and benefits of options - i.e., would the reduction of options to some rational ordering be deterministic - probably, if that ordering reflected a personal evaluation of what was "best" for the individual (itself reflective of the person's wants/desires). It seems to me that nothing escapes determinism except where choices are make "without thinking" or reflexively but I am not sure about that. Anyway, this concept of LFW has proved impossible for me to nail down - as to what people really mean by it.

 

[DBT]

Compatibalism is a dead duck. If determinism is true, freedom of any sort is out of the question. Freedom is not compatible with determinism, where every thought and action is shaped and formed by the process of determinism.

 

[Juma]

Compatibalism is a dead duck. If determinism is true, freedom of any sort is out of the question. Freedom is not compatible with determinism, where every thought and action is shaped and formed by the process of determinism.

Dont fall into the togo trap: determinism isnt really the issue. The real issue is special pleading: for libertarian free will to work there must some sort of "free will mechanism" since cause/effect + randomsness doest support it.

 

[Togo]

If it helps, my position tends towards the idea that determinism itself is flawed, unless you weaken it to the point where it no longer conflicts with Libertarian ideas of Free Will. In my experience, most arguments about Libertarian free will tend to end up as arguments about determinism, while most arguments around compatibilist definitions of free will end up as arguments about moral agency.

I see LFW as being necessary for moral agency and moral agency does not exist where decisions are determined.

Ok, so straightforward incompatibalism. (LFW and determinism are incompatible)

Where compatibilism allows for internal wants/desires to affect moral decisions, LFW apparently cannot allow that. Under LFW, a person must be able to choose otherwise or to act differently, apparently to choose other than that which one wants/desires, and while wants/desires can influence a person's decision they must not determine the person's decision.

You're mixing two different requirements (see my bolding above). In the first sentence you claim that LFW can not allow wants to affect decisions, but in the last sentence you support this by saying that although LFW can allow influence, it can't allow moral decisions to be determined. Which quite strongly suggests that you feel moral decisions must be determined by wants and desires to be effective? Why wouldn't influence be sufficient?

It seems like you have two choices here. Either you don't have determinism, in which case moral choices are influenced but not determined by prior states (wants/desires), or you have determinism, in which case moral choices are determined by forces external to the actor.

As far as I can tell, the whole issue of free will comes up because of the problem of evil and the only reason that the problem of evil comes up is because of God (as philosophically defined - if God were to exist, then God would have to be X, X,...).

To an extent, sure, and that's where a lot of the history of the problem comes from, but it's also a problem in other areas of morality and ethics, or any other discipline where you might want to model decision making.

I think people are constructing LFW from what it cannot be - it cannot be determined - rather than what it is. If a person cannot choose otherwise, then they cannot exercise LFW. I am not sure whether the ability to choose otherwise excludes the rational consideration of the costs and benefits of options - i.e., would the reduction of options to some rational ordering be deterministic - probably, if that ordering reflected a personal evaluation of what was "best" for the individual (itself reflective of the person's wants/desires).

All that's necessary for consideration of the costs and benefits to be part of decision making under LFW is for the such a consideration to not determine the outcome. Whether that fulfils your idea of 'rational' consideration is a matter of definition, but I don't see any reason to exclude such consideration, just so long as you don't go as far as to claim that the outcome is determined.

It seems to me that nothing escapes determinism except where choices are make "without thinking" or reflexively

??? Can we take an example. Let's say I want an ice-cream. I see an ice-cream truck. There are many considerations in play as to whether or not I buy one. As long as we do not make the claim that the sum of all considerations somehow determines the choice I make, why would they need to be excluded?

Take a more abstract example to make the problem clearer - Say I'm holding in my hands a 'Godelbox', a device with two buttons that light up, one red and one green. The device scans my brain, and then lights up the button I am going to press. In an entirely determined universe, I am going to press the button that lights up - it can be no other way. Yet if I'm sitting there with the box in my hands, looking at the buttons, it seems obvious that I can press either one. What would stop you from pressing the other button?

Anyway, this concept of LFW has proved impossible for me to nail down - as to what people really mean by it.

Well, have you pinned down what you mean by determined? Is it as strong as predestination and fatalism, or is it softer than that, say the position that all events are either strictly determined or entirely random? It sounds like what you're looking for is a step-by-step, not on how LFW 'works', but on how people get by without events being determined.

 

[DBT]

Compatibalism is a dead duck. If determinism is true, freedom of any sort is out of the question. Freedom is not compatible with determinism, where every thought and action is shaped and formed by the process of determinism.

Dont fall into the togo trap: determinism isnt really the issue. The real issue is special pleading: for libertarian free will to work there must some sort of "free will mechanism" since cause/effect + randomsness doest support it.

That's right. I made the comment on the failure of compatibalism due to it's mention as a viable position. Which, given the nature of determinism, it cannot be.

 

[Duke Leto]

People have wills. They will to do this or that. To say that the will is "free" to do this or that - contra-causal freedom - requires, I propose, three things, at least.

1. A person must have an awareness of the choices available.
2. A person must have some sense of the value inherent in the choices that exist.
3. A person must be able to rationally choose this or that.

With regard to (1), contra-causal freedom says that the most basic choice that is required is A and ~A.
With regard to (2), the person must have a sense of the costs and benefits of choosing A and ~A.
With regard to (3), the person is not forced or compelled to choose A or ~A based on the relative values of A or ~A but rationally considers the choices with their values, and his choice of A or ~A is rational.

Does this work?

No, Free Will is made by Rush.

 

[Togo]

Compatibalism is a dead duck. If determinism is true, freedom of any sort is out of the question. Freedom is not compatible with determinism, where every thought and action is shaped and formed by the process of determinism.

Dont fall into the togo trap: determinism isnt really the issue. The real issue is special pleading: for libertarian free will to work there must some sort of "free will mechanism" since cause/effect + randomsness doest support it.

The idea that all events are either determined or random is the soft determinist position. LFW is still incompatible with it.

There is never any need for a LFW to be a special case or need a special mechanism. You don't need a special mechanism to overcome determination in a special case, because you're assuming determinism is false in the first place.

This is presumably what Juma means by the 'Togo Trap' - He wants to claim that LFW requires special pleading as an exception to a more general case, but without discussing what the general case is that LFW needs to overcome. Any general case is either a variation on determinism, or is compatible with LFW.

Not because anyone is making any claims about the nature of the universe, or even about human decision making, but just because of how LFW is defined. LFW is incompatibalist free will - the decision making that is incompatible with determinism. If there is an objection, it has to fall into one of two logically complete categories

1) Determinism or equivalent, which contradicts incompatibalist free will
2) Not determinism or equivalent, in which case it does not contradict incompatibalist free will

The only way around this is to try and redefine incompatibalist free will to have additional features, and then claim it can't exist because those additional features can be overridden.

- - - Updated - - -

Compatibalism is a dead duck. If determinism is true, freedom of any sort is out of the question. Freedom is not compatible with determinism, where every thought and action is shaped and formed by the process of determinism.

Dont fall into the togo trap: determinism isnt really the issue. The real issue is special pleading: for libertarian free will to work there must some sort of "free will mechanism" since cause/effect + randomsness doest support it.

The idea that all events are either determined or random is the soft determinist position. LFW is still incompatible with it.

There is never any need for a LFW to be a special case or need a special mechanism. You don't need a special mechanism to overcome determination in a special case, because you're assuming determinism is false in the first place.

This is presumably what Juma means by the 'Togo Trap' - He wants to claim that LFW requires special pleading as an exception to a more general case, but without discussing what the general case is that LFW needs to overcome. Any general case is either a variation on determinism, or is compatible with LFW.

Not because anyone is making any claims about the nature of the universe, or even about human decision making, but just because of how LFW is defined. LFW is incompatibalist free will - the decision making that is incompatible with determinism. If there is an objection, it has to fall into one of two logically complete categories

1) Determinism or equivalent, which contradicts incompatibalist free will
2) Not determinism or equivalent, in which case it does not contradict incompatibalist free will

The only way around this is to try and redefine incompatibalist free will to have additional features, and then claim it can't exist because those additional features can be overridden.