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Is Ockham's Razor Bullshit?

Isn't another way to consider Occam's Razor ~ Don't be needlessly convoluted?

I think of the scene in The Messenger, where Joan's conscience is talking to her about her finding the sword... and that all of the possible reasonable reasons she found the sword, it seemed odd to assume God did it.
 
BTW, parsimony is not merely a philosophical abstraction. It is a basic principle of inferential statistics applied by practicing scientists in every field that collects quantitative measures. The number of parameters in a mathematical model correspond to number of assumptions. Showing that your model fits the data is never sufficient in any rigorous journal. You must show that a simpler model with fewer parameters cannot explain equal variance in the data, and if it does, then you must conclude that the evidence favors the simpler model, and there is no evidence to warrant the additional parameters. This even applies to something as simple as curve fitting and deciding whether a relationship is non-linear. Non-linear relationships are less parsimonious b/c they require more parameters. Each parameter conceptually represents addition assumed variables that cause inflection points and change the nature of the relationship across values of the two main variables. If you cannot explain significantly more variance with a non-linear curve, then the relationship is treated as linear until shown otherwise.

In fact, even null hypothesis significance testing is a manifestation of the parsimony principle. Random chance factors, including random sampling effects, are a known influence on any observed relationship. Your main "independent" or "predictor" variable is an added assumption. If you cannot show that a systematic variable is required to account for the variance in the data that is likely to exist by chance, given your measures and sampling error, then you have no evidence for your theory.
 
It's easy to see that in engineering, the best bridge is the cheapest one to build, that doesn't collapse under the conditions it is designed to withstand. You can strengthen a bridge by adding additional materials; But you only want to do so if the structure isn't sufficiently strong without them, because more material means more cost.

That principle, applied to ideas rather than structures, is Ockham's Razor. There's nothing 'bullshit' about it - the cheapest structure that does the job is the best. Make it too cheap, and it won't do the job. And if it fails to do the job, it no longer matters how cheap it was.

Ironically, this whole discussion has mushroomed into something insufficiently parsimonious.
 
Ironically, this whole discussion has mushroomed into something insufficiently parsimonious.

I think this is a sign that we're all tired of not leaving our houses, and have nothing interesting to talk about. Maybe one of us can make a new, exciting thread called Is God Real: A Debate.
 
It's easy to see that in engineering, the best bridge is the cheapest one to build, that doesn't collapse under the conditions it is designed to withstand. You can strengthen a bridge by adding additional materials; But you only want to do so if the structure isn't sufficiently strong without them, because more material means more cost.

That principle, applied to ideas rather than structures, is Ockham's Razor. There's nothing 'bullshit' about it - the cheapest structure that does the job is the best. Make it too cheap, and it won't do the job. And if it fails to do the job, it no longer matters how cheap it was.

Ironically, this whole discussion has mushroomed into something insufficiently parsimonious.

But your analogy doesn't actually do the job of explaining why parsimony matters to ideas. Ideas are not "cheaper" b/c they have fewer assumptions, so what is the analogous undesirable quality of a theory impacted by assumptions? If "doing the job" means explaining the data and allowing accurate prediction, then what negative thing do you avoid by doing this job with fewer assumptions?

The answer is that with fewer assumptions you avoid the increased probability that the theory is wrong, which makes the theory more likely to fail to do the job of explaining and predicting future data. Thus, a better engineering analogy is that you want as few neccessary components as possible, not to reduce cost, but to reduce the probability of future failure. Since each component has a failure rate, the total components needed to keep it from falling increases failure probability.
 
... Regardless, I say it’s past time to call [Occam's Razor] bullshit. I realize that this may be controversial here, but bear me out.

Hypothetical situation #1:

Sara thinks Joe stole twenty dollars off her dresser. So, as a test, Sara waits until she and Joe are alone in the house. Then she puts another twenty on her dresser, and then makes sure Joe sees her go out into the yard.

When she goes back in, she finds the twenty missing. She accuses Joe of stealing the money. She says that is the only explanation. She says it is proven.

Joe says there's an explanation that Sara has overlooked: It could have been aliens. It could be that a microscopic race of aliens has invaded the earth. They want to take over. They have decided that the best way to hurt us is to destroy all our money. So they are testing a weapon that disintegrates paper money, reduces it to undetectably fine powder.

And they have been testing this experimental weapon on Sara's dresser.

Sara says that's absurd.

Joe points out that he has heard Sara say that Occam's razor is bullshit, but, if she doesn't use that test, she has no way to distinguish between the aliens-did-it theory and the Joe-is-a-thief theory. In the absence of Occam, the two are equally plausible with each other, and equally plausible with numberless other theories that Joe has not yet taken the trouble to invent.

Hypothetical situation #2:

In 1811, Avogadro proves that water is made of two parts hydrogen to one part oxygen.

Joseph Gadro (an ancestor of Sara's Joe) points out that there is an alternative explanation. It may be that a magical being exists who is a single being but simultaneously three, and who can do anything at all except for defeat iron chariots. This being, if it exists, may have darkened Avogadro's mind when he was doing his experiments. Or the magical being may have left Avogadro's mind intact, but instead messed with Avogadro's experiment so that it just seemed like Avogadro had proven that water is H20. Maybe water is HO2p (one part hydrogen, two parts water, and one part pixie dust).

Joseph says that since he has offered two explanations to Avogadro's single explanation, the odds are two to one against Avogadro being right.

Avogadro protests that the three hypotheses are not equally likely. He can distinguish between them by the use of Occam's razor.

Joseph says Occam's razor hasn't been invented yet.

Avogadro points out that Occam invented his razor in the twelve or thirteen hundreds.

Joseph says maybe so, or maybe an evil demon has hypnotized Avogadro into believing the razor has already been invented when, in reality, it won't actually be invented for another thirty-seven years.

-

My position is that, unless we resort to using Occam's razor, we cannot say that the theories of Avogadro and Sara are more likely than those of Joe and Joseph.
 
Ironically, this whole discussion has mushroomed into something insufficiently parsimonious.

I think this is a sign that we're all tired of not leaving our houses, and have nothing interesting to talk about. Maybe one of us can make a new, exciting thread called Is God Real: A Debate.

Well, it's this or dancing on TikTok.
 
Joe points out that he has heard Sara say that Occam's razor is bullshit, but, if she doesn't use that test, she has no way to distinguish between the aliens-did-it theory and the Joe-is-a-thief theory. In the absence of Occam, the two are equally plausible with each other, and equally plausible with numberless other theories that Joe has not yet taken the trouble to invent.
So in your mind there are only two possibilities:

1. One scenario is most plausible, and you know which one it is due to Ockham's Razor.

or

2. All scenarios are equally plausible.

?
 
Joe points out that he has heard Sara say that Occam's razor is bullshit, but, if she doesn't use that test, she has no way to distinguish between the aliens-did-it theory and the Joe-is-a-thief theory. In the absence of Occam, the two are equally plausible with each other, and equally plausible with numberless other theories that Joe has not yet taken the trouble to invent.
So in your mind there are only two possibilities:

1. One scenario is most plausible, and you know which one it is due to Ockham's Razor.

or

2. All scenarios are equally plausible.

?


If we can't distinguish on some basis, then they are all equally plausible. The razor is the main basis, isn't it?

I'm inviting you to offer another basis for distinguishing, for evaluating.
 
Joe points out that he has heard Sara say that Occam's razor is bullshit, but, if she doesn't use that test, she has no way to distinguish between the aliens-did-it theory and the Joe-is-a-thief theory. In the absence of Occam, the two are equally plausible with each other, and equally plausible with numberless other theories that Joe has not yet taken the trouble to invent.
So in your mind there are only two possibilities:

1. One scenario is most plausible, and you know which one it is due to Ockham's Razor.

or

2. All scenarios are equally plausible.

?


If we can't distinguish on some basis, then they are all equally plausible. The razor is the main basis, isn't it?

I'm inviting you to offer another basis for distinguishing, for evaluating.

Empirical validation.

Deciding what, in your head, has the most "probability" (a term which has no real utility when not derived from a data set), is a terrible basis on which to decide.
 
If we can't distinguish on some basis, then they are all equally plausible. The razor is the main basis, isn't it?

I'm inviting you to offer another basis for distinguishing, for evaluating.

Empirical validation.

Deciding what, in your head, has the most "probability" (a term which has no real utility when not derived from a data set), is a terrible basis on which to decide.


I don't see that we're making progress here.

Can you offer an example of how Sara should empirically validate whether Joe stole her money?
 
If we can't distinguish on some basis, then they are all equally plausible. The razor is the main basis, isn't it?

I'm inviting you to offer another basis for distinguishing, for evaluating.

Empirical validation.

Deciding what, in your head, has the most "probability" (a term which has no real utility when not derived from a data set), is a terrible basis on which to decide.


I don't see that we're making progress here.

Can you offer an example of how Sara should empirically validate whether Joe stole her money?

She should construct her model based on known facts. They don't necessarily have to be about Joe specifically.
 
I don't see that we're making progress here.

Can you offer an example of how Sara should empirically validate whether Joe stole her money?

She should construct her model based on known facts. They don't necessarily have to be about Joe specifically.


Can you tell me how she would do that without using the razor?
 
I don't see that we're making progress here.

Can you offer an example of how Sara should empirically validate whether Joe stole her money?

She should construct her model based on known facts. They don't necessarily have to be about Joe specifically.

It is not a known fact that Joe has thievery tendencies, anymore than it it's a known fact that the aliens think destroying paper money helps them reach their goal.

The latter is one of several unattested facts that needs to be true for the second explanation.
 
If we can't distinguish on some basis, then they are all equally plausible. The razor is the main basis, isn't it?

I'm inviting you to offer another basis for distinguishing, for evaluating.

Empirical validation.

Deciding what, in your head, has the most "probability" (a term which has no real utility when not derived from a data set), is a terrible basis on which to decide.

And yet you and all human beings make such decisions constantly, every day. There is rarely enough direct empirical evidence to determine what is true. And "in your head" isn't arbitrary, it's based upon logic and considering coherence with general facts that determine probabilities but are not specific enough to count as "empirical validation" or direct knowledge of what is true. In fact, applying general theories to specific events is "deciding what, in your head, has the most probability". Such as if you infer that a paper left on the table got onto the floor from the wind. You don't have any data on that particular object or that particular event, and wind is not the only possible reason the paper moved. But of all the countless possibilities, the presence of wind in an otherwise empty house has higher probability than someone coming into your home and doing it, which in turn is more probable than a ghost or the paper being sentient. Our knowledge of the world is useful precisely b/c it serves at the basis to assign probabilities to what might happen and why things did happen when we lack the empirical data to directly validate an idea.
 
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