Axulus
Veteran Member
FIFY
...and just like republican's who cannot support anything Obama comes up with, the Israeli leaders cannot support anything which gets Iran out of economic sanctions.
This deal means Iran gets a nuclear weapon.
Then why are all the nonproliferation experts happy with the deal? Are you trying to pass yourself off as a nuclear expert? No one is going to fall for that.
"I would give it an A": Why nuclear experts love the Iran deal
Jeffrey Lewis was so eager to read the Iran nuclear deal that he woke up at 3:30 am California time to pore through all 150-plus pages of the text. Lewis is a nukes super nerd: He's the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and also runs an excellent arms control blog network and arms control podcast and has a regular arms control column in Foreign Policy. He is the person to talk to on this.
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Max Fisher: We did a post just rounding up tweets from arms control analysts on what they're saying about the Iran deal, and it was really hard to find arms control analysts who seem to be critical of the deal on the nonproliferation merits. Maybe there are some we just missed, but it seems like the consensus was overwhelmingly positive, which was so interesting to me because it's very different from the conversation among Middle East policy analysts, which is much more divided. Why do you think that is?
Jeffrey Lewis: If you are interested in the nonproliferation piece — how to say this. As a deal, this is what deals look like. Actually, they usually don't look this good. So if you don't know that...
When I read people saying, you know, "I can't believe we're making a deal with these morally dubious people," I understand why a regional security specialist might feel that way.
But when you work in the arms control field, they're all morally dubious people! These are people who are building nuclear weapons — there are no not-morally-dubious people involved. So when you take that out of the equation, you end up just looking at, "Do these limits slow them down, are they verifiable, are we likely to catch them if they cheat, are we likely to have enough time to do anything?"
The problem [for regional analysts] is not going to be the terms. It's not going to be how it's written. It's going to be the fact that one side or another decides they don't like the idea of it. But the deal itself can still be perfectly workable.
Max Fisher: Now that we're here, what grade would you give it?
Jeffrey Lewis: I would give it an A.
Max Fisher: A solid A!
Jeffrey Lewis: I mean, it's hard. There are two pieces to this.
Compared to the deal we could have gotten 10 years ago, if the Bush administration hadn't had their heads up their butts? Not an A! That would have been a great deal!
I remember when they had 164 centrifuges, in one cascade, and I said, "You know what, we should let them keep it in warm standby. No uranium, just gas." And people were like, "You're givin' away the store!"
Max Fisher: We would kill for that now! They got cut down to 5,000 centrifuges, and it's a huge deal.
Jeffrey Lewis: Exactly. And that's been the fundamental experience of this for me. Every six months, the deal we could have gotten six months before looks better. Every time we tried to hold out for a better deal, and every time we got in the position of a worse deal.
So, compared to where they started, and what I thought was feasible to achieve, this team I thought did a fantastic job. If this team had been in place in 2003 or 2004 or 2005, it might have looked even better. But they inherited what they inherited, and they did a pretty decent job with it. How could I give them less than A?
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So you ask, "Does it slow it down?" Yes. "Does it slow it down in a way that is verifiable?" Yes. "Does it slow it down more than bombing it would?" Yes. "Okay, good deal."
http://www.vox.com/2015/7/15/8967147/iran-nuclear-deal-jeffrey-lewis