Knowledge

[fast]

Which brings us to ....

Knowledge is an abstract aspect of being informed and a totally useless concept in most discourses. Justified belief is enough. All that goobliwok about "truth" should be left behind.

Ok. Knowledge is an abstract aspect of being informed. If one only uses one's mind and the information it has it may be that justified true belief may be the only recourse for that mind. However if that mind has the power to observe and test JTB becomes largely irrelevant since new information is possible which can remove that which JTB is used to resolve.

No, the result of the test is just another justified belief. (And ditch the "truth" from JTB, it doesnt add anything useful)

If what we're justified in believing happens to be false, then we shouldn't say we have knowledge of what we're justified in believing.

I think we should. Because if we would not allow any of our knowledge to be the tiniest bit of false then there would be no knowledge at all and knowlede would be a ridiciously useless concept.

We know things. Some of the things we think we know are in fact true. Granted, I can't be so certain that it's impossible to be mistaken when I think I know things, but that's okay, because there is no necessary condition that requires that I must be correct...only that I am.

As I just pointed out we don't know. With material evidence and a reasonable method we can build understanding, but, understandfing is only as good as what we understand here and now.

We have an understanding of things that we may come to find out do not quite match reality, but there are still things we know. For instance, I know my name. You don't know yours?

 

[Juma]

We have an understanding of things that we may come to find out do not quite match reality, but there are still things we know. For instance, I know my name. You don't know yours?

That would depend on what mean with "know". Since you seem to mean that knowledge require truth then you may or may not know your name, but you can never know wether you know.

 

[fromderinside]

We have an understanding of things that we may come to find out do not quite match reality, but there are still things we know. For instance, I know my name. You don't know yours?

Up to 'but' you were doing just fine. We are very evolved social beings. What we use to say 'we know' require these advanced attributes. Remove language, Remove social contact. Now what do you know? I take the view that evolution for a given being is aggrative, that is to say built upon what existed prior. My understanding of such suggests very strongly that piling on bells and whistles does not bring knowledge. Rather it brings means to manipulate understandings which even in worms I can demonstrate such.

Short answer: I don't know my name. I use a name. You catalog against my name your understanding of me as do I. That's it.

 

[fast]

We have an understanding of things that we may come to find out do not quite match reality, but there are still things we know. For instance, I know my name. You don't know yours?

That would depend on what mean with "know". Since you seem to mean that knowledge require truth then you may or may not know your name, but you can never know wether you know.

If you change, "may" to "might", I agree. There is a bare possibility (like a logical possibility) that I do not know my name, so I might (a bare possibility) not know my name, but there is good possibility (because of good evidence) that I do know my name.

It's possible that your good friend's house might (might, I say) be on fire, but the bare possibility alone doesn't prompt you to call the fire department, for logical possibilities in no way suggest truth, but if you were told by someone that your good friend's house was on fire, and if you hear on the radio (while driving in your good friends neighborhood) that there is a house on fire, and if you see smoke in the air, then it's more than merely logically possible that the house is on fire, so not only might it be on fire, it indeed may (may, I say) be on fire, and because it may (and not merely might) be on fire, it would make sense to act--if if it so happens to turn out that it wasn't on fire.

Of course, even if I have reason to believe something, what I may believe is not necessarily true. In fact, not much of what we know are necessary truths, but there is a difference (an important difference) between what is the case and what must be the case. You're right, it's not the case that I must know my name. After all, just because I may know my name, that's no guarantee that I do, but knowledge isn't a function of believing in justified necessary truths. It's not necessary that we know we know something in order to actually (actually, I say) know something.

 

[fast]

We have an understanding of things that we may come to find out do not quite match reality, but there are still things we know. For instance, I know my name. You don't know yours?

Up to 'but' you were doing just fine. We are very evolved social beings. What we use to say 'we know' require these advanced attributes. Remove language, Remove social contact. Now what do you know? I take the view that evolution for a given being is aggrative, that is to say built upon what existed prior. My understanding of such suggests very strongly that piling on bells and whistles does not bring knowledge. Rather it brings means to manipulate understandings which even in worms I can demonstrate such.

Short answer: I don't know my name. I use a name. You catalog against my name your understanding of me as do I. That's it.

You say you don't know your name, but I believe you do know your name, but I think i know why you don't think you know your name, and I believe it has more to do with what you think it means to say of something that you know something than it does with you actually knowing your name or not. I think you're elevating the meaning of knowledge to something that is virtually unattainable in most circumstances--something similar to Cartesian certainty. Essentially, there is always some imagined reason that could possibly come along to show that someone really didn't know their name. In fact, if we are extreme, we could think of a reason which could possibly be true to show that no one really truly knows their name, but these wild possibilities that could by chance surface, however, doesn't go to show that what we believe isn't actually true--just that it's possibly true. Truth (actual truth) is the necessary condition of knowledge ... so the possibility (the mere logical possibility) that we could be mistaken doesn't imply nor otherwise entail that we are.

 

[no-one-particular]

I have never been to Boston nor to LA and I don't have a map in front of me
yet I know beyond a reasonable doubt that the distance from Boston to LA is more than 10 meters and less than 10 light years

you don't need to know everything about everything to know some things about some things

 

[doubtingt]

The JTB theory of "knowledge" is uselessly non-psychological and ignores epistemic concerns.

All we can ever know is whether a belief meets standards of justification. That is the only sense in which we can know that a belief is "true". Thus, psychologically, justification = truth where "truth" has an upper limit below absolute certainty and closer to "likely true enough to warrant belief and acting as though it is true."
Rather than focussing on the knowledge/belief distinction as though they are qualitatively distinct, we's get a lot more traction by recognizing all acceptance of ideas are "beliefs" (just meaning accepting a claim as an accurate reflection of reality), and the distinction is the degree to which that acceptance/belief is rationally justified or based in motives other than rational justification and probable accuracy.

IOW, the creationist and "evolutionist" both have beliefs about the claims of evolution and creationism. The difference is that the evolutionists tend to have more rational justification for their beliefs whereas creationists have the motive of believing what they emotionally prefer to be true.

The field of psychology refers to "knowledge" just as ideas that are represented in the mind/brain. IOW, I can have knowledge of the theory of evolution and thus know the theory of evolution, but that is independent of whether I believe in or disbelieve those ideas, and from whether those beliefs are justified. IOW, its a misnomer to say "I know that X is true", because assigning a truth value to X is belief not knowledge. You can know of claim X, and you can believe that X is true.
I think this is a far more useful way of defining and relating belief and knowledge that what Plato or other version of JTB theories have to say.

 

[fromderinside]

We have an understanding of things that we may come to find out do not quite match reality, but there are still things we know. For instance, I know my name. You don't know yours?

Short answer: I don't know my name. I use a name. You catalog against my name your understanding of me as do I. That's it.

.... Essentially, there is always some imagined reason that could possibly come along to show that someone really didn't know their name. In fact, if we are extreme, we could think of a reason which could possibly be true to show that no one really truly knows their name, but these wild possibilities that could by chance surface, however, doesn't go to show that what we believe isn't actually true--just that it's possibly true. Truth (actual truth) is the necessary condition of knowledge ... so the possibility (the mere logical possibility) that we could be mistaken doesn't imply nor otherwise entail that we are.

I'm comfortable with the idea that we are beings limited in time and space and that the best we can possibly do is gain an understanding for the here and now. Truth is something those who have the luxury can consider but its something they can never hold.

I'm much more certain of my understanding that I have been given a name, not a unique name, but one rare enough for the present. I understand what is the name I was given to a near certainty in the Cartesian sense. The little good that understanding will help us get anywhere in this discussion.

For instance, my name is Kendrick. My dad chose that name because a doctor friend of his had that name and he got rid of a pigmentation problem on my face right after I was born using radium. Otherwise I know nothing of that Kendrick, not even where or how he came by that name, nor from whence such a name came. Obviously I understand I do not know my name.

Yet I will answer up when my name is called within my range of hearing it. I accept it as a label for me as a specific being in the vicinity I occupy. Since I don't know why I am here, where here is beyond some tags put to things about where I am, nor how, or what, elements about my presumed existence that could bring this discussion to a certainty halt. Obviously I understand I do not know my name.

....

like that.

 

[fast]

The JTB theory of "knowledge" is uselessly non-psychological and ignores epistemic concerns.

All we can ever know is whether a belief meets standards of justification. That is the only sense in which we can know that a belief is "true". Thus, psychologically, justification = truth where "truth" has an upper limit below absolute certainty and closer to "likely true enough to warrant belief and acting as though it is true."
Rather than focussing on the knowledge/belief distinction as though they are qualitatively distinct, we's get a lot more traction by recognizing all acceptance of ideas are "beliefs" (just meaning accepting a claim as an accurate reflection of reality), and the distinction is the degree to which that acceptance/belief is rationally justified or based in motives other than rational justification and probable accuracy.

IOW, the creationist and "evolutionist" both have beliefs about the claims of evolution and creationism. The difference is that the evolutionists tend to have more rational justification for their beliefs whereas creationists have the motive of believing what they emotionally prefer to be true.

The field of psychology refers to "knowledge" just as ideas that are represented in the mind/brain. IOW, I can have knowledge of the theory of evolution and thus know the theory of evolution, but that is independent of whether I believe in or disbelieve those ideas, and from whether those beliefs are justified. IOW, its a misnomer to say "I know that X is true", because assigning a truth value to X is belief not knowledge. You can know of claim X, and you can believe that X is true.
I think this is a far more useful way of defining and relating belief and knowledge that what Plato or other version of JTB theories have to say.

Knowing that a belief is true is about knowing something and is a different issue. It's a step away from knowing we know something, and that too is yet not at issue. How do we know versus how do we know we know has been done to death.

My main point is that if we believe something, and if we are justified in that belief, then whether we know and not merely believe has no more to do with either justification or belief. Instead, it has to do with whether what we believe is true. That's not to say we need to embark on yet another journey to figure out if we in fact know, as that changes the subject. We don't need to answer whether we know that we know. The key is rather quite simple: if what we justifiably believe is true, then we know. If, I say. Just if. When the elements are satisfied (save Gettier examples), then whether we know they are or not is inconsequential and goes to speak on a different issue.

People who overthink this have a very strong tendency to deny knowledge only because they might be mistaken, but that fear is unfounded, because what I'm saying allows for the possibility of mistake, just not the actuality of mistake.

If I have a justified belief and claim that I know something, then whether or not I in fact know will solely depend on whether I am mistaken. Many times, we are not mistaken in our justified beliefs, so many times, we do in fact know just what we believe we do.

 

[no-one-particular]

simply observing the sun rise again and again is not sufficient to know beyond a reasonable doubt that it will rise again tomorrow.
one must understand the reasons why the Sun rises

 

[Juma]

...and claim that I know something....

Exactly: the word "know" is used to make a claim, nothing else.

Knowledge is not something that exist or not.
Information does, but not knowledge.

"I know that A" =
"I understand what A means and I claim that this best describes what is the case".

How is this different from justified belief?

 

[fast]

simply observing the sun rise again and again is not sufficient to know beyond a reasonable doubt that it will rise again tomorrow.
one must understand the reasons why the Sun rises

Reasonable doubt? What has that to do with anything? If we had good reason to doubt, why claim knowledge? I have observed my vehicle cranking time and time again without fail, but there have been times when it hasn't, and even then I do believe I know my vehicle will crank, but the longtime observation of the sun rising without ever once failing surely gives me justification to conclude (inductively, of course) my belief is true, and if (just if, mind you) my justified belief is true (actually true, that is), then I do know (yes indeed I do know) that the sun will rise once again tomorrow. Could something occur? Yes, so I might (just might, not may) be mistaken, yet the possibility of mistake is no good reason to deny that I will actually be correct, and should it turn out that it doesn't, then I claimed to know yet did not know, not because I had no justification (or belief), nope, not for that ... Only because it wasn't actually true, and it's actuality (not possibility) that is important, as that is the relevant condition at issue.

 

[no-one-particular]

if you understood the reasons why the Sun rises then you would understand that there is no reason why the Sun would not rise tomorrow
and that therefore it must rise tomorrow beyond a reasonable doubt

the possibility that it will not rise tomorrow is unreasonable

it may be true that nothing is known beyond all doubt but some things are known beyond a reasonable doubt

 

[fast]

if you understood the reasons why the Sun rises then you would understand that there is no reason why the Sun would not rise tomorrow
and that therefore it must rise tomorrow beyond a reasonable doubt

the possibility that it will not rise tomorrow is unreasonable

it may be true that nothing is known beyond all doubt but some things are known beyond a reasonable doubt

Are we at odds?

 

[Bomb#20]

simply observing the sun rise again and again is not sufficient to know beyond a reasonable doubt that it will rise again tomorrow.
one must understand the reasons why the Sun rises

That hypothesis makes no sense. What does it mean to understand why the sun rises, other than that one can see how the operation of some other regularity of the universe implies the sun will rise? For instance, we understand the sun rises (relative to a human observer) because of gravity holding the observer on the earth. If gravity were to turn off then the observer would be flung into space and stop seeing sunrises. But merely knowing the sun rises because of gravity cannot logically be sufficient to know beyond a reasonable doubt that it will rise again tomorrow, unless one also knows beyond a reasonable doubt that gravity will continue to operate tomorrow. But according to your principle, we can't know beyond a reasonable doubt that gravity (or whatever other underlying regularity our understanding is appealing to) will continue operating tomorrow, unless we understand the reasons why that regularity obtains. And that would require our understanding to rely on some deeper third regularity underlying the second; and so forth. Therefore, your hypothesis implies an infinite regress of reasons we must understand in order to know anything beyond reasonable doubt. But our finite brains cannot understand an infinite chain of reasons; they simply don't have enough wetware to store that much information.

So if we know beyond reasonable doubt that anything at all will continue, then it follows that there must be something we know beyond reasonable doubt will continue, merely because we have observed it again and again. Here's a likely candidate for that something: do you understand the reasons why masses induce gravitational fields?

 

[no-one-particular]

as I said nothing is nothing beyond all doubt
we just know things beyond a reasonable doubt.
There is no reason to think the gravity will cease to operate.

eventually we will understand all of the causes and effects in operation within this universe.
We may not be there yet and if you wanna get technical about it then indeed we may not yet know beyond a reasonable doubt whether gravity will cease to operate
even when we do finally understand everything about this universe that still leaves the possibility of something coming in from outside our universe.
in the end I suppose we will have to append all of our deductions with "barring an act of God".
I guess it just boils down to whether you think an "act of God" is a reasonable possibility or not

 

[no-one-particular]

eventually we will understand the reasons why gravity operates and indeed why everything acts the way it does
and once we have that understanding the only doubt that will remain is the trivial possibility of something coming in from entirely outside our universe.
that doubt will always remain.

and I define "our universe" as everything that has ever interacted with us
therefore in all of history nothing has ever come in from outside our universe

 

[arkirk]

eventually we will understand the reasons why gravity operates and indeed why everything acts the way it does
and once we have that understanding the only doubt that will remain is the trivial possibility of something coming in from entirely outside our universe.
that doubt will always remain.

and I define "our universe" as everything that has ever interacted with us
therefore in all of history nothing has ever come in from outside our universe

So now you are defining the universe? Don't you think your arguments are a bit presumptive and a bit of a tautology. Can you actually monitor the entire universe and really be certain that nothing has ever come in from outside our universe? Isn't this more a suggestion of your feelings about the universe?

 

[Underseer]

simply observing the sun rise again and again is not sufficient to know beyond a reasonable doubt that it will rise again tomorrow.
one must understand the reasons why the Sun rises

That hypothesis makes no sense. What does it mean to understand why the sun rises, other than that one can see how the operation of some other regularity of the universe implies the sun will rise? For instance, we understand the sun rises (relative to a human observer) because of gravity holding the observer on the earth. If gravity were to turn off then the observer would be flung into space and stop seeing sunrises. But merely knowing the sun rises because of gravity cannot logically be sufficient to know beyond a reasonable doubt that it will rise again tomorrow, unless one also knows beyond a reasonable doubt that gravity will continue to operate tomorrow. But according to your principle, we can't know beyond a reasonable doubt that gravity (or whatever other underlying regularity our understanding is appealing to) will continue operating tomorrow, unless we understand the reasons why that regularity obtains. And that would require our understanding to rely on some deeper third regularity underlying the second; and so forth. Therefore, your hypothesis implies an infinite regress of reasons we must understand in order to know anything beyond reasonable doubt. But our finite brains cannot understand an infinite chain of reasons; they simply don't have enough wetware to store that much information.

So if we know beyond reasonable doubt that anything at all will continue, then it follows that there must be something we know beyond reasonable doubt will continue, merely because we have observed it again and again. Here's a likely candidate for that something: do you understand the reasons why masses induce gravitational fields?

If you want an example of something causing the Sun to not rise tomorrow, I think a better example would be a very massive object passing near or through the Solar system and disturbing the Earth's orbit and rotation in any number of ways (e.g. ejecting the Earth from the Solar system entirely). This would be much more likely than gravity turning off out of the blue.

 

[Bomb#20]

If you want an example of something causing the Sun to not rise tomorrow, I think a better example would be a very massive object passing near or through the Solar system and disturbing the Earth's orbit and rotation in any number of ways (e.g. ejecting the Earth from the Solar system entirely). This would be much more likely than gravity turning off out of the blue.

But that's not what I wanted an example of. I wanted an example of something our understanding of why the sun rises depends on.

The odds against a very massive object passing through the Solar system and ejecting the Earth from the Solar system entirely are, well, astronomical. Moreover, if such an event happens today it will almost certainly not cause the Sun to not rise tomorrow -- you can kick the Earth up to escape velocity and it will still take years for us to get far enough away to stop seeing sunrises. To do it in one day you'd have to be talking some other galaxy's central core black hole; those tend to be headed away from us. Failing that, you'd need not an orbit disturbance but a direct hit. Either scenario, pulling a number out of my ass, the chance is less than one in a billion billion. Do you agree?

So that's more likely than gravity turning off out of the blue. That makes the chance of gravity turning off out of the blue less than one in a billion billion. I'd say that counts as beyond reasonable doubt. Do you agree?

We have no idea what the reasons are for why masses induce gravitational fields. It's one of the last great mysteries of modern physics. Do you agree?

If you agree with all those, my conclusion follows. We know beyond reasonable doubt that masses will still induce gravitational fields tomorrow, simply from observing them do so again and again.