Knowledge

[Speakpigeon]

Does the fact that it might not rise tomorrow imply that I don't know the sun will rise? No, not at all. It just means that I can't be so incredibly certain that it's impossible to be mistaken. If the impossibility of mistake was a necessary condition of knowledge, then you'd be right, I don't know if the sun will rise. Fortunately, no such condition is a necessary condition of knowledge.

If you know that the Sun will rise tomorrow then it is true that it will rise.

Obviously, I may be mistaken in my belief that I know that the Sun will rise tomorrow and if so the Sun may or may not rise. But if you know it will rise then it will rise.

What would be the use of knowledge if knowing that the Sun will rise tomorrow didn't entail that it will?
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

if "knowledge" includes the requirement of truth then you are wrong. If it doesnt then it is = justified belief.

What do you mean by ""knowledge""?

Also, truth seems a requirement. If I know that p then it's true that p (or: then p is true). Of course, the question is whether we ever get to know that p. I think not, but to use the word "knowledge" as you do (if you do), without any implication of truth, is just using the word wrongly.
EB

 

[Juma]

if "knowledge" includes the requirement of truth then you are wrong. If it doesnt then it is = justified belief.

What do you mean by ""knowledge""?

Also, truth seems a requirement. If I know that p then it's true that p (or: then p is true). Of course, the question is whether we ever get to know that p. I think not, but to use the word "knowledge" as you do (if you do), without any implication of truth, is just using the word wrongly.
EB

You are aware that you totally contradict yourself?

 

[fast]

Does the fact that it might not rise tomorrow imply that I don't know the sun will rise? No, not at all. It just means that I can't be so incredibly certain that it's impossible to be mistaken. If the impossibility of mistake was a necessary condition of knowledge, then you'd be right, I don't know if the sun will rise. Fortunately, no such condition is a necessary condition of knowledge.

if "knowledge" includes the requirement of truth then you are wrong. If it doesnt then it is = justified belief.

That something will happen does imply that something must happen.

I believe I'm going to work tomorrow, and I'm justified in that belief. Yes, things 'might' happen that will prevent me from going, but the question isn't whether I'm so certain that I'll go to work tomorrow that it's impossible to be mistaken. Do I know I'm going? Yes, I know. If I don't go, then golly gee, I was wrong, and I didn't know when I thought I did, but if I do go, then because the justified belief is true, then although I could have been mistaken, I wasn't, and it's the fact I wasn't that is crucial to whether I know or not--not the possibility that it might have turned out differently.

 

[fast]

If you know that the Sun will rise tomorrow then it is true that it will rise.

I agree, for knowledge implies truth.

Obviously, I may be mistaken in my belief that I know that the Sun will rise tomorrow and if so the Sun may or may not rise. But if you know it will rise then it will rise.

You really shouldn't say that I may be mistaken merely because I might be. There is so much justification to believe it will rise to say that it may not. Sure, there's a remote (bare) possibility, but such a low possibility is no excuse for saying there's a good (or substantial) chance that it may actually not rise, but yes, if I know it will, then it will.

What would be the use of knowledge if knowing that the Sun will rise tomorrow didn't entail that it will?
EB

Let's be careful. Knowledge implies truth; hence, if you know P, then P is true, but just because something is true, that doesn't imply that P must be true. Knowledge doesn't imply necessity.

If I say that I know something, I'm certainly doing more than conveying a belief; Knowledge implies belief, but it also implies justification for that belief. Even then, if what I justifiably believe turns out not to be true, then I shouldn't claim knowledge, and if I already have, I should acknowledge that I was wrong. But, if I am justified in my belief, there is no problem in claiming knowledge just because there is the possibility of being in error.

Eta: if it's impossible to be mistaken, it would be unnecessarily safe to claim knowledge; in that instance, I should be claiming infallibility. That reminds me of those who know things but nervously choose to claim the less committal belief.

 

[Juma]

I agree, for knowledge implies truth.

Obviously, I may be mistaken in my belief that I know that the Sun will rise tomorrow and if so the Sun may or may not rise. But if you know it will rise then it will rise.

You really shouldn't say that I may be mistaken merely because I might be. There is so much justification to believe it will rise to say that it may not. Sure, there's a remote (bare) possibility, but such a low possibility is no excuse for saying there's a good (or substantial) chance that it may actually not rise, but yes, if I know it will, then it will.

What would be the use of knowledge if knowing that the Sun will rise tomorrow didn't entail that it will?
EB

Let's be careful. Knowledge implies truth; hence, if you know P, then P is true, but just because something is true, that doesn't imply that P must be true. Knowledge doesn't imply necessity.

If I say that I know something, I'm certainly doing more than conveying a belief; Knowledge implies belief, but it also implies justification for that belief. Even then, if what I justifiably believe turns out not to be true, then I shouldn't claim knowledge, and if I already have, I should acknowledge that I was wrong. But, if I am justified in my belief, there is no problem in claiming knowledge just because there is the possibility of being in error.

claiming knowledge also doesnt add anything beyond claiming justified belief.

 

[fast]

I agree, for knowledge implies truth.

You really shouldn't say that I may be mistaken merely because I might be. There is so much justification to believe it will rise to say that it may not. Sure, there's a remote (bare) possibility, but such a low possibility is no excuse for saying there's a good (or substantial) chance that it may actually not rise, but yes, if I know it will, then it will.

What would be the use of knowledge if knowing that the Sun will rise tomorrow didn't entail that it will?
EB

Let's be careful. Knowledge implies truth; hence, if you know P, then P is true, but just because something is true, that doesn't imply that P must be true. Knowledge doesn't imply necessity.

If I say that I know something, I'm certainly doing more than conveying a belief; Knowledge implies belief, but it also implies justification for that belief. Even then, if what I justifiably believe turns out not to be true, then I shouldn't claim knowledge, and if I already have, I should acknowledge that I was wrong. But, if I am justified in my belief, there is no problem in claiming knowledge just because there is the possibility of being in error.

claiming knowledge also doesnt add anything beyond claiming justified belief.

It's also a claim that the justified belief is true. If I believe P, and if I'm justified in my belief that P, then what I claim to know isn't something I in fact know if what I'm justified in believing happens to be false.

 

[fromderinside]

Presume I'm right about the following: The best we can do is operationalize the world we experience and call that operational knowledge.

Operationalize is to relate a target element to other elements in that world that are consistent through some kind of measurement.

In such a setup JTB can be no more than result in nominal operationalized knowledge since the only measures are exist or doesn't exist.

In the world of operations nominal is the lowest level of measurement, the one with which we can do the least.

So what we are talking about here seems to me to be the least significant level of understanding.

 

[Juma]

It's also a claim that the justified belief is true.

And that is totally superflous.

 

[fast]

It's also a claim that the justified belief is true.

And that is totally superflous.

I'm not sure what you're getting at. If I have have a justified belief that P is true, and if P is false, then my justified belief is false, and I don't know P since I have a justified belief that P is true yet P is false. You're the one who said ...doesn't add anything beyond...

 

[Speakpigeon]

What do you mean by ""knowledge""?

Also, truth seems a requirement. If I know that p then it's true that p (or: then p is true). Of course, the question is whether we ever get to know that p. I think not, but to use the word "knowledge" as you do (if you do), without any implication of truth, is just using the word wrongly.
EB

You are aware that you totally contradict yourself?

Please explain.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

if "knowledge" includes the requirement of truth then you are wrong. If it doesnt then it is = justified belief.

That something will happen does imply that something must happen.

I believe I'm going to work tomorrow, and I'm justified in that belief. Yes, things 'might' happen that will prevent me from going, but the question isn't whether I'm so certain that I'll go to work tomorrow that it's impossible to be mistaken. Do I know I'm going? Yes, I know. If I don't go, then golly gee, I was wrong, and I didn't know when I thought I did, but if I do go, then because the justified belief is true, then although I could have been mistaken, I wasn't, and it's the fact I wasn't that is crucial to whether I know or not--not the possibility that it might have turned out differently.

So if you know that p you may not know that you do? Being certain that you know p doesn't guaranty that you know p. How is that different from believing that p and being right or wrong in the event? You can't claim to know, even if you do, since you're not sure. Whatever justification you think you have that your belief is true is also useless since you're not sure. This makes knowledge a kind of metaphysical state. You know p but you don't know that you know p and when you think you know p maybe you're wrong.
So, what's the use of knowing that p exactly?
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I agree, for knowledge implies truth.

Obviously, I may be mistaken in my belief that I know that the Sun will rise tomorrow and if so the Sun may or may not rise. But if you know it will rise then it will rise.

You really shouldn't say that I may be mistaken merely because I might be. There is so much justification to believe it will rise to say that it may not. Sure, there's a remote (bare) possibility, but such a low possibility is no excuse for saying there's a good (or substantial) chance that it may actually not rise, but yes, if I know it will, then it will.

For all I know the sun may not rise tomorrow.

You can disagree with my use of "may" but I'm certain it's entirely appropriate.

Also, it's not a matter of how many of the stars that are very similar to the sun do suddenly blow up. Very few I'm sure but probabilities don't apply to what you don't know.
EB

 

[Juma]

And that is totally superflous.

I'm not sure what you're getting at. If I have have a justified belief that P is true, and if P is false, then my justified belief is false, and I don't know P since I have a justified belief that P is true yet P is false. You're the one who said ...doesn't add anything beyond...

Please give a real world example where "I know that A" means something else than "my belief of A is justified".

 

[Juma]

You are aware that you totally contradict yourself?

Please explain.
EB

Eh? I think i must have confused your and fasts posts.

 

[fast]

That something will happen does imply that something must happen.

I believe I'm going to work tomorrow, and I'm justified in that belief. Yes, things 'might' happen that will prevent me from going, but the question isn't whether I'm so certain that I'll go to work tomorrow that it's impossible to be mistaken. Do I know I'm going? Yes, I know. If I don't go, then golly gee, I was wrong, and I didn't know when I thought I did, but if I do go, then because the justified belief is true, then although I could have been mistaken, I wasn't, and it's the fact I wasn't that is crucial to whether I know or not--not the possibility that it might have turned out differently.

So if you know that p you may not know that you do? Being certain that you know p doesn't guaranty that you know p. How is that different from believing that p and being right or wrong in the event? You can't claim to know, even if you do, since you're not sure. Whatever justification you think you have that your belief is true is also useless since you're not sure. This makes knowledge a kind of metaphysical state. You know p but you don't know that you know p and when you think you know p maybe you're wrong.
So, what's the use of knowing that p exactly?
EB

Knowing P and knowing that I know P are different. If the conditions of knowledge are met, then I know P, but Knowing P is insufficient for knowing that I know P.

If by certain, you mean confident, then yes, you're right, being certain that I know P doesn't mean that I know P.

If I believe P and am not justified in believing P, then I shouldn't claim to know P, but if I believe P and am justified in my belief, then even should it be the case that I might be wrong, it's acceptable to claim that I know P.

If I claim to know P based on a justified belief, then although I may not know that I know (afterall, I might be mistaken), the necessary conditions have been met --if they have (and I therefore know P); alternatively, if I claim to know P based on a justified belief, and if that justified belief is false, then although it was acceptable to claim that I know P, I never knew P when I thought I did, let alone know that I know P. Notice in neither case did I know that I Know P, but in the first case, I did know P ... All conditions were met.

 

[fast]

I agree, for knowledge implies truth.

You really shouldn't say that I may be mistaken merely because I might be. There is so much justification to believe it will rise to say that it may not. Sure, there's a remote (bare) possibility, but such a low possibility is no excuse for saying there's a good (or substantial) chance that it may actually not rise, but yes, if I know it will, then it will.

For all I know the sun may not rise tomorrow.

You can disagree with my use of "may" but I'm certain it's entirely appropriate.

Also, it's not a matter of how many of the stars that are very similar to the sun do suddenly blow up. Very few I'm sure but probabilities don't apply to what you don't know.
EB

Not too many people make the distinction. I do. But, I hope you don't think it's just as likely that the sun won't rise tomorrow as it is that it will.

 

[fast]

I'm not sure what you're getting at. If I have have a justified belief that P is true, and if P is false, then my justified belief is false, and I don't know P since I have a justified belief that P is true yet P is false. You're the one who said ...doesn't add anything beyond...

Please give a real world example where "I know that A" means something else than "my belief of A is justified".

I'm outside and see my cat run into the house as the front door is opened.

Let's assume I have a justified belief that my cat is inside.

Scenario 1: the cat didn't run out the back door, so my justified belief is true
Scenario 2: the cat did run out the back door, so my justified belief is false.

Scenario 1: this is more than having a justified belief
Scenario 2: this is not more than having a justified belief

In both scenarios, I have a justified belief, but I know what I'm justified in believing in only one of the scenarios.

Your real world example is scenario 1

 

[Juma]

Please give a real world example where "I know that A" means something else than "my belief of A is justified".

I'm outside and see my cat run into the house as the front door is opened.

Let's assume I have a justified belief that my cat is inside.

Scenario 1: the cat didn't run out the back door, so my justified belief is true
Scenario 2: the cat did run out the back door, so my justified belief is false.

Scenario 1: this is more than having a justified belief
Scenario 2: this is not more than having a justified belief

In both scenarios, I have a justified belief, but I know what I'm justified in believing in only one of the scenarios.

Your real world example is scenario 1

What is the difference? I cannot see that there is a difference for anyone at the time referenced in the the example.

It is a difference when retelling the case: when you have perspective of an omniscient god, but it is of no significance at the time of the event. Also note that the difference between that you know and you dont know has nothing to do with you. It is solely depending what the cat does. Thus the cat decides what you know or doesnt know. Thus it is pretty stupid to attribute this property "knowledge" to you.

 

[Underseer]

I have never been to Boston nor to LA and I don't have a map in front of me
yet I know beyond a reasonable doubt that the distance from Boston to LA is more than 10 meters and less than 10 light years

you don't need to know everything about everything to know some things about some things

How do you know that Boston and LA even exist? You could be a brain in a vat or a piece of software running as part of a vast simulation.

Every piece of information in your brain (except for certain internal observations that you can never prove to others) had to pass through the filter of your flawed perception, the biases inherent in whatever language you use, and a whole laundry list of cognitive biases in your brain. Every piece of information you have about the outside world is suspect, and thus every conclusion you form on them is also suspect.

There are some things that are very likely to be true so far as we can tell, but even to say something like "The Germ Theory of Disease is almost certainly true," we still have to make a large number of assumptions (e.g. the universe actually exists, the sensory data we gather represents something in a real universe, etc.) just to reach that point.