Knowledge

[Bomb#20]

as I said nothing is nothing beyond all doubt
we just know things beyond a reasonable doubt.
There is no reason to think the gravity will cease to operate.

Exactly. Likewise, back in the days when we had no idea why the sun rose and all we had were precise Stonehenge observations of the events, there was no reason to think sunrises would cease to operate.

eventually we will understand all of the causes and effects in operation within this universe.

No we won't. Every case of understanding a cause and effect is simply an explanation of the form "Y causes Z." If we ever find out why Y occurs, that's just "X causes Y." At any given moment in history this sequence must necessarily terminate at some phenomenon we do not understand the cause of.

We may not be there yet and if you wanna get technical about it then indeed we may not yet know beyond a reasonable doubt whether gravity will cease to operate

If we don't know beyond a reasonable doubt whether gravity will cease to operate, it follows that we don't know beyond a reasonable doubt whether the sun will come up tomorrow. But as you said, we do know things beyond a reasonable doubt. You weren't talking only about mathematical facts; you were talking about events that one could understand reasons for. So, getting technical, we can predict events beyond a reasonable doubt simply from observing them.

Incidentally, have you been reading David Deutsch's books? He's very much into "solving" the infamous problem of induction by rejecting it completely, insisting that knowledge requires explanation. I haven't seen him address the infinite regress objection to his theory.

even when we do finally understand everything about this universe that still leaves the possibility of something coming in from outside our universe.
in the end I suppose we will have to append all of our deductions with "barring an act of God".
I guess it just boils down to whether you think an "act of God" is a reasonable possibility or not

If an act of God were capable of affecting our universe, why wouldn't God count as part of our universe?

and I define "our universe" as everything that has ever interacted with us
therefore in all of history nothing has ever come in from outside our universe

So why do you use different definitions of "our universe" for the past and for the future?

 

[no-one-particular]

eventually we will understand all of the causes and effects in operation within this universe.

No we won't. Every case of understanding a cause and effect is simply an explanation of the form "Y causes Z." If we ever find out why Y occurs, that's just "X causes Y." At any given moment in history this sequence must necessarily terminate at some phenomenon we do not understand the cause of.

no it will eventually terminate at a point where asking what causes it is no longer a meaningful question

asking what caused the first cause it's like asking what's north of the North Pole
its not that we don't know the answer it's that the question itself simply makes no sense

 

[Bomb#20]

no it will eventually terminate at a point where asking what causes it is no longer a meaningful question

asking what caused the first cause it's like asking what's north of the North Pole
its not that we don't know the answer it's that the question itself simply makes no sense

That argument takes for granted, not only that the lowest-level cause we'll have found at that point will be the hypothesized* first cause, but also that we'll know it's the first cause. But how could that ever happen?

Suppose we trace back from Z to Y to X to W; and suppose W is the grand unified field theory of everything, successfully accounting for every observation ever made; and suppose W actually is a metaphysical brute fact and there simply is no underlying V that's the real reason the universe follows equation W instead of some alternate equation W'. Suppose it just does and that's all there is to it. How will we know that? What could we imaginably see that would tell us there is no possible V whose operation could give rise to a universe appearing to its occupants to follow equation W? But if we won't be able to rule out every possible underlying V, then asking what causes W will remain a perfectly meaningful question -- just one for which our universe happens to have no answer.

(* Also keep in mind that there needn't be any such thing as a first cause. The circumstance that our finite brains can never understand infinitely many causes is no constraint on the universe itself. If none of the facts of reality are brute facts, each is explained by some underlying cause, and consequently physics is infinitely subtle, such is life.)

 

[no-one-particular]

that was the point I was making earlier.

we will know how the real universe must have started but we will have no way of knowing whether the universe we are living in is the real universe or just a simulation


And yes of course there has to be a first event

 

[fast]

that was the point I was making earlier.

we will know how the real universe must have started but we will have no way of knowing whether the universe we are living in is the real universe or just a simulation


And yes of course there has to be a first event

We do know that the world in which we live is not a simulation. The very notion that things might not be as they appear is merely a thought experiment to demonstrate that we can't be so certain that we cannot be mistaken, but (and as I keep saying) the possibility of mistake has no bearing on the matter of whether or not we have knowledge. The possibility of mistake doesn't negate knowledge, as the applicable necessary condition is whether what we justifiably believe is ACTUALLY true. Furthermore, whether we truly know if what we justifiably believe is actually true or not is not relevant, for what matters isn't whether we know that we know--only that the condition is met ... Not whether we know the condition is met.

 

[no-one-particular]

the simulation would be identical to the real universe down to the very smallest detail therefore there would be no way of knowing

the simulation would replay history exactly as it happened before in the real universe and would therefore allow its creators to see what had happened in their own prehistory and allow them to resurrect people that had died

 

[Bomb#20]

that was the point I was making earlier.

we will know how the real universe must have started but we will have no way of knowing whether the universe we are living in is the real universe or just a simulation

How could we possibly know how the real universe must have started? Since whatever K we think is the real universe might actually be a simulation within the true real universe J, it follows that whatever reasoning process we're relying on to conclude "This is how universe K must have started" might be simply missing the point and telling us about the wrong universe.

And yes of course there has to be a first event

Why? How is that different from looking through the Hubble out of the Milky Way into deep space, and saying "Yes of course space has to just stop at some finite distance from us."?

 

[Underseer]

How could we possibly know how the real universe must have started? Since whatever K we think is the real universe might actually be a simulation within the true real universe J, it follows that whatever reasoning process we're relying on to conclude "This is how universe K must have started" might be simply missing the point and telling us about the wrong universe.

And yes of course there has to be a first event

Why? How is that different from looking through the Hubble out of the Milky Way into deep space, and saying "Yes of course space has to just stop at some finite distance from us."?

My mechanical pencil is the only possible explanation for the existence of the universe, therefore my mechanical pencil created the universe. My mechanical pencil would never lie to me, therefore the universe is real and not a simulation.

Atheists have to come up with complex answers to nonsensical crap, but once you accept The Truth into your heart, the universe is much easier to understand!

 

[no-one-particular]

there is only one way that everything could have begun.
We just have to reason it out

space is finite too.
But that doesn't mean that it is bounded

entanglement suggests that space is not as fundamental as we assume

 

[fast]

the simulation would be identical to the real universe down to the very smallest detail therefore there would be no way of knowing

the simulation would replay history exactly as it happened before in the real universe and would therefore allow its creators to see what had happened in their own prehistory and allow them to resurrect people that had died

I'm not sure you're following. If I have a belief, and if that belief is justified, then it's permissible to claim knowledge. Of course, if what we justifiably believe so happens to be false, then we do not know that which we have claimed to know, but if our justified belief is indeed actually true, then we do know (or at least it's often the case that we do know--considering Gettier examples) what we justifiably believe to be true. The trick that consumes us is in figuring out whether or not we're mistaken and whether or not we do know or don't know what we believe we know, but understand that we do not need to solve the trick, for whether we figure out whether or not we're mistaken has nothing to do with whether we know or don't know, as figuring out whether we're mistaken has to do (not with whether or not we know what we think we do) but rather with whether or not we know we're mistaken or not.

 

[fast]

Just as truth is independent of knowledge, so too is the truth about whether the necessary conditions of knowledge have been met is independent of our knowledge of whether the necessary conditions of knowledge have been met. If the conditions are met is one thing, but our knowledge of whether they're met is another thing entirely. If they're met, then we know what we justifiably believe, and if they're not met, then we don't know what we justifiably believe. If we know the conditions are met, then not only do we know, but we know that we know, yet it's important to realize that whether we know is the issue, not whether we know that we do.

 

[Juma]

Just as truth is independent of knowledge, so too is the truth about whether the necessary conditions of knowledge have been met is independent of our knowledge of whether the necessary conditions of knowledge have been met.

False, since your definition of knowledge require truth.

If the conditions are met is one thing, but our knowledge of whether they're met is another thing entirely.

No. To say that we have knowledge about A is also to say that we know that our knowledge is true. If it wasnt, it wouldnt be knowledge.

If they're met, then we know what we justifiably believe, and if they're not met, then we don't know what we justifiably believe. If we know the conditions are met, then not only do we know, but we know that we know, yet it's important to realize that whether we know is the issue, not whether we know that we do.

You are fooled by how the words are used. Knowledge is not something we have. "To know" is not something we do. "Knowledge" is a quality of an information system. It is a quality describing the trustworthyness of its way of handling information.

 

[Underseer]

False, since your definition of knowledge require truth.

If the conditions are met is one thing, but our knowledge of whether they're met is another thing entirely.

No. To say that we have knowledge about A is also to say that we know that our knowledge is true. If it wasnt, it wouldnt be knowledge.

If they're met, then we know what we justifiably believe, and if they're not met, then we don't know what we justifiably believe. If we know the conditions are met, then not only do we know, but we know that we know, yet it's important to realize that whether we know is the issue, not whether we know that we do.

You are fooled by how the words are used. Knowledge is not something we have. "To know" is not something we do. "Knowledge" is a quality of an information system. It is a quality describing the trustworthyness of its way of handling information.

Pure nonsense. You're just making all that up because you want to deny the divinity of my mechanical pencil.

I can't explain how absolute knowledge came to be, therefore I know that absolute knowledge exists and I know how it came to be: my mechanical pencil created it. Since you cannot explain the existence of absolute knowledge, I therefore know that my mechanical pencil is the source of all truth. You cannot explain, therefore I know. This is basic logic known as teleology, which you would understand if you weren't wasting so much effort trying to deny the divinity of my mechanical pencil (His name is George, not that you care).

 

[fast]

False, since your definition of knowledge require truth.

Knowledge implies truth, but truth does not imply knowledge. That's why truth is independent of knowledge. Knowledge is not independent of truth.

For example, it may be true that my cat is in the kitchen, or it may be true that my cat is not in the kitchen, yet never must I know the truth for it to be true.

Another example: People who step on land mines don't know they're there when they step on them, but they're certainly there, evidenced by the explosion.

Third example: how could we ever come to know the truth unless the truth was there for the knowing.

Forth example, before there were people to discover the truth and come to know that the moon orbits Earth, it was true that the moon orbits the earth.

Again, truth is independent of knowledge, meaning no one needs to know the truth for there to be a truth to know.

 

[Juma]

False, since your definition of knowledge require truth.

Knowledge implies truth, but truth does not imply knowledge. That's why truth is independent of knowledge. Knowledge is not independent of truth.

For example, it may be true that my cat is in the kitchen, or it may be true that my cat is not in the kitchen, yet never must I know the truth for it to be true.

Another example: People who step on land mines don't know they're there when they step on them, but they're certainly there, evidenced by the explosion.

Third example: how could we ever come to know the truth unless the truth was there for the knowing.

Forth example, before there were people to discover the truth and come to know that the moon orbits Earth, it was true that the moon orbits the earth.

Again, truth is independent of knowledge, meaning no one needs to know the truth for there to be a truth to know.

So what? What is your point? This doesnt make "knowledge" a useable concept (except in very specialized discussions...)

 

[Bomb#20]

there is only one way that everything could have begun.
We just have to reason it out

I take it you don't mean reasoning it out from observations, since you stipulate that our observations might be simulated fakery, and since observation can't rule out an undetected underlying cause of whatever is the earliest cause observation can identify. So you appear to be talking about Kant's legendary "a priori synthetic knowledge", the derivation of nonmathematical facts using only deductive logic. How can that work? Deductive arguments only make explicit whatever knowledge is already implicit in their premises and inference rules.

space is finite too.
But that doesn't mean that it is bounded

How do you know space is finite?

entanglement suggests that space is not as fundamental as we assume

Indeed so; and also that time is not as fundamental as we assume, for entanglement crosses time as well as space. But does entanglement somehow imply either that space has a furthest point to the galactic north of us, or that there was a first event?

 

[Speakpigeon]

Which brings us to ....
As I just pointed out we don't know.

We have an understanding of things that we may come to find out do not quite match reality, but there are still things we know. For instance, I know my name. You don't know yours?

Your suggestion should be disambiguated. I know my name if my name is the name I have in mind that I believe I call myself or other people may call me. I don't know my name if my name is what I call myself or other people may call me. It may be true that's the name they use but I don't know it's true. I believe it's true and maybe it's true but still I don't know it's true. So much for JTB.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

but the longtime observation of the sun rising without ever once failing surely gives me justification to conclude (inductively, of course) my belief is true, and if (just if, mind you) my justified belief is true (actually true, that is), then I do know (yes indeed I do know) that the sun will rise once again tomorrow. Could something occur? Yes, so I might (just might, not may) be mistaken, yet the possibility of mistake is no good reason to deny that I will actually be correct, and should it turn out that it doesn't, then I claimed to know yet did not know, not because I had no justification (or belief), nope, not for that ... Only because it wasn't actually true, and it's actuality (not possibility) that is important, as that is the relevant condition at issue.

If you are to know now that the sun will rise tomorrow you have to know it now, not tomorrow so there is no question of actuality. You view rest on your belief that you make a distinction true to the material world between "may not rise" and "might not rise". But your own belief that the sun will rise tomorrow (rather than now) implies that before the fact of your claim to knowledge and the fact of the sun rising lies a length of time during which the future of reality will take place. So how would you know that the sun might well not rise but that it may not fail to rise? Cosmologists have just been led to assume the existence of no less than dark matter and dark energy and you think you know the sun will rise tomorrow? The only reason you believe you are justified in making this distinction between "may" and "might" is your own belief that you know enough to make that distinction but I have no idea how you could be justified. If we say "the sun will probably rise tomorrow" we express our confidence that it will, not our knowledge that it will. Whether the sun may not or might not rise tomorrow is all inside our head, meanwhile the universe will do as it pleases.
EB

 

[fast]

but the longtime observation of the sun rising without ever once failing surely gives me justification to conclude (inductively, of course) my belief is true, and if (just if, mind you) my justified belief is true (actually true, that is), then I do know (yes indeed I do know) that the sun will rise once again tomorrow. Could something occur? Yes, so I might (just might, not may) be mistaken, yet the possibility of mistake is no good reason to deny that I will actually be correct, and should it turn out that it doesn't, then I claimed to know yet did not know, not because I had no justification (or belief), nope, not for that ... Only because it wasn't actually true, and it's actuality (not possibility) that is important, as that is the relevant condition at issue.

If you are to know now that the sun will rise tomorrow you have to know it now, not tomorrow so there is no question of actuality. You view rest on your belief that you make a distinction true to the material world between "may not rise" and "might not rise". But your own belief that the sun will rise tomorrow (rather than now) implies that before the fact of your claim to knowledge and the fact of the sun rising lies a length of time during which the future of reality will take place. So how would you know that the sun might well not rise but that it may not fail to rise? Cosmologists have just been led to assume the existence of no less than dark matter and dark energy and you think you know the sun will rise tomorrow? The only reason you believe you are justified in making this distinction between "may" and "might" is your own belief that you know enough to make that distinction but I have no idea how you could be justified. If we say "the sun will probably rise tomorrow" we express our confidence that it will, not our knowledge that it will. Whether the sun may not or might not rise tomorrow is all inside our head, meanwhile the universe will do as it pleases.
EB

I am using the term, "might" to express a bare possibility. For instance, I might wake up tomorrow in Finland even though I have no intentions of going there. It's similar to simply saying it's a logical possibility. We need no reason for thinking something is logically possible, as everything is logically possible; the only exception would be logical impossibilities. In other words, only contradictions are logically impossible--all else is logically possible, even most physical impossibilities.

My friend's house might be on fire, and it might have been caused by the effects of a disgruntled alien flying past in a UFO, but the sheer logical possibility doesn't sway me to call the fire department.

To even say the sun might rise tomorrow hasn't much to do with my belief about the sun and what it'll do. Indeed, I am equally ready to say that it might not rise tomorrow. See, to say it might or it might not in effect does nothing much more than express the sentiment that it's possible, a bare possibility at that.

To say my friend's house may be on fire, well, that's a whole new ballgame. I really shouldn't say that unless I have good reason to think so. Sure, it might be on a fire, but we all know that, since it's logically possible, but no way am I going to say it may be on fire ... How irresponsible it would be of me!

If something may be the case, then something might be the case, but the inverse isn't true; hence, just because something might be the case, that's no good reason to think something may be the case. My car might be dangling from a spiderweb above my house, but that possibility gives me no reason to think it may be dangling from a spiderweb above my house. We shouldn't claim that something may be the case without good reason to think so.

The sun might not rise tomorrow, but it may rise tomorrow. What did I just say? Even though we have good reason to think the sun will rise to tomorrow, there is still a very slight (bare) possibility that it won't.

Does the fact that it might not rise tomorrow imply that I don't know the sun will rise? No, not at all. It just means that I can't be so incredibly certain that it's impossible to be mistaken. If the impossibility of mistake was a necessary condition of knowledge, then you'd be right, I don't know if the sun will rise. Fortunately, no such condition is a necessary condition of knowledge.

 

[Juma]

Does the fact that it might not rise tomorrow imply that I don't know the sun will rise? No, not at all. It just means that I can't be so incredibly certain that it's impossible to be mistaken. If the impossibility of mistake was a necessary condition of knowledge, then you'd be right, I don't know if the sun will rise. Fortunately, no such condition is a necessary condition of knowledge.

if "knowledge" includes the requirement of truth then you are wrong. If it doesnt then it is = justified belief.