The article is literally saying
Not what you mischaracterize it as saying.
Bernie is wrong that 3 people own more than the bottom half
Correct, because people in the bottom half do, in fact, "own" assets, it's just that the economists Sanders gets this shit from include the amount of debt those people also have and draw a net conclusion.
Iow, I can have a million in stocks, but if I also have a million in credit card/mortgage/school debt/personal business loans, etc, then the economists (and subsequently Sanders), would say I don't own any assets. I have a million in stocks and a home, it's just that I
also have debt, so
on paper and for the selective purposes of making such misleading headline grabbing campaign slogans, that part isn't made clear.
This is precisely why Sanders campaign slogan (that he evidently still keeps repeating) is such misleading bullshit, because the economists he
took that from (Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman) broke that down in a very different way.
Here's a copy of the
report where Sanders originally got his slogan. They state categorically:
Let us first define the concept of wealth that we consider in this paper. Wealth is the current market value of all the assets owned by households net of all their debts.
So the way they (and subsequently Sanders) define "wealth" is net of debt. You can have eight homes around the world, but if they're all mortgaged and you also hold some credit card debt or student debt--regardless of your ability to pay your monthly nut--then you have no wealth in their calculations, which is absurd.
What they also pointed out that never gets mentioned:
The increase in wealth concentration is due to the surge of top incomes combined with an increase in saving rate inequality.
So it's about top income being reinvested/saved and bottom 90% not saving/investing their money. They go into further detail (emphasis mine):
The second key result involves the dynamics of the bottom 90% wealth share. There is a widespread view that a key structural change in the US economy has been the rise of middle- class wealth since the beginning of the twentieth century, in particular because of the rise of pensions and home ownership rates. And indeed our results show that the bottom 90% wealth share gradually increased from 20% in the 1920s to a high of 35% in the mid-1980s. But in a sharp reversal of past trends, the bottom 90% wealth share has fallen since then, to about 23% in 2012. Pension wealth has continued to increase but not enough to compensate for a surge in mortgage, consumer credit, and student debt. The key driver of the declining bottom 90% share is the fall of middle-class saving, a fall which itself may partly owe to the low growth of middle-class income, to financial deregulation leading to some forms of predatory lending, or to growing behavioral biases in the saving decisions of middle-class households.
Clear? If not, there's more:
Our definition of wealth includes all pension wealth—whether held on individual retirement accounts, or through pension funds and life insurance companies—with the exception of Social Security and unfunded defined benefit pensions.
So, again, if you have an IRA that's got a million invested, but you also have a house with a mortgage of a million, regardless of whether or not you can pay your monthly mortgage payments no problem at all, they aren't counting either the house as equity or your IRA. The mortgage is considered debt and therefore it cancels out the value of your IRA for the purposes of their (and therefore
Sanders) calculations.
If I owned a home worth a million dollars, had a job that allowed me to pay the monthly premium on it with no problems and I had a million in an IRA, there's no way in hell anyone would or should consider me in the bottom 90%. Yet Saez and Zucman do, which means Sanders does as well.
They continue:
For the bottom 90%, average wealth is $84,000, which corresponds to a share of total wealth of 22.8%. The next 9% (top 10% minus top 1%), families with net worth between $660,000 and $4 million, hold 35.4% of total wealth. The top 1%—1.6 million families with net assets above $4 million—owns close to 42% of total wealth and the top 0.1%—160,700 families with net assets above $20 million—owns 22% of total wealth, about as much as the bottom 90%. The top 0.1% wealth share is about as large as the top 1% income share in 2012 (from the results of Piketty and Saez (2003)).
Get that? So the campaign
slogan of "the top one-tenth of one percent owns about as much as the bottom ninety percent" is based on the misleading notion that there is a total or finite amount of wealth (there isn't) and that, one group "owns" 22% of it, while another group "owns" 22.8% of it, so they are about equal.
But I could just as easily take those exact same percentages and say, "The bottom 90% own
more wealth than the top one-tenth of one percent!" The bottom "own" 22.8%; the top .1 "own" 22%, so my statement is just as "true" as Sanders' claim.
In regard to the bottom 90%, where the "average wealth is $84,000" they further break that down:
The second key result of our analysis involves the dynamics of the bottom 90% wealth share. The bottom half of the distribution always owns close to zero wealth on net. Hence, the bottom 90% wealth share is the same as the share of wealth owned by top 50-90% families— what can be described as the middle class.
...
The share of wealth owned by the middle class has followed an inverted-U shape evolution: it first increased from the early 1930s to the 1980s, peaked in the mid-1980s, and has continuously declined since then (Figure 8, bottom panel). The large rise in the bottom 90% share from 16% in the early 1930s to 35% in the mid-1980s was driven by the accumulation of housing wealth, and more importantly pension wealth. Pension wealth was almost non-existent at the beginning of the twentieth century. It first developed in the form of defined benefits plans, then from the 1980s in the form of defined contribution plans such as IRAs and 401(k)s. The decline in the bottom 90% wealth share since the mid-1980s owes to a fall in the net housing and fixed income (net of non-mortgage debt) components. The net housing wealth of the bottom 90% accounted for about 15% of total household wealth from the 1950s to the 1980s, while it now accounts foabout 5–6% only. In turn, the decline in the net housing and net fixed income wealth of bottom 90% families is due to a rise in debts—mortgages, student loans, credit card and other debts. On aggregate, household debt increased from the equivalent of 75% of national income in the mid-1980s to 135% of national income in 2009 and, despite some deleveraging in the wake of the Great Recession, still amounts to close to 110% of national income in 2012. Since about 90% of (non-mortgage) debt belongs to the bottom 90% of the wealth distribution, the upsurge in debt has had a large effect on the bottom 90% wealth share. It has more than offset the increase of pension wealth, and as result, in 2012 the bottom 90% share is as low as in 1940.
Strikingly, average real wealth of bottom 90% families is no higher in 2012 than in 1986. As Figure 9 shows, the average bottom 90% wealth rose a lot during the late 1990s tech-boom and the mid-2000s housing bubble, peaking at $130,000 dollars (in 2010 prices) in 2006, but it then collapsed to about $85,000 in 2009. Middle-class wealth has not yet recovered from the financial crisis: in 2012 it is still as low—even slightly lower—than in 2009. Despite an average growth rate of wealth per family of 1.9% per year, for 90% of U.S. families wealth has not grown at all over the 1986-2012 period. This situation contrasts with the dynamics of the average wealth of the top 1%, which was almost multiplied by 3 from the mid-1980s (about $5 million) to 2012 ($14 million), fell by about 20% from mid-2007 to mid-2009, but quickly recovered thereafter.
And in regard to what is causing the rise at the top:
Top wealth shares have followed a marked U-shaped evolution since the early twentieth century. As shown by Figure 6, the top 10% wealth share peaked at 84% in the late 1920s, then dropped down to 63% in the mid-1980s, and has been gradually rising ever since then, to 77.2% in 2012. The rising share of the top 10% is uncontroversial. In the SCF, the top 10% share is very similar in both level and trends to the one we obtain by capitalizing income tax returns (Bricker et al., 2014; Kennickell, 2009b). According to our estimates, all of the rise in the top decile is due to the rise of the very top groups. While the top 10% wealth share has increased by 13.6 percentage points since its low point in 1986, the top 1% share has risen even more (+ 16.7 points from 1986 to 2012), so that the top 10-1% wealth share has declined by 3.1 points (Figure 7, top panel). In turn, most of the rise in the top 1% wealth share since 1986 owes to the increase in the top 0.1% share (+ 12.7 points from 1986 to 2012, see bottom panel of Figure 7) and in the top 0.01% wealth share (+ 7.8 percentage points from 1986 to 2012).
What contributed to the disparity:
Wealth concentration has increased particularly strongly during the Great Recession of 2008- 2009 and in its aftermath. The bottom 90% share fell between mid-2007 (28.4%) and mid-2008 (25.4%) because of the crash in housing price. The recovery was then uneven: over 2009-2012, real wealth per family declined 0.6% per year for the bottom 90%, while it increased at an annual rate of 5.9% for the top 1% and 7.9% for the top 0.1% (see Appendix Table B3).At the very top end of the distribution, wealth is now as unequally distributed as in the 1920s. In 2012, the top 0.01% wealth share (fortunes of more than $110 million dollars belonging to the richest 16,000 families) is 11.2%, as much as in 1916 and more than in 1929. Further down the ladder, top wealth shares, although rising fast, are still below their Roaring Twenties peaks. The top 0.1% share is still about 2.8 points lower in 2012 than in 1929 (22.0% vs. 24.8%), and the top 1% share about 9.6 points lower (41.8% vs. 50.6%). Wealth is getting more concentrated in the United States, but this phenomenon largely owes to the spectacular dynamics of fortunes of dozens and hundreds of million dollars, and much less to the growth in fortunes of a few million dollars. Inequality within rich families is increasing.
The long run dynamics of the very top group we consider—the top 0.01%—are particularly striking. The losses experienced by the wealthiest families from the late 1920s to the late 1970s were so large that in 1980, the average real wealth of top 0.01% families ($44 million in constant 2010 prices) was half its 1929 value ($87 million). It took almost 60 years for the average real wealth of the top 0.01% to recover its 1929 value—which it did in 1988. These results confirm earlier findings of a dramatic reduction in wealth concentration (Kopczuk and Saez (2004)) and capital income concentration (Piketty and Saez (2003)) in the 1930s and 1940s. As these studies suggested, the most likely explanation is the drastic policy changes of the New Deal. The development of very progressive income and estate taxation made it much more diffi 梌 怀ﱠ怀 cult to accumulate and pass on large fortunes. Financial regulation sharply limited the role of finance and the ability to concentrate wealth as in the Gilded age model of the financier-industrialist. Part of these policies were reversed in the 1980s, and we find that top 0.01% average wealth has been growing at a real rate of 7.8% per year since 1988. In 1978, top 0.01% wealth holders were 220 times richer than the average family. In 2012, they are 1,120 times richer.
The growth of wealth at the very top is driven by both corporate equities and fixed income claims, as shown by the top panel of Figure 8. Business assets, pensions, and housing play a negligible role.
...
Besides, the rise in the top 0.01% owes even more to fixed income claims—for which reclassification issues and capital gains are irrelevant—than to corporate equities.In 2012, the fixed income claims—mainly bonds and saving deposits—owned by the top 0.01% amount to 5.4% of total household wealth, up from 1.0% in the mid-1980s.
What's their solution (and concluding paragraphs)?
Encouraging saving for the bottom 90% could also boost middle-class wealth by reducing the growing inequality in saving rates. The best policy to encourage middle-class saving depends on the reasons for the observed drop in the saving rate of bottom 90% families. Middle-class saving might have plummeted because of the lackluster growth in middle class incomes relative to top incomes, fueling demand for credit to maintain relative consumption (see e.g., Bertrand and Morse (2013)). In that case, policies to boost middle-class incomes would probably boost saving as well and powerfully affect the bottom 90% wealth share. Financial deregulation may have expanded borrowing opportunities (through consumer credit, home equity loans, subprime mortgages) and in some cases might have left consumers insufficiently protected against some forms of predatory lending. In that case, greater consumer protection and financial regulation could help increasing middle-class saving. Tuition increases may have increased student loans, in which case limits to university tuition fees may have a role to play.
Yet the fall in the bottom 90% saving rate might also owe to growing behavioral biases in the saving decisions of middle-class households; many individuals, for instance, do not know how to invest optimally and end up spending too much on servicing short-run debt at high interest rates (see e.g. Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). To address these biases, recent work in behavioral economics shows that nudges are more effective than tax incentives (see e.g. Chetty et al., 2014a). A good model for building wealth among the bottom 90% might therefore have three components: (1) nudged long-run savings, (2) directed investment, (3) ability to borrow against oneself. First, a fraction of earnings (e.g., 3 or 4% of pay up to $100,000 of annual earnings) could be directed by default to individual tax-deferred savings accounts that can only be used for retirement, home purchase downpayment (to build housing wealth), and education expenses (to build human capital) as in the existing automatic IRAs proposals. Second, such accounts could be invested in a broad fund delivering a rate of return r close to the global return on capital, ensuring that even modest accounts earn substantial returns. Third, individuals would be allowed to borrow (up to some level) against their savings account for any expense at an interest rate above r, but interest payments would be credited back to the account so that individuals e↵ectively borrow against themselves (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013). Tax refunds (or extra tax withholding) could be used to ensure repayment and keep default to a minimum.
I don't recall Sanders ever blaming the "90%" (which is
really the top 50-90%) for not saving or investing their money and I sure as shit have never heard him encourage the conclusion his favorite economists came to; that we should "nudge" them to invest in an IRA-type savings account.
So, the whole shooting match here is a combination of the top .1% investing their income primarily in the bond market and earning a modest, but consistent 3-5% return over the past thirty years, while my side of Gen X basically said "eat the rich" and fuck you to the idea of saving or investing (because we all thought we'd die by the magic age of 27 and/or were living a "Say Anything" punk ethos) and just got into serious credit card debt/mortgage debt/student loan debt, while at the same time not saving or investing any of our money during the same time period (emphasis mine):
average real wealth of bottom 90% families is no higher in 2012 than in 1986. As Figure 9 shows, the average bottom 90% wealth rose a lot during the late 1990s tech-boom and the mid-2000s housing bubble, peaking at $130,000 dollars (in 2010 prices) in 2006, but it then collapsed to about $85,000 in 2009. Middle-class wealth has not yet recovered from the financial crisis: in 2012 it is still as low—even slightly lower—than in 2009.
...
Over the 1986-2012 period, the wealth of top 1% wealth holders grew at 3.9% per year on average, much more than average wealth (1.9%) and bottom 90% wealth (0.1%). The growth of income was also unequal, but not as much. The annual saving rate of the bottom 90% has been extremely low since 1986 (0% on average) while the saving rate of the top 1% has been very high (36% on average). Asset price e↵ects were positive across the distribution, but roughly neutral. These results underscore that the key drivers of the rise in wealth inequality have been the surge in income inequality combined to an increase in saving rate inequality—and in particular the collapse of the saving rate of the bottom 90%.
...
The Forbes 400 list have been used to estimate very top wealth shares (see e.g. Kopczuk and Saez, 2004). As displayed on Figure 13, the Forbes 400 richest list from Forbes Magazine shows a sharp increase in the share of total wealth going to the top 400 (normalized for population growth) from 1% in the early 1980s to over 3% in 2012-3. Hence, the top 400 accounts for 2 percentage points of the increase in the top wealth shares.55 As shown in the figure, this tripling is roughly on par with the tripling of our top 0.01% wealth share from 3.5% to 11% over the same period.
And in that time period, while we who didn't save/invest, saw a HUGE market surge under Bill Clinton, but also a HUGE housing market crash under Bush, thus causing a severe
debt driven (on paper) disparity. And THAT is what is accounting for all of these highly misleading statements about "inequality."
ETA: What also is never mentioned by Sanders is the fact that the bond market consists of
municipal bonds as well, which translates into money from the top .1% being invested in cities, states and federal government. They are, in fact, the most stable of the bonds--which is why anyone invests in them--because they are backed by government.
But saying something like, "The average middle class American--in spite of being worth around $84,000--isn't fiscally responsible enough to invest for their future, so we should
nudge them into mandatory 401K-style investing of a small portion of their paychecks and teach them about the perils of credit card debt," isn't as sexy as blaming people who invested their money
three decades ago in the low yield, but stable bond market for having reaped the benefits.
Oh, and let's constantly misuse the word "inequality" (is there a financial
equality?) and the idea that there is a finite wealth pie that can only be sliced up in certain pieces and once that's done, nobody else can ever "own" anything.
My piece of pie has been taken by the rich!!!
Plus, there's absolutely nothing that can be done about any of this other than to do what Sanders' own economists recommend; require that middle class citizens to save and invest their money.