No reproductive rights for men

[Jokodo]

1. It is not relevant to the question of whether they both agreed that mutual consent is necessary to use the fertilized eggs.

It is relevant to whether or not this ruling is about reproductive rights as commonly undestood.

2. He would be subject to 18 years of child support payments

Which part of the ruling are you referring to?

This scenario is not analogous to anything we commonly see, just with the genders reversed, as you seem to insinuate.

Of course it is. We as a society have decided that it is wrong to force a woman into parenthood but we have yet to give that right to men.

Uhm, no. We as a society have decided that it is wrong to force a woman to go through pregnancy and childbirth. We also seem to think it wrong to force men through those, although vacuously. Whether, and under what conditions, we might consider it right to force women into biological parenthood when doing so doesn't physically (or otherwise) affect them has hitherto not been up to debate, so you have no way of knowing how we would react when it does come up, and thus no reason for claiming on the basis of this thread that men and women are being treated differently.

There are a lot of reasons to criticize the ruling - but "if we allow abortions, we have to allow this guy to stop this pregnancy too" isn't one of them. It's gibberish.

There is no pregnancy here and you are arguing a strawman as nobody is making this argument.

Wrong choice of words on my side, should be "prevent" rather than "stop". Other than that, that's exactly the argument you're making.

 

[zorq]

This appears to be a thread where emotionally based reactions are going to prevail with the usual taint of gender war. My opinion is that I sympathize with both sides. I cannot be compelled to pick a side.Really. But what I do not sympathize with is the fact that these 2 adults consumed time and energy and tax payer money because they would not meet half way.Each had their own need they expected to be fulfilled by involving a court of law. On one end, Karla totally obsessing on "I want a biological son or daughter" as if the alternatives would not meet the desire to raise a child from infancy to adulthood while nurturing and caring and loving the child. On the other end, Jakob's determination to benefit of his Constitutional Right (Both Illinois and federal level) to be the sole decision maker as to having any biological children.

Adults who when they agreed to in vitro fertilization did not quite think through all the implications. They did not sign the Co Parent Agreement. Has anyone wondered why?

I sympathize with both sides too. But it is easy to pick a side. Both individuals have compelling motivations and reasonable convictions. But one individual has the legal force of a contract helping them and the other does not. Because the effects on society of a legal system in which contracts can be arbitrarily reinterpreted by a judge to mean the exact opposite of their written text are numerous and odious, I find picking a side easy.

They were foolish for failing to foresee this outcome but as humans we have to expect that. We can't blame them for being stupid. We can't blame them for fighting for what they want. Wasting tax payer dollars on a case like this is not nearly my first concern. It is far better to pay for a courthouse filled with cases like this than for people to start taking their grievances into their own hands (again).

Unfortunately, the outcome of this trial can only encourage more people to bring cases to court in which they find themselves unsatisfied with the terms of the contracts they had previously agreed to. More tax money spent.

 

[RavenSky]

You know, all these speculative arguments about how the contract should be waived because Jacob Szafranski is just a big liar-face just sort of assume without stating it that Karla Dunston is so staggeringly stupid it's surprising she even knows what a lawyer is.

So these fantasies about how Szafranski is some kind of mustache twirling villain who's primary concern here is preventing Dunston from becoming the mother of her own biological children... how's that play out at the negotiation of the contract? He tells her "Oh sure, you can use the embryos any time you want, doesn't matter when, doesn't matter if we're still together, I certainly won't object." but then insists on there being a clause in the contract that she can't use the embryos without his permission?

...and she wasn't able to figure that one out? It simply never occurred to here that if he's insisting on a clause where she can't use the embryos without his consent that there might be scenarios in which he would not give his consent?

Keeping in mind this woman has signed a contract, so we know she's at least smart enough to spell her own name, it's pretty clear she knew at the time of the agreement that she might end up not being able to use those embryos.

As for Szafranski's motivation for that clause? No need to assign all sorts of villainous schemes to him. They'd only been dating for five months, he probably didn't want to commit to being the father of the children of a woman he'd only been dating for five months. Afterall, it might not work out.

And it didn't.

Sucks to be him though, because a judge said he's got to be the father of her children anyway.

You aren't really understanding the case:

1. They both agreed that the use of the embryos would be conditional upon both agreeing to use the embryos.
2. She asked. He refused.
3. THEN he said sure, as long as the hospital will destroy my medical records.
4. She said fine by her but the hospital refused as it is legally obligated to do.

His conditional agreement seems based upon a lie: he worked in the medical field and knew that hospitals are obligated through a multitude of laws, regulations and policies, to maintain health records and cannot destroy them.

His objection cannot be that he doesn't want the embryos used: he agreed that they could be used. His concern is that he be traced as the sperm donor. Not that the embryos be used. This concern can be addressed legally by a document which is signed by a judge.

I'm reading it like this:


1. They both signed a pro-forma agreement provided by the fertility clinic that stated the use of the embryos would be conditional upon both agreeing to use the embryos.
2. Together they then had a separate contract drawn up giving her sole *custody* of the embryos. Neither ultimately signed this contract, but
3. He donates the sperm with full knowledge of the understanding set forth in the unsigned contract
4. He breaks up with her; tells her he has changed his mind and he doesn't want children (after it is too late for her to pursue a different course)
5. He then changes his mind a third time and says "as long as the hospital will destroy my medical records"
6. She said fine by her but the hospital refused as it is legally obligated to do.

When I first read the OP (before reading any of the articles or the actual legal ruling), my first thought was "a contract is a contract" - similar to the way many others are arguing: "Contracts MUST BE treated as sacrosanct." If that had been the only contract and the only pertinent fact, I'd still agree. But it isn't.

In my opinion, a key issue is that the couple had a second contract drawn up giving her sole legal rights to the embryos. At minimum he had full awareness of her intention to have sole legal rights to the embryos... and THEN he donated the sperm. I think the act of donating the sperm, given his participation in drawing up the second contract, indicates his agreement that she had his authorization to use the resultant embryos. In business law, even an unsigned contract can be enforceable if there is strong evidence that the parties intended to be bound by it. I think his sperm donation is strong evidence.

I also think it is rather ridiculous that the fertility clinic cannot remove the man's identifying information from the records provided both parties are agreeing to it (as it appears they are). If she had gone with an anonymous donor, the donor's identifying information would not be there - so why not administratively convert the ex-boyfriend into an anonymous donor? Too late for that now, of course, but it would have been a simple solution before.

P.S. This is actually a really interesting legal case, and I am glad Derec posted it

 

[RavenSky]

This is an interesting twist for those insisting "Contracts MUST BE treated as sacrosanct." According to the appelate court ruling, it is the man who is arguing that there is no pre-existing binding contract:

¶ 43 Appellant [JACOB SZAFRANSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant] argues that “a contract to create and use pre-embryos is the same as a contract to engage in sexual intercourse,” and thus void ab initio. He also argues that Illinois public policy requires the couples’ consent for any use of the pre-embryos “at the time of the proposed use.” We disagree

¶ 44 Appellant further argues that “his constitutional right not to be a parent means his consent is required for any use of the pre-embryos at the time of their use.”

The actual ruling goes into great length explaining that this means, even if there is a signed agreement, some courts have held that pre-existing agreements don't count because the parties can change their minds right up until implantation or destruction of the embryos. The man is arguing on this point, and using abortion law to do it - another argument those here have rejected.

¶ 45 Appellant lastly argues that the Illinois Constitution requires the parties’ consent to the use of pre-embryos at the time of their use, relying on the same arguments raised in support of his federal constitutional claim, but with the added assertion that “the right of privacy under the Illinois Constitution is broader than its federal counterpart.” Appellant refers to the following legislative history in support of his claim that the broader Illinois right to privacy requires contemporaneous consent to use of the pre-embryos

He does simultaneously argue that there is a binding contract in the Informed Consent Disclosure used by the fertility clinic:

In this case, appellant maintains that the informed consent executed by the parties is a valid contract which prevents use of the pre-embryos without his consent. Specifically, he claims that the informed consent is an expression of both his and appellee’s intent that the pre-embryos cannot be used without both of their consents.

http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2013/1stDistrict/1122975.pdf

All three of his main arguments have been soundly rejected by those here who support his overall position. Now what?

 

[RavenSky]

And just to refute the claim that these types of cases are "lopsided" in favor of the woman:

Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), was the first court to address this issue in 1992. In that case, the husband wanted to destroy the embryos, but the wife wanted to donate them to another couple. The Tennessee Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the husband’s interest in avoiding parenthood was more significant than the wife’s interest in donating the embryos to another couple. (emphasis mine)

Note, in this case the woman was unable to have biological children without the embryos, but she wasn't arguing to have them implanted so she could have a child. She wanted to donate them to others. The man won.

In J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001), the husband wanted to preserve the embryos for another infertile couple to use. The wife wanted them destroyed, and did not want her former husband to retain them, either for himself or to donate. In reaching an ultimate decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that it did not want to force the wife to become a biological parent against her will.

Same case as cited in the appellate court ruling in SZAFRANSKI v. DUNSTON:

The court thus turned to balancing the parties interests, finding that the husband’s right to procreate would not be lost if he was denied an opportunity to use or donate the pre-embryos because he was “already a father and is able to become a father to additional children, whether through natural procreation or further in vitro fertilization,” but that the wife’s right not to procreate could be lost through attempted use or through donation of the pre-embryos. J.B., 783 A.2d at 717. Under the circumstances, the court concluded that it would “not force [the wife] to become a biological parent against her will.” J.B., 783 A.2d at 717

In Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006), the husband and wife had frozen their embryos, and had signed a contract with their fertility doctor. In the contract, the parties agreed that if the parties divorce, then the embryos shall be destroyed. The wife requested the embryos in the divorce action, but the husband objected, citing the contract. Ultimately, in 2006, the Texas Court of Appeals ruled that the contract was valid and enforceable and superseded the wife’s desire to become a parent. (emphasis mine)

In Kass, a husband and wife underwent in vitro fertilization when the wife could not become pregnant due to prenatal exposure to diethylstilbestrol. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175.
They signed a consent form stating that “ ‘[o]ur frozen pre-zygotes will not be released from storage for any purpose without the written consent of both of us.’ ” (Emphasis in original.)
Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176. They also signed a consent form stating: “ ‘In the event that we no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy or are unable to make a decision regarding the disposition of our stored, frozen pre-zygotes, we now indicate our desire for the disposition of our pre-zygotes and direct the IVF program to (choose one): *** (b) Our frozen pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF Program for biological studies and be disposed of by the IVF Program for approved research investigation as determined by the IVF Program.’ ” Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176-77.

Basically, what I saw in the appellate case cited earlier and various articles discussing precedent are the following points:

1. In almost every case, if there is an actual contract it has been upheld regardless which party that particular ruling favors; but not every case considers the "Informed Consent" document from the fertility clinic to be an actual contract between the two people.
2. In cases where there is determined to be no contract, first consideration is given to the person unable to have their own biological children. If this is not an issue, then ruling is in favor of the person not wanting to be a parent.

Citing Davis again:

“Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than use of the pre-embryos in question. If no other reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of using the pre-embryos to achieve pregnancy should be considered. However, if the party seeking control of the pre-embryos intends merely to donate them to another couple, the objecting party obviously has the greater interest and should prevail.” Davis,
842 S.W.2d at 604.

It appears to me that the OP case is not about any sort of lopsided judicial system, since it appears that men win these cases at least as frequently as women do. It appears the OP case hinges on:

1. whether the "Informed Consent" document used by the fertility clinic is a binding contractual agreement between the two parties
2. if the subsequent written but unsigned agreement is enforceable
3. or if (as some courts have ruled), either party can change their mind in spite of a valid contract.

 

[Toni]

Given that her ruling was not based on facts or law it seems a reasonable assumption.

It's still an embryo, don't go babyifying it.

Pre-embryo actually.

Not *all* men do this.

Not all women do this would fit the circumstances better I think.

- - - Updated - - -

I really don't see this as a gender issue, and I don't think men and women need any hockey-fans cheering for conflict.

But unfortunately it is gender issue, as issues concerning reproductive rights are very lopsided along gender lines.

I wasn't aware that you held a degree in jurisprudence.

In fact, judges and courts can and do interpret the law. That is their job, or part of it.

Despite your perpetual hand wringing and whining, reproductive rights are not nearly so lopsided along gender lines as you seem to believe. In many, many cases, the courts have prevented women from implanting embryos created with the sperm of their former husbands when the husband objected.

You would have a good case if you were to point out that reproduction technology is a relatively new field with many advances made in recent years and many more coming and that laws governing these technologies and their products are evolving and are not consistent.

 

[Toni]

And just to refute the claim that these types of cases are "lopsided" in favor of the woman:

Note, in this case the woman was unable to have biological children without the embryos, but she wasn't arguing to have them implanted so she could have a child. She wanted to donate them to others. The man won.

In J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001), the husband wanted to preserve the embryos for another infertile couple to use. The wife wanted them destroyed, and did not want her former husband to retain them, either for himself or to donate. In reaching an ultimate decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that it did not want to force the wife to become a biological parent against her will.

Same case as cited in the appellate court ruling in SZAFRANSKI v. DUNSTON:

The court thus turned to balancing the parties interests, finding that the husband’s right to procreate would not be lost if he was denied an opportunity to use or donate the pre-embryos because he was “already a father and is able to become a father to additional children, whether through natural procreation or further in vitro fertilization,” but that the wife’s right not to procreate could be lost through attempted use or through donation of the pre-embryos. J.B., 783 A.2d at 717. Under the circumstances, the court concluded that it would “not force [the wife] to become a biological parent against her will.” J.B., 783 A.2d at 717

In Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006), the husband and wife had frozen their embryos, and had signed a contract with their fertility doctor. In the contract, the parties agreed that if the parties divorce, then the embryos shall be destroyed. The wife requested the embryos in the divorce action, but the husband objected, citing the contract. Ultimately, in 2006, the Texas Court of Appeals ruled that the contract was valid and enforceable and superseded the wife’s desire to become a parent. (emphasis mine)

In Kass, a husband and wife underwent in vitro fertilization when the wife could not become pregnant due to prenatal exposure to diethylstilbestrol. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175.
They signed a consent form stating that “ ‘[o]ur frozen pre-zygotes will not be released from storage for any purpose without the written consent of both of us.’ ” (Emphasis in original.)
Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176. They also signed a consent form stating: “ ‘In the event that we no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy or are unable to make a decision regarding the disposition of our stored, frozen pre-zygotes, we now indicate our desire for the disposition of our pre-zygotes and direct the IVF program to (choose one): *** (b) Our frozen pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF Program for biological studies and be disposed of by the IVF Program for approved research investigation as determined by the IVF Program.’ ” Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176-77.

Basically, what I saw in the appellate case cited earlier and various articles discussing precedent are the following points:

1. In almost every case, if there is an actual contract it has been upheld regardless which party that particular ruling favors; but not every case considers the "Informed Consent" document from the fertility clinic to be an actual contract between the two people.
2. In cases where there is determined to be no contract, first consideration is given to the person unable to have their own biological children. If this is not an issue, then ruling is in favor of the person not wanting to be a parent.

Citing Davis again:

“Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than use of the pre-embryos in question. If no other reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of using the pre-embryos to achieve pregnancy should be considered. However, if the party seeking control of the pre-embryos intends merely to donate them to another couple, the objecting party obviously has the greater interest and should prevail.” Davis,
842 S.W.2d at 604.

It appears to me that the OP case is not about any sort of lopsided judicial system, since it appears that men win these cases at least as frequently as women do. It appears the OP case hinges on:

1. whether the "Informed Consent" document used by the fertility clinic is a binding contractual agreement between the two parties
2. if the subsequent written but unsigned agreement is enforceable
3. or if (as some courts have ruled), either party can change their mind in spite of a valid contract.

In this case, the court actually determined that the couple's verbal agreement was enforceable.

I recently found this, which goes a bit more into facts and reasoning in the case:


http://legalpronews.findlaw.com/article/a13cf288a279dbe0a345afad3d03ee28#.U4Il0vldXTo

Dunston, 41, a Chicago doctor, began dating Szafranski in late 2009. A few months into their relationship, she was diagnosed with lymphoma and had to undergo chemotherapy and treatments that likely would make her infertile.

She testified that she longed to have a biological child, in part to pass along the genes of her father who died of cancer when she was 5. She asked Szafranski to provide his sperm so embryos could be frozen before her treatment. A decision had to be made quickly and he agreed, despite neither of them thinking the relationship had long-term prospects.

Her eggs were harvested and she was given the option of fertilizing all of them, which experts said would give them a better shot at viability compared with freezing unfertilized eggs. Court documents say Szafranski agreed that all the eggs should be fertilized with his sperm; Dunston testified that had she known Dunston had any doubts, she would have saved and frozen some unfertilized eggs.

The couple broke up in May 2010. Szafranski said he changed his mind about the embryos after friends and a girlfriend reacted negatively, according to court documents.

The judge decided the oral agreements between Szafranski and Dunston concerning use of the embryos were legally binding; the ruling added that Dunston's desire to have a child outweighs Szafranski's desire to not procreate.

"Karla's desire to have a biological child in the face of the impossibility of having one without using the embryos outweighs Jacob's ... speculative concern that he might not find love with a woman because he unhesitatingly agreed to help give Karla her last opportunity to fulfill her wish to have a biological child," Hall said in her ruling.

Szafranski's attorney Brian Schroeder said he disagrees because the oral agreements were simply to create the embryos, not consent to how they'd be used in the future.

He added that the couple later signed informed consent documents that stated "No use can be made of these embryos without consent of both partners (if applicable)," paperwork he said negates any previous conversations. But the court found the previous oral agreement wasn't modified by the language in the consent form.

"We're obviously very unhappy," Schroeder said.

Dunston had testified that she is not seeking any support, financial or otherwise, from Szafranski. But the dispute still opens larger questions about Szafranski's rights if Dunston does one day have a child with the embryos.

"The judge seems to treat Jacob as occupying an interim position between sperm donor and intended parent," said Judith Daar, a professor at Whittier Law School in Costa Mesa, Calif., and expert on assisted reproductive technology law.

The ruling doesn't address whether Szafranski could be held legally responsible or granted parental rights some day, Daar said.

And to put an end to those who say that she intends to trample his rights no matter what (same source):

Schroeder said lawyers for both parties have agreed that the embryos should not be implanted in Dunston until the appeal is complete.

Please note: This is the second time an Illinois court has ruled in favor of Dunston. The IL State Supreme court declined to hear the case. He still has opportunity to appeal.

Also, please note that unanswered is what would happen if Szafranski were to have a(nother) change of heart and decide he wanted to be a part of any resulting child's life. Potentially, he could sue for custody AND child support, visitation, or be on the hook for child support although Dunston has stated she does not seek such. He could attempt to assert his parental rights. Although he claims now to not wish to have these embryos become children, it is possible that he would have a change of heart and wish to know his biological offspring.

 

[The Paul]

3. He donates the sperm with full knowledge of the understanding set forth in the unsigned contract

No, that part never happened. By the timeline you just described he had just explicitly refused to give up control of the embryos. That should have made it perfectly clear to everyone involved that he was not giving up control of the embryos.

A different contract was drawn up and shown to him and he refused to sign it. It's insane to say he should be bound by the terms of the contract he refused to sign because it indicated the true desires of the other party.

 

[RavenSky]

3. He donates the sperm with full knowledge of the understanding set forth in the unsigned contract

No, that part never happened. By the timeline you just described he had just explicitly refused to give up control of the embryos. That should have made it perfectly clear to everyone involved that he was not giving up control of the embryos.

A different contract was drawn up and shown to him and he refused to sign it. It's insane to say he should be bound by the terms of the contract he refused to sign because it indicated the true desires of the other party.

First of all, I said "with full knowledge of the understanding set forth in the unsigned contract". Are you claiming that he did not attend the meeting with the attorney and did not have any input into the resultant draft contract? Because that is not at all what he himself claims. In other words, yes that part did happen.

Second, kindly provide documentation that he "refused" to sign the agreement - especially prior to fulfilling his part of that same agreement.

Further, IF there was no agreement (though the court found that there was), then based on what little precedent there is the court would look at the "balancing approach" which puts a priority of the person unable to have biological children any other way. In this case, that is Karla Dunston.

 

[RavenSky]

In this case, the court actually determined that the couple's verbal agreement was enforceable.

I recently found this, which goes a bit more into facts and reasoning in the case:


http://legalpronews.findlaw.com/article/a13cf288a279dbe0a345afad3d03ee28#.U4Il0vldXTo

Dunston, 41, a Chicago doctor, began dating Szafranski in late 2009. A few months into their relationship, she was diagnosed with lymphoma and had to undergo chemotherapy and treatments that likely would make her infertile.

She testified that she longed to have a biological child, in part to pass along the genes of her father who died of cancer when she was 5. She asked Szafranski to provide his sperm so embryos could be frozen before her treatment. A decision had to be made quickly and he agreed, despite neither of them thinking the relationship had long-term prospects.

Her eggs were harvested and she was given the option of fertilizing all of them, which experts said would give them a better shot at viability compared with freezing unfertilized eggs. Court documents say Szafranski agreed that all the eggs should be fertilized with his sperm; Dunston testified that had she known Dunston had any doubts, she would have saved and frozen some unfertilized eggs.

The couple broke up in May 2010. Szafranski said he changed his mind about the embryos after friends and a girlfriend reacted negatively, according to court documents.

The judge decided the oral agreements between Szafranski and Dunston concerning use of the embryos were legally binding; the ruling added that Dunston's desire to have a child outweighs Szafranski's desire to not procreate.

"Karla's desire to have a biological child in the face of the impossibility of having one without using the embryos outweighs Jacob's ... speculative concern that he might not find love with a woman because he unhesitatingly agreed to help give Karla her last opportunity to fulfill her wish to have a biological child," Hall said in her ruling.

Szafranski's attorney Brian Schroeder said he disagrees because the oral agreements were simply to create the embryos, not consent to how they'd be used in the future.

He added that the couple later signed informed consent documents that stated "No use can be made of these embryos without consent of both partners (if applicable)," paperwork he said negates any previous conversations. But the court found the previous oral agreement wasn't modified by the language in the consent form.

"We're obviously very unhappy," Schroeder said.

Dunston had testified that she is not seeking any support, financial or otherwise, from Szafranski. But the dispute still opens larger questions about Szafranski's rights if Dunston does one day have a child with the embryos.

"The judge seems to treat Jacob as occupying an interim position between sperm donor and intended parent," said Judith Daar, a professor at Whittier Law School in Costa Mesa, Calif., and expert on assisted reproductive technology law.

The ruling doesn't address whether Szafranski could be held legally responsible or granted parental rights some day, Daar said.

And to put an end to those who say that she intends to trample his rights no matter what (same source):

Schroeder said lawyers for both parties have agreed that the embryos should not be implanted in Dunston until the appeal is complete.

Please note: This is the second time an Illinois court has ruled in favor of Dunston. The IL State Supreme court declined to hear the case. He still has opportunity to appeal.

Also, please note that unanswered is what would happen if Szafranski were to have a(nother) change of heart and decide he wanted to be a part of any resulting child's life. Potentially, he could sue for custody AND child support, visitation, or be on the hook for child support although Dunston has stated she does not seek such. He could attempt to assert his parental rights. Although he claims now to not wish to have these embryos become children, it is possible that he would have a change of heart and wish to know his biological offspring.

I knew that I had seen this bit:

The judge decided the oral agreements between Szafranski and Dunston concerning use of the embryos were legally binding

but couldn't find it again. I think that is a very important point that seems over-shadowed by the furious claims about a "lopsided" court allegedly ruling a "female's wishes trump both men's reproductive rights and prior written agreements."

 

[doubtingt]

Edited to highlight the legally relevant facts.

I'm reading it like this:


1. They both signed a pro-forma agreement provided by the fertility clinic that stated the use of the embryos would be conditional upon both agreeing to use the embryos.
2. Together they then had a separate contract drawn up giving her sole *custody* of the embryos. Neither ultimately signed this contract, but therefore he reasonably assumed this contract had no validity and the prior signed contract was still in full force.
3. He donates the sperm with full knowledge of the understanding set forth in that the unsigned contract carried no legal weight because he never consented to the terms, and thus the previously signed contract granting him right of refusal is still in full force.

4. He breaks up with her; tells her he has changed his mind and he doesn't want children (after it is too late for her to pursue a different course)
5. He then changes his mind a third time and says "as long as the hospital will destroy my medical records"
6. She said fine by her but the hospital refused as it is legally obligated to do.

None of these last points matter, because the signed contract gives him the right to refuse for any reason. It is not the judges pervu to decide he doesn't feel the man's reason is good enough. The entire point of rights is that each person, not the courts, decides what is good enough reason for them to use their own body and/or property.

In my opinion, a key issue is that the couple had a second contract drawn up giving her sole legal rights to the embryos. At minimum he had full awareness of her intention to have sole legal rights to the embryos... and THEN he donated the sperm.

Yes, he donated the sperm after NOT SIGNING a second contract that gave her sole custody, and thus fully expected that none of its terms were legally binding and that only the actual signed contract giving him right of refusal mattered. He was aware of her desire for full custody and aware that he did not give her full custody. Somehow you and the court are concluding that a some words on a paper that no one formally agreed to constitute a "contract" oral or otherwise.

 

[RavenSky]

Edited to highlight the legally relevant facts.


None of these last points matter, because the signed contract gives him the right to refuse for any reason. It is not the judges pervu to decide he doesn't feel the man's reason is good enough. The entire point of rights is that each person, not the courts, decides what is good enough reason for them to use their own body and/or property.

In my opinion, a key issue is that the couple had a second contract drawn up giving her sole legal rights to the embryos. At minimum he had full awareness of her intention to have sole legal rights to the embryos... and THEN he donated the sperm.

Yes, he donated the sperm after NOT SIGNING a second contract that gave her sole custody, and thus fully expected that none of its terms were legally binding and that only the actual signed contract giving him right of refusal mattered. He was aware of her desire for full custody and aware that he did not give her full custody. Somehow you and the court are concluding that a some words on a paper that no one formally agreed to constitute a "contract" oral or otherwise.

Some courts do not consider the "Informed Consent" documents to be an actual contract between the two parties (it is an "Informed Consent" disclosure provided by a third party for it's own protection). Some do. Some courts consider oral or written/unsigned contracts to be binding. Some don't. All of the courts in the few cases on point have also considered the future abilities of each party to have their own biological children.

 

[doubtingt]

Edited to highlight the legally relevant facts.


None of these last points matter, because the signed contract gives him the right to refuse for any reason. It is not the judges pervu to decide he doesn't feel the man's reason is good enough. The entire point of rights is that each person, not the courts, decides what is good enough reason for them to use their own body and/or property.

In my opinion, a key issue is that the couple had a second contract drawn up giving her sole legal rights to the embryos. At minimum he had full awareness of her intention to have sole legal rights to the embryos... and THEN he donated the sperm.

Yes, he donated the sperm after NOT SIGNING a second contract that gave her sole custody, and thus fully expected that none of its terms were legally binding and that only the actual signed contract giving him right of refusal mattered. He was aware of her desire for full custody and aware that he did not give her full custody. Somehow you and the court are concluding that a some words on a paper that no one formally agreed to constitute a "contract" oral or otherwise.

Some courts do not consider the "Informed Consent" documents to be an actual contract between the two parties (it is an "Informed Consent" disclosure provided by a third party for it's own protection). Some do. Some courts consider oral or written/unsigned contracts to be binding. Some don't. All of the courts in the few cases on point have also considered the future abilities of each party to have their own biological children.

A written contract that isn't signed should be treated as worthless, and is certainly not even an oral contract. You and I might make an oral agreement and not bother to write it down. The absence of a signature is due to the fact that the contract itself is not written. But a written contract without signatures is a clear indication that one or both party's was either unaware of or did not consent to its contents. People don't bother to write a contract then just verbally agree to it.
At minimum, it is absurd to give more weight to an unsigned contract than to a signed one, which is what this court did and it is absurd whether other judges were incompetent enough to do something similar in the past.

Also, the unsigned contract is irrelevant to people arguing that signed contracts are sacrosanct and can only be undone by a subsequent signed contract or by demonstration that the party was unduly coerced to sign originally.

 

[RavenSky]

A written contract that isn't signed should be treated as worthless, and is certainly not even an oral contract. You and I might make an oral agreement and not bother to write it down. The absence of a signature is due to the fact that the contract itself is not written. But a written contract without signatures is a clear indication that one or both party's was either unaware of or did not consent to its contents. People don't bother to write a contract then just verbally agree to it.

Not according to many court rulings. For example:

Can an unsigned contract be binding?
I am often asked if unsigned contracts are legally enforceable. The answer in many instances is yes!

This can sometimes be the case even if your document has the title “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) or “Letter of Intent”. The title that you give your document may not have any impact on whether or not a document will be enforceable.

And this can sometimes be the case even if your document specifically says that you do not intend to enter into a binding relationship until your management has signed off. This was the circumstance surrounding the case of PRA Electrical v Perseverance[1].

Perseverance owned a goldmine near Bendigo, which required electrical works. PRA was an electrical contracting company that responded to a tender for the electrical works. The tender documents included various contractual conditions, one of which was a condition that the contract would not come into effect until both parties executed a formal contract.

Following various discussions and negotiations between the parties, the contract was awarded to PRA, and PRA commenced work. However, the parties had never executed a “formal” contract.

During the period of work, a dispute arose between the parties, at which time the question emerged as to whether or not there was a binding contractual arrangement on foot.

The courts took the view that even though the original draft contract and tender documentation clearly stated that a binding contract would not come into effect until both parties executed a formal document, the actions of the parties (as though a contract was in place) was enough to override those written conditions.

- See more at: http://www.aspectlegal.com.au/can-an-unsigned-contract-be-binding/#sthash.NavEwq1O.dpuf

We have all heard that oral contracts can be valid and binding, and recently the High Court of Justice in Grant v. Bragg (Jan. 22 2009) has affirmed that an oral contract, and even an unsigned contract, can be binding if there is partial performance. Under the doctrine of part performance, the plaintiff can establish the existence of an oral contract through emails, text messages, and even mere post performance. Following an oral contract, if one of the parties begins to perform his or her end of the bargain, such acts may provide reliable evidence supporting the existence of an oral contract. This evidence may be bolstered by emails and text messages.

But what about unsigned contracts? Well, in Grant v. Bragg, the High Court found that a written unsigned contract was binding because the parties had acted as if the contract had been finalized. In Bragg, both Grant and Bragg had formed a company and entered into a buy-sell agreement (a.k.a. share agreement) pursuant to which either shareholder could buy out the other at a set price based on a formula in the event of a dispute. Needless to say, a dispute arose and Bragg offered to buy Grant's shares. Although a formal written contract was prepared by a law firm, neither party had signed it and both parties appeared to be continuing negotiations. However, the Court found that Bragg had already seized control of the company and that the email exchanges between the parties at the time were sufficient to bind them to the essential terms of the draft contract prepared by the law firm.

It is therefore important for parties engaged in contract negotiations to: (1) refrain from performing any work until a final written contract is prepared and executed; and (2) ensure that all pre-contract correspondence contains a statement that any deal is "subject to the execution of a signed written contract."

If your company routinely engages in long term, or multiple phase projects, that often require some advance, as is often the case in tech related projects, the parties should insist on the execution of a short letter agreement that clearly sets forth the terms of the limited scope of work to be performed in advance of a signed written agreement. Such a letter and all correspondence regarding the agreement should also reiterate the fact that the parties are not committing to the complete project's scope, regardless on any email correspondence to the contrary, until the parties execute a formal written contract addressing each phase of the project.

http://www.yourlegalcorner.com/articles.asp?id=120&cat=biz

The one from Illinois:

A corporate client recently had its legal department perform an audit, and found that eighty percent of all contracts the company believed it had “entered” in the last two years remained unsigned. The company had agreed on the terms, services were being provided, and payments were being made. If a dispute arose, would the company be able to enforce the agreement or would the other side be allowed to escape since the contract had never been signed? Unfortunately, the answer is not always the same, and depends on the specific facts of the case. This article will help make sense out of the muddy law of unsigned contracts with four guidelines based on key Illinois and 7th Circuit court decisions.

PARTIES WHO ACT CONSISTENT WITH A Written Agreement WILL Be Bound By the Written Agreement

Illinois courts have found that if parties did not sign a written contract, but acted in a way that was consistent with the terms of the written agreement, then the parties will be bound by all the terms of the written agreement.[1] For example, if a party made payments in an amount consistent with the written agreement, such payments would be strong evidence that the parties intended to be bound by the written agreement. This is especially true if the terms of the written contract were not identified in other sources such as emails and contract discussions. For example, if the non-signing party made monthly payments, and a monthly payment method can only be found in the proposed written agreement, then it may be hard to dispute the proposed written contract.

http://www.dcbabrief.org/vol250713art1.html

At minimum, it is absurd to give more weight to an unsigned contract than to a signed one, which is what this court did and it is absurd whether other judges were incompetent enough to do something similar in the past.

It could be that a judge could rule that the actions of the parties did not constitute enforcement of the unsigned contract, but rather some earlier signed, unsigned or verbal agreement. But the fact remains that an unsigned contract CAN be binding on the parties whether you think it is absurd or not.

Also, the unsigned contract is irrelevant to people arguing that signed contracts are sacrosanct and can only be undone by a subsequent signed contract or by demonstration that the party was unduly coerced to sign originally.

And apparently the signed "Informed Consent" document is irrelevant to the plaintiff, Jacob Szafranski, as his primary argument was that regardless what contracts he made, he was free to change his mind. There are a couple of states that would have supported him in that argument too. Illinois simply isn't one of them.

 

[doubtingt]

Not according to many court rulings. For example:

Can an unsigned contract be binding?
I am often asked if unsigned contracts are legally enforceable. The answer in many instances is yes!

This can sometimes be the case even if your document has the title “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) or “Letter of Intent”. The title that you give your document may not have any impact on whether or not a document will be enforceable.

And this can sometimes be the case even if your document specifically says that you do not intend to enter into a binding relationship until your management has signed off. This was the circumstance surrounding the case of PRA Electrical v Perseverance[1].

Perseverance owned a goldmine near Bendigo, which required electrical works. PRA was an electrical contracting company that responded to a tender for the electrical works. The tender documents included various contractual conditions, one of which was a condition that the contract would not come into effect until both parties executed a formal contract.

Following various discussions and negotiations between the parties, the contract was awarded to PRA, and PRA commenced work. However, the parties had never executed a “formal” contract.

During the period of work, a dispute arose between the parties, at which time the question emerged as to whether or not there was a binding contractual arrangement on foot.

The courts took the view that even though the original draft contract and tender documentation clearly stated that a binding contract would not come into effect until both parties executed a formal document, the actions of the parties (as though a contract was in place) was enough to override those written conditions.

- See more at: http://www.aspectlegal.com.au/can-an-unsigned-contract-be-binding/#sthash.NavEwq1O.dpuf

We have all heard that oral contracts can be valid and binding, and recently the High Court of Justice in Grant v. Bragg (Jan. 22 2009) has affirmed that an oral contract, and even an unsigned contract, can be binding if there is partial performance. Under the doctrine of part performance, the plaintiff can establish the existence of an oral contract through emails, text messages, and even mere post performance. Following an oral contract, if one of the parties begins to perform his or her end of the bargain, such acts may provide reliable evidence supporting the existence of an oral contract. This evidence may be bolstered by emails and text messages.

But what about unsigned contracts? Well, in Grant v. Bragg, the High Court found that a written unsigned contract was binding because the parties had acted as if the contract had been finalized. In Bragg, both Grant and Bragg had formed a company and entered into a buy-sell agreement (a.k.a. share agreement) pursuant to which either shareholder could buy out the other at a set price based on a formula in the event of a dispute. Needless to say, a dispute arose and Bragg offered to buy Grant's shares. Although a formal written contract was prepared by a law firm, neither party had signed it and both parties appeared to be continuing negotiations. However, the Court found that Bragg had already seized control of the company and that the email exchanges between the parties at the time were sufficient to bind them to the essential terms of the draft contract prepared by the law firm.

It is therefore important for parties engaged in contract negotiations to: (1) refrain from performing any work until a final written contract is prepared and executed; and (2) ensure that all pre-contract correspondence contains a statement that any deal is "subject to the execution of a signed written contract."

If your company routinely engages in long term, or multiple phase projects, that often require some advance, as is often the case in tech related projects, the parties should insist on the execution of a short letter agreement that clearly sets forth the terms of the limited scope of work to be performed in advance of a signed written agreement. Such a letter and all correspondence regarding the agreement should also reiterate the fact that the parties are not committing to the complete project's scope, regardless on any email correspondence to the contrary, until the parties execute a formal written contract addressing each phase of the project.

http://www.yourlegalcorner.com/articles.asp?id=120&cat=biz

The one from Illinois:

A corporate client recently had its legal department perform an audit, and found that eighty percent of all contracts the company believed it had “entered” in the last two years remained unsigned. The company had agreed on the terms, services were being provided, and payments were being made. If a dispute arose, would the company be able to enforce the agreement or would the other side be allowed to escape since the contract had never been signed? Unfortunately, the answer is not always the same, and depends on the specific facts of the case. This article will help make sense out of the muddy law of unsigned contracts with four guidelines based on key Illinois and 7th Circuit court decisions.

PARTIES WHO ACT CONSISTENT WITH A Written Agreement WILL Be Bound By the Written Agreement

Illinois courts have found that if parties did not sign a written contract, but acted in a way that was consistent with the terms of the written agreement, then the parties will be bound by all the terms of the written agreement.[1] For example, if a party made payments in an amount consistent with the written agreement, such payments would be strong evidence that the parties intended to be bound by the written agreement. This is especially true if the terms of the written contract were not identified in other sources such as emails and contract discussions. For example, if the non-signing party made monthly payments, and a monthly payment method can only be found in the proposed written agreement, then it may be hard to dispute the proposed written contract.

http://www.dcbabrief.org/vol250713art1.html

At minimum, it is absurd to give more weight to an unsigned contract than to a signed one, which is what this court did and it is absurd whether other judges were incompetent enough to do something similar in the past.

It could be that a judge could rule that the actions of the parties did not constitute enforcement of the unsigned contract, but rather some earlier signed, unsigned or verbal agreement. But the fact remains that an unsigned contract CAN be binding on the parties whether you think it is absurd or not.

Also, the unsigned contract is irrelevant to people arguing that signed contracts are sacrosanct and can only be undone by a subsequent signed contract or by demonstration that the party was unduly coerced to sign originally.

And apparently the signed "Informed Consent" document is irrelevant to the plaintiff, Jacob Szafranski, as his primary argument was that regardless what contracts he made, he was free to change his mind. There are a couple of states that would have supported him in that argument too. Illinois simply isn't one of them.

All of those are highly specialized specific situations having next to nothing in common with the current situation. In each of them both parties act and react in iterative fashion directly indicating agreement with the actions the other party has taken and thus acting as though an agreement is in place and there is no other signed agreement that directly contradicts the actions. IOW, they all indicate an oral agreement in line with a written but unsigned one and where there is no contradiction with any signed agreement. Thus, the courts are essentially saying that an unsigned agreement is worthless except in the extenuating circumstances where the actions of both parties directly demonstrate and would not be expected to occur unless they orally agreed to what is in the written document. It is the behavioral evidence of an oral agreement that actually counts, and the written and unsigned contract merely serves to indicate what that agreement likely was in the absence of any other written and signed agreement. That isn't what happened here. There was a signed agreement independent of the unsigned document and the man's actions were consistent fully with the prior signed agreement. His actions were not consistent with the unsigned contract and were in fact directly counter to the contents of unsigned contract and in favor of the opposing signed one. That is why he sued. Those are the actions he took in response to her saying she was going ahead with implantation. An analogy to all the cases you cite would be one party refusing to pay when the other party began the work, but instead in those cases the parties paid, collaborated in the work in an iterative fashion showing agreement.
This court is not using the unsigned contract as confirmation of what is indicated already by behavior, but rather using the unsigned document as the primary determinant of what was agreed to even when it contradicts observed behavior or when the behavior is as or more consistent with a previously signed contract.
That is absurd and undermines the integrity of contract law to a degree that is not at all true of these other cases.

 

[The Paul]

Second, kindly provide documentation that he "refused" to sign the agreement

I know people like to say "An absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." I know it's pithy and fun to say, but it isn't true.

For instance. If someone is claiming another party agreed to the terms of a contract but they are unable to produce a signed contract, that's evidence that no agreement ever took place.

The thing of it is though, I don't believe I actually need to explain that to you.

 

[Jokodo]

Second, kindly provide documentation that he "refused" to sign the agreement

I know people like to say "An absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." I know it's pithy and fun to say, but it isn't true.

For instance. If someone is claiming another party agreed to the terms of a contract but they are unable to produce a signed contract, that's evidence that no agreement ever took place.

The thing of it is though, I don't believe I actually need to explain that to you.

I haven't dug into the actual case as deep as RavenSky (thank you!), but the way I'm reading it, he doesn't even dispute that an oral agreement took place, nor is the content of that oral agreement disputed. What he seems to be disputing is that he is bound by it.

 

[RavenSky]

Second, kindly provide documentation that he "refused" to sign the agreement

I know people like to say "An absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." I know it's pithy and fun to say, but it isn't true.

For instance. If someone is claiming another party agreed to the terms of a contract but they are unable to produce a signed contract, that's evidence that no agreement ever took place.

The thing of it is though, I don't believe I actually need to explain that to you.

Except that in a court of law, it is not "evidence that no agreement ever took place". We have evidence that agreement took place because we have his actions. There are also more than a year's worth of emails and texts that the court had access to. It probably didn't help the plaintiff's case, either, that his main legal argument is that he's allowed to change his mind in spite of his agreement. If there wasn't an actual agreement, why would he need to legally verify a right to change his mind?

You and others here keep going back to the "Informed Consent" document, and stopping there. Not even the Plaintiff is doing that.

It appears to me that, given the conflicting nature of the "Informed Consent" document, the unsigned but acted on "Co-Parenting" contract and the various emails and texts after, the judge proceeded to the "balancing approach". I know that you think it is black and white cut and dried, but not even the Plaintiff believes that.

This is personal opinion, but I would also note that in the cases I've been reading as a result of this case, the only times a court relied on an "Informed Consent" document as binding is when

(1) the document was far more detailed than the OP one appears to be. For instance, in one case the basic language said both parties had to agree, but then it also said in the event of a divorce/separation/disagreement, the parties had to write in the name of the person (& it could have been a third party or an appointed mediator or the court) who would make the final determination. They hand wrote the wife's name, and both initialed it. Contrast this situation wherein there was no provision in the "Informed Consent" document in the event of a divorce/separation or disagreement. I think a court could view a detailed, fill-in-the-blank document as a better indication of an actual agreement than a boiler-plate "Informed Consent" superseded by a visit to the attorney's office and a completed draft of a co-parenting agreement.

(2) Abiding by the "Informed Consent" document does not result in one party not being able to have their own biological child.

And I would again emphasize that it is the Plaintiff insisting he had the right to change his mind regardless which agreement anyone found valid. Do you agree that he had the right to change his mind right up to the point of implantation?

 

[Metaphor]

And I would again emphasize that it is the Plaintiff insisting he had the right to change his mind regardless which agreement anyone found valid. Do you agree that he had the right to change his mind right up to the point of implantation?

The plaintiff has the right to change his mind if that's what was agreed to originally, regardless of what the Court or anyone else finds.

 

[Jokodo]

And I would again emphasize that it is the Plaintiff insisting he had the right to change his mind regardless which agreement anyone found valid. Do you agree that he had the right to change his mind right up to the point of implantation?

The plaintiff has the right to change his mind if that's what was agreed to originally, regardless of what the Court or anyone else finds.

By "agreed to originally", you're referring to the informed consent form from the clinic that does not constitute a contract? And that would have at any rate been superceded by a more recent oral agreement, the existence and content of which the plaintiff does not appear to dispute?