Our genes say we must soon die. I say they are not the masters.

[Bomb#20]

Did you mean to put "increasing"?

No, decreasing. If the probability of dying in a given year goes up, or stays the same, or even slowly falls year by year, then eventual death is a certainty. But if it falls quickly enough -- say, 1% this year, half a percent next year, a quarter of a percent the year after that, and so on, then your total chance of ever dying between now and eternity is 2%. So whatever scientific advance you imagine beating death with, it needs to somehow deliver that ever-decreasing chance of death.

You can significantly reduce the data needed by finding redundancies in the universe.

True; but one source of complexity you can't wipe out that way is that the universe contains the simulator, so the simulation has to simulate itself in addition to a lot of other stuff, which means it will have to do more computation than it's doing.

 

[T.G.G. Moogly]

Life is complex chemistry. My little piece suits me fine but when I kaput it doesn't put an end to all the complex chemistry out there that's just like me. It's more important we do something meaningful with our little chunk of complex chemistry than it is we preserve our little piece of complex chemistry forever.

 

[Peez]

I am sorry, I had no idea that you were so far along in developing this technology as to be able to make a backup copy of a person that persists while not 'operationalized' - or are you pulling this functional knowledge from thin air?

And a copy would no more be 'you' than your identical twin is 'you'.

Thank you, Dr. McCoy. McCoy may have angsted over the metaphysical question of whether the reconstituted material at the other end of the transporter beam was really "him"; but that didn't stop him from going along on the ride when the alternative was likely to be lethal.

McCoy did (and thought) whatever the scriptwriters wanted him to do.

Non-fictional characters however are not so easily mollified.

Let us imagine, for the sake of argument, that the transporter is supposed to record the position and motion of every particle in McCoys body; that information is then transmitted to another location - the surface of a nearby planet - and used to build an exact replica. Meanwhile, the 'Real McCoy' is disintegrated (and presumably the material recycled).

If the disintegration and recycling part fails, we now have two McCoys - one on the Enterprise, the other on the planet. Both believe that they are the Real McCoy - leading to many interesting issues; for the purpose of this discussion, the question is whether it was morally acceptable to try to disintegrate the original. Essentially the transporter has made an identical twin McCoy; and when working as designed, kills the McCoy that we started with; While this helps to resolve any argument about who gets to sleep with his wife on their return to Earth, it seems a little extreme.

Assuming that the transporter successfully disintegrates the Real McCoy, then he has done the exact opposite of achieving immortality. He is dead; and his twin lives.

Of course we can take a different view - if the pattern is the person - neatly avoiding dualism - then there are now two McCoys, and both are real. But in that case, your 'photograph' analogy breaks down. If the stored information is sufficient to model a person, then it is a person. Perhaps one 'Frozen' to be reanimated later, but a person nonetheless. Immortality in a 'Frozen' state is indestinguishable from death - unless and until the frozen image is 'operationalized'. If the universe retains the means to 'awaken' such images, then an indefinite life is possible - but there is no way to ensure that state of affairs, and every reason to expect it not to occur.

If the price of immortality is spending eternity 'asleep' as a 'non-operationalized' image, then it is too high - immortality that is indestinguishable from death is pointless.

It has always seemed pretty obvious to me that Star Trek transporters kill people and create copies, but in any event the scenario you describe was explored in a Next Generation episode: Second Chances.

Peez

 

[PyramidHead]

I find the transporter paradox endlessly fascinating. Reminds me of The Prestige.

 

[ryan]

Life is complex chemistry. My little piece suits me fine but when I kaput it doesn't put an end to all the complex chemistry out there that's just like me. It's more important we do something meaningful with our little chunk of complex chemistry than it is we preserve our little piece of complex chemistry forever.

You must be alive to do something meaningful. So by your philosophy, the longer we live the more meaningful things we can do.

 

[PyramidHead]

Because of how we are wired, no amount of meaningful things will ever be enough. Rare is the person who can say: I have done all of the meaningful things I wanted to do, so now I can die.

I think changing our wiring to be more satisfied with what we have already accomplished would go a long way toward removing people's fear of death.

 

[ryan]

Because of how we are wired, no amount of meaningful things will ever be enough. Rare is the person who can say: I have done all of the meaningful things I wanted to do, so now I can die.

I think changing our wiring to be more satisfied with what we have already accomplished would go a long way toward removing people's fear of death.

This is just so frustrating.

 

[PyramidHead]

Because of how we are wired, no amount of meaningful things will ever be enough. Rare is the person who can say: I have done all of the meaningful things I wanted to do, so now I can die.

I think changing our wiring to be more satisfied with what we have already accomplished would go a long way toward removing people's fear of death.

This is just so frustrating.

What is? Trying to convince people that your goal in life is the only legitimate one?

All I was pointing out is that the root of the problem may not in fact be death, it could be how we are programmed to live.

 

[ryan]

This is just so frustrating.

What is? Trying to convince people that your goal in life is the only legitimate one?

All I was pointing out is that the root of the problem may not in fact be death, it could be how we are programmed to live.

Or maybe it's because we our knowledge of reality might be infinitely small.

 

[Under the Rose]

I am reading that researchers may have identified a specific gene which everyone has that can possibly determine how long you may potentially live.

In the US, there are over 55,000 people over 100 years old, but only 60 people over 110. Comite believes that one gene is responsible for this difference. The gene is found in all people, but it has a crucial variant which is responsible for increased life expectancy.

Scientists find gene that plays a key role in aging | ZME Science

It will be very interesting to see if they have the science to back this up as they are presently playing their cards close to the vest in the interests of ideology and making the science available to all, not just the wealthy.​

 

[DBT]

Transporter copies?
The brain constructs a copy of 'you' based on memory every morning upon 'awakening.' For that matter 'you' are being constructed from moment to moment whilst the brain is consciously active.

 

[Peez]

I am reading that researchers may have identified a specific gene which everyone has that can possibly determine how long you may potentially live.

In the US, there are over 55,000 people over 100 years old, but only 60 people over 110. Comite believes that one gene is responsible for this difference. The gene is found in all people, but it has a crucial variant which is responsible for increased life expectancy.

Scientists find gene that plays a key role in aging | ZME Science

It will be very interesting to see if they have the science to back this up as they are presently playing their cards close to the vest in the interests of ideology and making the science available to all, not just the wealthy.​

Note that there is a big difference between "a specific gene which everyone has that can possibly determine how long you may potentially live" and "a key gene related to aging". Also note that, even if the research turns out to be on the right track, they are looking at the genetics of living from 100 to 110: so it might not have any relevance to anyone who does not make it to 100.

Peez

 

[PyramidHead]

What is? Trying to convince people that your goal in life is the only legitimate one?

All I was pointing out is that the root of the problem may not in fact be death, it could be how we are programmed to live.

Or maybe it's because we our knowledge of reality might be infinitely small.

Invoking radical skepticism isn't gonna help your position. Maybe it's because we're living in a simulation already. Maybe it's because God is testing us, and will punish those who artificially tamper with his plan. Cook up any scenario you like; we will both be gone in less than a hundred years.

 

[ryan]

Or maybe it's because we our knowledge of reality might be infinitely small.

Invoking radical skepticism isn't gonna help your position. Maybe it's because we're living in a simulation already. Maybe it's because God is testing us, and will punish those who artificially tamper with his plan. Cook up any scenario you like; we will both be gone in less than a hundred years.

Hope for the best; prepare for the worst.

 

[PyramidHead]

There is a funny argument out there that allegedly proves there are only a few possibilities with respect to computer simulations of reality: either we will never advance far enough to create that technology, or we are all currently living in a simulated reality. The basic idea is that, if people in the future invent simulated reality that is indistinguishable from the real world, and it becomes commonplace, there will be many more simulated "realities" than the actual reality. So, by simple probability theory, we are probably inside a Matrix being run by some advanced civilization who wish to simulate the reality of their ancestors.

http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html

This paper argues that at least one of the following propositions is true: (1) the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a “posthuman” stage; (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or variations thereof); (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that there is a significant chance that we will one day become posthumans who run ancestor-simulations is false, unless we are currently living in a simulation. A number of other consequences of this result are also discussed.

It's an interesting read, even if you don't buy the conclusion.

 

[ryan]

There is a funny argument out there that allegedly proves there are only a few possibilities with respect to computer simulations of reality: either we will never advance far enough to create that technology, or we are all currently living in a simulated reality. The basic idea is that, if people in the future invent simulated reality that is indistinguishable from the real world, and it becomes commonplace, there will be many more simulated "realities" than the actual reality. So, by simple probability theory, we are probably inside a Matrix being run by some advanced civilization who wish to simulate the reality of their ancestors.

http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html

This paper argues that at least one of the following propositions is true: (1) the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a “posthuman” stage; (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or variations thereof); (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that there is a significant chance that we will one day become posthumans who run ancestor-simulations is false, unless we are currently living in a simulation. A number of other consequences of this result are also discussed.

It's an interesting read, even if you don't buy the conclusion.

Yeah, this argument has become quite popular, but it's relatively new.

 

[PyramidHead]

Transporter copies?
The brain constructs a copy of 'you' based on memory every morning upon 'awakening.' For that matter 'you' are being constructed from moment to moment whilst the brain is consciously active.

Yeah, that's what intrigues me about the idea. The copy made by a transporter is actually much higher in fidelity and resolution than the copy made by my brain, and MUCH higher than the difference between the state of my body across a week. So, by that logic, if I am still me next week, then the transporter copy is still me. But what about the scenario where my original is not destroyed? Am I both copies, and where does my awareness reside? At that point, what effect does destroying one of the copies have on the continuity of identity? Or does it even matter?

 

[Bomb#20]

Nobody said the copy has to be operationalized while you're still functional. It's just backup data, no more alive than a photograph.

I am sorry, I had no idea that you were so far along in developing this technology as to be able to make a backup copy of a person that persists while not 'operationalized' - or are you pulling this functional knowledge from thin air?

Hey, I'm just going with ryan's scenario. He said "upload our information", not "replicate ourselves". I figured that meant upload it to the cloud or some such database.

Let us imagine, for the sake of argument, that the transporter is supposed to record the position and motion of every particle in McCoys body; that information is then transmitted to another location - the surface of a nearby planet - and used to build an exact replica. Meanwhile, the 'Real McCoy' is disintegrated (and presumably the material recycled).

If the disintegration and recycling part fails, we now have two McCoys - one on the Enterprise, the other on the planet. Both believe that they are the Real McCoy - leading to many interesting issues; for the purpose of this discussion, the question is whether it was morally acceptable to try to disintegrate the original. Essentially the transporter has made an identical twin McCoy; and when working as designed, kills the McCoy that we started with; While this helps to resolve any argument about who gets to sleep with his wife on their return to Earth, it seems a little extreme.

No worries. It's not morally acceptable to disintegrate the original unless he consents to being disintegrated; but that doesn't affect the technical question of what it takes to achieve subjective immortality. And we can arrange to have him consent by the simple expedient of having Transporters Inc. refuse to provide teleportation services to those who haven't signed a contract promising to disintegrate themselves in the event of inadvertent duplication. Of course Kirk would renege under those circumstances and then there'd be protracted litigation and Starfleet would probably step up and pay the judgment against Kirk, and Kirk would have to retire since Starfleet can't have a ship captain who TI refuses ever again to transport, yada yada; but the point is, McCoy has far too ingrained a sense of honor to go that route.

Assuming that the transporter successfully disintegrates the Real McCoy, then he has done the exact opposite of achieving immortality. He is dead; and his twin lives.

The brain constructs a copy of 'you' based on memory every morning upon 'awakening.' For that matter 'you' are being constructed from moment to moment whilst the brain is consciously active.

^^^ This. ^^^

Of course we can take a different view - if the pattern is the person - neatly avoiding dualism - then there are now two McCoys, and both are real. But in that case, your 'photograph' analogy breaks down. If the stored information is sufficient to model a person, then it is a person. Perhaps one 'Frozen' to be reanimated later, but a person nonetheless.

Not following the reasoning there. The stored information in a frozen embryo is sufficient to construct a mind; that doesn't mean it contains a mind. What makes a petabyte of iron oxide any more of a person than a frozen embryo?

Immortality in a 'Frozen' state is indestinguishable from death - unless and until the frozen image is 'operationalized'. If the universe retains the means to 'awaken' such images, then an indefinite life is possible - but there is no way to ensure that state of affairs, and every reason to expect it not to occur.

If the price of immortality is spending eternity 'asleep' as a 'non-operationalized' image, then it is too high - immortality that is indestinguishable from death is pointless.

Well, presumably the person setting up the collection of backup copies will also have set up some mechanism whereby if he ever stops sending "I'm still alive" messages to the database then it will do some due diligence and if satisfied that the original is gone for good then it will construct a robot body and download one of the backup copies into it.

 

[bilby]

I am sorry, I had no idea that you were so far along in developing this technology as to be able to make a backup copy of a person that persists while not 'operationalized' - or are you pulling this functional knowledge from thin air?

Hey, I'm just going with ryan's scenario. He said "upload our information", not "replicate ourselves". I figured that meant upload it to the cloud or some such database.

Let us imagine, for the sake of argument, that the transporter is supposed to record the position and motion of every particle in McCoys body; that information is then transmitted to another location - the surface of a nearby planet - and used to build an exact replica. Meanwhile, the 'Real McCoy' is disintegrated (and presumably the material recycled).

If the disintegration and recycling part fails, we now have two McCoys - one on the Enterprise, the other on the planet. Both believe that they are the Real McCoy - leading to many interesting issues; for the purpose of this discussion, the question is whether it was morally acceptable to try to disintegrate the original. Essentially the transporter has made an identical twin McCoy; and when working as designed, kills the McCoy that we started with; While this helps to resolve any argument about who gets to sleep with his wife on their return to Earth, it seems a little extreme.

No worries. It's not morally acceptable to disintegrate the original unless he consents to being disintegrated; but that doesn't affect the technical question of what it takes to achieve subjective immortality. And we can arrange to have him consent by the simple expedient of having Transporters Inc. refuse to provide teleportation services to those who haven't signed a contract promising to disintegrate themselves in the event of inadvertent duplication. Of course Kirk would renege under those circumstances and then there'd be protracted litigation and Starfleet would probably step up and pay the judgment against Kirk, and Kirk would have to retire since Starfleet can't have a ship captain who TI refuses ever again to transport, yada yada; but the point is, McCoy has far too ingrained a sense of honor to go that route.

Assuming that the transporter successfully disintegrates the Real McCoy, then he has done the exact opposite of achieving immortality. He is dead; and his twin lives.

The brain constructs a copy of 'you' based on memory every morning upon 'awakening.' For that matter 'you' are being constructed from moment to moment whilst the brain is consciously active.

^^^ This. ^^^

Of course we can take a different view - if the pattern is the person - neatly avoiding dualism - then there are now two McCoys, and both are real. But in that case, your 'photograph' analogy breaks down. If the stored information is sufficient to model a person, then it is a person. Perhaps one 'Frozen' to be reanimated later, but a person nonetheless.

Not following the reasoning there. The stored information in a frozen embryo is sufficient to construct a mind; that doesn't mean it contains a mind. What makes a petabyte of iron oxide any more of a person than a frozen embryo?

An embryo contains the information to construct 'a' mind, but not any specific individual's mind.

Assuming that the pattern is the individual - which I think we agree on - then a petabyte of iron oxide containing that pattern is exactly equivalent to a frozen person (or at least, a frozen brain). A brain in cryogenic storage is just another way to store that information. There is no substantive difference between being stored on a hard drive, and being unconscious. And unconsciousness for eternity is indistinguishable from death.

Immortality in a 'Frozen' state is indestinguishable from death - unless and until the frozen image is 'operationalized'. If the universe retains the means to 'awaken' such images, then an indefinite life is possible - but there is no way to ensure that state of affairs, and every reason to expect it not to occur.

If the price of immortality is spending eternity 'asleep' as a 'non-operationalized' image, then it is too high - immortality that is indestinguishable from death is pointless.

Well, presumably the person setting up the collection of backup copies will also have set up some mechanism whereby if he ever stops sending "I'm still alive" messages to the database then it will do some due diligence and if satisfied that the original is gone for good then it will construct a robot body and download one of the backup copies into it.

How? What materials will it use, and what will its energy source be, at the heat death of the universe? How can the database itself even still exist at that point in time?

 

[ryan]

I am sorry, I had no idea that you were so far along in developing this technology as to be able to make a backup copy of a person that persists while not 'operationalized' - or are you pulling this functional knowledge from thin air?

Hey, I'm just going with ryan's scenario. He said "upload our information", not "replicate ourselves". I figured that meant upload it to the cloud or some such database.

I don't think that a person can be conscious in a cloud of data. I think that uploading ultimately requires a clone to recreate you. But it wouldn't be like a typical clone that we can make now; it would be a clone right from the state you were in when you were "scanned". So the clone would even have your memories. Then it may be something like a 3D printer that will recreate you.