Physicalism

[Juma]

Either they are identical (share an identity - i.e. are the same thing) or they are not. If you just say they're close enough for all practical purposes, then you end up with a class of instances none of which can be said to be identical to the class, and concepts end up as non-physical after all.

But Togo, no side can win or lose by this argument because we don't know if the processes are identical.

We know that all the conceptions of '2' everywhere in the world are not usefully understood as one giant physical process.

"One giant physical process" where each human is a subprocess... That is spot on.

 

[Juma]

How do you define same?

Sharing an identity. That is, neither different nor separate.

But separate it is... Or do you mean some other room than spacetime?

That isn't maths as I recognise it.

it isnt math. It is how the process doing math works.

Math isnt the process, math is the behaviour of a process doing math.

So go ahead.

Why? There is no need. Noone has show a single non-physical entity of any kind. There is simply no competition.

Are running computer programs non-physical?

I'd say it's a physical process, why?

So you agree that behaviour caused by running computer programs are non-physical. Good. Now switch hardware from silicon chips to brain tissue. Does this makes behaviour of running processes non-physical?

 

[Togo]

How do you define same?

Sharing an identity. That is, neither different nor separate.

But separate it is... Or do you mean some other room than spacetime?

It's a single concept. The entire point of 1+1=2 is that it's a universal, generalisable concept.

That isn't maths as I recognise it.

it isnt math. It is how the process doing math works.

It's how a process doing maths works. Which is the problem. What about the math itself? Is that physical?

Math isnt the process, math is the behaviour of a process doing math.

No, it isn't. The behaviour of a process doing math is a calculation. Math itself is not the behaviour, otherwise a computer and a human calculating 1+1=2 would share a behaviour, and they don't. All they share is an outcome.

So go ahead.

Why? There is no need.

Because it would be the simplest possible demonstration that you are correct. You said it was easy...

Are running computer programs non-physical?

I'd say it's a physical process, why?

So you agree that behaviour caused by running computer programs are non-physical. Good. Now switch hardware from silicon chips to brain tissue. Does this makes behaviour of running processes non-physical?

I'm not following this at all. Are you classing behaviour as non-physical? How does that square with physicalism?

 

[Speakpigeon]

The moon is a concept. Does the moon exist outside out brain?

Juma, the Moon is not a concept. There is a concept of the Moon.

And, if the Moon was a concept (why not?), <snip>

How could the Moon be a concept? What object would the Moon conceptualise? We would have to redefine concept or redefine "Moon".

A concept is something conceived, i.e. something somehow in the mind, but not necessarily something representing something else although the term "conceptualise" suggests so.

We don't need to redefine anyhting. You just need to believe that instead of perceiving the Moon, you conceive the Moon.

I guess this would have to be the view of people who claim that only minds exist (as if they knew!).

But that is a stretch.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

[...]

This is basic in philosophy and this is a philosophical forum (is it, really?) so your assumption in framing your views should start from there, meaning you should have been explicit with Ryan that the existence of the Moon should be taken as beyond doubt. This would help.
EB

But we can't possibly say that the moon objectively/absolutely exists without claiming that evidence-based epistemologies can produce absolute/objective truths. Isn't that a big no-no?

I was discussing the form of Juma's argument, not the substance.

On substance, I nearly agree with you, except that I would qualify it a bit by saying that (as far as I know) evidence-based epistemologies cannot produce absolute/objective truths about anything external to our minds (like the material world or God). But I can deduce from what you already said on qualia that this point is meaningless to you.

As for Juma, he may be wrong on substance but he could at least make the effort to get the right wording to ease the discussion forward.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Either they are identical (share an identity - i.e. are the same thing) or they are not. If you just say they're close enough for all practical purposes, then you end up with a class of instances none of which can be said to be identical to the class, and concepts end up as non-physical after all.

Forget about concepts and think of how gregarious animals manage to be social. I don't think one cockroach is identical to any other (QM would say no-no), but they do work fine together somehow. So, you don't need to be identical. You need to be similar enough to achieve communication. Cockroaches are obviously very similar but think of dogs and human beings. They can work together and they don't share concepts. Concepts may be like unconsequential froth as far the material world is concerned.
EB

 

[Kharakov]

So go ahead.

Why? There is no need. Noone has show a single non-physical entity of any kind. There is simply no competition.

No. One has shown the concept of a non-physical entity.

Perfect objects of math don't exist in physical reality due to vacuum fluctuations. There is no perfect square, except in the imagination, there is no perfect circle, except in the imagination. We know what one would be, but we also know that we cannot create one in physical reality, or at the very least measure one. This could be because our imaginations and perception of physical reality is fuzzy and inexact, rather than some other way around (in which physical reality itself is fuzzy and inexact). At some level, there may be perfect circles of force, perfect squares of energy, etc.

 

[ryan]

Do properties (not concepts) exist outside of our brains?

The moon is a concept. Does the moon exist outside out brain?

Juma, the Moon is not a concept. There is a concept of the Moon.

Good. So I should interpret your question as "do the 'reference of the concept of a specific property' exist outside the brain"?

I really don't understand your objection to the question about properties. Please explain.

As for the Moon issue, the Moon is not a concept; it is the object that concepts refer to.

 

[ryan]

Either they are identical (share an identity - i.e. are the same thing) or they are not. If you just say they're close enough for all practical purposes, then you end up with a class of instances none of which can be said to be identical to the class, and concepts end up as non-physical after all.

But Togo, no side can win or lose by this argument because we don't know if the processes are identical.

We know that all the conceptions of '2' everywhere in the world are not usefully understood as one giant physical process.

I understand now.

 

[ryan]

Either they are identical (share an identity - i.e. are the same thing) or they are not. If you just say they're close enough for all practical purposes, then you end up with a class of instances none of which can be said to be identical to the class, and concepts end up as non-physical after all.

But Togo, no side can win or lose by this argument because we don't know if the processes are identical.

We know that all the conceptions of '2' everywhere in the world are not usefully understood as one giant physical process.

"One giant physical process" where each human is a subprocess... That is spot on.

So is it one giant process or is it 2? It can't be both in the same way that an orange can't be an orange and a collection of particles; it can only be one or the other.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

So is it one giant process or is it 2? It can't be both in the same way that an orange can't be an orange and a collection of particles; it can only be one or the other.

Why can't it be both? Both are accurate descriptions of an orange.

 

[ryan]

So is it one giant process or is it 2? It can't be both in the same way that an orange can't be an orange and a collection of particles; it can only be one or the other.

Why can't it be both? Both are accurate descriptions of an orange.

It can be described as both, but it can't be both.

However, that is just in physicalism that it can't be both. It may actually be both in other ways.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

So is it one giant process or is it 2? It can't be both in the same way that an orange can't be an orange and a collection of particles; it can only be one or the other.

Why can't it be both? Both are accurate descriptions of an orange.

It can be described as both, but it can't be both.

However, that is just in physicalism that it can't be both. It may actually be both in other ways.

Of course it can be both in physicalism. They are both accurate descriptions of the object and putting the word be in bold text doesn't somehow mean that you need more than an accurate description to get to what you're talking about. One of them is what it is at a macro level and the other is what it is at a micro level.

There's no more of a conflict between that than there is a conflict between saying that you had a sandwich for lunch and saying that you had a piece of meat surrounded by two pieces of bread for lunch.

 

[ryan]

So is it one giant process or is it 2? It can't be both in the same way that an orange can't be an orange and a collection of particles; it can only be one or the other.

Why can't it be both? Both are accurate descriptions of an orange.

It can be described as both, but it can't be both.

However, that is just in physicalism that it can't be both. It may actually be both in other ways.

Of course it can be both in physicalism. They are both accurate descriptions of the object and putting the word be in bold text doesn't somehow mean that you need more than an accurate description to get to what you're talking about. One of them is what it is at a macro level and the other is what it is at a micro level.

If I took away all of the particles, the orange would not be there. It can be described as both "particles" and "orange", but it can't be both

 

[Keith&Co.]

If I took away all of the particles, the orange would not be there. It can be described as both "particles" and "orange", but it can't be both

But if you take away all of the particles, you're also taking away the orange.
You take both away with one subtraction. You cannot take the orange away without taking away all the particles.

So your thought experiment shows that it's both, at the same time.

 

[ryan]

If I took away all of the particles, the orange would not be there. It can be described as both "particles" and "orange", but it can't be both

But if you take away all of the particles, you're also taking away the orange.
You take both away with one subtraction. You cannot take the orange away without taking away all the particles.

So your thought experiment shows that it's both, at the same time.

"Orange" = "n particles"; how could it be both sides of the equation? For example, 2 = 2; the left side does not equal 4 which is both sides of the equation. Remember, I agree that it can be called both names, but to be logically consistent it can't be called both at the same time either.

If you said that parts of the time it was an orange and the other parts of the time it was n particles, then I would agree.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

If I took away all of the particles, the orange would not be there. It can be described as both "particles" and "orange", but it can't be both

That's because oranges are made up of particles. If you take the bread away from a sandwich, it's just a slice of ham but when it has the bread it is a sandwich. Similarly, when a group of particles groups together in the form of an orange, it is an orange.

 

[ryan]

If I took away all of the particles, the orange would not be there. It can be described as both "particles" and "orange", but it can't be both

That's because oranges are made up of particles. If you take the bread away from a sandwich, it's just a slice of ham but when it has the bread it is a sandwich. Similarly, when a group of particles groups together in the form of an orange, it is an orange.

To be more specific, the words "orange" and "particles" are not the actual orange. There is only one unique orange. So if we are truly going to let a symbol stand for that unique orange, then we must have a unique symbol. No I am not playing semantic games; this is what it comes down to.

 

[none]

If I took away all of the particles, the orange would not be there. It can be described as both "particles" and "orange", but it can't be both

That's because oranges are made up of particles. If you take the bread away from a sandwich, it's just a slice of ham but when it has the bread it is a sandwich. Similarly, when a group of particles groups together in the form of an orange, it is an orange.

To be more specific, the words "orange" and "particles" are not the actual orange. There is only one unique orange. So if we are truly going to let a symbol stand for that unique orange, then we must have a unique symbol. No I am not playing semantic games; this is what it comes down to.

this sounds crazy...
aren't all oranges unique?
saying this orange is unique seems to supplant a special symbol...

 

[Zaphod Beeblebrox]

If I took away all of the particles, the orange would not be there. It can be described as both "particles" and "orange", but it can't be both

That's because oranges are made up of particles. If you take the bread away from a sandwich, it's just a slice of ham but when it has the bread it is a sandwich. Similarly, when a group of particles groups together in the form of an orange, it is an orange.

To be more specific, the words "orange" and "particles" are not the actual orange. There is only one unique orange. So if we are truly going to let a symbol stand for that unique orange, then we must have a unique symbol. No I am not playing semantic games; this is what it comes down to.

The point is that one can describe an orange in terms of:

a) the component particles that make it up;
b) the physical object as a whole; and
c) both simultaneously

Compare this to, say, water - water can be described in a multitude of ways, from its "wetness" to the hydrogen and oxygen atoms that form the necessary bonds to produce it.

EDIT: Since we're on the subject of language (specifically, words), I wish to bring up the following art installation - "One and Three Chairs," by John Kosuth.

The piece poses the fundamental question "how does one identify a chair?" Can we divorce the physical chair from the photograph and the definition and still have a "chair"? Definitions play an important part in our perceptions.