“Reality Goes Beyond Physics,” and more

[Elixir]

i may have said it before … free will is like a lightbulb. It doesn’t really have to work, it just has to look like it works. It doesn’t matter if it’s illusory, as long as it’s reliably so.

 

[peacegirl]

When DBT repeatedly brings up “inner necessity” to claim we do not have compatibilist freedom, I simply ask again and again: What kind of “necessity” is he talking about?

He is talking about inner necessity which compels only one decision, which is only ever possible, based on the antecedents that are factored in.

It cannot be logical necessity, for reasons I have given. So what IS this necessity of which he speaks? I hold that it does not exist — that the only form of necessity is logical necessity.

But it is true, of course, that people use language in a loose and often slipshod manner, so we might say, for instance, that it is “necessary” to eat a big breakfast if you are doing to do a hard day’s work. But it’s not necessary at all; it’s just advisable.

DBT never said that eating a big breakfast is "necessary". You are misrepresenting his words.

 

[pood]

When DBT repeatedly brings up “inner necessity” to claim we do not have compatibilist freedom, I simply ask again and again: What kind of “necessity” is he talking about?

He is talking about inner necessity which compels only one decision, which is only ever possible, based on the antecedents that are factored in.

“Inner necessity” is a label. It’s not an explanation. I am asking him to explain what kind of necessity this is, since it is obviously not logical necessity. And logical necessity is the only kind of necessity in the books.

It cannot be logical necessity, for reasons I have given. So what IS this necessity of which he speaks? I hold that it does not exist — that the only form of necessity is logical necessity.

But it is true, of course, that people use language in a loose and often slipshod manner, so we might say, for instance, that it is “necessary” to eat a big breakfast if you are doing to do a hard day’s work. But it’s not necessary at all; it’s just advisable.

DBT never said that eating a big breakfast is "necessary". You are misrepresenting his words.

Honestly, can you even read? I never said he said that! I was using this as a hypothetical example of how natural language speakers often use precise terms in a slipshod way. This is precisely why we have formal symbolic language, to do away with natural-language ambiguities.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

i may have said it before … free will is like a lightbulb. It doesn’t really have to work, it just has to look like it works. It doesn’t matter if it’s illusory, as long as it’s reliably so.

That's kind of like when Feynman said, "I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics." Does it matter whether anyone understands it so long as it is useful?

I think I correctly recall someone writing or speaking about "free will" (ugh, I seriously dislike that term) saying something along the lines of: it does not matter if there is no free will; it is still a useful concept. The only thing interesting about that way of thinking is that it opens up the notion of usefulness to analysis in terms of what it means for something to be useful, such as how is it useful - what does it mean to be useful - to someone who does not have free will. And that is an avenue leading to considerations about subjectivity which then, of course, brings up the notion of objectivity, and on and on and on.

Oh, but it also involves the relationship between useful and reliable. At some point in all that on and on and on some might be inclined - or driven? - to say, "Ah, shut up and calculate." Or maybe just, "Ah, shut up." Then again, maybe "I don't have time for all that."

 

[peacegirl]

necessity.

Stop using this to prove free will. No determinist that I know of would say you could NOT choose otherwise in a different situation that would naturally elicit a different response. Show me where this applies to the situation that compels a reaction due to having no choice given the options. You seem to be sidestepping the main argument Pood!

You seem unable to comprehend what I write

You keep using logical necessity and other worlds as some kind of proof that the world didn't have to unfold as it actually did. You cannot prove this, and your modal logic does nothing to prove it either.

 

[pood]

necessity.

Stop using this to prove free will. No determinist that I know of would say you could NOT choose otherwise in a different situation that would naturally elicit a different response. Show me where this applies to the situation that compels a reaction due to having no choice given the options. You seem to be sidestepping the main argument Pood!

You seem unable to comprehend what I write

You keep using logical necessity and other worlds as some kind of proof that the world didn't have to unfold as it actually did. You cannot prove this, and your modal logic does nothing to prove it either.

Since the history of the world is a vast set of contingencies, which means that events could have been otherwise, and because quantum indeterminacy repeatedly scales up to the macro world, I have proved it.

 

[peacegirl]

Earlier the Minkowski block world model was brought up, in which the future exists along with the past and the present. The model was derived from evidence: relativity theory. Given the relativity of simultaneity, and that every spacetime event has to be assigned four coordinates, three of space and one of time, it’s hard to see how the model could not be true, but then again, general relativity conflicts with quantum mechanics, so the jury is out.

However, if the future is already just as fixed as the past — a theme of the wonderful sci-fi movie Arrival — this still does not impugn compatibilist free will.

That’s because the block world was anticipated by Aristotle some 2,000 years ago, even though he knew nothing about relativity theory.

It’s called the Problem of Future Contingents. Aristotle worried that if it is true today that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then the battle is inevitable and no one could do anything about it. Hence, he reasoned, we have no free will. The ancient Greek thinkers were big on fatalism and the so-called “idle” argument — it is idle to worry about what we do, because the future is fixed, and there is nothing we can do to avoid it or change it. In drama, this idea is most vividly depicted in Oedipus Rex by Sophocles.

Aristotle, wishing to preserve free will, argued that propositions only become true at the time the event they describe happens; thus the statement “today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle” actually has no truth value.

But there are all sorts of assumptions here that need to unpacked and clarified.

If, 100 years ago, someone uttered the sentence, “In 2024, Donald Trump — unfortunately — will be elected president,” who can doubt that he spoke truly, both of the event and the value judgment ascribed to it? He did speak truly; Aristotle was mistaken. Importantly, his solution to the Problem of Future Contingents was not needed to vindicate free will.

Again, modern modal logic shows why. Aristotle’s reasoning was:

If today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then tomorrow the sea battle MUST (necessarily) occur. No one can prevent it.

The proper modal reconstruction is:

Necessarily (if today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then tomorrow a sea battle will [but not MUST!] occur.

The necessity is a relative necessity, inhering not just in the consequent, but jointly in the antecedent and consequent together.

From this it follows that the sea battle may, or MAY NOT, occur, but whatever happens, the statement prior to the event will adjust its truth value to reflect reality. If there is a sea battle, then today it will be true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle; if there is NOT a sea battle, then today it will be true that tomorrow there will NOT be a sea battle.

The implicit mistake in the Problem of Future Contingents is to suppose that the truth of a statement today, somehow forces the event that the statement describes to occur tomorrow. But this gets the flow of truth-making exactly backward. It’s like my saying that watching the sun come up forces the sun to come up.

The Problem of Future Contingents also amounts to the (false) assumptions that the fixity of the future is the same as fatalism, and that to have free will, we ought to be able to somehow change the future.

But fixity is not fatalism, inevitability is not necessity, and free will requires us to change nothing, only to be able to make certain things within our purview be, what they actually are.

If the future is already fixed as in the block world model, then my future free acts will contribute to that fixity, just as my past free acts contributed to the fixity of the past, and my current free acts contribute to to the fixity of the present. As I freely type these words in the present, I am changing nothing; I am only helping to make things be, what they actually are.

You are definitely contributing to the fixity of the future just as you contributed to the fixity of the past. The only difference is that in the present, you are helping to make things be what they actually are, but UNFREELY.

 

[peacegirl]

“I am a central participant in what I accomplish or don’t.” Exactly! I am the efficient and final cause of my acts, and I need determinism (distinct from hard determinism) to ensure that my choices are causally effectuated by me (as opposed to the big bang).

You're misconstruing what it means to have no free will. Yes, looking back, everything that happened had to happen going back to when this universe began.

No, it did not have to happen. It just did happen.

Nah, looking back it had to have happened exactly as it did unless you are pretending that there is another world where the laws of this world don't apply.

Laws don’t govern the world, they describe it.

Laws that describe govern as well. We cannot move against the laws that we are part of. That does not mean the laws tell us what to do; but we are bound by them with absolutely no choice of our own.

Funny then that I am “bound” by the “law” of gravity, but that didn’t stop us from landing on the moon or sending spacecraft to distant planets and even beyond the solar system. But there is a sense in which reality constrains us — how we are constrained, for example, to send spacecraft to distant worlds based on the fact of delayed-time seeing.

We are bound by the "law" of gravity "on Earth" and there is no contradiction using measurements of light to get us to the moon or any other celestial body and the fact that we see in real time. Good try.

Yes, how we go to the moon and other celestial bodies completely contradicts real-time seeing. This has been explained to you repeatedly but you prefer to remain willfully ignorant.

Nope, it actually doesn't. You have no understanding at all.

 

[peacegirl]

necessity.

Stop using this to prove free will. No determinist that I know of would say you could NOT choose otherwise in a different situation that would naturally elicit a different response. Show me where this applies to the situation that compels a reaction due to having no choice given the options. You seem to be sidestepping the main argument Pood!

You seem unable to comprehend what I write

You keep using logical necessity and other worlds as some kind of proof that the world didn't have to unfold as it actually did. You cannot prove this, and your modal logic does nothing to prove it either.

Since the history of the world is a vast set of contingencies, which means that events could have been otherwise, and because quantum indeterminacy repeatedly scales up to the macro world, I have proved it.

You have proved nothing other than your modal fallacies and your inconsistent logic.

 

[peacegirl]

Computers and other high-tech must take into account quantum indeterminacy, such as quantum tunneling. However, again, the compatitibilist position does not depend on QM.

Then why bring it up?

You're just confusing the issue.

I didn’t bring it up. Peacegirl did, when she stated that the world had to be, exactly the way that it is.

That is true. We can only move in one direction. There are no parallel worlds where this law doesn't apply. Quantum indeterminacy does not grant us the free will to have created a different world than the world we now have. As a reminder, for the purposes of this debate and what philosophers use when defining terms, the opposite of determinism is free will (or the ability to otherwise), not indeterminism.

No, philosophers do NOT define the opposite of determinism as “free will.” They define it as INdeterminism. You don’t get to declare victory by changing the definition of words, sorry. "

You're lost in your own logical maze. We cannot have free will (being able to choose other than what we choose in a given instance) and no free will (the inability to choose other than what we choose in a given instance) simultaneously. You can bring in the kitchen sink as a definition if you don't like the present one, but it changes nothing as far as reality is concerned. It boils down to whether it is true that we "could have or could NOT have done otherwise." Determinism states very clearly that "could have done otherwise" is impossible, therefore "could not have done otherwise" is the ONLY possible answer, leaving free will out in the cold. Sorry.

And that is disproven by quantum indeterminacy. ETA: But again, even without quantum indeterminacy, the world did not have to be, exactly the way that it is. It is built on a series of contingencies that may or may not have anything to do with QM, though QM does definitely affect the macro realm.

You are right back to your safety net, which proves nothing at all Pood. Could have, may have, might have, are imaginary IFs that did not occur, therefore they could not have occurred.

Which again reveals you maintain willful ignorance on this as on so much else, like how the eye works and how we see in delayed time. The “ifs” that did not occur, COULD HAVE OCCURRED. That’s why they are called contingent.

Contingent only means that one's choices are based on present and past environmental experiences along with one's genetics. Each person's decisions are contingent on these considerations. That being so, they could NOT have chosen otherwise. Tomorrow, they may choose differently based on other contingencies. Contingency, therefore, is a necessarily condition of no free will because it is situational, based on context, which push us in one direction ONLY, the only direction we can go.

The world could be anything you want it to be in imagination, but this makes it no more real than the man in the moon.

Just like real-time seeing and efferent vision are no more real than the man in the moon. Look in the mirror to see the true target of your accusations.

You still have no conception regarding how the brain and eyes work in relation to what we see, or even what his proof was, so go buy yourself your own mirror and look at it long and hard. You may actually have a moment of clarity.

 

[pood]

I suppose it should be noted at this point that determinism is not actually true, under Copenhagen quantum mechanics.

The determinism context would be the macrophysical domain in conjunction with the holding that quantum level indeterminateness never attains macrophysical effect.

But it does. Quantum indeterministic spontaneous decay of unstable atoms causes mutations which help drive evolution. There is now strong evidence that plants use QM to make photosynthesis more efficient. Quantum events in microtubules have been applied to the mind. Quantum computers work in superposition. I am sure many more examples can or will be adduced.

Well, it is actually the emitted radiation (energy) which can effect mutation; it is not the apparent associated indeterminateness.

But quantum indeterminacy is the indirect cause of the mutation, because the radiation occurred because of a spontaneous and non-determined, fully probabilistic event. Since these kinds of mutations happen all the time, indeterminacy obviously has a major role in biological evolution.

Upthread you mentioned Feynman. In one of his books he explains the quantum role of reflected light in windows. Seeing our reflections in windows is a consequence of indeterminism!

 

[pood]

necessity.

Stop using this to prove free will. No determinist that I know of would say you could NOT choose otherwise in a different situation that would naturally elicit a different response. Show me where this applies to the situation that compels a reaction due to having no choice given the options. You seem to be sidestepping the main argument Pood!

You seem unable to comprehend what I write

You keep using logical necessity and other worlds as some kind of proof that the world didn't have to unfold as it actually did. You cannot prove this, and your modal logic does nothing to prove it either.

Since the history of the world is a vast set of contingencies, which means that events could have been otherwise, and because quantum indeterminacy repeatedly scales up to the macro world, I have proved it.

You have proved nothing other than your modal fallacies and your inconsistent logic.

Let me correct you: it is you and DBT who commit modal fallacies and exhibit inconsistent logic. But as they say, every accusation is a confession.

 

[pood]

Computers and other high-tech must take into account quantum indeterminacy, such as quantum tunneling. However, again, the compatitibilist position does not depend on QM.

Then why bring it up?

You're just confusing the issue.

I didn’t bring it up. Peacegirl did, when she stated that the world had to be, exactly the way that it is.

That is true. We can only move in one direction. There are no parallel worlds where this law doesn't apply. Quantum indeterminacy does not grant us the free will to have created a different world than the world we now have. As a reminder, for the purposes of this debate and what philosophers use when defining terms, the opposite of determinism is free will (or the ability to otherwise), not indeterminism.

No, philosophers do NOT define the opposite of determinism as “free will.” They define it as INdeterminism. You don’t get to declare victory by changing the definition of words, sorry.

And that is disproven by quantum indeterminacy. ETA: But again, even without quantum indeterminacy, the world did not have to be, exactly the way that it is. It is built on a series of contingencies that may or may not have anything to do with QM, though QM does definitely affect the macro realm.

You are right back to your safety net, which proves nothing at all Pood. Could have, may have, might have, are imaginary IFs that did not occur, therefore they could not have occurred.

Which again reveals you maintain willful ignorance on this as on so much else, like how the eye works and how we see in delayed time. The “ifs” that did not occur, COULD HAVE OCCURRED. That’s why they are called contingent.

Contingent only means that one's choices are based on present and past environment considerations along with one's genetics. Every person's decisions are contingent on these considerations.

Contingency, in logic, means “could have been otherwise,” not, “depends on something else.”

Contingency, therefore, is a necessarily condition of no free will.

Total gobbledygook. Just the opposite is the case.

The world could be anything you want it to be in imagination, but this makes it no more real than the man in the moon.

Just like real-time seeing and efferent vision are no more real than the man in the moon. Look in the mirror to see the true target of your accusations.

You still have no conception as to the proof regarding how the brain and eyes work in relation to what we see, so go buy yourself your own mirror and look at it long and hard. You may actually have a moment of clarity.

The eye is a sense organ and we see in delayed time. These facts have been demonstrated to be true for hundreds of years. Too bad your author never studied up on the stuff about which he was so please to pontificate, and to do so in such a laughably cocksure manner.

 

[pood]

Nope, it actually doesn't. You have no understanding at all.

Every accusation is a confession.

Go ask NASA how they use delayed-time seeing to plot celestial courses. Remember when we took your claims to an astronomy board, and you refused to read their responses?

 

[pood]

Anyway, your BS about light and sight is a thread derailment. Please keep it in your own thread.

 

[The AntiChris]

It ("the world") is built on a series of contingencies that may or may not have anything to do with QM, though QM does definitely affect the macro realm.

If your compatibilism is at all dependent on contingencies that have anything to do with QM indeterminacy then you're not a compatibilist.

If your compatibilist beliefs hold true independently of any possible quantum indeterminacy then why would you even bring the subject up?

You surely realise that many hard determinists believe that most compatibilists aren't really 'true' determinists. So when you raise the subject of quantum indeterminacy in the context of a debate about free will you just add fuel to this mistaken belief.

 

[pood]

It ("the world") is built on a series of contingencies that may or may not have anything to do with QM, though QM does definitely affect the macro realm.

If your compatibilism is at all dependent on contingencies that have anything to do with QM indeterminacy then you're not a compatibilist.

If your compatibilist beliefs hold true independently of any possible quantum indeterminacy then why would you even bring the subject up?

You surely realise that many hard determinists believe that most compatibilists aren't really 'true' determinists. So when you raise the subject of quantum indeterminacy in the context of a debate about free will you just add fuel to this mistaken belief.

*Sigh*

Did you read where I said that compatibilism HAS NOTHING TO DO with quantum indeterminacy? I think I said that at least twice, maybe more.

Did you read where I informed you that I DID NOT BRING UP THE SUBJECT, peacegirl did?

 

[peacegirl]

Error

 

[peacegirl]

When DBT repeatedly brings up “inner necessity” to claim we do not have compatibilist freedom, I simply ask again and again: What kind of “necessity” is he talking about?

He is talking about inner necessity which compels only one decision, which is only ever possible, based on the antecedents that are factored in.

“Inner necessity” is a label. It’s not an explanation. I am asking him to explain what kind of necessity this is, since it is obviously not logical necessity. And logical necessity is the only kind of necessity in the books.

He explained that "inner necessity" is what compatibilists leave out when discussing free will. They only refer to having no undue influence from external constraints without any reference to inner constraints (besides addictions), as if to say anything other than a physical or emotional addiction is considered a free act. This is categorically false.

It cannot be logical necessity, for reasons I have given. So what IS this necessity of which he speaks? I hold that it does not exist — that the only form of necessity is logical necessity.

But it is true, of course, that people use language in a loose and often slipshod manner, so we might say, for instance, that it is “necessary” to eat a big breakfast if you are doing to do a hard day’s work. But it’s not necessary at all; it’s just advisable.

DBT never said that eating a big breakfast is "necessary". You are misrepresenting his words.

Honestly, can you even read? I never said he said that! I was using this as a hypothetical example of how natural language speakers often use precise terms in a slipshod way. This is precisely why we have formal symbolic language, to do away with natural-language ambiguities.

Symbolic language can also be wrong in its logic, just as imprecise language can be wrong in its logic.

 

[bilby]

i may have said it before … free will is like a lightbulb. It doesn’t really have to work, it just has to look like it works. It doesn’t matter if it’s illusory, as long as it’s reliably so.

"Free will" is an illusory condition that describes reality only for observers, individuals, systems and entities which lack the precise and complete knowledge of the exact states of every part of the universe. Such as (for example) literally all of them.

Hard determinism is a problem only for a hypothetical God, with the ability to view the entirety of spacetime. For such a God, freedom of any kind is impossible. For any and all lesser beings, there is compatability between their observed freedom, and a deterministic universe in which that freedom is embedded.

We cannot understand, and should not seek to understand, our lives and circumstances by the examination of the precise positions and momentum of every lepton and boson in existence; Nor by reference to spacetime in its entirety. We must and do understand our lives and circumstances by reference to the influential aggregate systems that exist at human scales.

To understand that it even makes sense to identify oneself as an individual, is to understand that as an individual, one makes decisions.

In order to deny that the individual is a decision making entity, it is necessary to expand our perspective to encompass the entire universe, as a single deterministic system. And by doing so, we render the concept of the individual meaningless.

Hard determinism is an abandonment of discrimination; It renders us incapable of considering subunits of reality at all, because any and all such subunits are influenced by other subunits. So to derive any utility from hard determinism, we must abandon any attempt to consider any subjects smaller than "everything".

Hard determinism (possibly) isn't wrong. It's just utterly useless.

The universe cannot be otherwise than it is, and amongst the myriad irrelevancies it contains, one is my taking Coke rather than Pepsi. The universe can make no other choice, and can take no other path.

I, on the other hand, choose Coke over Pepsi. As a minuscule subunit of the universe, I cannot and do not have any compulsion to do so; My choice is mine because I made it, and I am distinct from, but not separate from, the universe.

I am a subsystem that makes choices. It is irrelevant to that fact to consider whether the universe (of which I am a subsystem) is, as a whole, immutable and incapable of choice.

The belief that what is true of the whole must also be true of every part of the whole is fallacious.

The universe is deterministic. People are a part of the universe. People make choices. Universes don't make choices. That's your compatibilism right there.