“Revolution in Thought: A new look at determinism and free will"

[bilby]

It's just a question of whether the given information is accurate.

No, it is question of whether you source for that information is reliable.

AI is not.

You have reliable sources; You even quoted some. Do that first, and leave AI to the people who don't know what a reliable source is.

 

[peacegirl]

Easy to find, from Stanford, for instance.

Free Will and the Problem of Causal Determinism
''Compatibilism emerges as a response to a problem posed by causal determinism. But what problem is that? Well, suppose, as the thesis of causal determinism tells us, that everything that occurs is the inevitable result of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past. If this is the case, then everything human agents do flows from the laws of nature and the way the world was in the distant past. But if what we do is simply the consequence of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past—then we cannot do anything other than what we ultimately do. Nor are we in any meaningful sense the ultimate causal source of our actions, since they have their causal origins in the laws of nature and the state of the world long ago. Determinism therefore seems to prevent human agents from having the freedom to do otherwise, and it also seems to prevent them from being the sources of their actions. If either of these is true, then it’s doubtful that human agents are free or responsible for their actions in any meaningful sense.

These lines of argument, which have been regimented in the work of Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1975, 1983), Wisdom (1934), Mele (1995), and Pereboom (1995, 2001), among many others, present a real problem for those who are inclined to think that we are free and responsible for our choices and actions and that the natural world might operate as a deterministic system (or if not completely deterministic, one in which an indeterminism is merely stochastic noise that is causally irrelevant at the level of human agency). How to respond to such arguments? On the one hand, incompatibilists accept (some version of at least one of) these arguments and so insist that our self-conception as free and responsible agents would be seriously misguided if causal determinism turns out to be true. Some incompatibilists argue for these conclusions indirectly—first by arguing that determinism precludes freedom or control and then second by arguing that such freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. Other incompatibilists argue directly that causal determinism precludes moral responsibility.''

The bit you quoted from Stanford begins, “on the one hand…” without supplying the other hand.

Everything I’m about to say I have said many times before. If someone new wants to join the convo, great. If not, there’s no I reason to go round the block for the 101st time when we, the usual suspects, have already been around it 100 times.

A compatibilist, especially a neo-Humean compatibilist, is going to challenge the very first premise of the so-called problem: the laws of nature.

He will point out, correctly in my view, that “laws” is a is misnomer. As the aforementioned Norman Swartz has argued, there are no “laws” of nature. What we call “laws,” contra Newton and others, are merely descriptions of stuff that happens. “Laws” have no coercive or causal efficacy. They are not prescriptive. They are descriptive.

A law of nature describes, not prescribes; consequently, there is nothing wrong with saying something is a law of our nature.

So the whole framing of the alleged problem fails from the get-go. As Swartz says, the “laws” of nature are a hangover from theism. Newton thought there was a lawgiver (God), and the laws of nature are his laws. But they are not. They are descriptions of what happens in the world.

So what is the problem? There isn’t any.

We are the products of the laws of our nature that created us with particular attributes that are specific to humans, and we cannot extricate ourselves from the very laws that made us who we are.

There is only one actual world. In fact there may be others, under the quantum multiverse or David Lewis’s modal multiverse, but the only world we have access to is the one we call actual. So every moment of every day I must choose something in the actual world. Even not choosing among available alternatives if a form of choosing: choosing not to choose.

Standard compatibilism says that when I choose, my choice is free insofar as it is done according to my desire and free of impediment by external factors.

Some compatibilists affirm that we could not choose other than what we did, given antecedent circumstances.

Although compatibilism is incoherent, the ones who affirm that we could not choose other than what we did, in fact, choose, are 100% correct.

I disagree. I think these compatibilists have failed to attend to modal logic, “modal” meaning modes of being.

Modal logic doesn't change reality.

My view is that we CAN always choose differently, given antecedent circumstances, only that we WILL not.

Nope. It's physically impossible to go back in time and prove that given the same antecedent circumstances, another choice could have been made.

This is because all our choices are contingent (could have been otherwise).

They are contingent on new situations whose choices have not yet been made, not ones that have already been made. We cannot change the past Pood no matter how your modal logic tries to make it appear.

If we could “back up” the whole history of the world and replay it again and again, it might well be true that I would always choose Coke over Pepsi.

Yep, that is true, which is why determinism only goes in one direction.

It does not logically follow that I HAVE TO do that. I will do it always, again and again, because I WANT TO.

You keep mixing up the past with the present. It is logically possible to choose Pepsi over Coke today because you want to. Who is saying you can't do this? This is not predeterminism that tells you necessarily what must be chosen. The only thing that we cannot change is the past, which means we could not have chosen otherwise -- looking back.

Give me DIFFERENT antecedents, I might want to choose Pepsi instead.

It might just be that you want to prove that you have the freedom to choose A (Pepsi) over B (Coke), so you buy the Pepsi, but no one is saying you don't have this freedom (therefore, in no way does this colloquial expression "I did this of my own free will" prove that your will was actually free to do otherwise once you chose Pepsi). It could be that you want to try the new Pepsi formula that was advertised (which may influence your choice), or you may just be tired of the old flavor of Coke and want to try something new (which may alter what you normally buy). Determinism doesn't mean you are being forced by antecedents to buy Pepsi, if you don't want to. This is an important aspect of the discovery, which you obviously don't understand. No one is taking your ability to choose away from you.

Which is compatibilism. And sounds very much like peacegirl’s author was arguing for, but apparently without knowing it.

Not at all. This just shows me you still don't understand that being able to do something "of one's own accord" does not grant us freedom of the will or the ability to choose A or B equally when there are meaningful differences. And you are right that even not choosing something is a choice, if both choices are unappealing. The choice not to pick either of them would also be in the direction of greater satisfaction. This is an invariable law OF OUR NATURE.

 

[DBT]

Easy to find, from Stanford, for instance.

Free Will and the Problem of Causal Determinism
''Compatibilism emerges as a response to a problem posed by causal determinism. But what problem is that? Well, suppose, as the thesis of causal determinism tells us, that everything that occurs is the inevitable result of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past. If this is the case, then everything human agents do flows from the laws of nature and the way the world was in the distant past. But if what we do is simply the consequence of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past—then we cannot do anything other than what we ultimately do. Nor are we in any meaningful sense the ultimate causal source of our actions, since they have their causal origins in the laws of nature and the state of the world long ago. Determinism therefore seems to prevent human agents from having the freedom to do otherwise, and it also seems to prevent them from being the sources of their actions. If either of these is true, then it’s doubtful that human agents are free or responsible for their actions in any meaningful sense.

These lines of argument, which have been regimented in the work of Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1975, 1983), Wisdom (1934), Mele (1995), and Pereboom (1995, 2001), among many others, present a real problem for those who are inclined to think that we are free and responsible for our choices and actions and that the natural world might operate as a deterministic system (or if not completely deterministic, one in which an indeterminism is merely stochastic noise that is causally irrelevant at the level of human agency). How to respond to such arguments? On the one hand, incompatibilists accept (some version of at least one of) these arguments and so insist that our self-conception as free and responsible agents would be seriously misguided if causal determinism turns out to be true. Some incompatibilists argue for these conclusions indirectly—first by arguing that determinism precludes freedom or control and then second by arguing that such freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. Other incompatibilists argue directly that causal determinism precludes moral responsibility.''

The bit you quoted from Stanford begins, “on the one hand…” without supplying the other hand.

Everything I’m about to say I have said many times before. If someone new wants to join the convo, great. If not, there’s no I reason to go round the block for the 101st time when we, the usual suspects, have already been around it 100 times.

A compatibilist, especially a neo-Humean compatibilist, is going to challenge the very first premise of the so-called problem: the laws of nature.

He will point out, correctly in my view, that “laws” is a is misnomer. As the aforementioned Norman Swartz has argued, there are no “laws” of nature. What we call “laws,” contra Newton and others, are merely descriptions of stuff that happens. “Laws” have no coercive or causal efficacy. They are not prescriptive. They are descriptive.


So the whole framing of the alleged problem fails from the get-go. As Swartz says, the “laws” of nature are a hangover from theism. Newton thought there was a lawgiver (God), and the laws of nature are his laws. But they are not. They are descriptions of what happens in the world.

So what is the problem? There isn’t any.

There is only one actual world. In fact there may be others, under the quantum multiverse or David Lewis’s modal multiverse, but the only world we have access to is the one we call actual. So every moment of every day I must choose something in the actual world. Even not choosing among available alternatives if a form of choosing: choosing not to choose.

Standard compatibilism says that when I choose, my choice is free insofar as it is done according to my desire and free of impediment by external factors.

Some compatibilists affirm that we could not choose other than what we did, given antecedent circumstances.

I disagree. I think these compatibilists have failed to attend to modal logic, “modal” meaning modes of being.

My view is that we CAN always choose differently, given antecedent circumstances, only that we WILL not.

This is because all our choices are contingent (could have been otherwise).

If we could “back up” the whole history of the world and replay it again and again, it might well be true that I would always choose Coke over Pepsi.

It does not logically follow that I HAVE TO do that. I will do it always, again and again, because I WANT TO.

Give me DIFFERENT antecedents, I might want to choose Pepsi instead.

Which is compatibilism. And sounds very much like peacegirl’s author was arguing for, but apparently without knowing it.

Well. it is a murky subject.

The point I'm trying to get across is simply that compatibilism is related to determinism, not contingency.

That free will, as compatibilists define it to be, requires determinism, that the decision making process is deterministic. That ''the ability to act according to one's own desires and rational choices in the absence of external coercion,'' is deterministic.

Which excludes contingency, where ''an event is not necessary but depends on specific circumstances or chance. If something is contingent, it could have happened in a different way or not at all,'' where chance or disruptive events occurring at the decision making level - the activity of a brain - do not help maintain a rational, adaptive decision making process.

 

[DBT]

It's just a question of whether the given information is accurate.

No, it is question of whether you source for that information is reliable.

AI is not.

You have reliable sources; You even quoted some. Do that first, and leave AI to the people who don't know what a reliable source is.

A body of information that is accurate remains accurate regardless of who or what is presenting it.

The information in the AI overview I quoted had nothing that was particularly controversial.....except, of course, things like the debate on free will and compatibilism as a solid argument for free will.

Its definition of compatibilism was reasonable, as Pood agreed.

It's definition of determinism was fair, as was the its brief rundown on contingency. Which are quite obviously different concepts, where determinism does not permit alternate action in any given circumstance, but contingency does.

 

[peacegirl]

"Compatibilism is the philosophical view that free will and determinism are compatible, meaning both can be true at the same time without logical contradiction. Compatibilists, also known as soft determinists, argue that an action is "free" if it results from the agent's own internal desires and rational deliberations, rather than being forced by external constraints."

Definition of Free Will:

Compatibilists redefine free will not as an absolute ability to do otherwise in every circumstance, but rather as the ability to act according to one's own desires and rational choices in the absence of external coercion" - AI Overview

Contingency is not a part of the compatibilist definition of free will.

It is in the sense that there must be contingent truths about the world. Otherwise we get what is called modal collapse, the idea that all truths are necessary truths. But this is obviously false.

The AI overview is OK as far as it goes but there is much more to it than that, including a variant of compatibilism called neo-Humean compatibilism

Given that the compatibilist definition of free will is related to determinism, and determinism is not contingent, inserting contingency into compatibilism is a fallacy.

So every truth is a necessary truth? But that is obviously wrong. The antecedents of every act were also contingent.

But "contingent" does not mean "free." It means dependent on in this context.

1. (contingent on/upon)
   occurring or existing only if (certain circumstances) are the case; dependent on.

 

[peacegirl]

dupe

 

[peacegirl]

As I have pointed out before, DBT is mixing up determinism with predeterminism. But the latter is not supported and for that matter, neither is the former, since the world is fundamentally not deterministic, but quantum indeterministic.

Quantum indeterminism by itself does not support compatibilist free will. What does support it is that given a certain set of conditions, I will do as I please. As I’ve pointed out, which makes peacegirl freak out, her author’s writings on this are basically compatibilism.

But these writings are not compatibilism because the two are opposites if you don't cheat by changing the definition of "free will" to make them appear compatible. How can you have the ability to do otherwise (free will) and NOT have the ability to do otherwise (determinism) in the same breath? Being free to make choices without external force or constraint does not in any way equate with the freedom of the will. This was explained numerous times. How can our will be free if we are compelled to choose that which gives us greater, not less, satisfaction when two or more alternatives are compared? You never grasped this simple demonstration. For example, a libertarian will say, "This person didn't have to steal. He wanted to do it; he didn't have to. IOW, he had the free will to do otherwise. This is at the heart of the problem. Being able to choose without external constraint when no one has a gun to your head is called doing something of one's own free will in libertarian parlance. Lessans said this is an expression that we all use and there's nothing wrong with using it in a colloquial sense, but in no way does this mean that we had the freedom of the will to choose otherwise once a choice has been made. It does not mean before a choice is made, we necessarily must choose A over B unless we want to, which is not the same thing as determinism forcing us against our will to choose A over B.

------------------------------------

A central issue in the free will debate is confusion and disagreement about how the term is defined. The topic is clarified considerably when we distinguish freedom of choice from freedom of will. I argue that while rational agents may have freedom of choice, they cannot have freedom of will. Furthermore, freedom of choice alone is insufficient for free will; freedom of will is also required. Thus, rational agents cannot have free will.

<snip>

I will now refute two common mechanisms proposed by free will advocates to allow for free will. Firstly, the stochastic nature of quantum mechanics is often cited as a means by which the universe can be considered non-deterministic. This is true, at least for very small systems. However, it is actually unimportant whether or not quantum mechanical fluctuations result in any appreciable uncertainty in macroscopic systems. This is because the argument is based on the notion that a lack of determinism would prove the existence of free will. However, more accurately an agent being non-deterministic is a necessary, but not sufficient.

An argument against free will: freedom of choice, but not of will

A central issue in the free will debate is confusion and disagreement about how the term is defined. The topic is clarified considerably when we distinguish freedom of choice from freedom of will. I...

www.sciencesnail.com

 

[pood]

"Compatibilism is the philosophical view that free will and determinism are compatible, meaning both can be true at the same time without logical contradiction. Compatibilists, also known as soft determinists, argue that an action is "free" if it results from the agent's own internal desires and rational deliberations, rather than being forced by external constraints."

Definition of Free Will:

Compatibilists redefine free will not as an absolute ability to do otherwise in every circumstance, but rather as the ability to act according to one's own desires and rational choices in the absence of external coercion" - AI Overview

Contingency is not a part of the compatibilist definition of free will.

It is in the sense that there must be contingent truths about the world. Otherwise we get what is called modal collapse, the idea that all truths are necessary truths. But this is obviously false.

The AI overview is OK as far as it goes but there is much more to it than that, including a variant of compatibilism called neo-Humean compatibilism

Given that the compatibilist definition of free will is related to determinism, and determinism is not contingent, inserting contingency into compatibilism is a fallacy.

So every truth is a necessary truth? But that is obviously wrong. The antecedents of every act were also contingent.

But "contingent" does not mean "free." It means dependent on in this context.

1. (contingent on/upon)
   occurring or existing only if (certain circumstances) are the case; dependent on.

Sigh. The word “contingent” has different meanings, including depending on, or able to be otherwise. The second sense which I am using is the modal logical sense. Since it is obvious that it is logically possible to choose from any number of alternatives, our choices are never necessary truths. They are contingent truths (could have been otherwise).

 

[bilby]

A body of information that is accurate remains accurate regardless of who or what is presenting it.

A psychic correctly picked last years Melbourne Cup winner.

How valuable to you rate her opinion on this years winner to be?

 

[peacegirl]

"Compatibilism is the philosophical view that free will and determinism are compatible, meaning both can be true at the same time without logical contradiction. Compatibilists, also known as soft determinists, argue that an action is "free" if it results from the agent's own internal desires and rational deliberations, rather than being forced by external constraints."

Definition of Free Will:

Compatibilists redefine free will not as an absolute ability to do otherwise in every circumstance, but rather as the ability to act according to one's own desires and rational choices in the absence of external coercion" - AI Overview

Contingency is not a part of the compatibilist definition of free will.

It is in the sense that there must be contingent truths about the world. Otherwise we get what is called modal collapse, the idea that all truths are necessary truths. But this is obviously false.

The AI overview is OK as far as it goes but there is much more to it than that, including a variant of compatibilism called neo-Humean compatibilism

Given that the compatibilist definition of free will is related to determinism, and determinism is not contingent, inserting contingency into compatibilism is a fallacy.

So every truth is a necessary truth? But that is obviously wrong. The antecedents of every act were also contingent.

But "contingent" does not mean "free." It means dependent on in this context.

1. (contingent on/upon)
   occurring or existing only if (certain circumstances) are the case; dependent on.

Sigh. The word “contingent” has different meanings, including depending on, or able to be otherwise. The second sense which I am using is the modal logical sense. Since it is obvious that it is logically possible to choose from any number of alternatives, our choices are never necessary truths. They are contingent truths (could have been otherwise).

Being logically possible is not even being contested. Everyone knows it’s logically possible for Trump not to lie tomorrow or for you not to drink Coke instead of Pepsi if your antigens have changed. You are using a definition of determinism that calls for force. I am not. The very core of his discovery has gone right over your head.

 

[peacegirl]

Easy to find, from Stanford, for instance.

Free Will and the Problem of Causal Determinism
''Compatibilism emerges as a response to a problem posed by causal determinism. But what problem is that? Well, suppose, as the thesis of causal determinism tells us, that everything that occurs is the inevitable result of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past. If this is the case, then everything human agents do flows from the laws of nature and the way the world was in the distant past. But if what we do is simply the consequence of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past—then we cannot do anything other than what we ultimately do. Nor are we in any meaningful sense the ultimate causal source of our actions, since they have their causal origins in the laws of nature and the state of the world long ago. Determinism therefore seems to prevent human agents from having the freedom to do otherwise, and it also seems to prevent them from being the sources of their actions. If either of these is true, then it’s doubtful that human agents are free or responsible for their actions in any meaningful sense.

These lines of argument, which have been regimented in the work of Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1975, 1983), Wisdom (1934), Mele (1995), and Pereboom (1995, 2001), among many others, present a real problem for those who are inclined to think that we are free and responsible for our choices and actions and that the natural world might operate as a deterministic system (or if not completely deterministic, one in which an indeterminism is merely stochastic noise that is causally irrelevant at the level of human agency). How to respond to such arguments? On the one hand, incompatibilists accept (some version of at least one of) these arguments and so insist that our self-conception as free and responsible agents would be seriously misguided if causal determinism turns out to be true. Some incompatibilists argue for these conclusions indirectly—first by arguing that determinism precludes freedom or control and then second by arguing that such freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. Other incompatibilists argue directly that causal determinism precludes moral responsibility.''

The bit you quoted from Stanford begins, “on the one hand…” without supplying the other hand.

Everything I’m about to say I have said many times before. If someone new wants to join the convo, great. If not, there’s no I reason to go round the block for the 101st time when we, the usual suspects, have already been around it 100 times.

A compatibilist, especially a neo-Humean compatibilist, is going to challenge the very first premise of the so-called problem: the laws of nature.

He will point out, correctly in my view, that “laws” is a is misnomer. As the aforementioned Norman Swartz has argued, there are no “laws” of nature. What we call “laws,” contra Newton and others, are merely descriptions of stuff that happens. “Laws” have no coercive or causal efficacy. They are not prescriptive. They are descriptive.


So the whole framing of the alleged problem fails from the get-go. As Swartz says, the “laws” of nature are a hangover from theism. Newton thought there was a lawgiver (God), and the laws of nature are his laws. But they are not. They are descriptions of what happens in the world.

So what is the problem? There isn’t any.

There is only one actual world. In fact there may be others, under the quantum multiverse or David Lewis’s modal multiverse, but the only world we have access to is the one we call actual. So every moment of every day I must choose something in the actual world. Even not choosing among available alternatives if a form of choosing: choosing not to choose.

Standard compatibilism says that when I choose, my choice is free insofar as it is done according to my desire and free of impediment by external factors.

Some compatibilists affirm that we could not choose other than what we did, given antecedent circumstances.

I disagree. I think these compatibilists have failed to attend to modal logic, “modal” meaning modes of being.

My view is that we CAN always choose differently, given antecedent circumstances, only that we WILL not.

This is because all our choices are contingent (could have been otherwise).

If we could “back up” the whole history of the world and replay it again and again, it might well be true that I would always choose Coke over Pepsi.

It does not logically follow that I HAVE TO do that. I will do it always, again and again, because I WANT TO.

Give me DIFFERENT antecedents, I might want to choose Pepsi instead.

Which is compatibilism. And sounds very much like peacegirl’s author was arguing for, but apparently without knowing it.

Well. it is a murky subject.

The point I'm trying to get across is simply that compatibilism is related to determinism, not contingency.

That free will, as compatibilists define it to be, requires determinism, that the decision making process is deterministic. That ''the ability to act according to one's own desires and rational choices in the absence of external coercion,'' is deterministic.

Which excludes contingency, where ''an event is not necessary but depends on specific circumstances or chance. If something is contingent, it could have happened in a different way or not at all,'' where chance or disruptive events occurring at the decision making level - the activity of a brain - do not help maintain a rational, adaptive decision making process.

I am not sure where the word "contingent" means something could have happened in a different way or not at all. It's just a synonym for "based on." We make decisions based (or contingent) on those antecedents that we are using to determine what our next decision will be. It certainly doesn't mean that our movement in the direction of "greater satisfaction" could have been any different.

 

[peacegirl]

"Compatibilism is the philosophical view that free will and determinism are compatible, meaning both can be true at the same time without logical contradiction. Compatibilists, also known as soft determinists, argue that an action is "free" if it results from the agent's own internal desires and rational deliberations, rather than being forced by external constraints."

Definition of Free Will:

Compatibilists redefine free will not as an absolute ability to do otherwise in every circumstance, but rather as the ability to act according to one's own desires and rational choices in the absence of external coercion" - AI Overview

Contingency is not a part of the compatibilist definition of free will.

It is in the sense that there must be contingent truths about the world. Otherwise we get what is called modal collapse, the idea that all truths are necessary truths. But this is obviously false.

The AI overview is OK as far as it goes but there is much more to it than that, including a variant of compatibilism called neo-Humean compatibilism

Given that the compatibilist definition of free will is related to determinism, and determinism is not contingent, inserting contingency into compatibilism is a fallacy.

So every truth is a necessary truth? But that is obviously wrong. The antecedents of every act were also contingent.

But "contingent" does not mean "free." It means dependent on in this context.

1. (contingent on/upon)
   occurring or existing only if (certain circumstances) are the case; dependent on.

Sigh. The word “contingent” has different meanings, including depending on, or able to be otherwise. The second sense which I am using is the modal logical sense. Since it is obvious that it is logically possible to choose from any number of alternatives, our choices are never necessary truths. They are contingent truths (could have been otherwise).

So what if it is logically possible to choose from any number of alternatives and therefore our choices are not necessary truths like 3-sided triangles. No one said they were. But you cannot use the fact that because they are not necessary truths, that it is logically possible for an individual to choose an alternative that he did not desire choosing due to the fact that it was less satisfying than the choice he did, in fact, make; and just because that alternative was available changed nothing in as far as his lack of free will to choose otherwise is concerned.

Yes, that option may be available in the future but this contingent truth does not in any way support free will. It just means that future conditions and circumstances change, not only the scope of the choices available, but also what choices we will make in the direction of greater satisfaction that may be different than previously. There is no possible changing the past, Pood even with your modal logic. This actually supports determinism because it does nothing to prove we could have chosen otherwise. Free will based on the modal logic of “contingent truths” versus “necessary truths” just lost again.

 

[DBT]

A body of information that is accurate remains accurate regardless of who or what is presenting it.

A psychic correctly picked last years Melbourne Cup winner.

How valuable to you rate her opinion on this years winner to be?

Ahem, there was nothing particularly controversial to be found in the Overview. As with Contingency, the given definitions of compatibilism and determinism were reasonable,

Nothing much to complain about. Just a question of whether compatibilism is actually compatible with determinism, and how contingency happens to relate.

 

[DBT]

Easy to find, from Stanford, for instance.

Free Will and the Problem of Causal Determinism
''Compatibilism emerges as a response to a problem posed by causal determinism. But what problem is that? Well, suppose, as the thesis of causal determinism tells us, that everything that occurs is the inevitable result of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past. If this is the case, then everything human agents do flows from the laws of nature and the way the world was in the distant past. But if what we do is simply the consequence of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past—then we cannot do anything other than what we ultimately do. Nor are we in any meaningful sense the ultimate causal source of our actions, since they have their causal origins in the laws of nature and the state of the world long ago. Determinism therefore seems to prevent human agents from having the freedom to do otherwise, and it also seems to prevent them from being the sources of their actions. If either of these is true, then it’s doubtful that human agents are free or responsible for their actions in any meaningful sense.

These lines of argument, which have been regimented in the work of Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1975, 1983), Wisdom (1934), Mele (1995), and Pereboom (1995, 2001), among many others, present a real problem for those who are inclined to think that we are free and responsible for our choices and actions and that the natural world might operate as a deterministic system (or if not completely deterministic, one in which an indeterminism is merely stochastic noise that is causally irrelevant at the level of human agency). How to respond to such arguments? On the one hand, incompatibilists accept (some version of at least one of) these arguments and so insist that our self-conception as free and responsible agents would be seriously misguided if causal determinism turns out to be true. Some incompatibilists argue for these conclusions indirectly—first by arguing that determinism precludes freedom or control and then second by arguing that such freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. Other incompatibilists argue directly that causal determinism precludes moral responsibility.''

The bit you quoted from Stanford begins, “on the one hand…” without supplying the other hand.

Everything I’m about to say I have said many times before. If someone new wants to join the convo, great. If not, there’s no I reason to go round the block for the 101st time when we, the usual suspects, have already been around it 100 times.

A compatibilist, especially a neo-Humean compatibilist, is going to challenge the very first premise of the so-called problem: the laws of nature.

He will point out, correctly in my view, that “laws” is a is misnomer. As the aforementioned Norman Swartz has argued, there are no “laws” of nature. What we call “laws,” contra Newton and others, are merely descriptions of stuff that happens. “Laws” have no coercive or causal efficacy. They are not prescriptive. They are descriptive.


So the whole framing of the alleged problem fails from the get-go. As Swartz says, the “laws” of nature are a hangover from theism. Newton thought there was a lawgiver (God), and the laws of nature are his laws. But they are not. They are descriptions of what happens in the world.

So what is the problem? There isn’t any.

There is only one actual world. In fact there may be others, under the quantum multiverse or David Lewis’s modal multiverse, but the only world we have access to is the one we call actual. So every moment of every day I must choose something in the actual world. Even not choosing among available alternatives if a form of choosing: choosing not to choose.

Standard compatibilism says that when I choose, my choice is free insofar as it is done according to my desire and free of impediment by external factors.

Some compatibilists affirm that we could not choose other than what we did, given antecedent circumstances.

I disagree. I think these compatibilists have failed to attend to modal logic, “modal” meaning modes of being.

My view is that we CAN always choose differently, given antecedent circumstances, only that we WILL not.

This is because all our choices are contingent (could have been otherwise).

If we could “back up” the whole history of the world and replay it again and again, it might well be true that I would always choose Coke over Pepsi.

It does not logically follow that I HAVE TO do that. I will do it always, again and again, because I WANT TO.

Give me DIFFERENT antecedents, I might want to choose Pepsi instead.

Which is compatibilism. And sounds very much like peacegirl’s author was arguing for, but apparently without knowing it.

Well. it is a murky subject.

The point I'm trying to get across is simply that compatibilism is related to determinism, not contingency.

That free will, as compatibilists define it to be, requires determinism, that the decision making process is deterministic. That ''the ability to act according to one's own desires and rational choices in the absence of external coercion,'' is deterministic.

Which excludes contingency, where ''an event is not necessary but depends on specific circumstances or chance. If something is contingent, it could have happened in a different way or not at all,'' where chance or disruptive events occurring at the decision making level - the activity of a brain - do not help maintain a rational, adaptive decision making process.

I am not sure where the word "contingent" means something could have happened in a different way or not at all. It's just a synonym for "based on." We make decisions based (or contingent) on those antecedents that we are using to determine what our next decision will be. It certainly doesn't mean that our movement in the direction of "greater satisfaction" could have been any different.

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Easy to find, from Stanford, for instance.

Free Will and the Problem of Causal Determinism
''Compatibilism emerges as a response to a problem posed by causal determinism. But what problem is that? Well, suppose, as the thesis of causal determinism tells us, that everything that occurs is the inevitable result of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past. If this is the case, then everything human agents do flows from the laws of nature and the way the world was in the distant past. But if what we do is simply the consequence of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past—then we cannot do anything other than what we ultimately do. Nor are we in any meaningful sense the ultimate causal source of our actions, since they have their causal origins in the laws of nature and the state of the world long ago. Determinism therefore seems to prevent human agents from having the freedom to do otherwise, and it also seems to prevent them from being the sources of their actions. If either of these is true, then it’s doubtful that human agents are free or responsible for their actions in any meaningful sense.

These lines of argument, which have been regimented in the work of Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1975, 1983), Wisdom (1934), Mele (1995), and Pereboom (1995, 2001), among many others, present a real problem for those who are inclined to think that we are free and responsible for our choices and actions and that the natural world might operate as a deterministic system (or if not completely deterministic, one in which an indeterminism is merely stochastic noise that is causally irrelevant at the level of human agency). How to respond to such arguments? On the one hand, incompatibilists accept (some version of at least one of) these arguments and so insist that our self-conception as free and responsible agents would be seriously misguided if causal determinism turns out to be true. Some incompatibilists argue for these conclusions indirectly—first by arguing that determinism precludes freedom or control and then second by arguing that such freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. Other incompatibilists argue directly that causal determinism precludes moral responsibility.''

The bit you quoted from Stanford begins, “on the one hand…” without supplying the other hand.

Everything I’m about to say I have said many times before. If someone new wants to join the convo, great. If not, there’s no I reason to go round the block for the 101st time when we, the usual suspects, have already been around it 100 times.

A compatibilist, especially a neo-Humean compatibilist, is going to challenge the very first premise of the so-called problem: the laws of nature.

He will point out, correctly in my view, that “laws” is a is misnomer. As the aforementioned Norman Swartz has argued, there are no “laws” of nature. What we call “laws,” contra Newton and others, are merely descriptions of stuff that happens. “Laws” have no coercive or causal efficacy. They are not prescriptive. They are descriptive.


So the whole framing of the alleged problem fails from the get-go. As Swartz says, the “laws” of nature are a hangover from theism. Newton thought there was a lawgiver (God), and the laws of nature are his laws. But they are not. They are descriptions of what happens in the world.

So what is the problem? There isn’t any.

There is only one actual world. In fact there may be others, under the quantum multiverse or David Lewis’s modal multiverse, but the only world we have access to is the one we call actual. So every moment of every day I must choose something in the actual world. Even not choosing among available alternatives if a form of choosing: choosing not to choose.

Standard compatibilism says that when I choose, my choice is free insofar as it is done according to my desire and free of impediment by external factors.

Some compatibilists affirm that we could not choose other than what we did, given antecedent circumstances.

I disagree. I think these compatibilists have failed to attend to modal logic, “modal” meaning modes of being.

My view is that we CAN always choose differently, given antecedent circumstances, only that we WILL not.

This is because all our choices are contingent (could have been otherwise).

If we could “back up” the whole history of the world and replay it again and again, it might well be true that I would always choose Coke over Pepsi.

It does not logically follow that I HAVE TO do that. I will do it always, again and again, because I WANT TO.

Give me DIFFERENT antecedents, I might want to choose Pepsi instead.

Which is compatibilism. And sounds very much like peacegirl’s author was arguing for, but apparently without knowing it.

Well. it is a murky subject.

The point I'm trying to get across is simply that compatibilism is related to determinism, not contingency.

That free will, as compatibilists define it to be, requires determinism, that the decision making process is deterministic. That ''the ability to act according to one's own desires and rational choices in the absence of external coercion,'' is deterministic.

Which excludes contingency, where ''an event is not necessary but depends on specific circumstances or chance. If something is contingent, it could have happened in a different way or not at all,'' where chance or disruptive events occurring at the decision making level - the activity of a brain - do not help maintain a rational, adaptive decision making process.

I am not sure where the word "contingent" means something could have happened in a different way or not at all. It's just a synonym for "based on." We make decisions based (or contingent) on those antecedents that we are using to determine what our next decision will be. It certainly doesn't mean that our movement in the direction of "greater satisfaction" could have been any different.

Contingency and modal possibility

''In logic, a thing is considered to be possible when it is true in at least one possible world. This means there is a way to imagine a world in which a statement is true and in which its truth does not contradict any other truth in that world. If it were impossible, there would be no way to conceive such a world: the truth of any impossible statement must contradict some other fact in that world. Contingency is not impossible, so a contingent statement is therefore one which is true in at least one possible world. But contingency is also not necessary, so a contingent statement is false in at least one possible world. While contingent statements are false in at least one possible world, possible statements are not also defined this way. Since necessary statements are a kind of possible statement (e.g. 2=2 is possible and necessary), then to define possible statements as 'false in some possible world' is to affect the definition of necessary statements. Since necessary statements are never false in any possible world, then some possible statements are never false in any possible world. So the idea that a statement might ever be false and yet remain an unrealized possibility is entirely reserved to contingent statements alone. While all contingent statements are possible, not all possible statements are contingent''

 

[pood]

Contingency and modal possibility

''In logic, a thing is considered to be possible when it is true in at least one possible world. This means there is a way to imagine a world in which a statement is true and in which its truth does not contradict any other truth in that world. If it were impossible, there would be no way to conceive such a world: the truth of any impossible statement must contradict some other fact in that world. Contingency is not impossible, so a contingent statement is therefore one which is true in at least one possible world. But contingency is also not necessary, so a contingent statement is false in at least one possible world. While contingent statements are false in at least one possible world, possible statements are not also defined this way. Since necessary statements are a kind of possible statement (e.g. 2=2 is possible and necessary), then to define possible statements as 'false in some possible world' is to affect the definition of necessary statements. Since necessary statements are never false in any possible world, then some possible statements are never false in any possible world. So the idea that a statement might ever be false and yet remain an unrealized possibility is entirely reserved to contingent statements alone. While all contingent statements are possible, not all possible statements are contingent''

The above accords exactly with what I have been saying all along,

 

[pood]

So one can follow the modal logic based on the above extract. If I have a choice between Pepsi and Coke, it is plainly possible that I pick one or the other, but surely neither pick is necessary — one can imagine a possible world in which I pick either drink without brining about a logical contradiction or contradicting any other truth about the world,. The modal fallacy I have plointed out again and again is to say that given antecedents x, y, and z, I MUST (necessarily) pick Pepsi. But from the above it is obvious that picking Pepsi is not and cannot be a necessary truth about the world. Therefore the most one can say is that, necessarily (given antecedents x, y, and z, I will will [but not MUST] pick Pepsi; i.e, the necessity operator cannot logically be assigned to the consequent alone, but only conjointly to the antecedent and the consequent. This is compatibilism.

 

[bilby]

A body of information that is accurate remains accurate regardless of who or what is presenting it.

A psychic correctly picked last years Melbourne Cup winner.

How valuable to you rate her opinion on this years winner to be?

Ahem, there was nothing particularly controversial to be found in the Overview.

Not the point. At all.

As with Contingency, the given definitions of compatibilism and determinism were reasonable,

No, they were FROM A LARGE LANGUAGE MODEL. Nothing from such a source is reasonable.

Nothing much to complain about.

Then you seriously don't grasp what the words "AI summary" mean.

Just a question of whether compatibilism is actually compatible with determinism, and how contingency happens to relate.

No. That isn't the question. The question is whether you should post horseshit generated by a horseshit generating machine*, rather than you own words, or those of an actual authority on the subject. The actual topic is irrelevant. I am complaining that your SOURCE is unreliable.





* Even if it happens to contain zero errors, the only way to know that is by reference to an actual source, so quote that actual source instead.

 

[peacegirl]

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Easy to find, from Stanford, for instance.

Free Will and the Problem of Causal Determinism
''Compatibilism emerges as a response to a problem posed by causal determinism. But what problem is that? Well, suppose, as the thesis of causal determinism tells us, that everything that occurs is the inevitable result of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past. If this is the case, then everything human agents do flows from the laws of nature and the way the world was in the distant past. But if what we do is simply the consequence of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past—then we cannot do anything other than what we ultimately do. Nor are we in any meaningful sense the ultimate causal source of our actions, since they have their causal origins in the laws of nature and the state of the world long ago. Determinism therefore seems to prevent human agents from having the freedom to do otherwise, and it also seems to prevent them from being the sources of their actions. If either of these is true, then it’s doubtful that human agents are free or responsible for their actions in any meaningful sense.

These lines of argument, which have been regimented in the work of Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1975, 1983), Wisdom (1934), Mele (1995), and Pereboom (1995, 2001), among many others, present a real problem for those who are inclined to think that we are free and responsible for our choices and actions and that the natural world might operate as a deterministic system (or if not completely deterministic, one in which an indeterminism is merely stochastic noise that is causally irrelevant at the level of human agency). How to respond to such arguments? On the one hand, incompatibilists accept (some version of at least one of) these arguments and so insist that our self-conception as free and responsible agents would be seriously misguided if causal determinism turns out to be true. Some incompatibilists argue for these conclusions indirectly—first by arguing that determinism precludes freedom or control and then second by arguing that such freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. Other incompatibilists argue directly that causal determinism precludes moral responsibility.''

The bit you quoted from Stanford begins, “on the one hand…” without supplying the other hand.

Everything I’m about to say I have said many times before. If someone new wants to join the convo, great. If not, there’s no I reason to go round the block for the 101st time when we, the usual suspects, have already been around it 100 times.

A compatibilist, especially a neo-Humean compatibilist, is going to challenge the very first premise of the so-called problem: the laws of nature.

He will point out, correctly in my view, that “laws” is a is misnomer. As the aforementioned Norman Swartz has argued, there are no “laws” of nature. What we call “laws,” contra Newton and others, are merely descriptions of stuff that happens. “Laws” have no coercive or causal efficacy. They are not prescriptive. They are descriptive.


So the whole framing of the alleged problem fails from the get-go. As Swartz says, the “laws” of nature are a hangover from theism. Newton thought there was a lawgiver (God), and the laws of nature are his laws. But they are not. They are descriptions of what happens in the world.

So what is the problem? There isn’t any.

There is only one actual world. In fact there may be others, under the quantum multiverse or David Lewis’s modal multiverse, but the only world we have access to is the one we call actual. So every moment of every day I must choose something in the actual world. Even not choosing among available alternatives if a form of choosing: choosing not to choose.

Standard compatibilism says that when I choose, my choice is free insofar as it is done according to my desire and free of impediment by external factors.

Some compatibilists affirm that we could not choose other than what we did, given antecedent circumstances.

I disagree. I think these compatibilists have failed to attend to modal logic, “modal” meaning modes of being.

My view is that we CAN always choose differently, given antecedent circumstances, only that we WILL not.

This is because all our choices are contingent (could have been otherwise).

If we could “back up” the whole history of the world and replay it again and again, it might well be true that I would always choose Coke over Pepsi.

It does not logically follow that I HAVE TO do that. I will do it always, again and again, because I WANT TO.

Give me DIFFERENT antecedents, I might want to choose Pepsi instead.

Which is compatibilism. And sounds very much like peacegirl’s author was arguing for, but apparently without knowing it.

Well. it is a murky subject.

The point I'm trying to get across is simply that compatibilism is related to determinism, not contingency.

That free will, as compatibilists define it to be, requires determinism, that the decision making process is deterministic. That ''the ability to act according to one's own desires and rational choices in the absence of external coercion,'' is deterministic.

Which excludes contingency, where ''an event is not necessary but depends on specific circumstances or chance. If something is contingent, it could have happened in a different way or not at all,'' where chance or disruptive events occurring at the decision making level - the activity of a brain - do not help maintain a rational, adaptive decision making process.

I am not sure where the word "contingent" means something could have happened in a different way or not at all. It's just a synonym for "based on." We make decisions based (or contingent) on those antecedents that we are using to determine what our next decision will be. It certainly doesn't mean that our movement in the direction of "greater satisfaction" could have been any different.

Contingency and modal possibility

''In logic, a thing is considered to be possible when it is true in at least one possible world. This means there is a way to imagine a world in which a statement is true and in which its truth does not contradict any other truth in that world. If it were impossible, there would be no way to conceive such a world: the truth of any impossible statement must contradict some other fact in that world. Contingency is not impossible, so a contingent statement is therefore one which is true in at least one possible world. But contingency is also not necessary, so a contingent statement is false in at least one possible world. While contingent statements are false in at least one possible world, possible statements are not also defined this way. Since necessary statements are a kind of possible statement (e.g. 2=2 is possible and necessary), then to define possible statements as 'false in some possible world' is to affect the definition of necessary statements. Since necessary statements are never false in any possible world, then some possible statements are never false in any possible world. So the idea that a statement might ever be false and yet remain an unrealized possibility is entirely reserved to contingent statements alone. While all contingent statements are possible, not all possible statements are contingent''

This whole modal logic thing does not prove that determinism is false, or compatibilism is true, when free will is a figment of the imagination. We are not interested in some future time where in another possible world, a person could drink Pepsi instead of Coke. We are saying that a contingent truth only means that my choice was based what options were available to me in order to determine which option would be the better one. Once I made the choice, it could not have been otherwise. We are not talking about another time or place. We are talking about each moment in time. It is a fallacy to use this logic to think it proves free will true just because contingent truths are not necessary truths. It doesn't fly. We all know that every person is different, every situation is different, every time period is different, and, more importantly, none of this grants us free will.

 

[pood]

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This whole modal logic thing does not prove that determinism is false, or compatibilism is true, when free will is a figment of the imagination. We are not interested in some future time where in another possible world, a person could drink Pepsi instead of Coke. We are saying that a contingent truth only means that my choice was based what options were available to me in order to determine which option would be the better one. Once I made the choice, it could not have been otherwise. We are not talking about another time or place. We are talking about each moment in time. It is a fallacy to use this logic to think it proves free will true just because contingent truths are not necessary truths. It doesn't fly. We all know that every person is different, every situation is different, every time period is different, and, more importantly, none of this grants us free will.

Modal logic does not try to prove that determinism is false, nor could it, because .,.

… compatibilism IS determinism!

And yes, once you made the choice it could have been otherwise because no contingent truth never becomes a necessary truth and vice versa.

And so we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.

 

[peacegirl]

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This whole modal logic thing does not prove that determinism is false, or compatibilism is true, when free will is a figment of the imagination. We are not interested in some future time where in another possible world, a person could drink Pepsi instead of Coke. We are saying that a contingent truth only means that my choice was based what options were available to me in order to determine which option would be the better one. Once I made the choice, it could not have been otherwise. We are not talking about another time or place. We are talking about each moment in time. It is a fallacy to use this logic to think it proves free will true just because contingent truths are not necessary truths. It doesn't fly. We all know that every person is different, every situation is different, every time period is different, and, more importantly, none of this grants us free will.

Modal logic does not try to prove that determinism is false, nor could it, because .,.

… compatibilism IS determinism!

And yes, once you made the choice it could have been otherwise because no contingent truth never becomes a necessary truth and vice versa.

And so we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.

I'm sorry but Pood's effort to prove that we have free will based on Swartz's modal logic is just beyond me. I really don't get that he believes that because contingent truths are distinguishable from necessary truths, that somehow this grants us free will. I think he is using the standard definition of determinism that this author is not using. How can we communicate if we are not speaking the same language? It's almost like a smokescreen because they both are right. That is where the reconciliation of these two schools of thought come together. Until people want to see how these two principles come together, they will not see the potential of this reconciliation. They will just argue that their side is right. That has been the problem for thousands of years, both sides thinking they are right when both sides cannot be right. One has to be the winner, and it is determinism, but not the way it's presently defined. Everyone wins here. There are no losers, which is why I'm trying so hard to get people to give this man a chance.