“Revolution in Thought: A new look at determinism and free will"

[pood]

Try to read posts 651 and 652 for comprehension this time.

 

[peacegirl]

I would have become a nurse practitioner if the circumstances were different, but they weren't different, so I had to choose the next best thing.

You had to choose?

So much for hard determinism, then.

I had to choose something else because becoming a nurse practitioner was out of the question. Where does this conflict with determinism or the fact that I am compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction whether it is the lesser of two evils, the greater of two goods, or a good over an evil?

 

[bilby]

I would have become a nurse practitioner if the circumstances were different, but they weren't different, so I had to choose the next best thing.

You had to choose?

So much for hard determinism, then.

I had to choose something else because becoming a nurse practitioner was out of the question. Where does this conflict with determinism or the fact that I am compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction whether it is the lesser of two evils, the greater of two goods, or a good over an evil?

That place where you (aparently without self awareness, irony or comprehension) state, repeatedly, that you choose.

I had to choose

...is not a claim that could be made by a person who has embraced, understood, and internalised hard determinism as a philosophy.

It is absurd as the old joke "I pray to God that I shall always remain an atheist", but appears not to be being presented for comic effect, so much as as an act of obliviousness, and an abject failure to think about what you write before you post it.

 

[peacegirl]

To put this another way, to argue, as DBT does, that our choices are necessary, UNDER THESE DETERMINED CIRCUMSTANCES, is just flat wrong as a matter of logic — it is the modal fallacy he alway commits. A proposition is necessary if and only if it is necessary UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Maybe when it comes to triangles. A triangle can't be three sides in one world and two sides in another, but when it comes to human behavior, modal logic doesn't apply where it states: A proposition is necessary if and only if it is necessary UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CIRCUMSTANCES. What all possible circumstances are they talking about? Before making a decision is quite different than after. Every choice we make becomes a necessary choice after the fact because any other choice, given the available options, would have been the least preferred, which cannot be done when a greater preference is available. This is not a tautology and even if it was, it doesn't mean there isn't valuable information. IOW, what I prefer is what I prefer sounds like a triviality, but in reality, it is anything but trivial. Determinism does not tell a person in advance which choice he MUST make. It doesn't say this person MUST rob a bank. It just presents the conditions which drive a person to prefer robbing a bank over not robbing a bank. His choice is contingent on many factors that he is considering before his final decision. Once he makes his choice, it can be said that he could not have chosen otherwise given those same set of conditions going back in time. Maybe he reasoned that this was the easiest way to get the money he needs, and in his mind, he is willing to take a gamble that he won't get caught. Weighing the pros and cons, he chooses the pros over the cons. Someone else might not choose the same thing because we are all different to a degree. Even twins have been shown to be different in their personalities and predispositions, which may lead them to make different choices.

That is what necessary MEANS. And so any of my acts at any time are contingent (could have been otherwise).

I know what necessary means and it is necessary that I'm here talking to you or I would choose to do other things. This does not mean determinism is forcing me to be here. I want to be here, which is why I'm here. Any other option to do something else is not preferable. I am choosing what gives me greater satisfaction, but if my child knocked on the door, I may turn off my computer and enjoy the visit with my child, in the direction of greater satisfaction. Everything we do is in this direction, which I've tried to explain to you, but it seems to go in one ear and out the other.

 

[pood]

I know what necessary means and it is necessary that I'm here talking to you or I would choose to do other things.

No, that is not what necessary means.

 

[pood]

@DBT, consider it this way.

You’re telling me that I pick Coke over Pepsi because antecedents made my choice NECESSARY.

But now I’m asking, suppose antecedents conditions had been slightly different in some relevant way. Let’s say the whole history of the world is EXACTLY the same, except at birth, I inherited a very slightly different genome that in the future would predispose me to prefer the the taste of Pepsi over Coke. This is not the actual world, but a POSSIBLE non-actual world.

In that case, would you not say that I would pick Pepsi over Coke?

Now you are going to say, I imagine, that this possible non-actual world is not REALLY possible, because the whole future was fixed at the big bang and that future included me NOT having a genetic predisposition to preferring the taste of Pepsi.

But even if you argue in this way, it still does not follow that my choosing Coke over Pepsi is NECESSARY. This is because I can easily imagine a different reality in which I preferred Pepsi over Coke (the genome bit) without invoking a logical contradiction. Agree?

By contrast, I can imagine no possible world at which triangles have other than three sides. To imagine so is to invoke a logical contradiction. Agree?

Now if you agree with both of the above, please follow the logic. Since I can imagine a possible non-actual world at which I choose Pepsi over Coke, my choosing Coke over Pepsi in the ACTUAL world CANNOT be necessary, because “necessary” just MEANS true at ALL (logically) possible worlds. If you agree with my two points above, then you must agree with what I just said.

Now if we look at the whole history of the ACTUAL world, all events are exactly like this — contingent. They could have been otherwise. Since even the initial conditions COULD have been otherwise, history as a matter of logic is a series of contingencies and not necessities.

Thus it IS possible that I could have inherited a genetic tase for Pepsi instead of Coke, and chosen Pepsi instead of Coke under THOSE conditions.

It won’t work to argue that my choice of Coke is necessary in the ACTUAL world, and it fails to work not just because conditions COULD have been different, but it will not work as a matter of definition: a necessarily true proposition CANNOT be necessarily true in just one, or some, possible worlds. It must be true at ALL possible worlds.

Surely you are not going to argue that it was LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE for me to choose Pepsi, that I could not have done so under any conditions whatsoever?

It follows automatically as a matter of logic that anything I have done COULD HAVE GONE OTHERWISE. Granted, things only WOULD have gone differently under different circumstances, but so what? Because, yes, we only have one ACTUAL history. But this is exactly my point. Given ACTUAL antecedents x, y, z, I WILL choose Coke, but it does not follow that I MUST. This means I choose Coke in the actual world because I WANT to, under THESE conditions (which could have gone otherwise as a matter of logic), and provided no one balks me from exercising my choice, I have compatibilist free will.

 

[peacegirl]

DBT is maintaining, perhaps without even knowing it, that all our acts are necessary acts — that they could not have been otherwise. But this means he makes no distinction between propositions like “triangles have three sides” and “I chose Coke instead of Pepsi.” But surely there is some relevant difference between the two propositions. In the “possible worlds” modal-logic heuristic, “possible worlds” refers to logically possible worlds. A world is logically possible insofar as it is possible to imagine such a world without invoking a logical contradiction. If I can imagine such a world, then the proposition is contingent (could have been otherwise) and not necessary (could not have been otherwise).

A logical world doesn't mean it's a real world. It just means that if a different choice could have been made if it had been the desirable choice. Obviously, triangles are not behaviors. It's not even relevant.

Now surely, I can imagine a possible world, without invoking a logical contradiction, in which I choose Pepsi over Coke. I can imagine no such world where triangles have more or less than three sides. So, “triangles have three sides” is a necessary truth (true at all logically possible worlds), and “I chose Coke over Pepsi” is a contingent truth (true at some logically possible worlds, false at others).

It wouldn't be a logical contradiction if you had decided to choose Pepsi over Coke, but you didn't, hence you could not have. What was the purpose of deciding Pood which you preferred if not to consider your preference?

Suppose someone must choose between taking a job in Boston or New York. She weighs the relevant factors in making her choice, which include “I like money” and “I would prefer to live in Boston rather than New York (though heaven knows why).” Now it turns out that the job in New York offers more money, so now she must weigh her desire for more money against her desire to live in Boston rather than New York.

Suppose she chooses the New York job, just because it pays more money, even though she would have preferred to live in Boston. She would say something like, “If the job in Boston had paid more than the New York job, I would have taken it.”

And clearly she COULD have taken the job in Boston, and WOULD have, too,

She would have possibly taken the job but under those conditions, she didn't because she needed the money. Where is this contradictory to determinism? Where does this invoke the ability to do otherwise?

IF it had offered more money than the New York job. So, she could, and would, have done otherwise, had antecedents been slightly different. The point is that she chose as she did, even though the choice may have been a close call, because she WANTED extra money MORE than she wanted to live in Boston. So, she did what she wanted.

I answered this. The antecedents were not different so you are creating an imaginary scenario that could not have happened because she wasn't offered more money.

Now the hard determinist is going to protest that the antecedents COULD NOT have been different, given that all antecedents were fixed by the initial conditions of the universe. But this is false in two ways. First, the initial conditions themselves were contingent — could have been otherwise, in the sense of “I could have chosen Pepsi over Coke.” And second, if you could “back up” the history of the whole universe and replay it, with the same initial conditions, some things would still turn out differently because of quantum indeterminism.

All that is necessary is to see that what one is contemplating at any particular moment (based on the antecedents that have presented themselves to him), compel a particular action or nonaction. The confusion with the word necessary is problematic. Again and again you think that determinism is forcing a choice on you that you don't want to make. It's necessary that you must make this choice. That is true only if you consent to that choice. DBT was very clear about that. Free will of any kind is so glaringly false, it's amazing people still believe in it.

Free will in the compatibilist just means, “I would have taken the job in Boston had antecedents been different, but they weren’t, so I took the job in New York instead.” In others words, “I did what I wanted to do, or what I most wanted to do, given the particular circumstances (which could have been different) that I found myself in.”

To ask, COULD she, or WOULD she, have done differently under the exact same circumstances, is just irrelevant. One can shrug and reply “She did what she wanted to do, or most wanted to do, under those circumstances. Why would you expect her to do differently?”

There is only one history, and people will do what the want to do under the circumstances they find themselves in.

They will do what they want to do because the alternative is worse in that person's way of thinking, which cannot be chosen. It would be moving in the direction of the most dissatisfying choice, which is an impossibility.

 

[peacegirl]

@DBT, consider it this way.

You’re telling me that I pick Coke over Pepsi because antecedents made my choice NECESSARY.

The pros and cons that you were considering (forget antecedents for a moment because I think it's getting in the way of your understanding) compelled you to choose Coke, if you were contemplating Pepsi as a possible choice. If you were, you would have probably went back and forth, based on your reasons for considering Coke and then your reasons for considering Pepsi. The one that you found having more pros than cons would be the winner. The choice made at that moment, looking back, would be the only choice that could have been made because choosing Pepsi would have been less satisfying and you cannot move in the direction of what offers less satisfaction when a better choice (in this instance, Coke) is available. If you had considered that Pepsi has been shown to be healthier, and that was something that was in your repetoire of considerations, you may have then chosen Pepsi, as that alternative that gave you greater satisfaction. This is not rocket science Pood.

But now I’m asking, suppose antecedents conditions had been slightly different in some relevant way. Let’s say the whole history of the world is EXACTLY the same, except at birth, I inherited a very slightly different genome that in the future would predispose me to prefer the the taste of Pepsi over Coke. This is not the actual world, but a POSSIBLE non-actual world.

In that case, would you not say that I would pick Pepsi over Coke?

I would say that because of your genetic predisposition to like Pepsi over Coke, you probably would have chosen Pepsi, but you were not born with this genetic predisposition, so it's not relevant Pood.

Now you are going to say, I imagine, that this possible non-actual world is not REALLY possible, because the whole future was fixed at the big bang and that future included me NOT having a genetic predisposition to preferring the taste of Pepsi.

But even if you argue in this way, it still does not follow that my choosing Coke over Pepsi is NECESSARY.

This is because I can easily imagine a different reality in which I preferred Pepsi over Coke (the genome bit) without invoking a logical contradiction. Agree?

Peacegirl: This got messed up but I'll try to answer. You can imagine anything you want, and it doesn't have to be a logical contradiction for it to be something that could never have happened given your exact circumstances.
Imagining a different reality again does not mean it could be a reality.

By contrast, I can imagine no possible world at which triangles have other than three sides. To imagine so is to invoke a logical contradiction. Agree?

Now if you agree with both of the above, please follow the logic. Since I can imagine a possible non-actual world at which I choose Pepsi over Coke, my choosing Coke over Pepsi in the ACTUAL world CANNOT be necessary, because “necessary” just MEANS true at ALL (logically) possible worlds. If you agree with my two points above, then you must agree with what I just said.

Now if we look at the whole history of the ACTUAL world, all events are exactly like this — contingent. They could have been otherwise. Since even the initial conditions COULD have been otherwise, history as a matter of logic is a series of contingencies and not necessities.

Being contingent does not mean an outcome could have been any different than what it turned out to be. It's imaginary that it could have been any different, which is based on a false preposition. It's the preposition regarding contingencies that is just plain wrong.

Thus it IS possible that I could have inherited a genetic tase for Pepsi instead of Coke, and chosen Pepsi instead of Coke under THOSE conditions.

It won’t work to argue that my choice of Coke is necessary in the ACTUAL world, and it fails to work not just because conditions COULD have been different, but it will not work as a matter of definition: a necessarily true proposition CANNOT be necessarily true in just one, or some, possible worlds. It must be true at ALL possible worlds.

Maybe as a matter of definition a necessarily true proposition CANNOT be necessarily true in just one, or some, possible worlds and must be true in all possible worlds. But the definition is problematic. Remember, definitions mean nothing where reality is concerned unless it reflects reality. You are just repeating a definition that is flawed and trying to use it to make your case regarding free will. But it doesn't. DBT is correct, not you.

Surely you are not going to argue that it was LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE for me to choose Pepsi, that I could not have done so under any conditions whatsoever?

It follows automatically as a matter of logic that anything I have done COULD HAVE GONE OTHERWISE. Granted, things only WOULD have gone differently under different circumstances, but so what? Because, yes, we only have one ACTUAL history. But this is exactly my point. Given ACTUAL antecedents x, y, z, I WILL choose Coke, but it does not follow that I MUST. This means I choose Coke in the actual world because I WANT to, under THESE conditions (which could have gone otherwise as a matter of logic), and provided no one balks me from exercising my choice, I have compatibilist free will.

As a matter of logic, it could have gone otherwise, but logic can be wrong. It can have no validity, and even if it appears valid, it can be unsound. So once again, DBT wins.