“Revolution in Thought: A new look at determinism and free will"

[pood]

Try to read posts 651 and 652 for comprehension this time.

 

[peacegirl]

I would have become a nurse practitioner if the circumstances were different, but they weren't different, so I had to choose the next best thing.

You had to choose?

So much for hard determinism, then.

I had to choose something else because becoming a nurse practitioner was out of the question. Where does this conflict with determinism or the fact that I am compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction whether it is the lesser of two evils, the greater of two goods, or a good over an evil?

 

[bilby]

I would have become a nurse practitioner if the circumstances were different, but they weren't different, so I had to choose the next best thing.

You had to choose?

So much for hard determinism, then.

I had to choose something else because becoming a nurse practitioner was out of the question. Where does this conflict with determinism or the fact that I am compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction whether it is the lesser of two evils, the greater of two goods, or a good over an evil?

That place where you (aparently without self awareness, irony or comprehension) state, repeatedly, that you choose.

I had to choose

...is not a claim that could be made by a person who has embraced, understood, and internalised hard determinism as a philosophy.

It is absurd as the old joke "I pray to God that I shall always remain an atheist", but appears not to be being presented for comic effect, so much as as an act of obliviousness, and an abject failure to think about what you write before you post it.

 

[peacegirl]

To put this another way, to argue, as DBT does, that our choices are necessary, UNDER THESE DETERMINED CIRCUMSTANCES, is just flat wrong as a matter of logic — it is the modal fallacy he alway commits. A proposition is necessary if and only if it is necessary UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Maybe when it comes to triangles. A triangle can't be three sides in one world and two sides in another, but when it comes to human behavior, modal logic doesn't apply where it states: A proposition is necessary if and only if it is necessary UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CIRCUMSTANCES. What all possible circumstances are they talking about? Before making a decision is quite different than after. Every choice we make becomes a necessary choice after the fact because any other choice, given the available options, would have been the least preferred, which cannot be done when a greater preference is available. This is not a tautology and even if it was, it doesn't mean there isn't valuable information. IOW, what I prefer is what I prefer sounds like a triviality, but in reality, it is anything but trivial. Determinism does not tell a person in advance which choice he MUST make. It doesn't say this person MUST rob a bank. It just presents the conditions which drive a person to prefer robbing a bank over not robbing a bank. His choice is contingent on many factors that he is considering before his final decision. Once he makes his choice, it can be said that he could not have chosen otherwise given those same set of conditions going back in time. Maybe he reasoned that this was the easiest way to get the money he needs, and in his mind, he is willing to take a gamble that he won't get caught. Weighing the pros and cons, he chooses the pros over the cons. Someone else might not choose the same thing because we are all different to a degree. Even twins have been shown to be different in their personalities and predispositions, which may lead them to make different choices.

That is what necessary MEANS. And so any of my acts at any time are contingent (could have been otherwise).

I know what necessary means and it is necessary that I'm here talking to you or I would choose to do other things. This does not mean determinism is forcing me to be here. I want to be here, which is why I'm here. Any other option to do something else is not preferable. I am choosing what gives me greater satisfaction, but if my child knocked on the door, I may turn off my computer and enjoy the visit with my child, in the direction of greater satisfaction. Everything we do is in this direction, which I've tried to explain to you, but it seems to go in one ear and out the other.

 

[pood]

I know what necessary means and it is necessary that I'm here talking to you or I would choose to do other things.

No, that is not what necessary means.

 

[pood]

@DBT, consider it this way.

You’re telling me that I pick Coke over Pepsi because antecedents made my choice NECESSARY.

But now I’m asking, suppose antecedents conditions had been slightly different in some relevant way. Let’s say the whole history of the world is EXACTLY the same, except at birth, I inherited a very slightly different genome that in the future would predispose me to prefer the the taste of Pepsi over Coke. This is not the actual world, but a POSSIBLE non-actual world.

In that case, would you not say that I would pick Pepsi over Coke?

Now you are going to say, I imagine, that this possible non-actual world is not REALLY possible, because the whole future was fixed at the big bang and that future included me NOT having a genetic predisposition to preferring the taste of Pepsi.

But even if you argue in this way, it still does not follow that my choosing Coke over Pepsi is NECESSARY. This is because I can easily imagine a different reality in which I preferred Pepsi over Coke (the genome bit) without invoking a logical contradiction. Agree?

By contrast, I can imagine no possible world at which triangles have other than three sides. To imagine so is to invoke a logical contradiction. Agree?

Now if you agree with both of the above, please follow the logic. Since I can imagine a possible non-actual world at which I choose Pepsi over Coke, my choosing Coke over Pepsi in the ACTUAL world CANNOT be necessary, because “necessary” just MEANS true at ALL (logically) possible worlds. If you agree with my two points above, then you must agree with what I just said.

Now if we look at the whole history of the ACTUAL world, all events are exactly like this — contingent. They could have been otherwise. Since even the initial conditions COULD have been otherwise, history as a matter of logic is a series of contingencies and not necessities.

Thus it IS possible that I could have inherited a genetic tase for Pepsi instead of Coke, and chosen Pepsi instead of Coke under THOSE conditions.

It won’t work to argue that my choice of Coke is necessary in the ACTUAL world, and it fails to work not just because conditions COULD have been different, but it will not work as a matter of definition: a necessarily true proposition CANNOT be necessarily true in just one, or some, possible worlds. It must be true at ALL possible worlds.

Surely you are not going to argue that it was LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE for me to choose Pepsi, that I could not have done so under any conditions whatsoever?

It follows automatically as a matter of logic that anything I have done COULD HAVE GONE OTHERWISE. Granted, things only WOULD have gone differently under different circumstances, but so what? Because, yes, we only have one ACTUAL history. But this is exactly my point. Given ACTUAL antecedents x, y, z, I WILL choose Coke, but it does not follow that I MUST. This means I choose Coke in the actual world because I WANT to, under THESE conditions (which could have gone otherwise as a matter of logic), and provided no one balks me from exercising my choice, I have compatibilist free will.

 

[peacegirl]

DBT is maintaining, perhaps without even knowing it, that all our acts are necessary acts — that they could not have been otherwise. But this means he makes no distinction between propositions like “triangles have three sides” and “I chose Coke instead of Pepsi.” But surely there is some relevant difference between the two propositions. In the “possible worlds” modal-logic heuristic, “possible worlds” refers to logically possible worlds. A world is logically possible insofar as it is possible to imagine such a world without invoking a logical contradiction. If I can imagine such a world, then the proposition is contingent (could have been otherwise) and not necessary (could not have been otherwise).

A logical world doesn't mean it's a real world. It just means that if a different choice could have been made if it had been the desirable choice. Obviously, triangles are not behaviors. It's not even relevant.

Now surely, I can imagine a possible world, without invoking a logical contradiction, in which I choose Pepsi over Coke. I can imagine no such world where triangles have more or less than three sides. So, “triangles have three sides” is a necessary truth (true at all logically possible worlds), and “I chose Coke over Pepsi” is a contingent truth (true at some logically possible worlds, false at others).

It wouldn't be a logical contradiction if you had decided to choose Pepsi over Coke, but you didn't, hence you could not have. What was the purpose of deciding Pood which you preferred if not to consider your preference?

Suppose someone must choose between taking a job in Boston or New York. She weighs the relevant factors in making her choice, which include “I like money” and “I would prefer to live in Boston rather than New York (though heaven knows why).” Now it turns out that the job in New York offers more money, so now she must weigh her desire for more money against her desire to live in Boston rather than New York.

Suppose she chooses the New York job, just because it pays more money, even though she would have preferred to live in Boston. She would say something like, “If the job in Boston had paid more than the New York job, I would have taken it.”

And clearly she COULD have taken the job in Boston, and WOULD have, too,

She would have possibly taken the job but under those conditions, she didn't because she needed the money. Where is this contradictory to determinism? Where does this invoke the ability to do otherwise?

IF it had offered more money than the New York job. So, she could, and would, have done otherwise, had antecedents been slightly different. The point is that she chose as she did, even though the choice may have been a close call, because she WANTED extra money MORE than she wanted to live in Boston. So, she did what she wanted.

I answered this. The antecedents were not different so you are creating an imaginary scenario that could not have happened because she wasn't offered more money.

Now the hard determinist is going to protest that the antecedents COULD NOT have been different, given that all antecedents were fixed by the initial conditions of the universe. But this is false in two ways. First, the initial conditions themselves were contingent — could have been otherwise, in the sense of “I could have chosen Pepsi over Coke.” And second, if you could “back up” the history of the whole universe and replay it, with the same initial conditions, some things would still turn out differently because of quantum indeterminism.

All that is necessary is to see that what one is contemplating at any particular moment (based on the antecedents that have presented themselves to him), compel a particular action or nonaction. The confusion with the word necessary is problematic. Again and again you think that determinism is forcing a choice on you that you don't want to make. It's necessary that you must make this choice. That is true only if you consent to that choice. DBT was very clear about that. Free will of any kind is so glaringly false, it's amazing people still believe in it.

Free will in the compatibilist just means, “I would have taken the job in Boston had antecedents been different, but they weren’t, so I took the job in New York instead.” In others words, “I did what I wanted to do, or what I most wanted to do, given the particular circumstances (which could have been different) that I found myself in.”

To ask, COULD she, or WOULD she, have done differently under the exact same circumstances, is just irrelevant. One can shrug and reply “She did what she wanted to do, or most wanted to do, under those circumstances. Why would you expect her to do differently?”

There is only one history, and people will do what the want to do under the circumstances they find themselves in.

They will do what they want to do because the alternative is worse in that person's way of thinking, which cannot be chosen. It would be moving in the direction of the most dissatisfying choice, which is an impossibility.

 

[peacegirl]

@DBT, consider it this way.

You’re telling me that I pick Coke over Pepsi because antecedents made my choice NECESSARY.

The pros and cons that you were considering (forget antecedents for a moment because I think it's getting in the way of your understanding) compelled you to choose Coke, if you were contemplating Pepsi as a possible choice. If you were, you would have probably went back and forth, based on your reasons for considering Coke and then your reasons for considering Pepsi. The one that you found having more pros than cons would be the winner. The choice made at that moment, looking back, would be the only choice that could have been made because choosing Pepsi would have been less satisfying and you cannot move in the direction of what offers less satisfaction when a better choice (in this instance, Coke) is available. If you had considered that Pepsi has been shown to be healthier, and that was something that was in your repetoire of considerations, you may have then chosen Pepsi, as that alternative that gave you greater satisfaction. This is not rocket science Pood.

But now I’m asking, suppose antecedents conditions had been slightly different in some relevant way. Let’s say the whole history of the world is EXACTLY the same, except at birth, I inherited a very slightly different genome that in the future would predispose me to prefer the the taste of Pepsi over Coke. This is not the actual world, but a POSSIBLE non-actual world.

In that case, would you not say that I would pick Pepsi over Coke?

I would say that because of your genetic predisposition to like Pepsi over Coke, you probably would have chosen Pepsi, but you were not born with this genetic predisposition, so it's not relevant Pood.

Now you are going to say, I imagine, that this possible non-actual world is not REALLY possible, because the whole future was fixed at the big bang and that future included me NOT having a genetic predisposition to preferring the taste of Pepsi.

But even if you argue in this way, it still does not follow that my choosing Coke over Pepsi is NECESSARY.

This is because I can easily imagine a different reality in which I preferred Pepsi over Coke (the genome bit) without invoking a logical contradiction. Agree?

Peacegirl: This got messed up but I'll try to answer. You can imagine anything you want, and it doesn't have to be a logical contradiction for it to be something that could never have happened given your exact circumstances.
Imagining a different reality again does not mean it could be a reality.

By contrast, I can imagine no possible world at which triangles have other than three sides. To imagine so is to invoke a logical contradiction. Agree?

Now if you agree with both of the above, please follow the logic. Since I can imagine a possible non-actual world at which I choose Pepsi over Coke, my choosing Coke over Pepsi in the ACTUAL world CANNOT be necessary, because “necessary” just MEANS true at ALL (logically) possible worlds. If you agree with my two points above, then you must agree with what I just said.

Now if we look at the whole history of the ACTUAL world, all events are exactly like this — contingent. They could have been otherwise. Since even the initial conditions COULD have been otherwise, history as a matter of logic is a series of contingencies and not necessities.

Being contingent does not mean an outcome could have been any different than what it turned out to be. It's imaginary that it could have been any different, which is based on a false preposition. It's the preposition regarding contingencies that is just plain wrong.

Thus it IS possible that I could have inherited a genetic tase for Pepsi instead of Coke, and chosen Pepsi instead of Coke under THOSE conditions.

It won’t work to argue that my choice of Coke is necessary in the ACTUAL world, and it fails to work not just because conditions COULD have been different, but it will not work as a matter of definition: a necessarily true proposition CANNOT be necessarily true in just one, or some, possible worlds. It must be true at ALL possible worlds.

Maybe as a matter of definition a necessarily true proposition CANNOT be necessarily true in just one, or some, possible worlds and must be true in all possible worlds. But the definition is problematic. Remember, definitions mean nothing where reality is concerned unless it reflects reality. You are just repeating a definition that is flawed and trying to use it to make your case regarding free will. But it doesn't. DBT is correct, not you.

Surely you are not going to argue that it was LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE for me to choose Pepsi, that I could not have done so under any conditions whatsoever?

It follows automatically as a matter of logic that anything I have done COULD HAVE GONE OTHERWISE. Granted, things only WOULD have gone differently under different circumstances, but so what? Because, yes, we only have one ACTUAL history. But this is exactly my point. Given ACTUAL antecedents x, y, z, I WILL choose Coke, but it does not follow that I MUST. This means I choose Coke in the actual world because I WANT to, under THESE conditions (which could have gone otherwise as a matter of logic), and provided no one balks me from exercising my choice, I have compatibilist free will.

As a matter of logic, it could have gone otherwise, but logic can be wrong. It can have no validity, and even if it appears valid, it can be unsound. So once again, DBT wins.

 

[DBT]

DBT, it's an exercise in futility. Don't waste your breath.

It is. Yet, for as long as it lasts, we persist.

 

[bilby]

DBT, it's an exercise in futility. Don't waste your breath.

It is. Yet, for as long as it lasts, we persist.

It's not like you have any choice.

 

[DBT]

Some folks tend to get defensive of their faith.

The difference between faith-based hard determinism, and rational soft determinism is this: The hard determinist says antecedents NECESSITATE (modal fallacy) that I do x; the soft determinist says I do x because I want to, and I want to because of antecedents.

It appears that you don't understand the implications of what you just said.

Yes, I do. I framed the matter correctly, whereas you commit the standard logical fallacy you always do.

Still wrong. The logical fallacy is yours. Always has been

No, it’s yours. You don’t understand the difference between necessary and contingent truth.

You are insisting on something that doesn't represent what I say.

Again; the issue about what you have said and claimed, the definition of determinism that you endorse and the things that you have said about compatibilism in relation to your definition of determinism.

You don't address the points I raise.

The fallacy is not mine, but yours.

It was you that said ''I do x because I want to, and I want to because of antecedents,'' where you fail to account the very antecedents that shape, form and generate your wants, where you have no regulative control of antecedents, nor the wants that inevitably emerge from them through the agency of the brain as it acquires and processes information.

Not to mention the irrelevancy of 'had conditions been different' in relation to determinism as you define it to be.

 

[DBT]

DBT, it's an exercise in futility. Don't waste your breath.

It is. Yet, for as long as it lasts, we persist.

It's not like you have any choice.

Of course, if determinism is true, choice is an illusion and all decisions are inevitable.

 

[DBT]

@DBT, consider it this way.

You’re telling me that I pick Coke over Pepsi because antecedents made my choice NECESSARY.

Given determinism, antecedents determine decision making. There is a distinction to be made between decision making and choice. If determinism is true, the decision to select Coke was determined. If there was in fact a choice, where it could have been Pepsi, that is not how is defined, nor is how determinism works as defined.

But now I’m asking, suppose antecedents conditions had been slightly different in some relevant way. Let’s say the whole history of the world is EXACTLY the same, except at birth, I inherited a very slightly different genome that in the future would predispose me to prefer the the taste of Pepsi over Coke. This is not the actual world, but a POSSIBLE non-actual world.

In that case, would you not say that I would pick Pepsi over Coke?

Now you are going to say, I imagine, that this possible non-actual world is not REALLY possible, because the whole future was fixed at the big bang and that future included me NOT having a genetic predisposition to preferring the taste of Pepsi.

No, I am pointing to how determinism is defined and how it works as it is defined.

No different to how you define it to be.

You can't have it both ways. You can't have a deterministic world where anything can happen at any given time.

Not because I say so, but how you, yourself define determinism, constant conjunction, etc, where B invariably follows A.

But even if you argue in this way, it still does not follow that my choosing Coke over Pepsi is NECESSARY. This is because I can easily imagine a different reality in which I preferred Pepsi over Coke (the genome bit) without invoking a logical contradiction. Agree?

Don't be hung up on the word 'necessary.' You can ignore the word if you like and use words like, fixed, set, causally inevitable.

''determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable.'' - Brittanica

By contrast, I can imagine no possible world at which triangles have other than three sides. To imagine so is to invoke a logical contradiction. Agree?

Sure.

Now if you agree with both of the above, please follow the logic. Since I can imagine a possible non-actual world at which I choose Pepsi over Coke, my choosing Coke over Pepsi in the ACTUAL world CANNOT be necessary, because “necessary” just MEANS true at ALL (logically) possible worlds. If you agree with my two points above, then you must agree with what I just said.

It doesn't matter what you imagine. We are discussing the terms and conditions of a deterministic world as you define it to be.

Now if we look at the whole history of the ACTUAL world, all events are exactly like this — contingent. They could have been otherwise. Since even the initial conditions COULD have been otherwise, history as a matter of logic is a series of contingencies and not necessities.

You are playing with words. Invoking contingency doesn't alter the given terms of your definition of determinism. You can argue for contingency if you like, but that is not the same as determinism

 

[pood]

@DBT, consider it this way.

You’re telling me that I pick Coke over Pepsi because antecedents made my choice NECESSARY.

Given determinism, antecedents determine decision making. There is a distinction to be made between decision making and choice. If determinism is true, the decision to select Coke was determined. If there was in fact a choice, where it could have been Pepsi, that is not how is defined, nor is how determinism works as defined.

But now I’m asking, suppose antecedents conditions had been slightly different in some relevant way. Let’s say the whole history of the world is EXACTLY the same, except at birth, I inherited a very slightly different genome that in the future would predispose me to prefer the the taste of Pepsi over Coke. This is not the actual world, but a POSSIBLE non-actual world.

In that case, would you not say that I would pick Pepsi over Coke?

Now you are going to say, I imagine, that this possible non-actual world is not REALLY possible, because the whole future was fixed at the big bang and that future included me NOT having a genetic predisposition to preferring the taste of Pepsi.

No, I am pointing to how determinism is defined and how it works as it is defined.

No different to how you define it to be.

You can't have it both ways. You can't have a deterministic world where anything can happen at any given time.

I never said you could, of course. It appears you did not read what I wrote with much comprehension.

Not because I say so, but how you, yourself define determinism, constant conjunction, etc, where B invariably follows A.

That is determinism, not the mythical hard determinism.

But even if you argue in this way, it still does not follow that my choosing Coke over Pepsi is NECESSARY. This is because I can easily imagine a different reality in which I preferred Pepsi over Coke (the genome bit) without invoking a logical contradiction. Agree?

Don't be hung up on the word 'necessary.' You can ignore the word if you like and use words like, fixed, set, causally inevitable.

No, you really cannot ignore it. An act is either necessary or contingent. I have explained why human actions cannot be necessary. Therefore, they are contingent — could have been otherwise — because that is the only category left.

''determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable.'' - Brittanica

As I have explained, “inevitable” is not the same as “necessary.” If all my future acts are inevitable, they are still not necessary. Their inevitability is set by ME, based on determined antecedents, and not by the mythical beast Hard Determinism.

By contrast, I can imagine no possible world at which triangles have other than three sides. To imagine so is to invoke a logical contradiction. Agree?

Sure.

Now if you agree with both of the above, please follow the logic. Since I can imagine a possible non-actual world at which I choose Pepsi over Coke, my choosing Coke over Pepsi in the ACTUAL world CANNOT be necessary, because “necessary” just MEANS true at ALL (logically) possible worlds. If you agree with my two points above, then you must agree with what I just said.

It doesn't matter what you imagine. We are discussing the terms and conditions of a deterministic world as you define it to be.

No, my world is SOFT determinism, the correct determinism. Your world, HARD determinism, is empirically unevidenced (“constant conjunction is determinism, not HARD determinism) and false as a matter of logic, as I have demonstrated. Indeed, it CANNOT be right, as a matter of modal logic. Modal logic, which has only been around for a hundred years, has been very useful in clearing up puzzling cases such as this one, because it deals specifically with modality, or modes of being

Now if we look at the whole history of the ACTUAL world, all events are exactly like this — contingent. They could have been otherwise. Since even the initial conditions COULD have been otherwise, history as a matter of logic is a series of contingencies and not necessities.

You are playing with words. Invoking contingency doesn't alter the given terms of your definition of determinism. You can argue for contingency if you like, but that is not the same as determinism

I have shown that human acts can’t be necessary as a matter of logic, and therefore they are contingent, which means they would have been otherwise, as could have all antecedents. That is all I need to show.

 

[pood]

@DBT, consider it this way.

You’re telling me that I pick Coke over Pepsi because antecedents made my choice NECESSARY.

Given determinism, antecedents determine decision making. There is a distinction to be made between decision making and choice. If determinism is true, the decision to select Coke was determined. If there was in fact a choice, where it could have been Pepsi, that is not how is defined, nor is how determinism works as defined.

But now I’m asking, suppose antecedents conditions had been slightly different in some relevant way. Let’s say the whole history of the world is EXACTLY the same, except at birth, I inherited a very slightly different genome that in the future would predispose me to prefer the the taste of Pepsi over Coke. This is not the actual world, but a POSSIBLE non-actual world.

In that case, would you not say that I would pick Pepsi over Coke?

Now you are going to say, I imagine, that this possible non-actual world is not REALLY possible, because the whole future was fixed at the big bang and that future included me NOT having a genetic predisposition to preferring the taste of Pepsi.

No, I am pointing to how determinism is defined and how it works as it is defined.

No different to how you define it to be.

You can't have it both ways. You can't have a deterministic world where anything can happen at any given time.

I never said you could, of course. It appears you did not read what I wrote with much comprehension.

Let me home in for a moment on this “anything can happen at any given time.”

Only one thing will happen, at any given time, when faced with the option of mutually exclusive choices. Now the question arises, “could have x have done other, than what he or she did?” The compatibilist answer to this question is that “yes, he/she could have done otherwise,” but what the compatibilist means by this is that he/she would have done otherwise IF antecedents had been different — in other words, for the compatibilist, “could have done otherwise, means, “would have done otherwise, IF.”

And now, again, because all antecedents COULD have been different, since like human acts none of them are necessary either, then x could have done, other than what he/she did, and this is proven by a modal analysis of the whole argument, which demonstrates that necessity CANNOT adhere in human acts. Since human acts can never be necessary, they must always be contingent, the only modal category left, and contingent just means “could have been otherwise.”

We see this immediately in daily life, where we reason counterfactually as a matter of course, all the time, without often even realizing it. See my earlier example of the woman considering between job offers in Boston and New York. She says, “I preferred to live in Boston over New York, but the New York job pays more, and in the end the extra money induced me to choose the New York job.” She would be very surprised, and rightly so, if you told her she HAD TO accept the New York job, that she had no choice in the matter. But it’s plain she COULD have, and WOULD have, accepted the Boston job, if it had paid more than the New York job — i.e., if antecedents had been different. As noted, we base our decisions on counterfactual reasoning all the time, a compatibilist way of thinking.

 

[peacegirl]

@DBT, consider it this way.

You’re telling me that I pick Coke over Pepsi because antecedents made my choice NECESSARY.

Given determinism, antecedents determine decision making. There is a distinction to be made between decision making and choice. If determinism is true, the decision to select Coke was determined. If there was in fact a choice, where it could have been Pepsi, that is not how is defined, nor is how determinism works as defined.

But now I’m asking, suppose antecedents conditions had been slightly different in some relevant way. Let’s say the whole history of the world is EXACTLY the same, except at birth, I inherited a very slightly different genome that in the future would predispose me to prefer the the taste of Pepsi over Coke. This is not the actual world, but a POSSIBLE non-actual world.

In that case, would you not say that I would pick Pepsi over Coke?

Now you are going to say, I imagine, that this possible non-actual world is not REALLY possible, because the whole future was fixed at the big bang and that future included me NOT having a genetic predisposition to preferring the taste of Pepsi.

No, I am pointing to how determinism is defined and how it works as it is defined.

No different to how you define it to be.

You can't have it both ways. You can't have a deterministic world where anything can happen at any given time.

I never said you could, of course. It appears you did not read what I wrote with much comprehension.

Not because I say so, but how you, yourself define determinism, constant conjunction, etc, where B invariably follows A.

That is determinism, not the mythical hard determinism.

But even if you argue in this way, it still does not follow that my choosing Coke over Pepsi is NECESSARY. This is because I can easily imagine a different reality in which I preferred Pepsi over Coke (the genome bit) without invoking a logical contradiction. Agree?

Don't be hung up on the word 'necessary.' You can ignore the word if you like and use words like, fixed, set, causally inevitable.

No, you really cannot ignore it. An act is either necessary or contingent. I have explained why human actions cannot be necessary. Therefore, they are contingent — could have been otherwise — because that is the only category left.

''determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable.'' - Brittanica

As I have explained, “inevitable” is not the same as “necessary.” If all my future acts are inevitable, they are still not necessary. Their inevitability is set by ME, based on determined antecedents, and not by the mythical beast Hard Determinism.

If something is inevitable, it means it cannot not happen. How is this different from necessary? If it is inevitable, it is going to happen, therefore it will necessarily happen.

By contrast, I can imagine no possible world at which triangles have other than three sides. To imagine so is to invoke a logical contradiction. Agree?

Sure.

Now if you agree with both of the above, please follow the logic. Since I can imagine a possible non-actual world at which I choose Pepsi over Coke, my choosing Coke over Pepsi in the ACTUAL world CANNOT be necessary, because “necessary” just MEANS true at ALL (logically) possible worlds. If you agree with my two points above, then you must agree with what I just said.

It doesn't matter what you imagine. We are discussing the terms and conditions of a deterministic world as you define it to be.

No, my world is SOFT determinism, the correct determinism.

There is no such thing as soft determinism where an alternate non-actual world could replace the exact same conditions of the actual world where IT COULD BE OTHERWISE. You are getting confused with these definitions. Hard determinism only means that something had to happen the way it did due to laws over which we have no control. It does not mean per soft determinism that free will can slip in somehow.

Your world, HARD determinism, is empirically unevidenced (“constant conjunction is determinism, not HARD determinism) and false as a matter of logic, as I have demonstrated. Indeed, it CANNOT be right, as a matter of modal logic. Modal logic, which has only been around for a hundred years, has been very useful in clearing up puzzling cases such as this one, because it deals specifically with modality, or modes of being

The modal world of logic is flawed because its logic does not represent the real world; it only represents their preposition, which may be quite valid, but very unsound. It is not helping to solve this puzzling debate as you may think.

Contingent does not mean that under the same exact conditions where a decision is made, it could have been otherwise. If our choices are contingent, it is true that all of our choices (note: determinists may use the term choice, although it's not a free choice because we can only go in one direction) are contingent --- or dependent upon --- the antecedents that each brain state uses to come to a decision. None of this is free.

Now if we look at the whole history of the ACTUAL world, all events are exactly like this — contingent. They could have been otherwise. Since even the initial conditions COULD have been otherwise, history as a matter of logic is a series of contingencies and not necessities.

You are playing with words. Invoking contingency doesn't alter the given terms of your definition of determinism. You can argue for contingency if you like, but that is not the same as determinism

I have shown that human acts can’t be necessary as a matter of logic, and therefore they are contingent, which means they would have been otherwise, as could have all antecedents. That is all I need to show.

No, it isn't all you need to show. That's a copout. Human acts are necessary because they could be no other way after the act is performed; it does not mean that the same acts done in the past will be the same acts in the future when a different set of environmental conditions are put in place. Even though our actions are already predetermined (based on all of the antecedents leading up to this moment, as DBT expressed), we don't yet know what that choice will be until we make it. It's not like determinism is forcing a choice on us, even if we don't like that choice. Determinism is in agreement with whatever option we pick or find most preferable. After the culmination of many experiences, combined with our genetics, we are driven to make one possible choice among two or many, depending on what options our brain has in its repertoire. What it doesn't have, it cannot use. Whatever decision we make based on the knowledge that is available to us (at that exact moment in time) is completely out of our control, therefore none of our choices are free in any sense of the word, compatibilist or otherwise.

 

[peacegirl]

@DBT, consider it this way.

You’re telling me that I pick Coke over Pepsi because antecedents made my choice NECESSARY.

Given determinism, antecedents determine decision making. There is a distinction to be made between decision making and choice. If determinism is true, the decision to select Coke was determined. If there was in fact a choice, where it could have been Pepsi, that is not how is defined, nor is how determinism works as defined.

But now I’m asking, suppose antecedents conditions had been slightly different in some relevant way. Let’s say the whole history of the world is EXACTLY the same, except at birth, I inherited a very slightly different genome that in the future would predispose me to prefer the the taste of Pepsi over Coke. This is not the actual world, but a POSSIBLE non-actual world.

In that case, would you not say that I would pick Pepsi over Coke?

Now you are going to say, I imagine, that this possible non-actual world is not REALLY possible, because the whole future was fixed at the big bang and that future included me NOT having a genetic predisposition to preferring the taste of Pepsi.

No, I am pointing to how determinism is defined and how it works as it is defined.

No different to how you define it to be.

You can't have it both ways. You can't have a deterministic world where anything can happen at any given time.

I never said you could, of course. It appears you did not read what I wrote with much comprehension.

Let me home in for a moment on this “anything can happen at any given time.”

Only one thing will happen, at any given time, when faced with the option of mutually exclusive choices. Now the question arises, “could have x have done other, than what he or she did?” The compatibilist answer to this question is that “yes, he/she could have done otherwise,” but what the compatibilist means by this is that he/she would have done otherwise IF antecedents had been different — in other words, for the compatibilist, “could have done otherwise, means, “would have done otherwise, IF.”

So what are you disputing then? Of course, x could have done other than what he or she did IF the antecedents had been different, but that's not what you have been saying all along. You're changing your position.

And now, again, because all antecedents COULD have been different, since like human acts none of them are necessary either, then x could have done, other than what he/she did, and this is proven by a modal analysis of the whole argument, which demonstrates that necessity CANNOT adhere in human acts.

No Pood, the antecedents could not have been different, which throws out your argument that necessity CANNOT adhere in human acts. From the beginning of time, everything was necessary up until the present. Nothing could have been any different. To say that if the antecedents were different, the outcome would have been different, is true, but the antecedents were unchangeable, so this again throws out your argument.

Since human acts can never be necessary, they must always be contingent, the only modal category left, and contingent just means “could have been otherwise.”

When a choice is contingent, it in no way means it was unnecessary. Anytime we contemplate, we are using what we have learned from past events to help us decide our next move. Our decisions are based on those contingencies and what we have learned through experience. This thought process is out of our control and our decision to choose one thing over another is also determined based on the input our brain has received. There is no break in this cascade of determinants. In fact, it is these contingent processes that make our decisions necessary.

We see this immediately in daily life, where we reason counterfactually as a matter of course, all the time, without often even realizing it. See my earlier example of the woman considering between job offers in Boston and New York. She says, “I preferred to live in Boston over New York, but the New York job pays more, and in the end the extra money induced me to choose the New York job.” She would be very surprised, and rightly so, if you told her she HAD TO accept the New York job, that she had no choice in the matter.

She didn't have a choice after thinking it through. When it is said that she had a choice, it only means that she had the option to go this way or that way, but the word choice becomes confusing to many because libertarians and compatibilists believe this means she was free to choose one or the other. It was an impossibility that she could have chosen B (Boston) after New York was selected. In your example, the whole purpose of her mulling over which place to live was based on what she valued the most and what would serve her best. She was compelled to choose New York because her preference was to get a better paying job, which was her priority. This outweighed anything else. The word choice is misleading for it implies she could have chosen either/or, which is incorrect. As long as there were meaningful differences between A and B, she had no free choice to choose at that exact time and place. DBT tried to clarify this whole debacle by using "her decision" to live in New York, not her choice, because she really didn't have a choice --- being a part of the causal chain that continues on ad infinitum. This example does not prove your case; it actually enhances mine. I will repeat certain excerpts in the hope that it eventually sink in.

The author wrote: The reason you are confused is because the word choice is very misleading, for it assumes that man has two or more possibilities, but in reality this is a delusion because the direction of life, always moving towards greater satisfaction, compels a person to prefer of differences what he, not someone else, considers better for himself, and when two or more alternatives are presented for his consideration, he is compelled by his very nature to prefer not that one which he considers worse, but what gives every indication of being better or more satisfying for the particular set of circumstances involved. Choosing, or the comparison of differences, is an integral part of man’s nature, but to reiterate this important point, he is compelled to prefer of alternatives that which he considers better for himself, and though he chooses various things all through the course of his life, he is never given any choice at all. Although the definition of free will states that man can choose good or evil without compulsion or necessity, how is it possible for the will of man to be free when choice is under a tremendous amount of compulsion to choose the most preferable alternative each and every moment of time?
<snip>
Here you are in the process of demonstrating why the will of man is not free, and in the same breath you tell me you’re doing this of your own free will.”

This is clarified somewhat when you understand that man is free to choose what he prefers, what he desires, what he wants, what he considers better for himself and his family. But the moment he prefers or desires anything is an indication that he is compelled to this action because of some dissatisfaction, which is the natural compulsion of his nature. Because of this misinterpretation of the expression ‘man’s will is free,’ great confusion continues to exist in any discussion surrounding this issue, for although it is true that man has to make choices, he must always prefer that which he considers good, not evil, for himself when the former is offered as an alternative.

But it’s plain she COULD have, and WOULD have, accepted the Boston job, if it had paid more than the New York job — i.e., if antecedents had been different. As noted, we base our decisions on counterfactual reasoning all the time, a compatibilist way of thinking.

It is accurate to say she would have accepted the Boston job if it had paid more (unless other antecedents came into play that we don't know about that may have kept her in New York), since this was the deciding factor at that time in her choosing to live in New York, which was not her favorite place other than getting better pay than in Boston for the same job.

 

[pood]

Inevitable does not mean necessary. Please reread my posts regarding the difference between inevitability and necessity. I am not going to repeat myself. I have already explained this. (This is in reference to peacegirl’s question why inevitability does not mean necessity; I accidentally deleted her comment while responding.)

 

[peacegirl]

Inevitable does not mean necessary. Please reread my posts regarding the difference between inevitability and necessity. I am not going to repeat myself. I have already explained this. (This is in reference to peacegirl’s question why inevitability does not mean necessity; I accidentally deleted her comment while responding.)

I believe I know the difference without having to find your post. It was inevitable that he was going to slip on the black ice when he took a step onto the driveway without taking any precaution. It wasn't necessary that he slip on the black ice if he had known it was there and decided to stay inside until salt was put down or take some other measure to prevent a fall. But he didn't know, and therefore he didn't take precaution. Because he didn't think about checking the driveway for ice because he hadn't listened to the news and had no idea that the weather conditions were deteriorating, his decision to walk out on the driveway and slip was inevitable. It necessarily had to happen the way it did.

 

[pood]

Inevitable does not mean necessary. Please reread my posts regarding the difference between inevitability and necessity. I am not going to repeat myself. I have already explained this. (This is in reference to peacegirl’s question why inevitability does not mean necessity; I accidentally deleted her comment while responding.)

I believe I know the difference without having to find your post.

It was inevitable that he was going to slip on the black ice when he took a step onto the driveway without taking any precaution. It wasn't necessary that he slip on the black ice if he had known it was there and decided to stay inside until salt was put down.

Yes, and even if he had slipped on the nice, it was not necessary that he do so. No matter what he does or doesn’t do, it is not necessary.