That doesn't work. You are just restating the logic of your argument, where the premises have no apparent relationship to compatibilism or incompatibilism as it relates to determinism as it is defined, which entails that whatever Paul does is fixed by antecedent without the possibility of alternate actions.
Without the possibility of alternate actions, there is no choice, selecting Coke is the only possible action in that moment of selection without the possibility of any other option being realized.
So, on the contrary, the only possible action that Paul can take in that instance, is to select Coke.
Anything else contravenes the terms of your definition of determinism, where 'will do' is must necessarily do (a constant conjunction of events)
The Paul argument is therefore flawed, essentially a modal fallacy.
He is right. According to definition of determinism, there is no "will do." But again, the word cause is confusing as well because nothing from the past causes anything. Everything happens in the present.
''If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son. Paul has one daughter and two sons. Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.''
It's puzzling that you would use this as an argument for compatibilism or a refutation of incompatibilism.
What else can I say?
Maybe you can explain the connection? For instance, what, if anything, does this have to do with free will and determinism as compatibilists define these things?
I’ll show you.
Here is the argument again:
If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.
Paul has one daughter and two sons.
Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.
The problem is that you, and peacegirl especially, are throwing around all sorts of words like “necessary,” “possible,” “contingent,” “actual,” and the like, that are notoriously imprecise, vague, slippery, and ambiguous in natural language, because natural language is like that. That is why we have formal symbolic logic, to clear up these discrepancies. The above arguments needs to be treated in formal modal symbolic logic, and I can’t here reproduce all the required modal symbols, though I can reproduce some for them. So I’ll mostly make do with English to clarify inconsistencies in English words.
The above argument is invalid (conclusion does not follow from premises) and unsound (premise one is false).
Paul does not HAVE TO have at least one son. He just DOES.
HAVE TO means “necessary.” In modal logic, necessity is denoted by ☐. Here, in formal modal logic, is the formal definition of necessity, and not the sloppy way you and peacegirl use the word:
☐P =df ~◊~P
This means P (a proposition) is necessary if and only if (iff) its negation (that is, “~P”) is impossible (where “=df” stands for “is by definition” and ◊ stand for “possible”).
By the word “impossible,” we mean, “not possible at any time, anywhere, under any conditions whatsoever.” Another way to say “impossible” is “necessarily false.” Another way to say that is, “false at all logically possible worlds.”
From this, it follows that “necessary” means, “P is true at all logically possible worlds, and cannot fail to be true at any of them.” Clearly, that is not the case for Paul having at least one son.
However, in the Paul argument, it’s plain that something is necessary, but what?
The corrected argument shows that it is not necessary for Paul to have at least one child, because obviously, we can imagine a possible world where Paul does NOT have at least one child. Paul having at least one child is possible (◊) and also contingent (∇), which means, “could have been otherwise.”
The necessity in the Paul argument is a relative and not an absolute necessity. The modal fallacy you repeatedly commit in these discussions to ascribe the modal necessity operator ☐ to the consequent of the antecedent, rather than conjointly to the antecedent AND the consequent together.
Correcting premise one, we get, in natural language, as follow:
Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son. Another way to put this is, Paul having at least one son, is a NECESSARY PRECONDITION for him having two sons.
The corrected argument, which becomes both valid and sound, is straightforward:
Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.)
Paul has one daughter and two sons.
Therefore, Paul has [but does not HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.
Now we can treat the parallel argument to hard determinism:
Unsound and invalid:
If antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul has to choose Coke.
Antecedents are x, y, and z.
Therefore, Paul has to choose Coke.
Corrected argument, valid and sound:
Necessarily (if antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.)
Antecedents are x, y, and z.
Therefore, Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.
And, the corrected argument is … soft determinism, also known as compatibilism.
So, when you say, “don’t get hung up on the word ‘necessity,’ that’s wrong, because that is the whole crux of the matter. If it is not NECESSARY for Paul to choose Coke, then the proposition “Paul chooses Coke,” is, was, and always will be, CONTINGENT (could have been otherwise). And if that is true, and it is, as I have just shown, the argument to hard determinism fails as a matter of cold, hard logic.
Note, finally, that contra peacegirl, propositions can never change their modal status on pain of logical contradiction, so her claim that a human act is contingent before it is carried out and necessary afterward is utter logical BS. Modal logic yields ☐☐P and ☐∇P.
That doesn't work. You are just restating the logic of your argument, where the premises have no apparent relationship to compatibilism or incompatibilism as it relates to determinism as it is defined, which entails that whatever Paul does is fixed by antecedent without the possibility of alternate actions.
Without the possibility of alternate actions, there is no choice, selecting Coke is the only possible action in that moment of selection without the possibility of any other option being realized.
So, on the contrary, the only possible action that Paul can take in that instance, is to select Coke.
Anything else contravenes the terms of your definition of determinism, where 'will do' is must necessarily do (a constant conjunction of events)
The Paul argument is therefore flawed, essentially a modal fallacy.
LOL, you don’t even know what a modal fallacy is. I just SHOWED you what it is — and YOU commit it ALL THE TIME.
You just committed it AGAIN.
He knows a lot more than you.You still don’t know anything about a topic you talk about endlessly. But go ahead and follow peacegirl down her rabbit holes. That should be fun.
Contingent does not mean "could have done otherwise". It actually means the very opposite, according to the definition of determinism that compatibilists have agreed upon. It could NOT HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE AFTER THE FACT.Your argument is no longer with me. It’s with cold, hard modal logic, which not only shows that Paul choosing Coke is contingent (could have been otherwise) but that it is NECESSARILY contingent, rendering your position a fortiori not just wrong but worthless.
But do find more quotes from Tricky Dick Slattery. HIs bullshit is always amusing.
Don't do this Pood just because you're pissed.Meanwhile, peacegirl, interest in this thread seems to have significantly waned. Maybe it’s time to introduce all the good stuff?
He is right. According to definition of determinism, there is no "will do." But again, the word cause is confusing as well because nothing from the past causes anything. Everything happens in the present.
''If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son. Paul has one daughter and two sons. Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.''
It's puzzling that you would use this as an argument for compatibilism or a refutation of incompatibilism.
What else can I say?
Maybe you can explain the connection? For instance, what, if anything, does this have to do with free will and determinism as compatibilists define these things?
I’ll show you.
Here is the argument again:
If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.
Paul has one daughter and two sons.
Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.
The problem is that you, and peacegirl especially, are throwing around all sorts of words like “necessary,” “possible,” “contingent,” “actual,” and the like, that are notoriously imprecise, vague, slippery, and ambiguous in natural language, because natural language is like that. That is why we have formal symbolic logic, to clear up these discrepancies. The above arguments needs to be treated in formal modal symbolic logic, and I can’t here reproduce all the required modal symbols, though I can reproduce some for them. So I’ll mostly make do with English to clarify inconsistencies in English words.
The above argument is invalid (conclusion does not follow from premises) and unsound (premise one is false).
Paul does not HAVE TO have at least one son. He just DOES.
HAVE TO means “necessary.” In modal logic, necessity is denoted by ☐. Here, in formal modal logic, is the formal definition of necessity, and not the sloppy way you and peacegirl use the word:
☐P =df ~◊~P
This means P (a proposition) is necessary if and only if (iff) its negation (that is, “~P”) is impossible (where “=df” stands for “is by definition” and ◊ stand for “possible”).
By the word “impossible,” we mean, “not possible at any time, anywhere, under any conditions whatsoever.” Another way to say “impossible” is “necessarily false.” Another way to say that is, “false at all logically possible worlds.”
From this, it follows that “necessary” means, “P is true at all logically possible worlds, and cannot fail to be true at any of them.” Clearly, that is not the case for Paul having at least one son.
However, in the Paul argument, it’s plain that something is necessary, but what?
The corrected argument shows that it is not necessary for Paul to have at least one child, because obviously, we can imagine a possible world where Paul does NOT have at least one child. Paul having at least one child is possible (◊) and also contingent (∇), which means, “could have been otherwise.”
The necessity in the Paul argument is a relative and not an absolute necessity. The modal fallacy you repeatedly commit in these discussions to ascribe the modal necessity operator ☐ to the consequent of the antecedent, rather than conjointly to the antecedent AND the consequent together.
Correcting premise one, we get, in natural language, as follow:
Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son. Another way to put this is, Paul having at least one son, is a NECESSARY PRECONDITION for him having two sons.
The corrected argument, which becomes both valid and sound, is straightforward:
Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.)
Paul has one daughter and two sons.
Therefore, Paul has [but does not HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.
Now we can treat the parallel argument to hard determinism:
Unsound and invalid:
If antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul has to choose Coke.
Antecedents are x, y, and z.
Therefore, Paul has to choose Coke.
Corrected argument, valid and sound:
Necessarily (if antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.)
Antecedents are x, y, and z.
Therefore, Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.
And, the corrected argument is … soft determinism, also known as compatibilism.
So, when you say, “don’t get hung up on the word ‘necessity,’ that’s wrong, because that is the whole crux of the matter. If it is not NECESSARY for Paul to choose Coke, then the proposition “Paul chooses Coke,” is, was, and always will be, CONTINGENT (could have been otherwise). And if that is true, and it is, as I have just shown, the argument to hard determinism fails as a matter of cold, hard logic.
Note, finally, that contra peacegirl, propositions can never change their modal status on pain of logical contradiction, so her claim that a human act is contingent before it is carried out and necessary afterward is utter logical BS. Modal logic yields ☐☐P and ☐∇P.
That doesn't work. You are just restating the logic of your argument, where the premises have no apparent relationship to compatibilism or incompatibilism as it relates to determinism as it is defined, which entails that whatever Paul does is fixed by antecedent without the possibility of alternate actions.
Without the possibility of alternate actions, there is no choice, selecting Coke is the only possible action in that moment of selection without the possibility of any other option being realized.
So, on the contrary, the only possible action that Paul can take in that instance, is to select Coke.
Anything else contravenes the terms of your definition of determinism, where 'will do' is must necessarily do (a constant conjunction of events)
The Paul argument is therefore flawed, essentially a modal fallacy.
LOL, you don’t even know what a modal fallacy is. I just SHOWED you what it is — and YOU commit it ALL THE TIME.
You just committed it AGAIN.
He knows a lot more than you.You still don’t know anything about a topic you talk about endlessly. But go ahead and follow peacegirl down her rabbit holes. That should be fun.
Contingent does not mean "could have done otherwise". It actually means the very opposite, according to the definition of determinism that compatibilists have agreed upon. It could NOT HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE AFTER THE FACT.Your argument is no longer with me. It’s with cold, hard modal logic, which not only shows that Paul choosing Coke is contingent (could have been otherwise) but that it is NECESSARILY contingent, rendering your position a fortiori not just wrong but worthless.
But do find more quotes from Tricky Dick Slattery. HIs bullshit is always amusing.
He is right. According to definition of determinism, there is no "will do." But again, the word cause is confusing as well because nothing from the past causes anything. Everything happens in the present.
''If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son. Paul has one daughter and two sons. Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.''
It's puzzling that you would use this as an argument for compatibilism or a refutation of incompatibilism.
What else can I say?
Maybe you can explain the connection? For instance, what, if anything, does this have to do with free will and determinism as compatibilists define these things?
I’ll show you.
Here is the argument again:
If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.
Paul has one daughter and two sons.
Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.
The problem is that you, and peacegirl especially, are throwing around all sorts of words like “necessary,” “possible,” “contingent,” “actual,” and the like, that are notoriously imprecise, vague, slippery, and ambiguous in natural language, because natural language is like that. That is why we have formal symbolic logic, to clear up these discrepancies. The above arguments needs to be treated in formal modal symbolic logic, and I can’t here reproduce all the required modal symbols, though I can reproduce some for them. So I’ll mostly make do with English to clarify inconsistencies in English words.
The above argument is invalid (conclusion does not follow from premises) and unsound (premise one is false).
Paul does not HAVE TO have at least one son. He just DOES.
HAVE TO means “necessary.” In modal logic, necessity is denoted by ☐. Here, in formal modal logic, is the formal definition of necessity, and not the sloppy way you and peacegirl use the word:
☐P =df ~◊~P
This means P (a proposition) is necessary if and only if (iff) its negation (that is, “~P”) is impossible (where “=df” stands for “is by definition” and ◊ stand for “possible”).
By the word “impossible,” we mean, “not possible at any time, anywhere, under any conditions whatsoever.” Another way to say “impossible” is “necessarily false.” Another way to say that is, “false at all logically possible worlds.”
From this, it follows that “necessary” means, “P is true at all logically possible worlds, and cannot fail to be true at any of them.” Clearly, that is not the case for Paul having at least one son.
However, in the Paul argument, it’s plain that something is necessary, but what?
The corrected argument shows that it is not necessary for Paul to have at least one child, because obviously, we can imagine a possible world where Paul does NOT have at least one child. Paul having at least one child is possible (◊) and also contingent (∇), which means, “could have been otherwise.”
The necessity in the Paul argument is a relative and not an absolute necessity. The modal fallacy you repeatedly commit in these discussions to ascribe the modal necessity operator ☐ to the consequent of the antecedent, rather than conjointly to the antecedent AND the consequent together.
Correcting premise one, we get, in natural language, as follow:
Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son. Another way to put this is, Paul having at least one son, is a NECESSARY PRECONDITION for him having two sons.
The corrected argument, which becomes both valid and sound, is straightforward:
Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.)
Paul has one daughter and two sons.
Therefore, Paul has [but does not HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.
Now we can treat the parallel argument to hard determinism:
Unsound and invalid:
If antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul has to choose Coke.
Antecedents are x, y, and z.
Therefore, Paul has to choose Coke.
Corrected argument, valid and sound:
Necessarily (if antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.)
Antecedents are x, y, and z.
Therefore, Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.
And, the corrected argument is … soft determinism, also known as compatibilism.
So, when you say, “don’t get hung up on the word ‘necessity,’ that’s wrong, because that is the whole crux of the matter. If it is not NECESSARY for Paul to choose Coke, then the proposition “Paul chooses Coke,” is, was, and always will be, CONTINGENT (could have been otherwise). And if that is true, and it is, as I have just shown, the argument to hard determinism fails as a matter of cold, hard logic.
Note, finally, that contra peacegirl, propositions can never change their modal status on pain of logical contradiction, so her claim that a human act is contingent before it is carried out and necessary afterward is utter logical BS. Modal logic yields ☐☐P and ☐∇P.
That doesn't work. You are just restating the logic of your argument, where the premises have no apparent relationship to compatibilism or incompatibilism as it relates to determinism as it is defined, which entails that whatever Paul does is fixed by antecedent without the possibility of alternate actions.
Without the possibility of alternate actions, there is no choice, selecting Coke is the only possible action in that moment of selection without the possibility of any other option being realized.
So, on the contrary, the only possible action that Paul can take in that instance, is to select Coke.
Anything else contravenes the terms of your definition of determinism, where 'will do' is must necessarily do (a constant conjunction of events)
The Paul argument is therefore flawed, essentially a modal fallacy.
LOL, you don’t even know what a modal fallacy is. I just SHOWED you what it is — and YOU commit it ALL THE TIME.
You just committed it AGAIN.
He knows a lot more than you.You still don’t know anything about a topic you talk about endlessly. But go ahead and follow peacegirl down her rabbit holes. That should be fun.
Contingent does not mean "could have done otherwise". It actually means the very opposite, according to the definition of determinism that compatibilists have agreed upon. It could NOT HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE AFTER THE FACT.Your argument is no longer with me. It’s with cold, hard modal logic, which not only shows that Paul choosing Coke is contingent (could have been otherwise) but that it is NECESSARILY contingent, rendering your position a fortiori not just wrong but worthless.
But do find more quotes from Tricky Dick Slattery. HIs bullshit is always amusing.
''If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son. Paul has one daughter and two sons. Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.''
It's puzzling that you would use this as an argument for compatibilism or a refutation of incompatibilism.
What else can I say?
Maybe you can explain the connection? For instance, what, if anything, does this have to do with free will and determinism as compatibilists define these things?
I’ll show you.
Here is the argument again:
If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.
Paul has one daughter and two sons.
Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.
The problem is that you, and peacegirl especially, are throwing around all sorts of words like “necessary,” “possible,” “contingent,” “actual,” and the like, that are notoriously imprecise, vague, slippery, and ambiguous in natural language, because natural language is like that. That is why we have formal symbolic logic, to clear up these discrepancies. The above arguments needs to be treated in formal modal symbolic logic, and I can’t here reproduce all the required modal symbols, though I can reproduce some for them. So I’ll mostly make do with English to clarify inconsistencies in English words.
The above argument is invalid (conclusion does not follow from premises) and unsound (premise one is false).
Paul does not HAVE TO have at least one son. He just DOES.
HAVE TO means “necessary.” In modal logic, necessity is denoted by ☐. Here, in formal modal logic, is the formal definition of necessity, and not the sloppy way you and peacegirl use the word:
☐P =df ~◊~P
This means P (a proposition) is necessary if and only if (iff) its negation (that is, “~P”) is impossible (where “=df” stands for “is by definition” and ◊ stand for “possible”).
By the word “impossible,” we mean, “not possible at any time, anywhere, under any conditions whatsoever.” Another way to say “impossible” is “necessarily false.” Another way to say that is, “false at all logically possible worlds.”
From this, it follows that “necessary” means, “P is true at all logically possible worlds, and cannot fail to be true at any of them.” Clearly, that is not the case for Paul having at least one son.
However, in the Paul argument, it’s plain that something is necessary, but what?
The corrected argument shows that it is not necessary for Paul to have at least one child, because obviously, we can imagine a possible world where Paul does NOT have at least one child. Paul having at least one child is possible (◊) and also contingent (∇), which means, “could have been otherwise.”
The necessity in the Paul argument is a relative and not an absolute necessity. The modal fallacy you repeatedly commit in these discussions to ascribe the modal necessity operator ☐ to the consequent of the antecedent, rather than conjointly to the antecedent AND the consequent together.
Correcting premise one, we get, in natural language, as follow:
Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son. Another way to put this is, Paul having at least one son, is a NECESSARY PRECONDITION for him having two sons.
The corrected argument, which becomes both valid and sound, is straightforward:
Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.)
Paul has one daughter and two sons.
Therefore, Paul has [but does not HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.
Now we can treat the parallel argument to hard determinism:
Unsound and invalid:
If antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul has to choose Coke.
Antecedents are x, y, and z.
Therefore, Paul has to choose Coke.
Corrected argument, valid and sound:
Necessarily (if antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.)
Antecedents are x, y, and z.
Therefore, Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.
And, the corrected argument is … soft determinism, also known as compatibilism.
So, when you say, “don’t get hung up on the word ‘necessity,’ that’s wrong, because that is the whole crux of the matter. If it is not NECESSARY for Paul to choose Coke, then the proposition “Paul chooses Coke,” is, was, and always will be, CONTINGENT (could have been otherwise). And if that is true, and it is, as I have just shown, the argument to hard determinism fails as a matter of cold, hard logic.
Note, finally, that contra peacegirl, propositions can never change their modal status on pain of logical contradiction, so her claim that a human act is contingent before it is carried out and necessary afterward is utter logical BS. Modal logic yields ☐☐P and ☐∇P.
That doesn't work. You are just restating the logic of your argument, where the premises have no apparent relationship to compatibilism or incompatibilism as it relates to determinism as it is defined, which entails that whatever Paul does is fixed by antecedent without the possibility of alternate actions.
Without the possibility of alternate actions, there is no choice, selecting Coke is the only possible action in that moment of selection without the possibility of any other option being realized.
So, on the contrary, the only possible action that Paul can take in that instance, is to select Coke.
Anything else contravenes the terms of your definition of determinism, where 'will do' is must necessarily do (a constant conjunction of events)
The Paul argument is therefore flawed, essentially a modal fallacy.
LOL, you don’t even know what a modal fallacy is. I just SHOWED you what it is — and YOU commit it ALL THE TIME.
You just committed it AGAIN.
You still don’t know anything about a topic you talk about endlessly. But go ahead and follow peacegirl down her rabbit holes. That should be fun.
Your argument is no longer with me. It’s with cold, hard modal logic, which not only shows that Paul choosing Coke is contingent (could have been otherwise) but that it is NECESSARILY contingent, rendering your position a fortiori not just wrong but worthless.
But do find more quotes from Tricky Dick Slattery. HIs bullshit is always amusing.
Don't do this Pood just because you're pissed.Meanwhile, peacegirl, interest in this thread seems to have significantly waned. Maybe it’s time to introduce all the good stuff?
The problem is that although Paul (my brother) does have a son (he in fact has two sons), he does not have to have any. His having any children at all, as well as the exact number, are contingent matters, not matters of logical necessity.If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.
Paul has one daughter and two sons.
—————————
Paul has to have at least one son.