laughing dog
Contributor
Since no one is forcing anyone to do anything nor is baking a retail cake for celebration indicating support for the celebration, your response is based on false premises.
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Should bakers be forced to make gender transition celebration cakes?
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James Madison
Senior Member
You think this is a winning strategy legally? Courts cannot determine or rule upon the validity of religious beliefs. The stubborn Free Exercise of Religion Clause has been held to preclude a court from determining the validity of a religious belief.
Now, sincerity of a religious belief can be assessed by a court but not in the manner you’ve described above in relation to Phillips. Phillips can have a sincerely held religious belief regardless of how implausible the belief is to the court or anyone else.
including hysterics, sounds correct.
I'll keep it simple. By time warp to move the goal post I was addressing you're preemptive attempt to defend your own analogy; which IMO, you had to warp (there goes that word again) in order to fit your argument. It is indeed the same, both individuals have choices, whether they are agreeable options or not is another discussion. The reason why Churches have exemptions is to protect the freedom of religion. Individuals have the same access and it is not the government's fault when faith-based organizations &/or other individuals make said option suck.
This is my true contention with the system and those who game it. It's time to stop being pussies and define our shit. The courts upon accepting a case need to be clear on their definitions. If they don't want to then laws should be written so as to prevent the courts from having to decide. I dunno, call it the Commercially Untied Nation of Theists ACT or something. Give them a clear designation so the general public (like myself) who avoids overly religious places like the plague can execute my clear and wholeheartedly enjoyed choice to avoid them.
Emily Lake
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I'm not really sure that I see a meaningful distinction between "forcing someone to do something" and "suing them if they refuse to do something". Perhaps you'd prefer the term "coerce" instead of "force"?
bareback or condoms? yeah let's discuss
note this comment is for good reason and facetious
I'll explain later lol
just ask Loren
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It's no different than forcing a diner owner to serve black people.
The sincerity of a religious belief? If that's what the court says then it's required to define what constitutes religious belief in order to determine said sincerity. Yet (as you seem to allude to) the courts can now magically accept said sincerity of religious belief without defining the religious belief itself. Interesting. Can't wait to get out of as many established laws as I can using my sincere beliefs the court can't question.
Edit: I Forgot there are right-wing children on this forum. That was sarcasm. You know damn well that won't work for brown folks.
KeepTalking
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So, you see a distinction, you just want to behave as if the distinction has no meaning. Would the reason for that be because you would then have to admit that you are incorrect?
Don2 (Don1 Revised)
Contributor
Speaking of words...
It's not really the baker that is under discussion, not exactly anyway, since if there are multiple employees, one baker could ask a different baker to make the cake. This is one of a multiple of alternate options for the baker to consider, like baking for a church, baking in his spare time, not baking cakes, whatever.
The real entity under discussion is the for-profit business entity that has a permit to sell baked goods to the general public. The business entity ought to treat different classes of persons equally according to its rules of operation.
Perhaps the title of the thread instead could be "Should a for-profit business entity with a business permit to bake and sell food to the general public be legally obligated to bake and sell a cake that is purported to symbolize gender transition by a customer that the business entity would have normally baked and sold without the specific knowledge of any customer symbolism?"
It's not really the baker that is under discussion, not exactly anyway, since if there are multiple employees, one baker could ask a different baker to make the cake. This is one of a multiple of alternate options for the baker to consider, like baking for a church, baking in his spare time, not baking cakes, whatever.
The real entity under discussion is the for-profit business entity that has a permit to sell baked goods to the general public. The business entity ought to treat different classes of persons equally according to its rules of operation.
Perhaps the title of the thread instead could be "Should a for-profit business entity with a business permit to bake and sell food to the general public be legally obligated to bake and sell a cake that is purported to symbolize gender transition by a customer that the business entity would have normally baked and sold without the specific knowledge of any customer symbolism?"
Emily Lake
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Sure... but do you agree that the diner owner is actually being forced to serve black people whether he wants to or not?
Emily Lake
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What?
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Yeah, so?
I'm being forced to follow the rules of the road every time I drive my car.
You seem to think this is a bad thing.
Don2 (Don1 Revised)
Contributor
No, I don't agree. He can stay in the back doing paperwork, doing the dishes, helping the cook, cleaning the bathrooms, etc. He doesn't actually have to partake in serving people. It's the business entity that has a legal obligation.
What you seem to be discussing is the particular instance when a small business owner is their only single employee, but then they have the option to never have gone into business in the first place or do it for a church or in their spare time if it's something they like. To add-- a BIGOT ought never, ever go into business to serve the public at large in a business where they are the only employee, unless that bigot is wise enough to know how to separate their business from their personal likes and dislikes. It's a very poor life decision they've made, otherwise, and they shouldn't be crying victim after they went ahead and made such poor decision.
KeepTalking
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Not sure what was so confusing about it.
You said "I'm not really sure that I see a meaningful distinction between" which would imply that you see there is a distinction between the two things in question, but that the distinction is not meaningful. My post should be read in that context. To further explain what I mean, it seems to me that a distinction without meaning would not be a distinction at all. In this particular case, I also think that there is a distinction between "forcing someone to do something" and "suing them if they refuse to do something", so it seems to me that your "distinction without meaning" is just a way for you to avoid having to address the distinction.
If you rather meant to say that you see no distinction between the two, I could understand your confusion.
James Madison
Senior Member
The sincerity of a religious belief? If that's what the court says then it's required to define what constitutes religious belief in order to determine said sincerity. Yet (as you seem to allude to) the courts can now magically accept said sincerity of religious belief without defining the religious belief itself. Interesting. Can't wait to get out of as many established laws as I can using my sincere beliefs the court can't question.
Edit: I Forgot there are right-wing children on this forum. That was sarcasm. You know damn well that won't work for brown folks.
Religious beliefs has been construed very broadly, to include Secular Humanism, a view in relation to a creator, and the obligations, if any, between the created and creator, but a belief in god/God not being necessary, recognizing Taoism and more as religion.
Aristotle believed in a first cause, an unmoved mover, who was the cause for the physical world. Aristotle can profess this to be his religious belief, and indeed this would meet the courts’ broad understanding of religious belief. The court could not inform Aristotle what he has professed isn’t a religious belief but philosophical belief into causation.
In Thomas v Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, a Jehovah's Witness, worked in roll foundry, which fabricated sheet steel for a variety of industrial uses. The foundry was closed and he was transferred to a department fabricating turrets for military tanks. The remaining departments he couldn’t have worked in were producing weapons. So, rather than working to produce weapons, as he believed doing so would violate his religious beliefs, he asked to be laid off. He wasn’t laid off so he quit, asserting his religious beliefs precluded him from producing weapons.
He applied for unemployment and testified at an administrative hearing he believed contributing to the production of weapons violated his religion. He did concede, however, that he could engage indirectly in the production of materials, although they might be used ultimately make weapons. The ALJ found petitioner had terminated his employment because of his religious convictions, but also determined petitioner was not entitled to benefits because his voluntary termination was not based upon a "good cause [arising] in connection with [his] work," as required by the Indiana statute.
The Review Board affirmed. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding the Indiana statute, as applied to him,improperly burdened his right to the free exercise of his religion. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed and denied him benefits, holding he had quit voluntarily for personal reasons, his belief being more "personal philosophical choice" than religious belief.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the Indiana Supreme Court in the latter’s determination his belief was “pesosnal philosophical choice.” The Court noted, “ The determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate task, as the division in the Indiana Supreme Court attests.7 However, the resolution of that question is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection... The narrow function of a reviewing court in this context is to determine whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner terminated his work because of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion.”
The following, below, numbers 21-24, was sufficient for the Court to affirm, the Jehovah Witness quit because of a “honest conviction” of “his religion.”
“21
"Q. And then when it comes to actually producing the tank itself, hammering it out; that you will not do. . . .
22
"A. That's right, that's right when . . . I'm daily faced with the knowledge that these are tanks. . . .
23
* * * * *
24
"A. I really could not, you know, conscientiously continue to work with armaments. It would be against all of the . . . religious principles that . . . I have come to learn. . . ." Ind., 391 N.E.2d, at 1132.”
Freedom of religion does include a logical corollary of professing and living by religious beliefs which do not need to pass a review board, called the courts, as to whether said belief IS a religious belief. Yes, this precludes a religious majority of a particular faith, whether this majority manifests itself in a legislature or as single judge belonging to the religious majority, from ruling the Santeria religious belief of animal sacrifice isn’t a religious belief.
No, you’ve misstated what was said. The courts can question your sincerity to a religious belief. Yet, at times sincerely held religious beliefs may have to yield to laws of general applicability and neutral on their face towards religion. Indeed, this is what the Court decided in Employment Division v Smith, in an opinion penned by devout Catholic, Justice Scalia.
Yet, a law of general applicability and neutral on its face towards religion can be applied in a discriminatory manner against religious beliefs, thereby implicating the free exercise clause, establishment clause, or both. Indeed, that is what the Court held to have happened in Master Piece Cakeshop v CCRD.
The majority drew a comparison of the facts surrounding Phillips denying a request to make a custom cake for a same sex wedding, because it offended his religious beliefs, to other bakers denying the request to place a customer requested message on custom made cakes that stated same sex marriage is sinful. In Phillips’ case, the CCRD determined Phillips refused service on the basis of the protected class of sexual orientation. In the latter, comparison case, the CCRD determined the protected class of “creed,” which includes religious creeds, was not the basis of refused service but instead the refused service was because of the personal “moral” objections the bakers had to the requested message.
For SCOTUS, on review, the CCRD has discriminated against Phillips and his religious beliefs. Phillips was not permitted to refuse service because of his religious beliefs, but magically there’s no foul when bakers refused service because of their “moral” beliefs. So, the message by CCRD was unequivocal. We will green light refusal of service because of “moral” convictions but religious convictions be damned.
OKThe sincerity of a religious belief? If that's what the court says then it's required to define what constitutes religious belief in order to determine said sincerity. Yet (as you seem to allude to) the courts can now magically accept said sincerity of religious belief without defining the religious belief itself. Interesting. Can't wait to get out of as many established laws as I can using my sincere beliefs the court can't question.
Edit: I Forgot there are right-wing children on this forum. That was sarcasm. You know damn well that won't work for brown folks.
Religious beliefs has been construed very broadly, to include Secular Humanism, a view in relation to a creator, and the obligations, if any, between the created and creator, but a belief in god/God not being necessary, recognizing Taoism and more as religion.
Aristotle believed in a first cause, an unmoved mover, who was the cause for the physical world. Aristotle can profess this to be his religious belief, and indeed this would meet the courts’ broad understanding of religious belief. The court could not inform Aristotle what he has professed isn’t a religious belief but philosophical belief into causation.
In Thomas v Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, a Jehovah's Witness, worked in roll foundry, which fabricated sheet steel for a variety of industrial uses. The foundry was closed and he was transferred to a department fabricating turrets for military tanks. The remaining departments he couldn’t have worked in were producing weapons. So, rather than working to produce weapons, as he believed doing so would violate his religious beliefs, he asked to be laid off. He wasn’t laid off so he quit, asserting his religious beliefs precluded him from producing weapons.
He applied for unemployment and testified at an administrative hearing he believed contributing to the production of weapons violated his religion. He did concede, however, that he could engage indirectly in the production of materials, although they might be used ultimately make weapons. The ALJ found petitioner had terminated his employment because of his religious convictions, but also determined petitioner was not entitled to benefits because his voluntary termination was not based upon a "good cause [arising] in connection with [his] work," as required by the Indiana statute.
The Review Board affirmed. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding the Indiana statute, as applied to him,improperly burdened his right to the free exercise of his religion. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed and denied him benefits, holding he had quit voluntarily for personal reasons, his belief being more "personal philosophical choice" than religious belief.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the Indiana Supreme Court in the latter’s determination his belief was “pesosnal philosophical choice.” The Court noted, “ The determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate task, as the division in the Indiana Supreme Court attests.7 However, the resolution of that question is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection... The narrow function of a reviewing court in this context is to determine whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner terminated his work because of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion.”
The following, below, numbers 21-24, was sufficient for the Court to affirm, the Jehovah Witness quit because of a “honest conviction” of “his religion.”
“21
"Q. And then when it comes to actually producing the tank itself, hammering it out; that you will not do. . . .
22
"A. That's right, that's right when . . . I'm daily faced with the knowledge that these are tanks. . . .
23
* * * * *
24
"A. I really could not, you know, conscientiously continue to work with armaments. It would be against all of the . . . religious principles that . . . I have come to learn. . . ." Ind., 391 N.E.2d, at 1132.”
Freedom of religion does include a logical corollary of professing and living by religious beliefs which do not need to pass a review board, called the courts, as to whether said belief IS a religious belief. Yes, this precludes a religious majority of a particular faith, whether this majority manifests itself in a legislature or as single judge belonging to the religious majority, from ruling the Santeria religious belief of animal sacrifice isn’t a religious belief.
No, you’ve misstated what was said. The courts can question your sincerity to a religious belief. Yet, at times sincerely held religious beliefs may have to yield to laws of general applicability and neutral on their face towards religion. Indeed, this is what the Court decided in Employment Division v Smith, in an opinion penned by devout Catholic, Justice Scalia.
Yet, a law of general applicability and neutral on its face towards religion can be applied in a discriminatory manner against religious beliefs, thereby implicating the free exercise clause, establishment clause, or both. Indeed, that is what the Court held to have happened in Master Piece Cakeshop v CCRD.
The majority drew a comparison of the facts surrounding Phillips denying a request to make a custom cake for a same sex wedding, because it offended his religious beliefs, to other bakers denying the request to place a customer requested message on custom made cakes that stated same sex marriage is sinful. In Phillips’ case, the CCRD determined Phillips refused service on the basis of the protected class of sexual orientation. In the latter, comparison case, the CCRD determined the protected class of “creed,” which includes religious creeds, was not the basis of refused service but instead the refused service was because of the personal “moral” objections the bakers had to the requested message.
For SCOTUS, on review, the CCRD has discriminated against Phillips and his religious beliefs. Phillips was not permitted to refuse service because of his religious beliefs, but magically there’s no foul when bakers refused service because of their “moral” beliefs. So, the message by CCRD was unequivocal. We will green light refusal of service because of “moral” convictions but religious convictions be damned.
now return to business licenses and their mandates?
James Madison
Senior Member
I’ve devoted enough posts to the subject matter of the baker’s free speech rights and public accommodation law.
And perhaps you’d like to inform me how the Masterpiece Decision, which involved a specific baker refusing to make a cake, and winning at the U.S. Supreme Court, factors into your analysis of business licenses and their mandates.