Yeah, Einstein also said that "God does not play dice with the universe"... which is wrong on a couple of different levels.
Which has nothing to do with his example....the motion//orbit of the moon being determined by gravity and mass not quantum randomness, so your objection completely misses the point of the example, which was related to causality and perception of agency.
It matters not in the least if it was quantum probability, this is no more subject to regulation by will than hard determinism.
''Indeterminism is not an absence of causation but the presence of non−deterministic causal processes'' (Fetzer 1988).
Pretty sure I said almost exactly that a few pages ago...
yep, I did.
That was your discussion with fast, not me. I don't have time to read everyones discussions and replies.
On topic... If the causal process is non-deterministic, then the outcomes are also non-deterministic. That clearly implies that given the same starting conditions, it's possible for a different outcome to occur. In this context, that means that given the same history and experiences, it's possible for a person to make a different decision.
And again, since you keep sidestepping it... It's possible for the decision-making process to be deterministic (follows a well-defined rule set) and still have outcomes that are non-deterministic.
You don't appear to be reading what I say. I pointed out that non deterministic events produce different outcomes....but, this is the important part - non deterministic events are not subject to regulation through an act of will.
It's an integral part of the syllogism.
Another way to put it being;
"Volitions are either caused or they are not. If they are not caused, an inexorable logic brings us to the absurdities just mentioned. If they are caused, the free-will doctrine is annihilated." - John Fiske.
"If previous physical events completely determine all the movements of my body, then the movements of my pen are also completely determined by previous physical events....But if the movements of my pen are completely determined by previous physical events, how can it be held that my mental processes have anything to do with the movements made by my pen....I do not think that it can reasonably be maintained that physical indeterminism is capable of affording any help in this problem."
(Philosophy and the Physicists, Dover, 1958 (1939), pp.216-7)
'' But now we must ask how it is that I come to make my choice. Either it is an accident that I choose to act as I do or it is not. If it is an accident, then it is merely a matter of chance that I did not choose otherwise; and if it is merely a matter of chance that I did not choose otherwise, it is surely irrational to hold me morally responsible for choosing as I did. But if it is not an accident that I choose to do one thing rather than another, then presumably there is some causal explanation of my choice: and in that case we are led back to determinism.''
(Philosophical Essays, 1954, p.275)
''As far as human freedom is concerned, it doesn't matter whether physics is deterministic, as Newtonian physics was, or whether it allows for an indeterminacy at the level of particle physics, as contemporary quantum mechanics does. Indeterminism at the level of particles in physics is really no support at all to any doctrine of the freedom of the will; because first, the statistical indeterminacy at the level of particles does not show any indeterminacy at the level of the objects that matter to us – human bodies, for example. And secondly, even if there is an element of indeterminacy in the behaviour of physical particles – even if they are only statistically predictable – still, that by itself gives no scope for human freedom of the will; because it doesn't follow from the fact that particles are only statistically determined that the human mind can force the statistically-determined particles to swerve from their paths. Indeterminism is no evidence that there is or could be some mental energy of human freedom that can move molecules in directions that they were not otherwise going to move. So it really does look as if everything we know about physics forces us to some form of denial of human freedom.''
(Mind, Brains, and Science, 1984, pp.86-7)
Adding: A non-deterministic outcome is contradictory to your insistence in a perfectly deterministic universe.
No, it is not a problem for me. It is a problem for the idea of 'free' will as opposed to normal garden variety 'will' which we experience daily.
I have focused on one or the other, determinism and indeterminism at different times. I have repeatedly pointed out the problems with both determinism and non determinism, be it random events or quantum probability in relation to the decision making process and its agency, this being the architecture and information processing activity of a brain.