There isn't really a 'freewill problem'.

[The AntiChris]

Causal determinism does not allow freedom.

If this were true then every single positive claim of freedom in our universe would be mistaken. This would be absurd.

No, it would relate to appearance, ''the sun is setting'' ''the moon is rising,'' the dog is free of its chain, etc, which says nothing about the ultimate state of the system, only appearance.

You can't have it both ways.

Either there is no freedom in a deterministic universe or there is freedom dependent on context.

The two claims are mutually exclusive.

 

[untermensche]

Will doesn't choose. It is the brain that acquires and processes information and makes a selection from a set of realizable options based on a given set of criteria, wants, needs, fears, hopes, desires, which are based on past experience, weighing of cost to benefit....or simply emotion taking over, a snap decision, sometimes leading to regret.

The mind chooses what ideas it will accept and what it will reject.

What difference does it make to a brain if it supports Trump or Clinton?

Why would a brain care? What evolved mechanism would cause a brain to care about something like that?

But minds had a lot of opinions.

 

[DBT]

We're not even free to say we're free.
EB

Whatever you say and do being determined by your brain in response to stimuli, and there lies the difficulty posed by relativity: brain/mind and action. What we are able to do in relation to how this ability is enabled.

I was not talking about common usage of words.

 

[untermensche]

We're not even free to say we're free.
EB

Whatever you say and do being determined by your brain in response to stimuli, and there lies the difficulty posed by relativity: brain/mind and action. What we are able to do in relation to how this ability is enabled.

Whatever you decide to accept as true is something your mind has done.

Not your brain.

 

[DBT]

No, it would relate to appearance, ''the sun is setting'' ''the moon is rising,'' the dog is free of its chain, etc, which says nothing about the ultimate state of the system, only appearance.

You can't have it both ways.

Either there is no freedom in a deterministic universe or there is freedom dependent on context.

The two claims are mutually exclusive.

So give an example of freedom within a determined system. Define your terms and references. Explain the nature of freedom within a deterministic system.

Keep in mind that common usage of words is inadequate,...merely saying ''god created the universe'' - for example - does not establish the existence of god or that the universe was created.

 

[DBT]

We're not even free to say we're free.
EB

Whatever you say and do being determined by your brain in response to stimuli, and there lies the difficulty posed by relativity: brain/mind and action. What we are able to do in relation to how this ability is enabled.

Whatever you decide to accept as true is something your mind has done.

Not your brain.

There are no examples of mind without the existence and activity of a brain. If you can explain mind without brain agency, go ahead, do your best.

 

[untermensche]

Whatever you decide to accept as true is something your mind has done.

Not your brain.

There are no examples of mind without the existence and activity of a brain. If you can explain mind without brain agency, go ahead, do your best.

That is as far besides any point as possible.

Don't blame your brain for your bad ideas.

You have a mind and can freely use it.

 

[DBT]

Whatever you decide to accept as true is something your mind has done.

Not your brain.

There are no examples of mind without the existence and activity of a brain. If you can explain mind without brain agency, go ahead, do your best.

That is as far besides any point as possible.

Don't blame your brain for your bad ideas.

You have a mind and can freely use it.

How do you 'use' your mind independently from the brain? Are you separate from both 'your' mind, which you use, and the brain....which according to what you imply has little or no function, just a dumb brain slopping around the skull to fill space, perhaps mere decoration, maybe placed there just to perplex neuroscientists?

 

[The AntiChris]

No, it would relate to appearance, ''the sun is setting'' ''the moon is rising,'' the dog is free of its chain, etc, which says nothing about the ultimate state of the system, only appearance.

You can't have it both ways.

Either there is no freedom in a deterministic universe or there is freedom dependent on context.

The two claims are mutually exclusive.

So give an example of freedom within a determined system. Define your terms and references. Explain the nature of freedom within a deterministic system.

I'm pretty sure you're totally incapable of discerning the difference between "freedom" and "free will". You appear to constantly conflate the two.

 

[untermensche]

That is as far besides any point as possible.

Don't blame your brain for your bad ideas.

You have a mind and can freely use it.

How do you 'use' your mind independently from the brain? Are you separate from both 'your' mind, which you use, and the brain....which according to what you imply has little or no function, just a dumb brain slopping around the skull to fill space, perhaps mere decoration, maybe placed there just to perplex neuroscientists?

You use your mind as you freely use it.

How we do that is something we don't understand at all.

 

[DBT]

So give an example of freedom within a determined system. Define your terms and references. Explain the nature of freedom within a deterministic system.

I'm pretty sure you're totally incapable of discerning the difference between "freedom" and "free will". You appear to constantly conflate the two.

Resorting to ad homs now. Free and freedom are related. It is as valid and reasonable to say 'freedom of will' as it is to say 'free will'

freedom
noun
mass noun

1The power or right to act, speak, or think as one wants.
‘we do have some freedom of choice’


free
adjective

1 Able to act or be done as one wishes; not under the control of another.

One is a noun, the other an adjective.

You are scraping the bottom of the barrel.

 

[DBT]

That is as far besides any point as possible.

Don't blame your brain for your bad ideas.

You have a mind and can freely use it.

How do you 'use' your mind independently from the brain? Are you separate from both 'your' mind, which you use, and the brain....which according to what you imply has little or no function, just a dumb brain slopping around the skull to fill space, perhaps mere decoration, maybe placed there just to perplex neuroscientists?

You use your mind as you freely use it.

How we do that is something we don't understand at all.

What exactly is the nature of this 'you' that 'freely uses' its mind? You still imply an autonomous agent that not only operates the brain, but the mind as well.....your imply three separate entities, the brain (being dumb, according to you), the mind (according to you, being smart), and the user of both mind and brain, the Maestro, the Homunculus.

 

[The AntiChris]

So give an example of freedom within a determined system. Define your terms and references. Explain the nature of freedom within a deterministic system.

I'm pretty sure you're totally incapable of discerning the difference between "freedom" and "free will". You appear to constantly conflate the two.

Free and freedom are related. It is as valid and reasonable to say 'freedom of will' as it is to say 'free will'

But the claim I'm objecting to isn't about "freedom of will", it's your claim about "freedom":

Causal determinism does not allow freedom [no mention of 'will'].

Earlier you confirmed that when you used the word 'freedom' you didn't mean 'freedom of will':

On a general point, I think you generate much confusion when you make general claims about the use of the word 'free' when you actually mean 'free will'.

No, I meant the status of freedom in general within a Determined World.

So I repeat, when you say "Causal determinism does not allow freedom" it follows that any positive claim of freedom (in any sense) in our determined world would be mistaken. This is clearly absurd.

 

[DBT]

Free and freedom are related. It is as valid and reasonable to say 'freedom of will' as it is to say 'free will'

But the claim I'm objecting to isn't about "freedom of will", it's your claim about "freedom":

'Freedom' and 'freedom of will' are related. The nature of the world, brain, mind and self being the central question in the issue of free will and freedom in general.

Earlier you confirmed that when you used the word 'freedom' you didn't mean 'freedom of will':

Brief remarks cannot include all relevant information....being brief. As a said the debate on free will is related to the nature of the world at large. It is related to idea of freedom, the ability to act, the question of regulative control, being able to do otherwise under the same conditions and so on. I don't think I need to keep repeating this each and every time I make a brief remark in case it gets forgotten.

E]
So I repeat, when you say "Causal determinism does not allow freedom" it follows that any positive claim of freedom (in any sense) in our determined world would be mistaken. This is clearly absurd.

It depends on what you mean by freedom and what freedom would look like in relation to a determined system, not relative states within that system (chain on, chain off/freed from chain, etc). I have asked you to define your terms and references and give an example of freedom in a determined system, but all I get is ''This is clearly absurd''

 

[The AntiChris]

'Freedom' and 'freedom of will' are related. The nature of the world, brain, mind and self being the central question in the issue of free will and freedom in general.

Earlier you confirmed that when you used the word 'freedom' you didn't mean 'freedom of will':

Brief remarks cannot include all relevant information....being brief. As a said the debate on free will is related to the nature of the world at large. It is related to idea of freedom, the ability to act, the question of regulative control, being able to do otherwise under the same conditions and so on. I don't think I need to keep repeating this each and every time I make a brief remark in case it gets forgotten.

E]
So I repeat, when you say "Causal determinism does not allow freedom" it follows that any positive claim of freedom (in any sense) in our determined world would be mistaken. This is clearly absurd.

It depends on what you mean by freedom and what freedom would look like in relation to a determined system, not relative states within that system (chain on, chain off/freed from chain, etc). I have asked you to define your terms and references and give an example of freedom in a determined system, but all I get is ''This is clearly absurd''

Like attempting to pin jelly to a wall.

 

[untermensche]

You use your mind as you freely use it.

How we do that is something we don't understand at all.

What exactly is the nature of this 'you' that 'freely uses' its mind? You still imply an autonomous agent that not only operates the brain, but the mind as well.....your imply three separate entities, the brain (being dumb, according to you), the mind (according to you, being smart), and the user of both mind and brain, the Maestro, the Homunculus.

I don't imply I conclude.

The mind is not a homunculus. It is a mind.

An entity that can influence the brain.

You use it to decide which ideas you will freely accept and which you will freely reject. Nothing forces you to accept or reject ideas. You judge them with your mind.

A brain cannot judge an idea. Only a mind can do that.

 

[DBT]

You use your mind as you freely use it.

How we do that is something we don't understand at all.

What exactly is the nature of this 'you' that 'freely uses' its mind? You still imply an autonomous agent that not only operates the brain, but the mind as well.....your imply three separate entities, the brain (being dumb, according to you), the mind (according to you, being smart), and the user of both mind and brain, the Maestro, the Homunculus.

I don't imply I conclude.

The mind is not a homunculus. It is a mind.

An entity that can influence the brain.

You use it to decide which ideas you will freely accept and which you will freely reject. Nothing forces you to accept or reject ideas. You judge them with your mind.

A brain cannot judge an idea. Only a mind can do that.

You haven't given an explanation based on evidence, you are merely repeating and reaffirming your belief in autonomy of mind over brain. The ability to raise one's arm at will is not evidence for autonomy of will or mind over brain activity and brain function.

 

[untermensche]

You haven't given an explanation based on evidence, you are merely repeating and reaffirming your belief in autonomy of mind over brain. The ability to raise one's arm at will is not evidence for autonomy of will or mind over brain activity and brain function.

A person knows a mind exists when they have one.

Nobody has to tell any human with a mind that minds exist.

It takes a special kind of self delusion to not see it.

 

[PyramidHead]

Is your will free from the influence of psychotropic drugs? How about the influence of violent threats to your person? Is it free from constraint by mechanical impediments such as handcuffs, ropes? Is it free from coercion by special interests trying to gain your favor? What about the effects of debilitating disease or injury?

I'm not sure if that is directed at me or The AntiChris.

It's directed at you. If your will is free from the above things, then your will is free, because free does not mean free from every possible constraint. It's relative. When people in ordinary situations ask whether something was an act of free will, the above concerns are what matters.

Nothing is free from causal determination except for subatomic particles. But some things are free in the limited sense you have mentioned. Yet, you do not allow the will to be free in any sense, not even a limited sense, even though it plainly is. A choice that is made under threat of bodily harm is not as free as a choice made without such a threat, all else being equal, even if neither choice is free from the laws of nature that describe how the brain responds to stimuli. Do you disagree?

 

[Emily Lake]

Here's a weird thing. I don't think I have free will. And yet, if I exceed a legal speed limit while driving, I can understand that there are still good reasons why I would need to be held accountable and accept that I should get some form of penalty. You think I'd be saying, 'But it's not my fault, let me off!'. Go figure.

Why should you be held accountable? You couldn't have driven the speed limit no matter what - it's entirely outside of your control. You had no choice in the matter, and there is no possible way that you could have done anything other than exceed the legal speed limit.

Why should you be held accountable for something over which you have absolutely zero control?

For one thing, why shouldn't (or better still, wouldn't) I be held accountable? If I wasn't, then that, and not a lack of belief in free will, is arguably exactly what would probably have adverse consequences for the functioning of human society. It's what self-policing, decision-making, biological-machine agents with learning algorithms (or the equivalent) would be 'progammed' to do, when immersed in a competitive environment. Not entirely dissimilar, in principle at least, to many other species. Possibly because overriding almost everything else is a survival instinct, and for social species, a collection of 'fairly hard-wired' (though perhaps somewhat flexible) group survival instincts. That there would be 'group rules' would be virtually inescapable dare I say inevitable, and conforming to them would arguably be an evolutionary/survival advantage, regardless of whether anyone actually had the control they thought they had or not.

Why do you think it is acceptable to hold people accountable for things over which they have no volition? If a baby cries in a quiet room, you don't hold the baby accountable for crying - it's not something they can control. If a physically disabled individual drops a plate and it breaks, we don't hold them accountable for not having good physical skills - it's not something they can control. If a bird poops on your windshield, you don't hold the bird to blame for it - they have no control over that bodily function. You don't hold a gay person accountable for liking the same sex, you don't hold a short person accountable for not being able to reach the top shelf, you don't hold a black person accountable for social stereotypes, and you don't hold a ginger accountable for having no soul . In general, we as a society and a species, give dispensation to people who arguably have no choice in a situation.

Self-policing is only logical when self-policing can alter a decision. But in a fully deterministic schema, that is not possible - a decision cannot be altered, because that decision is the only decision possible for that person at that time. Self-policing, then, is an illusion that accomplishes nothing except to introduce a feeling of guilt onto a person for something over which they have no control.

By a similar token conforming to group rules is a meaningless concept in a deterministic view. Group rules, and expected conformation to them, is only logical when the entity has a choice of whether or not to conform. If the entity has no choice, then they aren't rules, and conformity is meaningless - an entity will either conform with an illusory construct of social contract, or they won't, they have no power and no agency to do other than they actually do. There are no alternatives available. And since there are no alternatives available... that makes group rules themselves a shared delusion.

I can only again recommend you to go read more about it (if you're sufficiently motivated). The suggestion that a dramatically decreased belief in free will* (or an acceptance that we don't have it) necessarily would or does result in the dire consequences you suggest is basically a potential red herring. Losing a belief in free will might throw us a bit of a curve ball, but I reckon (putting my optimist's hat on) humans can gradually cope. That said, there may be downsides as well as upsides, and we should imo probably not instigate or recommend any dramatic social changes while the scientific understanding is still fledgling. We can, imo, already incorporate the likelihood nonetheless into our own thinking and into our personal relationships. In fact, there's arguably no honest way not to, once the realisation of the likelihood has occurred.

Compatibilism (although I think it uses the wrong term when it refers to 'free will') seems to offer one of the best, most pragmatic ways to deal with the issue socially, even if not the only one (Sam Harris is an avowed non-compatibilist afreewiller and his prognosis and that of others like him, such as Jerry Coyne et al, is very similar to that of compatibilism). Complex and sophisticated human capacities for agency, even if they are not in fact free from prior causality (determined and/or randomn) are deemed 'sufficient', in their decision-making and learning functions, to warrant allocating 'proximate' causal responsibility, albeit under a new understanding and one which would, for example, imply less need or justification for retribution, and more compassion, understanding and forgiveness, and a greater emphasis on tackling prevention and rehabilitation/cure (machines fixing broken machines) than on punishment (though there would still be penalties, possibly even severe ones if necessary), possibly, putting my optimist's hat on again, for the betterment for the world, possibly even the physical world, not just humanity (it has been said that a strong sense of our own free will may lead us to think we can manipulate and dominate nature with impunity).

If humans have a capacity for agency, then they have free will. Introducing, again, the strawman of "free" with respect to will implying that it is free from prior causality is irrelevant. Look - there's a difference here that seems to get lost. A non-linear stochastic outcome set can still be subject to prior cause. Free will doesn't mean that there is no causality - that's just plain silly. Free will does, however, mean that the next step is not deterministic. It means that the prior causes produce a set of options available to the agent, and that those options can be chosen based on reason, emotion, or at random. The only thing that free will actually means is that the set of options at a decision point can be a set with more than one element in it. A deterministic view implies that for each illusory decision point, there is one and only one next step available. That is what it means. One input --> one output. Therefore, in a deterministic schema, there is no choice, no agency, no decision.

Prevention has no particular meaning in a deterministic framework. Prevention as a concept requires that the entity be able to extrapolate a set of possible consequences for an outcome, select the desired outcome from within that set, and take purposeful effort to achieve the desired outcome. But a deterministic framework eliminates the SET from consideration. In a deterministic framework, there is one and only one possible consequence and there is one and only one possible action. No other options exist - no other actions are possible. There is no set. Prevention becomes an illusion.

That said, it is true that the belief (which likely involves illusions) is very deeply-embedded (which, along with consequences, is not something I don't consider). I personally can only find it intellectually possible to readily accept. Emotionally and instinctively, it's much harder. It's a mindfuck outcome of Socrates maxim for life, 'know thyself'. Who knows, maybe future generations will not find it so difficult to integrate into their hopefully more sophisticated and enlightened worldviews. But in any case, I don't think that possible consequences are a good reason to deny the likelihood of it actually being the case. And that's true for me regardless of the wider outcomes, which to me are a secondary issue (not least because I'll likely be dead before they develop very far). I didn't not become an atheist because of possible adverse consequences and so I can't rationally not do it for afreewillisim either, at the end of the day. Which is why, up until you raised it, I did not opine much if at all on possible wider consequences.

If you acknowledge that the set of possible consequences is an input into a decision... then you are implicitly accepting free will as legitimate. Without free will, there are no "possible" consequences from which to select - there is only one path. You frame the entire discussion here in terms of innately non-deterministic concepts. Likelihoods, possible consequences, accountability, prevention, agency, decision-making... all of those depend on free will in order to have any meaning. In a deterministic framework, every one of those concepts would have to be illusions. Your entire argument is based on illusions in an attempt to convince people (who, lest you've forgotten, have no agency or choice anyway) to cast aside the illusion of free will. You implicitly appeal to free will when trying to convince people that free will doesn't exist.

So if you were hoping for something less subtle, more dramatic and immediate to reignite your interest, I'm sorry to disappoint. You can repeat what you said about it having no great implications for how you live your life tomorrow or next year. Carry on as you were. I'm fairly sure you weren't about to go out and murder someone and then try to get off scot free anyway.

And as for losing interest specifically because of a ding dong about definitions. I agree.

I was never going to go out and murder anyone... because I'm pretty well convinced that I have control over my actions, and that I can freely decide what I do, and I can weigh the immediate gratification of setting a bad neighbor on fire against the long-term consequences of jail time and loss of freedom and make an informed choice about what is most likely to produce the best outcome from within a set of possible actions