To our resident transhumanists

[PyramidHead]

You could just as easily go from that starting point to a conclusion totally opposed to transhumanism: the most effective way of "taking the pain, fear, panic, sadness, vengeance, anger, etc out of the human condition" is to stop making more humans. If we're purely speculating here, what would be the downside if everybody voluntarily made that choice?

Since Ryan isn't really addressing this, and since my own subthread in this thread is kind of going nowhere;

If everyone voluntarily made that choice, then you're right that you'd take away all the negative experiences in that if there's no more humans, there also can't be any present and future human suffering. So one might argue that it is functionally the same as (and quite a bit easier to accomplish too, assuming that universal consent thing) eliminating those experiences while still allowing for continued human life. Of course, this is primarily an argument that can be raised to begin with, because Ryan's position is either weird or not particularly well explained. It's all in the wording really. I'd instead state the goal to be: The increase of happiness; rather than the elimination of suffering (which while related, are not one and the same). Voluntary extinction of the human race would eliminate the potential for future human suffering, but it would also eliminate the potential for future human happiness. That's the downside; the elimination of positive potential.

A downside has to be suffered by somebody, though. If there is nobody around to lament the loss of positive potential, then nobody is deprived. The people who are never born will not care one iota that their future human happiness is not being maximized.

Extending life on the other hand, also extends the potential for happiness. At that point you could argue that if the suffering 'exceeds' the happiness, it'd be a detriment to the original goal and that there's a 'sweet' spot where you've reached the maximum amount of happiness possible, at which point you should end your life; but this imo reduces our emotions and experiences to an overly simplistic linear spectrum between suffering and happiness; I do not consider it to be a matter of adding up the happiness and subtracting the suffering to get a final 'value'.

I agree that happiness and suffering are not on the same spectrum. However, I disagree that maximizing happiness per se is a goal that makes any sense; rather, we should be maximizing the happiness of actual people, because without it, those actual people will likely suffer. It is fruitless and counter-productive at best to make new people simply so they may be vessels for happiness; if you never make the cup, you don't have to worry about filling it... or breaking it.

I don't have a problem with people extending their lives if that's what they want to do.

 

[ryan]

Wishful thinking.

No, it's actually realistic thinking. The greatest capabilities and accomplishments come from the greatest of motivators. What is more of a motivator than death and unhealthiness for friends, family, country, world and yourself?

 

[PyramidHead]

Wishful thinking.

No, it's actually realistic thinking. The greatest capabilities and accomplishments come from the greatest of motivators. What is more of a motivator than death and unhealthiness for friends, family, country, world and yourself?

But having great motivation does not mean you will accomplish anything. Necessary and sufficient are two different things.

 

[ryan]

Since Ryan isn't really addressing this, and since my own subthread in this thread ...

It's quite simple as I tried to explain to PyramidHead. Before we judge whether or not a person's life is worth living for that person, we should simply ask the person if he/she would rather have lived until the present moment or not. If the answer is yes, then their existence is not of negative value at least for that person, which conflicts with antinatalism.

This antinatalism is such an ugly and pessimistic assumption. It is dead wrong for me and many people that I know - and I suffer from depression.

Now, it might be true for people who actually commit suicide or the people that won't for whatever reason. In such cases, I would argue that suicide and severe depression are only temporary. For example, there were a couple of years where I actually answered the qualifying question that I gave earlier in this post to be "no". But that is outweighed by the rest of my life. One other example is that some people who attempt suicide (like a real attempt such as jumping off of a high bridge) actually never try it again, and they go on to live normal lives.

Antinatalism seems to be a potentially tragic attempt to make a horribly idiotic judgement on the rest of humanity. If there is any mindset that is actually worse than Hitler's or Al- Qaeda's it is antinatalism because at least the former two still involve life.

 

[ryan]

Wishful thinking.

No, it's actually realistic thinking. The greatest capabilities and accomplishments come from the greatest of motivators. What is more of a motivator than death and unhealthiness for friends, family, country, world and yourself?

But having great motivation does not mean you will accomplish anything. Necessary and sufficient are two different things.

Yes, obviously I am not going to Mars tomorrow no matter how much motivation I have. I don't understand what your second sentence has to do with what I put in the post that you quoted.

 

[dystopian]

A downside has to be suffered by somebody, though. If there is nobody around to lament the loss of positive potential, then nobody is deprived. The people who are never born will not care one iota that their future human happiness is not being maximized.

I don't really accept that a downside absolute *has* to be suffered by somebody. However, assuming that's true, there's the question of 'so what?'. We live in a world where that is currently true, and it doesn't seem to stop any of us from doing anything. Ideally of course, you'd want to minimize that sort of thing, but surely not by ensuring a lack of suffering by also eliminating happiness.

I agree that happiness and suffering are not on the same spectrum. However, I disagree that maximizing happiness per se is a goal that makes any sense; rather, we should be maximizing the happiness of actual people, because without it, those actual people will likely suffer. It is fruitless and counter-productive at best to make new people simply so they may be vessels for happiness; if you never make the cup, you don't have to worry about filling it... or breaking it.

I actually completely agree (although I don't particularly make a distinction between maximizing happiness and maximimizing the happiness of actual people; they're one and the same to me). But then, this is what the drive to life extension is about, is it not? I don't ascribe to the idea that we should refrain from things like life extension because it would take resources away from hypothetical people that have yet to be born. We have actual real people alive today; if we also had life extension technology, then we could use that to increase the happiness potential of those actual real people; the cup already exists, might as well try filling it.

I don't have a problem with people extending their lives if that's what they want to do.

That's perfectly agreeable; I don't really have a problem with people *not* doing that if that's their choice (I might try to convince a person to not just accept death, and try living a little longer because I believe it's in their best interest, but if they make a definitive choice then that's that). My main problem with these sort of debates is that the rhetoric of the naysayers often skirts dangerously close to the sentiment of "I don't like it, therefore nobody can/should do it."

Even if that's not what a critic might be thinking, that's often the automatic takeaway from the way they tend to insert themselves into these sorts of debates. I mean, someone comes and says; "We can use technology to extend life"; and then someone
else stands up and starts arguing about how they wouldn't want to live forever because they'd get bored or what have you... which is an opinion they have a right to hold I suppose, but nobody asked them to share said opinion. It's the equivalent of someone coming out as gay and then someone else standing up and starting into a rant about how they wouldn't want to be gay because [x]; it's certainly their right to hold those opinions, but they're kind of being dicks about it.

 

[PyramidHead]

I don't really accept that a downside absolute *has* to be suffered by somebody. However, assuming that's true, there's the question of 'so what?'. We live in a world where that is currently true, and it doesn't seem to stop any of us from doing anything. Ideally of course, you'd want to minimize that sort of thing, but surely not by ensuring a lack of suffering by also eliminating happiness.

"Ideally" is the operative word, true. I'm under no illusions that anything like a worldwide movement to voluntarily stop procreating would ever happen. But if it did, it would be the best outcome in my opinion. The other important word is "minimize." The end goal of minimizing something is to eliminate it completely. I think the only thing that may be said to be intrinsically bad is suffering itself. Often, alleviating or preventing suffering comes at a cost. The situations where we have a chance to completely rule it out, period, are rare and should be taken advantage of. So, if suffering can be avoided without causing further suffering, then I think people have a duty to take that approach. My current view on the matter is that refraining from having offspring is just such a scenario. I still maintain that happiness cannot be missed by those who never exist to miss it, so eliminating the potential happiness of potential people does not constitute a tangible disadvantage.

I agree with the rest of your post, particularly "the cup that already exists" part, which is why my opposition to child-bearing is tempered by a strong support for adoption. If people want to have children, there are plenty of children out there who want parents. Unfortunately, it's not always an easy process to join the two together. But it's morally preferable in every way to making a new person who will take up the resources that could have gone to the existing person.

I agree that happiness and suffering are not on the same spectrum. However, I disagree that maximizing happiness per se is a goal that makes any sense; rather, we should be maximizing the happiness of actual people, because without it, those actual people will likely suffer. It is fruitless and counter-productive at best to make new people simply so they may be vessels for happiness; if you never make the cup, you don't have to worry about filling it... or breaking it.

I actually completely agree (although I don't particularly make a distinction between maximizing happiness and maximimizing the happiness of actual people; they're one and the same to me). But then, this is what the drive to life extension is about, is it not? I don't ascribe to the idea that we should refrain from things like life extension because it would take resources away from hypothetical people that have yet to be born. We have actual real people alive today; if we also had life extension technology, then we could use that to increase the happiness potential of those actual real people; the cup already exists, might as well try filling it.

I don't have a problem with people extending their lives if that's what they want to do.

That's perfectly agreeable; I don't really have a problem with people *not* doing that if that's their choice (I might try to convince a person to not just accept death, and try living a little longer because I believe it's in their best interest, but if they make a definitive choice then that's that). My main problem with these sort of debates is that the rhetoric of the naysayers often skirts dangerously close to the sentiment of "I don't like it, therefore nobody can/should do it."

Even if that's not what a critic might be thinking, that's often the automatic takeaway from the way they tend to insert themselves into these sorts of debates. I mean, someone comes and says; "We can use technology to extend life"; and then someone
else stands up and starts arguing about how they wouldn't want to live forever because they'd get bored or what have you... which is an opinion they have a right to hold I suppose, but nobody asked them to share said opinion. It's the equivalent of someone coming out as gay and then someone else standing up and starting into a rant about how they wouldn't want to be gay because [x]; it's certainly their right to hold those opinions, but they're kind of being dicks about it.

 

[dystopian]

The other important word is "minimize." The end goal of minimizing something is to eliminate it completely.

Eeeehh... the end goal of minimizing something is to achieve a state in which it is at it's smallest possible state, which doesn't necessarily mean it's non-existence (especially when you're not willing to do the things it would take to fully eliminate it)

So, if suffering can be avoided without causing further suffering, then I think people have a duty to take that approach. My current view on the matter is that refraining from having offspring is just such a scenario. I still maintain that happiness cannot be missed by those who never exist to miss it, so eliminating the potential happiness of potential people does not constitute a tangible disadvantage.

I don't disagree with the general principle; though I would argue that we should only do this if or when we have an effectively immortal population. I'd rather not have us cause our own extinction.

I agree with the rest of your post, particularly "the cup that already exists" part, which is why my opposition to child-bearing is tempered by a strong support for adoption. If people want to have children, there are plenty of children out there who want parents. Unfortunately, it's not always an easy process to join the two together. But it's morally preferable in every way to making a new person who will take up the resources that could have gone to the existing person.

Again, I generally agree with the principle. Of course, emotionally speaking you're not going to convince everyone who wants to be a parent that they should be happy with raising someone who doesn't share their genes.

 

[PyramidHead]

I don't disagree with the general principle; though I would argue that we should only do this if or when we have an effectively immortal population. I'd rather not have us cause our own extinction.

Out of curiousity, why not? Is there any rational, non-instinctual/emotional, cost-benefit-driven reason why the human species should continue indefinitely?

 

[dystopian]

I don't disagree with the general principle; though I would argue that we should only do this if or when we have an effectively immortal population. I'd rather not have us cause our own extinction.

Out of curiousity, why not? Is there any rational, non-instinctual/emotional, cost-benefit-driven reason why the human species should continue indefinitely?

Depends on how you define 'benefits', I suppose. I consider existence itself to be a benefit to begin with, so there's that.

There's also the fact that intelligence is the only thing capable of exhibiting rational thought to begin with; so naturally if you value rational things (as would be indicated by you requiring the reason for our continued existence to be based in reason) you ought to value the existence of a capacity to understand things in a rational manner.

There's also things like how human beings are the only thing capable of stopping an impending asteroid strike that'd wipe out all life as we know it.

Of course, none of this is going to be very convincing if you were to take a nihilistic point of view in which things can't be considered to have an innate benefit simply by existing, from which it then follows 'sod it all, let's just power down the universe.'

All that said; seeing as I am indeed a transhumanist; I don't care so much that the human 'species' continues indefinitely, as I do that some form of human *derived* intelligence (ideally including myself) continues indefinitely. And if I need a non-emotional justification for that, then the simplest such justification would simply be the same thing I've essentially said previously to Jokodo: It is better to exist than not exist; because that which does not exist can't even ask itself why.

 

[PyramidHead]

I don't disagree with the general principle; though I would argue that we should only do this if or when we have an effectively immortal population. I'd rather not have us cause our own extinction.

Out of curiousity, why not? Is there any rational, non-instinctual/emotional, cost-benefit-driven reason why the human species should continue indefinitely?

Depends on how you define 'benefits', I suppose. I consider existence itself to be a benefit to begin with, so there's that.

There's also the fact that intelligence is the only thing capable of exhibiting rational thought to begin with; so naturally if you value rational things (as would be indicated by you requiring the reason for our continued existence to be based in reason) you ought to value the existence of a capacity to understand things in a rational manner.

Not necessarily. I value rationality as a means to an end, not an end in itself. An appropriate analogy would be medicine: an extremely valuable tool that, if applied perfectly, would eliminate the need for its own existence. If a perfect medicine for all ailments, past and future, were to become available, who would consider avoiding it on the grounds that it would remove the need for further medicine?

There's also things like how human beings are the only thing capable of stopping an impending asteroid strike that'd wipe out all life as we know it.

Of course, none of this is going to be very convincing if you were to take a nihilistic point of view in which things can't be considered to have an innate benefit simply by existing, from which it then follows 'sod it all, let's just power down the universe.'

Simply existing is an odd and arbitrary thing to value, at least for me. I don't think one needs to be a nihilist (which I am not, by the way) to think that.

All that said; seeing as I am indeed a transhumanist; I don't care so much that the human 'species' continues indefinitely, as I do that some form of human *derived* intelligence (ideally including myself) continues indefinitely. And if I need a non-emotional justification for that, then the simplest such justification would simply be the same thing I've essentially said previously to Jokodo: It is better to exist than not exist; because that which does not exist can't even ask itself why.

Interesting. I take the same empirical starting point and conclude the opposite: that having the ability to ask "why" is precisely what puts humans at risk for the deepest, most enduring harms imaginable. In fact, the capacity to even imagine them is a source of much human misery and anxiety. No, consciousness is not something whose evolution I view positively. I cannot be persuaded that it is better to exist than not, since non-existence is immune to suffering and impervious to the loss of potential happiness.

 

[dystopian]

Not necessarily. I value rationality as a means to an end, not an end in itself. An appropriate analogy would be medicine: an extremely valuable tool that, if applied perfectly, would eliminate the need for its own existence. If a perfect medicine for all ailments, past and future, were to become available, who would consider avoiding it on the grounds that it would remove the need for further medicine?

That's not really an appropriate analogy at all; What is the 'end' of rationality? It can lead you to accomplish many goals; but there are always more goals it can help you accomplish... there's no end to them. In this analogy, what is the thing that rationality 'cures'? And what is this so perfect state that rationality is no longer needed?

Simply existing is an odd and arbitrary thing to value, at least for me. I don't think one needs to be a nihilist (which I am not, by the way) to think that.

I think on some level one has to. In order to avoid being a nihilist, you have to accept that there is a 'point' to things. However, objectively speaking you can't really establish a 'point' to anything without first making assumptions like 'X is a desirable thing'. And we can't actually do that in so satisfying a manner that there's no counterargument to it. 'Why do we want to accomplish x?' 'because otherwise we're left with y' 'Why don't we want y?' 'because Y is bad' 'Why is Y bad?' 'Just cause'.

So, in order to avoid nihilism, we *have* to assert certain basic 'truths' from which everything else follows. If x, then y. The question of whether a thing exists or does not exist, is as basic as it gets. You can't get to a more fundamental base level than that; so if we ARE going to make certain base assertions from which our non-nihilistic worldview ultimately derives, then an assertion like 'it is good to exist' is as natural and basic as it gets.

Think of it another way; a nihilist is someone who doesn't think there's a point to anything. If there is no point to anything, then what's the point in existing? Existence can lead to +1, +2, etc; non-existence can only ever remain at a static 0.

Interesting. I take the same empirical starting point and conclude the opposite: that having the ability to ask "why" is precisely what puts humans at risk for the deepest, most enduring harms imaginable.

Yes, this is true. However it doesn't change anything in my argument. Cost/Benefit.

In fact, the capacity to even imagine them is a source of much human misery and anxiety. No, consciousness is not something whose evolution I view positively. I cannot be persuaded that it is better to exist than not, since non-existence is immune to suffering and impervious to the loss of potential happiness.

Being impervious to the loss of potential happiness does little to convince though. A caveman, not having our experience, would have been impervious to the fact that he never got to enjoy chocolate and great movies; hurray for him, I guess. But that doesn't change the fact that his experience of life would (likely, assuming he's not fatally allergic to chocolate or something) have been greatly improved by having these experiences. I see this as analogous to telling someone that 'they don't know what they're missing.'; Just because you've never had a certain awesome experience, and you have no particular drive to experience it, may mean you're not 'missing' it as such sure. But it doesn't mean you wouldn't enjoy it if you did experience it.

Not having the experience = 0

Having the experience = +1

1 > 0

 

[PyramidHead]

That's not really an appropriate analogy at all; What is the 'end' of rationality? It can lead you to accomplish many goals; but there are always more goals it can help you accomplish... there's no end to them. In this analogy, what is the thing that rationality 'cures'? And what is this so perfect state that rationality is no longer needed?

The purpose of the analogy was to demonstrate that your earlier reasoning was faulty. When you said:

if you value rational things (as would be indicated by you requiring the reason for our continued existence to be based in reason) you ought to value the existence of a capacity to understand things in a rational manner.

I picked the medicine to provide a counterexample to that principle. Just because one values medicine does not mean that one would prefer a world in which medicine is always around. Similarly, just because I value rationality does not entail that I would wish to prolong its mere existence as a matter of a priori necessity. That's all I meant to convey.

Simply existing is an odd and arbitrary thing to value, at least for me. I don't think one needs to be a nihilist (which I am not, by the way) to think that.

I think on some level one has to. In order to avoid being a nihilist, you have to accept that there is a 'point' to things. However, objectively speaking you can't really establish a 'point' to anything without first making assumptions like 'X is a desirable thing'. And we can't actually do that in so satisfying a manner that there's no counterargument to it. 'Why do we want to accomplish x?' 'because otherwise we're left with y' 'Why don't we want y?' 'because Y is bad' 'Why is Y bad?' 'Just cause'.

So, in order to avoid nihilism, we *have* to assert certain basic 'truths' from which everything else follows. If x, then y. The question of whether a thing exists or does not exist, is as basic as it gets. You can't get to a more fundamental base level than that; so if we ARE going to make certain base assertions from which our non-nihilistic worldview ultimately derives, then an assertion like 'it is good to exist' is as natural and basic as it gets.

Whether a thing exists or not is one thing. Whether existence is good is another. Your response seems to conflate the two.

Think of it another way; a nihilist is someone who doesn't think there's a point to anything. If there is no point to anything, then what's the point in existing? Existence can lead to +1, +2, etc; non-existence can only ever remain at a static 0.

A nihilist is someone who does not assign value to anything. I assign value (negative value) to suffering as the basis of my morality. A true nihilist would say, "It doesn't matter to me if people go on reproducing or not, because I don't care about the consequences one way or another."

Interesting. I take the same empirical starting point and conclude the opposite: that having the ability to ask "why" is precisely what puts humans at risk for the deepest, most enduring harms imaginable.

Yes, this is true. However it doesn't change anything in my argument. Cost/Benefit.

In fact, the capacity to even imagine them is a source of much human misery and anxiety. No, consciousness is not something whose evolution I view positively. I cannot be persuaded that it is better to exist than not, since non-existence is immune to suffering and impervious to the loss of potential happiness.

Being impervious to the loss of potential happiness does little to convince though. A caveman, not having our experience, would have been impervious to the fact that he never got to enjoy chocolate and great movies; hurray for him, I guess. But that doesn't change the fact that his experience of life would (likely, assuming he's not fatally allergic to chocolate or something) have been greatly improved by having these experiences. I see this as analogous to telling someone that 'they don't know what they're missing.'; Just because you've never had a certain awesome experience, and you have no particular drive to experience it, may mean you're not 'missing' it as such sure. But it doesn't mean you wouldn't enjoy it if you did experience it.

Not having the experience = 0

Having the experience = +1

1 > 0

Earlier in the thread, you indicated that you opposed tallying up good and bad experiences mathematically to assign value to life. Do you now wish to reverse that stance? If so, there is a great deal more at play than just a single positive experience added to nil. Either way, the problem is that moral responsibility is centered around avoiding negative experiences, not promoting positive experiences: I have a duty not to break your cell phone, but I have no corresponding duty to buy you a better one.

So, while it may be nice for a caveman to eat a piece of chocolate, I don't think it's imperative that we give him any. What is imperative is that, if we can stop it, we prevent a boulder from crushing his shelter. The caveman analogy is not appropriate anyway, because the caveman also experiences a great deal of pain and hardship, so a piece of chocolate would be a nice break. An unborn nothingness doesn't experience anything. A proper analogy would be if the caveman somehow had no suffering whatsoever in his life, nor any happiness, and by eating the piece of chocolate gained the ability to experience both. I wouldn't say the caveman is better off after eating it. You might say he is. We can differ on that point, but it's not as simple an equation as you made it out to be.

 

[dystopian]

I picked the medicine to provide a counterexample to that principle.

I get that, but an analogy can't really serve as a counterexample to a principle, when the analogy is flawed, right? Medicine is indeed a means to an end; and so if you take the position that rationality is exactly the same, then pointing to medicine there would be a good counterargument. However, to someone like myself, who does not consider rationality a mere means to an end, that argument falls apart right away.

Rationaly can be used to solve problems; and in that sense it is a means to an end. It can also be used to identify and solve entirely hypothetical problems, consider a multitude of possibilities, or even create internally consistent fictional worlds and art. So when you've solved all real world problems using rationality, and ensured no future problems can arise that require reason to tackle, you still haven't established reason as now being superfluous.

Whether a thing exists or not is one thing. Whether existence is good is another. Your response seems to conflate the two.

No, I recognize they are two different things. I just assert it as a basic premise from which everything else must flow; a premise without which one must by definition be a nihilist (since if existence is not better than non-existence in terms of purpose, or is equal, then there can not be any point to anything... which is nihilism)

A nihilist is someone who does not assign value to anything. I assign value (negative value) to suffering as the basis of my morality. A true nihilist would say, "It doesn't matter to me if people go on reproducing or not, because I don't care about the consequences one way or another."

While I understand the distinction; there doesn't seem to be a practical difference. Whether you're okay with non-existence because you ascribe a negative value to the suffering of living, or because you don't care one way or the other; the outcome is the exact same.

Earlier in the thread, you indicated that you opposed tallying up good and bad experiences mathematically to assign value to life. Do you now wish to reverse that stance? If so, there is a great deal more at play than just a single positive experience added to nil.

I did not say that exactly. What I opposed was adding up happiness, subtracting suffering, and considering the result to be the sum value of life; I didn't say that one can't tally up experiences in order to assign some value. It just means you end up with more than one figure.

Either way, the problem is that moral responsibility is centered around avoiding negative experiences, not promoting positive experiences: I have a duty not to break your cell phone, but I have no corresponding duty to buy you a better one.

Huh? Who says that moral responsibility is centered around avoidance instead of promotion?

A proper analogy would be if the caveman somehow had no suffering whatsoever in his life, nor any happiness, and by eating the piece of chocolate gained the ability to experience both. I wouldn't say the caveman is better off after eating it. You might say he is.

I would absolutely say that he is. And I confess to having a hard time grasping your logic on this topic. I can follow your train of thought, the arguments; I just can't grasp how it seems logical to you. That is not intended as an insult, but rather as an explanation of the fundamental problem here. You do not ascribe to the same basic set of premises from which my entire worldview is derived; premises like 'it is is better to exist than not exist'; and so you can arrive at a worldview that on some level is completely alien to me. Presumably, the reverse is true as well.

Neither of us can logically establish our basic premises as being objectively true without appealing to the sense of logic that ultimately exists within a mental framework that is contingent upon those very same basic premises. It is an interesting problem I rarely find myself faced with, since usually when I disagree with someone it's because there's an actual flaw in their own system of logic or some such, or their arguments are in direct conflict with known reality. It is relatively rare to encounter a disagreement of this nature instead.

We can differ on that point, but it's not as simple an equation as you made it out to be.

In these sorts of discussions, nothing's ever so simple that it can be reduced to a mere analogy or cute axiom.

 

[PyramidHead]

It's true that when differences come down to clashes of foundational intuitions, there's really not much left to discuss. Thomas Ligotti bemoans this state of affairs in his writings. Pessimists and optimists are doomed to clash, with neither really having an objective leg to stand on. He's in the former camp (frequently using the cheery phrase "consciousness, parent of all horrors").

The reason I question the statement that existence is better than non-existence is because it's genetically hardwired, not rationally derived. We are all, to some extent, programmed to be optimistic. But natural selection has no interest in what is rational, just in what promotes reproduction. In all areas of belief, gut feelings should be treated with skepticism. We only excel when we go beyond our genetic dispositions. It's never a good justification to say something is true because it helped our ancestors get laid. I know that's not what you're proposing, but I'm just trying to de-mystify our differences.

 

[dystopian]

It's true that when differences come down to clashes of foundational intuitions, there's really not much left to discuss. Thomas Ligotti bemoans this state of affairs in his writings. Pessimists and optimists are doomed to clash, with neither really having an objective leg to stand on. He's in the former camp (frequently using the cheery phrase "consciousness, parent of all horrors").

The reason I question the statement that existence is better than non-existence is because it's genetically hardwired, not rationally derived.

Well, I contend that that's just something you're saying on account of you having a different set of opposite starting values, and that furthermore; a thing being genetically hardwired does not mean it can't also be rationally derived at (I'm pretty sure I showed how to rationally arrive at it within this thread; though, as I've also said, you're not likely to agree on that if your starting values are substantially different enough from mine that your logic; however equally valid; conflicts with it.)

 

[PyramidHead]

Well, I contend that that's just something you're saying on account of you having a different set of opposite starting values, and that furthermore; a thing being genetically hardwired does not mean it can't also be rationally derived at (I'm pretty sure I showed how to rationally arrive at it within this thread; though, as I've also said, you're not likely to agree on that if your starting values are substantially different enough from mine that your logic; however equally valid; conflicts with it.)

Fair enough. I would encourage you to look up David Benatar, who gives a rigorous defense of why coming into existence is always harmful. Last month, there was an entire issue of a philosophy journal dedicated to refuting his claims (which none of them did, in my opinion). It's an interesting read even if you disagree. His book isn't free, but this analysis of his thesis is pretty good: https://www.princeton.edu/~eharman/Benatar.pdf

It appears that the life-extension community is also aware of his position, and has written some material about it: http://www.evidencebasedcryonics.org/tag/david-benatar/ I only glanced over it, but it appears they may share your view. Anyway, good discussion.

 

[ryan]

It's true that when differences come down to clashes of foundational intuitions, there's really not much left to discuss. Thomas Ligotti bemoans this state of affairs in his writings. Pessimists and optimists are doomed to clash, with neither really having an objective leg to stand on. He's in the former camp (frequently using the cheery phrase "consciousness, parent of all horrors").

The reason I question the statement that existence is better than non-existence is because it's genetically hardwired, not rationally derived. We are all, to some extent, programmed to be optimistic. But natural selection has no interest in what is rational, just in what promotes reproduction. In all areas of belief, gut feelings should be treated with skepticism. We only excel when we go beyond our genetic dispositions. It's never a good justification to say something is true because it helped our ancestors get laid. I know that's not what you're proposing, but I'm just trying to de-mystify our differences.

If our arguments are based on what the molecules in our bodies are doing, then your logic and reasoning is just an illusion. At what point then can we trust our own judgements on value?

The point is that our motivations should be assumed to be real/true in discussions like these.

 

[dystopian]

Fair enough. I would encourage you to look up David Benatar, who gives a rigorous defense of why coming into existence is always harmful. Last month, there was an entire issue of a philosophy journal dedicated to refuting his claims (which none of them did, in my opinion). It's an interesting read even if you disagree. His book isn't free, but this analysis of his thesis is pretty good: https://www.princeton.edu/~eharman/Benatar.pdf

He's going to be more convincing on this issue than you are; again, because I'm already starting from the base premise that existence > non-existence. And more so because I couple this with the idea that I'm willing to suffer through anything in order to maintain that existence; which means that even if he could convincingly argue that coming into existence is always harmful (which he's not convincingly able to do), it doesn't matter to me because that's a price I'm willing to pay.

Also, having skimmed that PDF, it seems he makes the argument that good/bad experiences are on the same spectrum, which we've already agreed isn't the case.

 

[abaddon]

There is no functional difference between two people if everything about them, right down to their past experiences, is exactly identical. That's not faith, that's simple logic. Sure, you could argue that once the copy that is 'you' dies, 'you' no longer exist. But since the new you is exactly like the old you, it doesn't fucking matter to anyone except the old you.

Why doesn't that matter, that it matters to the old you? If I wanted very much to live forever, then specifically I would very much want to live forever. abaddon #2047 does not matter to me.

If "anyone" can dismiss "the old you" this easily, then why shouldn't everyone dismiss the current dystopian this easily? Why does "no functional difference" matter?