To our resident transhumanists

[dystopian]

Why doesn't that matter, that it matters to the old you? If I wanted very much to live forever, then specifically I would very much want to live forever. abaddon #2047 does not matter to me.

You answered your own question: If you wanted to live forever, then specifically *you* would want to live forever. In this hypothetical scenario, the 'you' we're talking about would be the copy. If you as abadon #2 (or #1 for that matter) don't care about abaddon #2047, then why would you care about abaddon #1?

If "anyone" can dismiss "the old you" this easily, then why shouldn't everyone dismiss the current dystopian this easily? Why does "no functional difference" matter?

It's not so much a dismissal as saying "*I* am alive right now, and that's okay even if the person I'm a copy of is not". That's not exactly the same as 'dismissing' the original as having ever had any value. However, since the original no longer exists, he no longer has any *current* value, does he?

 

[abaddon]

dystopian, try staying in one head long enough to finish his death process, rather than taking imaginary flight into another you. Hopefully the significance of "the older you" that dies (whichever one, in a long line of you's) will become apparent eventually. These you's will have "no functional difference", you said. So they'll each suffer the torment that the imagination of a future state of "non-existence" appears to create in you, dystopian #1, right?

 

[dystopian]

dystopian, try staying in one head long enough to finish his death process, rather than taking imaginary flight into another you.

You realize we're talking about a hypothetical future technology right? Not a psychotic break I'm having.

These you's will have "no functional difference", you said. So they'll each suffer the torment that the imagination of a future state of "non-existence" appears to create in you, dystopian #1, right?

Presumably. Of course, that's scarcely the point. The point is that they're alive, and therefore some version of me is alive; which even though they might still suffer the same angst regarding the possibility of death, is a hell of a lot better than if "I/we" just stopped existing the first time one of us dies.

And beyond that; If I was assured that when I die, I'm replaced by a new version exactly like me... while I might still suffer that torment you speak of, I'd certainly experience LESS of it.

 

[abaddon]

"Stay in one head" merely meant to not skip over a dying you to emphasize how little an old you matters to a new you. I find an immortality that still leaves death as something people suffer way more than a little incomplete.

Let me ask this, just to be sure… because when you said "the older you" dies then that suggested to me a break in continuity of experiencing. But perhaps you don't think so. So, here's the question: If there is no functional difference between copies then is that, in your mind, the same as seamless continuity in experiences?

Otherwise I don't see how this is better than having a variety of immortality by having children.

 

[dystopian]

Let me ask this, just to be sure… because when you said "the older you" dies then that suggested to me a break in continuity of experiencing. But perhaps you don't think so. So, here's the question: If there is no functional difference between copies then is that, in your mind, the same as seamless continuity in experiences?

There both is and is not a break in continuity.

Let's say you play a videogame, and at one point you save the game. Just to be extra safe, you copy the savegame onto a USB stick. Then, a freak accident happens and your computer blows up; the original savegame is lost. But you still have the copy of the savegame; so you buy a new computer, reinstall the game, and you can keep playing from where you were. There's been a break in continuity in that you're not playing the game on the same hardware anymore. There's not been a break in continuity in that you're playing from the exact same moment you saved the game at.

However, even if what we were talking about were not a seamless continuity (in experience or otherwise, such as say there's a gap of a month between death and the last copy); it's still a degree of immortality not even remotely approximated by having children. Children are not a form of immortality; they're not even a form of genetic immortality since while they are based in part off of your genetics, they're not a copy and are in fact an entirely new entity. They don't have your experiences. A copy of you however, even an imperfect one that only has a percentage of your experiences, *is* a form of immortality in that some version of you still lives when you are dead.

Besides, it really doesn't matter if there's a break in continuity of experience or not; you experience such a break every time you go to sleep.

 

[ryan]

Let me ask this, just to be sure… because when you said "the older you" dies then that suggested to me a break in continuity of experiencing. But perhaps you don't think so. So, here's the question: If there is no functional difference between copies then is that, in your mind, the same as seamless continuity in experiences?

There both is and is not a break in continuity.

Let's say you play a videogame, and at one point you save the game. Just to be extra safe, you copy the savegame onto a USB stick. Then, a freak accident happens and your computer blows up; the original savegame is lost. But you still have the copy of the savegame; so you buy a new computer, reinstall the game, and you can keep playing from where you were. There's been a break in continuity in that you're not playing the game on the same hardware anymore. There's not been a break in continuity in that you're playing from the exact same moment you saved the game at.

However, even if what we were talking about were not a seamless continuity (in experience or otherwise, such as say there's a gap of a month between death and the last copy); it's still a degree of immortality not even remotely approximated by having children. Children are not a form of immortality; they're not even a form of genetic immortality since while they are based in part off of your genetics, they're not a copy and are in fact an entirely new entity. They don't have your experiences. A copy of you however, even an imperfect one that only has a percentage of your experiences, *is* a form of immortality in that some version of you still lives when you are dead.

Besides, it really doesn't matter if there's a break in continuity of experience or not; you experience such a break every time you go to sleep.

Dystopian, the more that I think about it the more I don't think that my personal consciousness will continue no matter how perfectly identical the clone is. In other words, once I kick the bucket, I will have just as much confidence in a rock continuing my consciousness than I would an identical clone.

There might truly be a death of this continuity by replacing all of the parts at once. Yes we don't have the same molecules that we did at birth, but each part that exchanges an "accustomed" part, has a very intimate period with the other "accustomed" parts. This is much different than a total replacement of parts. We know that a consciousness does not go through anything like this during a normal life.

Having said all of that, I still believe that there are always ways to get something accomplished.

 

[dystopian]

Dystopian, the more that I think about it the more I don't think that my personal consciousness will continue no matter how perfectly identical the clone is. In other words, once I kick the bucket, I will have just as much confidence in a rock continuing my consciousness than I would an identical clone.

Irrelevant, I already addressed this.

There might truly be a death of this continuity by replacing all of the parts at once.

Then don't replace them all at once.

 

[ryan]

Irrelevant, I already addressed this.

There might truly be a death of this continuity by replacing all of the parts at once.

Then don't replace them all at once.

From what I have read in your posts, you seem to expect that uploading your information into a computer would be sufficient for immortality. But when your information is finally used to construct a new body, how will it be any different than an identical clone?

 

[Bullmoose Too]

"Immortality is impossible; it is too dangerous."

I dissagree. Immortality is impossible because of the inevitable Big Crash. Immortality is undesirable because the universe is too dangerous. Furthermore immortality is undesirable because immortality sounds realy boring.

 

[dystopian]

Furthermore immortality is undesirable because immortality sounds realy boring.

This, more than anything, is the sort of 'argument' that annoys me; there's no difference between saying that immortality is undesirable because 'it sounds really boring', and saying 'Well, I don't know what to do tomorrow... better go kill myself.'

People who think that immortality would be boring just aren't very imaginative.

- - - Updated - - -

Irrelevant, I already addressed this.

There might truly be a death of this continuity by replacing all of the parts at once.

Then don't replace them all at once.

From what I have read in your posts, you seem to expect that uploading your information into a computer would be sufficient for immortality.

Then you haven't properly read them, have you?

What I've said is that it's better than nothing.

But when your information is finally used to construct a new body, how will it be any different than an identical clone?

I've already explained that it doesn't matter if it's no different.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

"Immortality is impossible; it is too dangerous."

I dissagree. Immortality is impossible because of the inevitable Big Crash. Immortality is undesirable because the universe is too dangerous. Furthermore immortality is undesirable because immortality sounds realy boring.

How is it boring? If you're immortal, you always know that no matter how good things get, there's always going to be a part of your life ahead of you that's going to be even better. Sure, the opposite is true as well and no matter how many eons of mind-numbing boredom you spend, it's nothing compared to the boredom you're certain to face in the future, but being immortal isn't an excuse to be a glass-half-empty person instead of a glass-half-full one.

 

[dystopian]

How is it boring? If you're immortal, you always know that no matter how good things get, there's always going to be a part of your life ahead of you that's going to be even better. Sure, the opposite is true as well and no matter how many eons of mind-numbing boredom you spend, it's nothing compared to the boredom you're certain to face in the future, but being immortal isn't an excuse to be a glass-half-empty person instead of a glass-half-full one.

I think this argument stems from people looking at some old people who've 'grown tired of the world', and think that that would be magnified when you're immortal. What they fail to realize is that old people don't actually grow tired of the world because of their experiences, but because their body disintegrates to the point where just getting up to pee becomes an athletic activity. When you're in old body with a brain that's no longer as nimble as that of a young person; of course you might get 'tired' of life. I really doubt, however, that if those same 80 year olds were in the body of a 20 year old, that they'd be tired of life the same way.

When you're immortal, there's always something new to experience.