• Welcome to the Internet Infidels Discussion Board.

What is free will?

It's not hard: Actions that are determined are not - by definition -
Argumentum Ad Dictum.

directed by an act of will
See, that's the thing. Do you not think a processor can be directed by a set of instructions?

And so do you not think a human can be directed by a set of instructions?

Do you think these instructions cannot contain "while(!result && cancellation_token != cancelled){try{Result = do(stuff);}catch(failure){if (unrecoverable(failure)){throw(failure);}}} return result;"?

The question is whether this ••• is °°° with regards to the result: does result ever measure as nonzero, or does it throw/cancel before that happens?

This has a simple true/false answer that is observable.

°°° and ••• are in some manners passive things. They donlt take active roles and I don't know what insanity or madness some folks have that goads them into thinking it must be that way.

Will is the script the actor reads. Freedom is whether they read it or get hooked off the stage because their act sucks.

Neither of these things "plays a role", one is the role that is played, and the other is whether others allowed them to play it. They are qualities not operations.


It's not hard to grasp:

Antecedent conditions determine current states.

Determined actions are, by definition, not freely chosen actions.

The decision-making process within neural networks is determined by the state and condition of the system in any given instance in time.

State and condition is not free chosen.

Will is not a regulator or conductor within the system and plays no part in what decision is made in any given instance in time, hence will cannot be defined as being free.

Free will within a determined system is an illusion

Goodby Compatibilism, a failed argument based on careful wording designed to make free will appear compatible with determinism.
 
The answer is: will plays no role in determining actions....
My question was not about the role of 'will', it was about language use.

Language, word usage, common references (explained numerous times), does not prove the proposition.

You've got tunnel vision.

Nope, the discussion here is related to the question of free will within a determined system. Which is precisely what I deal with.


You see everything I post as an attempt to "prove the proposition". This is despite my consistent denials that I'm attempting to prove anything.

I don't care about you. You are prone to asking simplistic questions that that have been addressed a thousand times. You don't seem to understand the issue, the argument or the answers.

Nor is it something I made up. It is the incompatibilist argument, which I have quoted, cited and explained in my own words....to no evail. It's still not understood.
My interest here is philosophy. In particular I'm interested in examining how people arrive at their opinions (especially if those opinions run counter to mine).

Incompatibilism is not new. There is abundant information readily available, arguments and explanations are given, authors cited, cognition, brain research, etc, referred to.....this in not new. This isn't groundhog day.
The problem here is that you're ultra-defensive. You see everything that's not complete agreement with you as an attack on your passionately held views. This makes any kind of serious engagement with you impossible - whatever I post you invariably respond with an uncompromisingly belligerent anti-free will rant.

Defensive? No, that is your defensive interpretation. Irritated by some who ignore information, explanations as if they were not given or comprehended, and simply ask the same questions over and over, yes, it is irritating.
 
It is the incompatibilist argument, which I have quoted, cited and explained in my own words....to no evail. It's still not understood.
You complain that you're misunderstood but refuse to respond to any enquiry into your reasoning with anything other than a restatement of your beliefs.

Philosophy fora ought to be places where beliefs are examined and discussed - not simply platforms for broadcasting opinions.
 
Antecedent conditions determine current states

"let ••• be 'a set of configurations which through causal necessity determines some future aspect of systemic behavioral moment'"
A ••• is a precedent of a future state.

So, nothing in conflict there.
Determined actions are, by definition, not freely chosen actions.
And then there's the Argumentum Ad Dictum again. I didn't talk about "freely" since you have a mental block there.

I talked about °°°:
let °°° be 'when causal necessity determines that an object shall pass through a given configuration or one of a set of given configurations'"
A °°° action by this usage is a determined action. Nowhere does it imply anyone or anything need do anything different for something to be °°°.

It is asking, "will that kicked football traverse between the goal posts?" Or, "is that football's moment force going to carry it through that space" or, "is that ball °°° with respect to going through the goal?"

All these make sense. None of it takes even an iota's step towards silly motions of libertarian free will.

As you can see whether it is °°° does not determine whether it goes through the goal; rather whether it may go through the goal determines whether it is °°°.
 
It is the incompatibilist argument, which I have quoted, cited and explained in my own words....to no evail. It's still not understood.
You complain that you're misunderstood but refuse to respond to any enquiry into your reasoning with anything other than a restatement of your beliefs.

I didn't say that I was being misunderstood. I was referring to the incompatibilst argument. Incompatibilism doesn't belong to me. It's not something I invented.

You see, you even misrepresent that simple distinction. It's amazing, astonishing.

Philosophy fora ought to be places where beliefs are examined and discussed - not simply platforms for broadcasting opinions.

They have been discussed. Countless explanations have been given, quotes, citations, neuroscience, experiments, case studies, definitions of will and determinism......for what, a period of ten years or more. You must not have been paying attention. It's like Groundhog day.

Once more: determined events are fixed by antecedents: the current state of the system and inputs. Determined actions are therefore not freely chosen actions. Will is determined by antecedents, inputs acting upon the current state of the system. Will is not the agency of decision making or action. Will cannot be defined as being free, it is simply 'will.' Actions, being determined progress without impediment as determined: actions are freely performed as determined. Actions are not freely willed actions. Hence to claim uncoerced or unforced actions as examples of free will is false.
 
Antecedent conditions determine current states

"let ••• be 'a set of configurations which through causal necessity determines some future aspect of systemic behavioral moment'"
A ••• is a precedent of a future state.

So, nothing in conflict there.
Determined actions are, by definition, not freely chosen actions.
And then there's the Argumentum Ad Dictum again. I didn't talk about "freely" since you have a mental block there.

I talked about °°°:
let °°° be 'when causal necessity determines that an object shall pass through a given configuration or one of a set of given configurations'"
A °°° action by this usage is a determined action. Nowhere does it imply anyone or anything need do anything different for something to be °°°.

It is asking, "will that kicked football traverse between the goal posts?" Or, "is that football's moment force going to carry it through that space" or, "is that ball °°° with respect to going through the goal?"

All these make sense. None of it takes even an iota's step towards silly motions of libertarian free will.

As you can see whether it is °°° does not determine whether it goes through the goal; rather whether it may go through the goal determines whether it is °°°.

Nobody is arguing for Libertarian free will. On top of that, you essentially brush aside the consequences of determinism, that all actions are determined, not willed. Actions not being willed eliminates the claim of free will. There is no case. Based on the given terms and conditions (and an agreed upon definition of determinism), fixed action that are entailed by determinism excludes freedom of will.
 
all actions are determined, not willed
Well, if you want to claim that ••• is not a thing, you throw out determinism entirely.

It's entirely based on determinism.

Events are caused by antecedents. The antecedents that produce any given contribution to the systemic moment are viewable, generally.

Those antecedents are the •••.

We call the ••• the "will". As in this WILL lead to that.

It is ultimately a guess, but a guess built on an available observation of determinism.

The actions of an x86 are rather concretely and observably "willed": it is my job, at times, to read these wills to understand why requirements of software (which are physical configurations of hardware) are failed.

The fact that my job is possible at all proves that ••• do concretely exist.
 
It is the incompatibilist argument, which I have quoted, cited and explained in my own words....to no evail. It's still not understood.
You complain that you're misunderstood but refuse to respond to any enquiry into your reasoning with anything other than a restatement of your beliefs.

I didn't say that I was being misunderstood.

You did, quite literally!

Here's what you said: "I have quoted, cited and explained in my own words....to no evail. It's still not understood."

They have been discussed.......for what, a period of ten years or more. You must not have been paying attention. It's like Groundhog day.

We haven't discussed. I've asked questions which you consistently ignore preferring instead to parrot your standard anti-free will lecture.

Once more:

Ok.

determined events are fixed by antecedents: the current state of the system and inputs. Determined actions are therefore not freely chosen actions.
This is a non sequitur (the second sentence does not logically follow from the first). It's just unargued personal belief.

Will is determined by antecedents, inputs acting upon the current state of the system. Will is not the agency of decision making or action. Will cannot be defined as being free,

Non sequitur (the final sentence does not logically follow from the first two). It's just unargued personal belief.


Hence to claim uncoerced or unforced actions as examples of free will is false.
This conclusion is derived from unargued premises and is worthless.
____________________________________

I don't expect you to address the points I raise but please spare me any more mock exasperation and another anti-free will sermon.
 
all actions are determined, not willed
Well, if you want to claim that ••• is not a thing, you throw out determinism entirely.

It's entirely based on determinism.

Events are caused by antecedents. The antecedents that produce any given contribution to the systemic moment are viewable, generally.

Those antecedents are the •••.

We call the ••• the "will". As in this WILL lead to that.

It is ultimately a guess, but a guess built on an available observation of determinism.

The actions of an x86 are rather concretely and observably "willed": it is my job, at times, to read these wills to understand why requirements of software (which are physical configurations of hardware) are failed.

The fact that my job is possible at all proves that ••• do concretely exist.

You are hand waving. Nothing you said to date addresses the central problem.

The issue here is compatibilism.

Compatibilists claim that free will is compatible with determinism. A definition based on uncoerced or non-forced actions (acting according to one's will) is given.

The definition fails for the given reasons.

Basically: determined actions cannot and are not freely chosen (antecedents), consequently, determined actions are not freely willed actions. Actions not being freely chosen or willed; it is false to make a claim of free will.

That is the nail in the coffin of compatibilism.
 
You are hand waving
No, at this point you are the one doing all the hand waving.

The definitions on "unforced" actions comes entirely down to causal hierarchichy.

Causal Hierarchichy is the bread and butter here and is a graph theoretic demand of any system you call deterministic.

All you have given are unargued assertions and then you claim they are reasons.

°°° here is entirely defined in terms of Determinism.

All you have are unargued assertions.
 
It is the incompatibilist argument, which I have quoted, cited and explained in my own words....to no evail. It's still not understood.
You complain that you're misunderstood but refuse to respond to any enquiry into your reasoning with anything other than a restatement of your beliefs.

I didn't say that I was being misunderstood.

You did, quite literally!

Here's what you said: "I have quoted, cited and explained in my own words....to no evail. It's still not understood."

I clearly referring to the argument, that the whatever was explained in terms of incompatibilism is not being understood.

Did you miss the bit where I said ''I have quoted, cited....?'' Which means all the quotes and citations I have provided, quotes by other incompatibilists, neuroscientists, case studies, experiments, etc, etc. Not to mention that I have said it more than a few times.

Which means it's not just me that you fail to understand. Of course, that is conveniently brushed aside in favour of your interpretation.

You of course know better what I meant than me.


They have been discussed.......for what, a period of ten years or more. You must not have been paying attention. It's like Groundhog day.

We haven't discussed. I've asked questions which you consistently ignore preferring instead to parrot your standard anti-free will lecture.

I didn't mention you. Discussion with you has never been possible.

determined events are fixed by antecedents: the current state of the system and inputs. Determined actions are therefore not freely chosen actions.
This is a non sequitur (the second sentence does not logically follow from the first). It's just unargued personal belief.

Crock. You don't have a clue. Never have and never will, which is why discussion is not an option.

Do you even understand the nature of determinism, what it entails and what the implications are? Judging by your remarks, you don't.

Again:
What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

Are you able to envisage the consequences of ''given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs?''

I guess not.




Will is determined by antecedents, inputs acting upon the current state of the system. Will is not the agency of decision making or action. Will cannot be defined as being free,

Non sequitur (the final sentence does not logically follow from the first two). It's just unargued personal belief.

Crock, it is the very essence of determinism. Something which you clearly do not understand.

Hence to claim uncoerced or unforced actions as examples of free will is false.
This conclusion is derived from unargued premises and is worthless.
____________________________________

I don't expect you to address the points I raise but please spare me any more mock exasperation and another anti-free will sermon.

The points have been addressed.

It is your inability to grasp the nature and implications of determinism that prevents you from understanding incompatibilism regardless of who explains it to you;


Bruce Silverstein, B.A. Philosophy
''Compatibilism is a position that seeks to harmonize Determinism (or Causal Determinism) and Free Will, and posits that they can coexist— typically (i) by watering down the pure form of Free Will to include the illusion of choice that exists prior to the inexorable occurrence of determined activity that is not and cannot be known until after it occurs, or (ii) by watering down Causal Determinism to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence — or by watering down both concepts. Notably, Compatibilism simply stakes out a position respecting the relationship between Determinism and Free Will, and does not take a position as to whether Determinism is true or Free Will exists — or neither. Rather, Compatibilism simply posits that the two concepts can coexist (to the extent that either or both exist).

As explained below, based on my understanding of Determinism and Free Will, I believe that Compatiblism is not supported by sound logic, and results from an emotional resistance to accepting the absence of Free Will. Then, again, if Determinism is true, people who believe in Compatibilism are compelled to have that belief, and are incapable of having any other belief.

As I understand it, Determinism posits that all activity in the universe is both (i) the effect of [all] antecedent activity, and (ii) the only activity that can occur given the antecedent activity. That is what is meant by saying that everything is “determined” — it is the inexorable consequence of activity that preceded it. If Determinism is true, everything that has ever occurred, is occurring, and will occur since the universe came into existence (however that might have occurred) can only occur exactly as it has occurred, is occurring, or will occur, and cannot possibly occur in any different manner. This mandated activity necessarily includes all human action, including all human cognition.

As I understand the notion of Free Will, it posits that a human being, when presented with more than one course of action, has the freedom or agency to choose between or among the alternatives, and that the state of affairs that exists in the universe immediately prior to the putative exercise of that freedom of choice does not eliminate all but one option and compel the selection of only one of the available options.

Based on the foregoing, if Determinism is true, human beings lack the ability to think in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, and thereby lack Free Will. By the same token, if human beings have Free-Will, they are capable of thinking in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, which rules out Determinism. Based on the foregoing, Determinism and Free Will are irreconcilably incompatible unless (i) Determinism is defined to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence, and/or (ii) Free Will is defined to be include the illusion of human cognition that is a part of the path of Determinism. As I see it, however, watering down either or both definitions does justice to neither concept, and is a cowardly approach to dealing forthrightly with the full implications of either concept being true.

I could write many pages describing the varied attempts of by Compatibilists to harmonize the irreconcilable concepts of Determinism and Free Will, but it is unnecessary for me to do so, as there is an excellent discussion of this subject on-line within the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It should suffice to say that none of the various arguments for Compatibilism courageously presented on the Stanford website is satisfying, and all suffer from the same flaw identified above — namely, a stubborn refusal to come to grips with the true and complete nature of the two incompatible concepts.''
 
whatever was explained in terms of incompatibilism is not being understood
Oh, it's being understood. It's being understood so we'll that those who are understanding it understand that it's a mere assertion fallacy.
Discussion with you has never been possible.
Oh there has been plenty of discussion, just not from you or FDI. All we have gotten from you two is assertion fallacies.
Are you able to envisage the consequences of ''given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs?''
Envision? Yes. In fact I frequently leverage this nature of determinism specifically to observe what element of it's behavior, what ••• is not °°° to the requirement "no faults in normal execution".

The real question is why you continually fail to recognize that determinism leads to hierarchies of causality, which can be mapped, discussed, and used to develop better ones that are °°° to their requirements.

These hierarchies are used and understood by people, by me offentimes, to engineer entire and complete •••, observably °°° towards some requirement.

@DBT:
The points have been addressed Vaguely Hand-waved at with assertion fallacies.
It is your inability to grasp the nature and implications of determinism that prevents you from understanding incompatibilism systemic dynamics regardless of who explains it to you;

It is laughably true, given the well understood property of locality, that not every action in the universe is equally caused by every prior event of the universe.

Many prior effects of the universe will not impact us at all for billions of years.

Many prior effects of the universe will impact us meaninglessly: a single additional photon bounces off our skin, unnoticed and contributing nothing to knock is off the course of our •••.

Some of the prior causes were in our control because they came from inside our own heads, which is us, and the thing we exist controlling of.

In the same way that when the robot loses the line it is an observable state of nature as to why: was the line faded? Did the controller hit a bad line of code? Did I just not program logic around it well enough to manage a corner?

I can identify the root cause. The fact that root cause can be identified means unequivocally that the ••• can have it's °°° calculated, and the situation can have the ••• that was °°° exposed.

The purpose of this is to make my robot hold a ••• that will remain °°°. Or to make myself hold a ••• that is °°°.

You really wish these concepts to be incompatible, but they are not.

All I can say is that if someone kills people or hurts children, their next victim should be themselves.
 
Bruce Silverstein, B.A. Philosophy
''Compatibilism is a position that seeks to harmonize Determinism (or Causal Determinism) and Free Will, and posits that they can coexist— typically (i) by watering down the pure form of Free Will to include the illusion of choice that exists prior to the inexorable occurrence of determined activity that is not and cannot be known until after it occurs, or (ii) by watering down Causal Determinism to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence — or by watering down both concepts. Notably, Compatibilism simply stakes out a position respecting the relationship between Determinism and Free Will, and does not take a position as to whether Determinism is true or Free Will exists — or neither. Rather, Compatibilism simply posits that the two concepts can coexist (to the extent that either or both exist).

As explained below, based on my understanding of Determinism and Free Will, I believe that Compatiblism is not supported by sound logic, and results from an emotional resistance to accepting the absence of Free Will. Then, again, if Determinism is true, people who believe in Compatibilism are compelled to have that belief, and are incapable of having any other belief.

As I understand it, Determinism posits that all activity in the universe is both (i) the effect of [all] antecedent activity, and (ii) the only activity that can occur given the antecedent activity. That is what is meant by saying that everything is “determined” — it is the inexorable consequence of activity that preceded it. If Determinism is true, everything that has ever occurred, is occurring, and will occur since the universe came into existence (however that might have occurred) can only occur exactly as it has occurred, is occurring, or will occur, and cannot possibly occur in any different manner. This mandated activity necessarily includes all human action, including all human cognition.

As I understand the notion of Free Will, it posits that a human being, when presented with more than one course of action, has the freedom or agency to choose between or among the alternatives, and that the state of affairs that exists in the universe immediately prior to the putative exercise of that freedom of choice does not eliminate all but one option and compel the selection of only one of the available options.

Based on the foregoing, if Determinism is true, human beings lack the ability to think in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, and thereby lack Free Will. By the same token, if human beings have Free-Will, they are capable of thinking in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, which rules out Determinism. Based on the foregoing, Determinism and Free Will are irreconcilably incompatible unless (i) Determinism is defined to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence, and/or (ii) Free Will is defined to be include the illusion of human cognition that is a part of the path of Determinism. As I see it, however, watering down either or both definitions does justice to neither concept, and is a cowardly approach to dealing forthrightly with the full implications of either concept being true.

I could write many pages describing the varied attempts of by Compatibilists to harmonize the irreconcilable concepts of Determinism and Free Will, but it is unnecessary for me to do so, as there is an excellent discussion of this subject on-line within the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It should suffice to say that none of the various arguments for Compatibilism courageously presented on the Stanford website is satisfying, and all suffer from the same flaw identified above — namely, a stubborn refusal to come to grips with the true and complete nature of the two incompatible concepts.''
This is a new one. Apparently compatibilists are accused of "watering down the pure form of Free Will"!

Silverstein accuses compatibilists of taking a cowardly approach by "watering down the pure form of Free Will".

I suppose this is one approach - in the absence of a reasoned counterargument, accuse your opponents of not being courageous enough to deal with 'real' free will.
 
Bruce Silverstein, B.A. Philosophy
''Compatibilism is a position that seeks to harmonize Determinism (or Causal Determinism) and Free Will, and posits that they can coexist— typically (i) by watering down the pure form of Free Will to include the illusion of choice that exists prior to the inexorable occurrence of determined activity that is not and cannot be known until after it occurs, or (ii) by watering down Causal Determinism to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence — or by watering down both concepts. Notably, Compatibilism simply stakes out a position respecting the relationship between Determinism and Free Will, and does not take a position as to whether Determinism is true or Free Will exists — or neither. Rather, Compatibilism simply posits that the two concepts can coexist (to the extent that either or both exist).

As explained below, based on my understanding of Determinism and Free Will, I believe that Compatiblism is not supported by sound logic, and results from an emotional resistance to accepting the absence of Free Will. Then, again, if Determinism is true, people who believe in Compatibilism are compelled to have that belief, and are incapable of having any other belief.

As I understand it, Determinism posits that all activity in the universe is both (i) the effect of [all] antecedent activity, and (ii) the only activity that can occur given the antecedent activity. That is what is meant by saying that everything is “determined” — it is the inexorable consequence of activity that preceded it. If Determinism is true, everything that has ever occurred, is occurring, and will occur since the universe came into existence (however that might have occurred) can only occur exactly as it has occurred, is occurring, or will occur, and cannot possibly occur in any different manner. This mandated activity necessarily includes all human action, including all human cognition.

As I understand the notion of Free Will, it posits that a human being, when presented with more than one course of action, has the freedom or agency to choose between or among the alternatives, and that the state of affairs that exists in the universe immediately prior to the putative exercise of that freedom of choice does not eliminate all but one option and compel the selection of only one of the available options.

Based on the foregoing, if Determinism is true, human beings lack the ability to think in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, and thereby lack Free Will. By the same token, if human beings have Free-Will, they are capable of thinking in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, which rules out Determinism. Based on the foregoing, Determinism and Free Will are irreconcilably incompatible unless (i) Determinism is defined to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence, and/or (ii) Free Will is defined to be include the illusion of human cognition that is a part of the path of Determinism. As I see it, however, watering down either or both definitions does justice to neither concept, and is a cowardly approach to dealing forthrightly with the full implications of either concept being true.

I could write many pages describing the varied attempts of by Compatibilists to harmonize the irreconcilable concepts of Determinism and Free Will, but it is unnecessary for me to do so, as there is an excellent discussion of this subject on-line within the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It should suffice to say that none of the various arguments for Compatibilism courageously presented on the Stanford website is satisfying, and all suffer from the same flaw identified above — namely, a stubborn refusal to come to grips with the true and complete nature of the two incompatible concepts.''
This is a new one. Apparently compatibilists are accused of "watering down the pure form of Free Will"!

Silverstein accuses compatibilists of taking a cowardly approach by "watering down the pure form of Free Will".

I suppose this is one approach - in the absence of a reasoned counterargument, accuse your opponents of not being courageous enough to deal with 'real' free will.
"You won't accept my no-true-scotsman, so here's an argument from authority that... no-true-scotsman!"
 
whatever was explained in terms of incompatibilism is not being understood
Oh, it's being understood. It's being understood so we'll that those who are understanding it understand that it's a mere assertion fallacy.

Rhetoric in other words, empty words and claims, where incompatibilism is really not being understood because you prefer to believe in free will. You believe regardless of the fact that determined actions are not - by the given and accepted definition of determinism - freely chosen actions.

Not being freely chosen, determined actions are not freely willed actions.

That alone eliminates any claim to free will being compatible with determinism....a system where all events are fixed by initial conditions and the way things go ever after, ie, fixed by antecedents.

Goodbye compatibilism. There is no case to argue, only assert. Which is what you do.
 
Bruce Silverstein, B.A. Philosophy
''Compatibilism is a position that seeks to harmonize Determinism (or Causal Determinism) and Free Will, and posits that they can coexist— typically (i) by watering down the pure form of Free Will to include the illusion of choice that exists prior to the inexorable occurrence of determined activity that is not and cannot be known until after it occurs, or (ii) by watering down Causal Determinism to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence — or by watering down both concepts. Notably, Compatibilism simply stakes out a position respecting the relationship between Determinism and Free Will, and does not take a position as to whether Determinism is true or Free Will exists — or neither. Rather, Compatibilism simply posits that the two concepts can coexist (to the extent that either or both exist).

As explained below, based on my understanding of Determinism and Free Will, I believe that Compatiblism is not supported by sound logic, and results from an emotional resistance to accepting the absence of Free Will. Then, again, if Determinism is true, people who believe in Compatibilism are compelled to have that belief, and are incapable of having any other belief.

As I understand it, Determinism posits that all activity in the universe is both (i) the effect of [all] antecedent activity, and (ii) the only activity that can occur given the antecedent activity. That is what is meant by saying that everything is “determined” — it is the inexorable consequence of activity that preceded it. If Determinism is true, everything that has ever occurred, is occurring, and will occur since the universe came into existence (however that might have occurred) can only occur exactly as it has occurred, is occurring, or will occur, and cannot possibly occur in any different manner. This mandated activity necessarily includes all human action, including all human cognition.

As I understand the notion of Free Will, it posits that a human being, when presented with more than one course of action, has the freedom or agency to choose between or among the alternatives, and that the state of affairs that exists in the universe immediately prior to the putative exercise of that freedom of choice does not eliminate all but one option and compel the selection of only one of the available options.

Based on the foregoing, if Determinism is true, human beings lack the ability to think in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, and thereby lack Free Will. By the same token, if human beings have Free-Will, they are capable of thinking in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, which rules out Determinism. Based on the foregoing, Determinism and Free Will are irreconcilably incompatible unless (i) Determinism is defined to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence, and/or (ii) Free Will is defined to be include the illusion of human cognition that is a part of the path of Determinism. As I see it, however, watering down either or both definitions does justice to neither concept, and is a cowardly approach to dealing forthrightly with the full implications of either concept being true.

I could write many pages describing the varied attempts of by Compatibilists to harmonize the irreconcilable concepts of Determinism and Free Will, but it is unnecessary for me to do so, as there is an excellent discussion of this subject on-line within the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It should suffice to say that none of the various arguments for Compatibilism courageously presented on the Stanford website is satisfying, and all suffer from the same flaw identified above — namely, a stubborn refusal to come to grips with the true and complete nature of the two incompatible concepts.''
This is a new one. Apparently compatibilists are accused of "watering down the pure form of Free Will"!

It's not new. Compatibilism is based on careful wording designed to give the impression of the compatibility of the incompatible.

''Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent.[1] It may, however, be more accurate to say that compatibilists define 'free will' in a way that allows it to co-exist with determinism.'' - wiki.



Silverstein accuses compatibilists of taking a cowardly approach by "watering down the pure form of Free Will".

I suppose this is one approach - in the absence of a reasoned counterargument, accuse your opponents of not being courageous enough to deal with 'real' free will.

Reasoned counterarguments have been given in abundance. The nature of determinism. The role of will, the nature of decision making. the absence of alternate actions within a determined system, outcomes fixed by antecedents, by definition not freely chosen or willed, case studies in neuroscience, experiments, etc, etc, reasoned arguments provided over and over.....yet here we are with you claiming 'the absence of reasoned counterarguments' in the face of all evidence to the contrary.

It can't get sillier than that.
 
you prefer to believe in free will
It's nothing about preference of belief. I've explained repeatedly, shown for a fact, that ••• is an identifiable thing within deterministic systems, as is the truth of °°° as pertains to that •••.

You fail to speak to ••• and °°° so you fail to do anything but level assertion fallacies about °°° and ••• regardless of how they are used or defined.

You reject the usefulness and meaningfulness of °°° and •••.

I repeat, anyone who is a serial killer or who harms children has a responsibility to kill themselves.
 
Reasoned counterarguments have been given in abundance.
If you're so confident that you've given adequate counterarguments, why do you feel the need to bolster those arguments by accusing compatibilists of cowardice?

You and Silverstein come across as being outraged by compatibilists who in your view are attempting to "water down" the sacred "pure form of Free Will".

As I've said before, you come across as a zealot when you defend "pure" Free Will.
 
Reasoned counterarguments have been given in abundance.
If you're so confident that you've given adequate counterarguments, why do you feel the need to bolster those arguments by accusing compatibilists of cowardice?

You and Silverstein come across as being outraged by compatibilists who in your view are attempting to "water down" the sacred "pure form of Free Will".

As I've said before, you come across as a zealot when you defend "pure" Free Will.
I readily agree because I am one and I'm correct in being so. Determinism has no more that a single input per output. Unless you can show were compatibilism can get to will though a chain of causes and effects you have no argument. Yes there are lots of causes and effects within a human being every instant, but every cause generates a single effect.

You need another mechanism to get choice and you can't get that until you look in ward and try to rationalize how thus became so. That inward looking give you permission to generalize based on your view of the effective result. Results don't determine causes. To take that route you are being lazy. So you need to break your thinking down more so that causes result in effects. One can't organize micro causalities to be effect (outcome) dependent.

Still accept that many organisms appear to have choice and will. I accept that view because I'm not taking the time to properly analyze causes. I'm probably doing so because I don't understand actual causes to the level necessary to resolve them. Still we operate on illusions in many ways as Daniel Wegner, and others have indicated. So why not illusory choice, will as well. After all we don't really sense reality. We sense reality as what our senses tell us about it conditioned by what our organization and design permit. Since that is a social being, reality must be something quite different form what we perceive.

I plan to soldier on to ever greater understanding of what is reality because from what we've discovered we've made much hay.
 
Yes there are lots of causes and effects within a human being every instant, but every cause generates a single effect.
Yes. That's determinism.

Compatibilists don't dispute this.

It's quite pointless arguing against Incompatibilist free will with compatibilists. We agree with you.

The only thing we disagree about is the use of the words 'choice', 'free' and 'freedom'. You want these words expunged from the English language whereas compatibilists think that's silly.
 
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