What is free will?

[DBT]

... I am pointing out the nature and implications of determinism according to an agreed upon definition; that events are not willed, but fixed by antecedents.

If you attempt to ignore or cherry-pick your antecedent events you falsify determinism. I've laid it out correctly for you so that you can see what is actually happening.

Nope. It is compatibilism that cherry picks terms and conditions, carefully selecting its premises in order to make free will appear compatible with determinism (explained in numerous posts).... and sometimes carelessly drifts into Libertarian territory (examples given).

It is I who is adhering to the given and agreed upon definition of determinism: no deviation from what is determined, no alternate actions possible, no choosing to do otherwise under the same circumstances. Every action in every moment in time being fixed (not chosen) by antecedents.

That is the nature of determinism. No free will to be found.

Actions being fixed by antecedents, proceed or unfold as determined....not freely willed.

Actions not being freely willed within a determined system, the idea of free will is incompatible with determinism.

Consequently, free will is not compatible with determinism, a system where all actions are not willed, but fixed by antecedents (which more than mere 'reliable causation').

 

[Jarhyn]

It is completely logical

A complete logical fallacy. Argumentum Ad Dictum.

I repeat:

And more to the point, regardless of whether you accept my definition of "free" as a definition specifically for that utterance, the thing I am defining, let's call it °°°, is still a real property regardless of what you wish to name it!

So let's actually operate with it:

"let °°° be 'when causal necessity determines that an object shall pass through a given configuration or one of a set of given configurations'"

And let's define another word:
"let ••• be 'a set of configurations which through causal necessity determines some future aspect of systemic behavioral moment'"

So, now we have "••• that may be assessed as °°°". It is a very real, identified set of things entirely in terms of causal necessity. Namely, the dwarf has a •••, "attempt to open door". The ••• is not °°° with respect to "opening": the door is locked.

These terms are in fact necessary to discuss causal determinism in any meaningful way.

It just happens that the utterances compatibilists attach to these terms are "free" and "will".

If you would like to offer different utterances for °°° and ••• you can go right on ahead.

And then we'll use those utterances to derive responsibility for things, use them exactly the same way we used the terms "free" and "will", and then that allows a responsibility calculus that has such statements as

"(Person)'s ••• unto murder cannot be allowed to be left [apparently] °°°. We must take measures to definiticely constrain their ••• such that it is observably not °°° and to address the fact that they hold ••• to murder folks."

Of course, until reality resolves, we have to operate on the basis of provisional or apparent rather than real °°°.

Compatibilists use the utterances "free" and "will" for °°° and •••.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

...

And we've just gotten repetitive at this point. I've said all that I needed to say. Perhaps we'll go through this exercise again some time. Then again, perhaps we won't.

 

[The AntiChris]

Are you agreeing that nothing in a determined system can be free (making all uses of the words 'free' and 'freedom' mistaken)?

Or are you saying that 'will' is a special case (i.e. 'will' is the only thing that cannot be free in a determined system) and that all other uses of 'free' and 'freedom' are acceptable (i.e. uses of 'free' and 'freedom' which refer to anything other than 'will')?

I am pointing out that nothing within a determined system has alternatives. If you feel that freedom of will has no alternatives, that a fixed action is an example of free will, so be it. Enjoy the illusion.

Are you aware that you're not answering my questions?

I don't think you're being deliberately evasive, you just seem totally incapable of seeing anything I post as anything other than an argument for the existence of free will to which you respond with your usual anti-free will spiel.

Read what I said again and you will find that I'm not making an argument for free will - I'm just trying to understand the reasoning you apply in justification of some of your claims.

 

[DBT]

It is completely logical

A complete logical fallacy. Argumentum Ad Dictum.

I repeat:

And more to the point, regardless of whether you accept my definition of "free" as a definition specifically for that utterance, the thing I am defining, let's call it °°°, is still a real property regardless of what you wish to name it!

So let's actually operate with it:

"let °°° be 'when causal necessity determines that an object shall pass through a given configuration or one of a set of given configurations'"

And let's define another word:
"let ••• be 'a set of configurations which through causal necessity determines some future aspect of systemic behavioral moment'"

So, now we have "••• that may be assessed as °°°". It is a very real, identified set of things entirely in terms of causal necessity. Namely, the dwarf has a •••, "attempt to open door". The ••• is not °°° with respect to "opening": the door is locked.

These terms are in fact necessary to discuss causal determinism in any meaningful way.

It just happens that the utterances compatibilists attach to these terms are "free" and "will".

If you would like to offer different utterances for °°° and ••• you can go right on ahead.

And then we'll use those utterances to derive responsibility for things, use them exactly the same way we used the terms "free" and "will", and then that allows a responsibility calculus that has such statements as

"(Person)'s ••• unto murder cannot be allowed to be left [apparently] °°°. We must take measures to definiticely constrain their ••• such that it is observably not °°° and to address the fact that they hold ••• to murder folks."

Of course, until reality resolves, we have to operate on the basis of provisional or apparent rather than real °°°.

Compatibilists use the utterances "free" and "will" for °°° and •••.

Repeating doesn't alter a flawed belief in free will within a determined system.

It's not hard to grasp why compatibilism is flawed: basically, what is caused is not freely willed or chosen.

It is causality, not free will, that determines outcomes. Causes are not chosen, information acts upon the system determining outcomes.

Wail and cry if it makes you feel better, cling to your faith for comfort or whatever, but as it is causality rather than will that determines behaviour, free will is incompatible with determinism.

 

[DBT]

Are you agreeing that nothing in a determined system can be free (making all uses of the words 'free' and 'freedom' mistaken)?

Or are you saying that 'will' is a special case (i.e. 'will' is the only thing that cannot be free in a determined system) and that all other uses of 'free' and 'freedom' are acceptable (i.e. uses of 'free' and 'freedom' which refer to anything other than 'will')?

I am pointing out that nothing within a determined system has alternatives. If you feel that freedom of will has no alternatives, that a fixed action is an example of free will, so be it. Enjoy the illusion.

Are you aware that you're not answering my questions?

I don't think you're being deliberately evasive, you just seem totally incapable of seeing anything I post as anything other than an argument for the existence of free will to which you respond with your usual anti-free will spiel.

Read what I said again and you will find that I'm not making an argument for free will - I'm just trying to understand the reasoning you apply in justification of some of your claims.

I don't think that you understand the answers I give. You asked- ''are you saying that 'will' is a special case (i.e. 'will' is the only thing that cannot be free in a determined system) and that all other uses of 'free' and 'freedom' are acceptable (i.e. uses of 'free' and 'freedom' which refer to anything other than 'will')?'' - even though I have explained the cognitive role of will time and time again, that will is not the driver of behaviour, that will cannot change outcomes, that will does not regulate decision making, plus of course the nature of action within a determined system.

This has been explained over and over, ad nauseum, yet you still ask the same stupid questions as if nothing has been explained over a period of six months on this occasion and years on other occasions.

You act as if each day has no antecedents. That each time you ask a question that has been addressed countless times, you ask for the first time, apparently having no recall of anything that has been said before.

Groundhog day? Memory loss? It's puzzling.

 

[DBT]

...

And we've just gotten repetitive at this point. I've said all that I needed to say. Perhaps we'll go through this exercise again some time. Then again, perhaps we won't.

We can both agree on that. Cheers.

 

[Jarhyn]

It is completely logical

A complete logical fallacy. Argumentum Ad Dictum.

I repeat:

And more to the point, regardless of whether you accept my definition of "free" as a definition specifically for that utterance, the thing I am defining, let's call it °°°, is still a real property regardless of what you wish to name it!

So let's actually operate with it:

"let °°° be 'when causal necessity determines that an object shall pass through a given configuration or one of a set of given configurations'"

And let's define another word:
"let ••• be 'a set of configurations which through causal necessity determines some future aspect of systemic behavioral moment'"

So, now we have "••• that may be assessed as °°°". It is a very real, identified set of things entirely in terms of causal necessity. Namely, the dwarf has a •••, "attempt to open door". The ••• is not °°° with respect to "opening": the door is locked.

These terms are in fact necessary to discuss causal determinism in any meaningful way.

It just happens that the utterances compatibilists attach to these terms are "free" and "will".

If you would like to offer different utterances for °°° and ••• you can go right on ahead.

And then we'll use those utterances to derive responsibility for things, use them exactly the same way we used the terms "free" and "will", and then that allows a responsibility calculus that has such statements as

"(Person)'s ••• unto murder cannot be allowed to be left [apparently] °°°. We must take measures to definiticely constrain their ••• such that it is observably not °°° and to address the fact that they hold ••• to murder folks."

Of course, until reality resolves, we have to operate on the basis of provisional or apparent rather than real °°°.

Compatibilists use the utterances "free" and "will" for °°° and •••.

Repeating doesn't alter a flawed belief in free will within a determined system.

It's not hard to grasp why compatibilism is flawed: basically, what is caused is not freely willed or chosen.

It is causality, not free will, that determines outcomes. Causes are not chosen, information acts upon the system determining outcomes.

Wail and cry if it makes you feel better, cling to your faith for comfort or whatever, but as it is causality rather than will that determines behaviour, free will is incompatible with determinism.

Repeating doesn't alter that fact that you havent answered anything I said, just as you have not with anti-chris.

Maybe you can try using the terms °°° and ••• if it offends you so much to use the terms "Free" and "will" in this way.

"let °°° be 'when causal necessity determines that an object shall pass through a given configuration or one of a set of given configurations'"

"let ••• be 'a set of configurations which through causal necessity determines some future aspect of systemic behavioral moment'"

If you can point out the flaws in these definitions as relates causal necessity I would love to see it.

At this point I feel like your entire objection is what might shake out from doing the math and having to come to terms with the fact that someone did a bad thing, that they choose to do that bad thing, and that this is an inappropriate way to cope with that .

 

[The AntiChris]

I don't think that you understand the answers I give.

I understand the words you write, they just don't seem to bear any relationship to the questions I ask.

You asked- ''are you saying that 'will' is a special case (i.e. 'will' is the only thing that cannot be free in a determined system) and that all other uses of 'free' and 'freedom' are acceptable (i.e. uses of 'free' and 'freedom' which refer to anything other than 'will')?'' - even though I have explained the cognitive role of will time and time again, that will is not the driver of behaviour, that will cannot change outcomes, that will does not regulate decision making, plus of course the nature of action within a determined system.

I still have no idea if this was a 'yes' or 'no'. (can anyone else reading this thread enlighten me?)

 

[Jarhyn]

I don't think that you understand the answers I give.

I understand the words you write, they just don't seem to bear any relationship to the questions I ask.

You asked- ''are you saying that 'will' is a special case (i.e. 'will' is the only thing that cannot be free in a determined system) and that all other uses of 'free' and 'freedom' are acceptable (i.e. uses of 'free' and 'freedom' which refer to anything other than 'will')?'' - even though I have explained the cognitive role of will time and time again, that will is not the driver of behaviour, that will cannot change outcomes, that will does not regulate decision making, plus of course the nature of action within a determined system.

I still have no idea if this was a 'yes' or 'no'. (can anyone else reading this thread enlighten me?)

I would like to see him explain exactly how and why he thinks "the instructions that rest at the program counter and in the text section of the program do not drive the behavior of the processor".

This set of instructions is a material, concrete will.

 

[DBT]

It is completely logical

A complete logical fallacy. Argumentum Ad Dictum.

I repeat:

And more to the point, regardless of whether you accept my definition of "free" as a definition specifically for that utterance, the thing I am defining, let's call it °°°, is still a real property regardless of what you wish to name it!

So let's actually operate with it:

"let °°° be 'when causal necessity determines that an object shall pass through a given configuration or one of a set of given configurations'"

And let's define another word:
"let ••• be 'a set of configurations which through causal necessity determines some future aspect of systemic behavioral moment'"

So, now we have "••• that may be assessed as °°°". It is a very real, identified set of things entirely in terms of causal necessity. Namely, the dwarf has a •••, "attempt to open door". The ••• is not °°° with respect to "opening": the door is locked.

These terms are in fact necessary to discuss causal determinism in any meaningful way.

It just happens that the utterances compatibilists attach to these terms are "free" and "will".

If you would like to offer different utterances for °°° and ••• you can go right on ahead.

And then we'll use those utterances to derive responsibility for things, use them exactly the same way we used the terms "free" and "will", and then that allows a responsibility calculus that has such statements as

"(Person)'s ••• unto murder cannot be allowed to be left [apparently] °°°. We must take measures to definiticely constrain their ••• such that it is observably not °°° and to address the fact that they hold ••• to murder folks."

Of course, until reality resolves, we have to operate on the basis of provisional or apparent rather than real °°°.

Compatibilists use the utterances "free" and "will" for °°° and •••.

Repeating doesn't alter a flawed belief in free will within a determined system.

It's not hard to grasp why compatibilism is flawed: basically, what is caused is not freely willed or chosen.

It is causality, not free will, that determines outcomes. Causes are not chosen, information acts upon the system determining outcomes.

Wail and cry if it makes you feel better, cling to your faith for comfort or whatever, but as it is causality rather than will that determines behaviour, free will is incompatible with determinism.

Repeating doesn't alter that fact that you havent answered anything I said, just as you have not with anti-chris.

Maybe you can try using the terms °°° and ••• if it offends you so much to use the terms "Free" and "will" in this way.

"let °°° be 'when causal necessity determines that an object shall pass through a given configuration or one of a set of given configurations'"

"let ••• be 'a set of configurations which through causal necessity determines some future aspect of systemic behavioral moment'"

If you can point out the flaws in these definitions as relates causal necessity I would love to see it.

At this point I feel like your entire objection is what might shake out from doing the math and having to come to terms with the fact that someone did a bad thing, that they choose to do that bad thing, and that this is an inappropriate way to cope with that .

I realize that repeating doesn't help.....yet you, yourself keep repeating regardless of anything and everything that is explained to you. Which compels me to point out your fallacies over and over in the vain hope that something gets through, which of course it cannot.

Call it an exercise in futility.

I get that you imagine that you are making a point. You are not.

The issue of freedom of will within a determined system isn't difficult to grasp.

Once again, no hope of getting though but: determined actions are not freely chosen actions.

Antecedents fix outcomes.

Will plays no part in choosing option. Will itself is determined by antecedents.

Because will plays no part in outcomes or choices, it is false to claim that will is free.

Free will does not exist within a determined system.

Wail and gnash your teeth, but there it is, undeniable.

 

[Jarhyn]

It is completely logical

A complete logical fallacy. Argumentum Ad Dictum.

I repeat:

And more to the point, regardless of whether you accept my definition of "free" as a definition specifically for that utterance, the thing I am defining, let's call it °°°, is still a real property regardless of what you wish to name it!

So let's actually operate with it:

"let °°° be 'when causal necessity determines that an object shall pass through a given configuration or one of a set of given configurations'"

And let's define another word:
"let ••• be 'a set of configurations which through causal necessity determines some future aspect of systemic behavioral moment'"

So, now we have "••• that may be assessed as °°°". It is a very real, identified set of things entirely in terms of causal necessity. Namely, the dwarf has a •••, "attempt to open door". The ••• is not °°° with respect to "opening": the door is locked.

These terms are in fact necessary to discuss causal determinism in any meaningful way.

It just happens that the utterances compatibilists attach to these terms are "free" and "will".

If you would like to offer different utterances for °°° and ••• you can go right on ahead.

And then we'll use those utterances to derive responsibility for things, use them exactly the same way we used the terms "free" and "will", and then that allows a responsibility calculus that has such statements as

"(Person)'s ••• unto murder cannot be allowed to be left [apparently] °°°. We must take measures to definiticely constrain their ••• such that it is observably not °°° and to address the fact that they hold ••• to murder folks."

Of course, until reality resolves, we have to operate on the basis of provisional or apparent rather than real °°°.

Compatibilists use the utterances "free" and "will" for °°° and •••.

Repeating doesn't alter a flawed belief in free will within a determined system.

It's not hard to grasp why compatibilism is flawed: basically, what is caused is not freely willed or chosen.

It is causality, not free will, that determines outcomes. Causes are not chosen, information acts upon the system determining outcomes.

Wail and cry if it makes you feel better, cling to your faith for comfort or whatever, but as it is causality rather than will that determines behaviour, free will is incompatible with determinism.

Repeating doesn't alter that fact that you havent answered anything I said, just as you have not with anti-chris.

Maybe you can try using the terms °°° and ••• if it offends you so much to use the terms "Free" and "will" in this way.

"let °°° be 'when causal necessity determines that an object shall pass through a given configuration or one of a set of given configurations'"

"let ••• be 'a set of configurations which through causal necessity determines some future aspect of systemic behavioral moment'"

If you can point out the flaws in these definitions as relates causal necessity I would love to see it.

At this point I feel like your entire objection is what might shake out from doing the math and having to come to terms with the fact that someone did a bad thing, that they choose to do that bad thing, and that this is an inappropriate way to cope with that .

...The issue of freedom of will .

Free will does not exist within a determined system.

I didn't really ask about "free" and "will' because you have some kind of mental block in discussing them. I asked about °°° and •••.

 

[DBT]

I don't think that you understand the answers I give.

I understand the words you write, they just don't seem to bear any relationship to the questions I ask.

That's because you cannot seem to grasp the implications that determinism has in relation to the notion of free will. I don't expect you to understand. I'd be very surprised if you did.

It's not difficult. Actions determined by antecedents, which is determinism, does not allow for freedom of choice (doing this instead of that), where will plays no part.

You asked- ''are you saying that 'will' is a special case (i.e. 'will' is the only thing that cannot be free in a determined system) and that all other uses of 'free' and 'freedom' are acceptable (i.e. uses of 'free' and 'freedom' which refer to anything other than 'will')?'' - even though I have explained the cognitive role of will time and time again, that will is not the driver of behaviour, that will cannot change outcomes, that will does not regulate decision making, plus of course the nature of action within a determined system.

I still have no idea if this was a 'yes' or 'no'. (can anyone else reading this thread enlighten me?)

It's not a yes or no question. The answer is: will plays no role in determining actions, a determined action must proceed as determined, unrestricted, unrestrained, determined actions, freely carried out as determined are not instances of free will. There lies your 'free.'

Is that too complicated?

Put another way:
''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. - Cold Comfort in Compatibilism.

 

[Jarhyn]

I don't think that you understand the answers I give.

I understand the words you write, they just don't seem to bear any relationship to the questions I ask.

That's because you cannot seem to grasp the implications that determinism has in relation to the notion of free will. I don't expect you to understand. I'd be very surprised if you did.

It's not difficult. Actions determined by antecedents, which is determinism, does not allow for freedom of choice (doing this instead of that), where will plays no part.

You asked- ''are you saying that 'will' is a special case (i.e. 'will' is the only thing that cannot be free in a determined system) and that all other uses of 'free' and 'freedom' are acceptable (i.e. uses of 'free' and 'freedom' which refer to anything other than 'will')?'' - even though I have explained the cognitive role of will time and time again, that will is not the driver of behaviour, that will cannot change outcomes, that will does not regulate decision making, plus of course the nature of action within a determined system.

I still have no idea if this was a 'yes' or 'no'. (can anyone else reading this thread enlighten me?)

It's not a yes or no question. The answer is: will plays no role in determining actions, a determined action must proceed as determined, unrestricted, unrestrained, determined actions, freely carried out as determined are not instances of free will. There lies your 'free.'

Is that too complicated?

Put another way:
''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. - Cold Comfort in Compatibilism.

You mistake the idea that just because someone feels a desire to do X that that is all there is.

There are a lot more things in the brain than desire. There are a lot of things I desire for which additional thoughts happen like "yes, I desire the outcome but I will not do "anything" to get it.

The issue here is that the responsibility calculus allows you to identify "Wanting to do X is the desire being felt by Y, and there are no other (apparent) constraints to keep Y front doing what they want so IF we wish to not have X done to us by Y, we need to put some constraints there. Whether we succeed, whether we have °°° in our ••• to add constraints before they complete their execution, is unclear, but we will try."

Of course in the end, the ••• to constrain Y from doing X will be judged on its °°° by "what happens, happens".

First we need to be able, as you say, to make this kind of statement: Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.

Because we as humans generally have time to react to apparently °°° ••• which we might stand to oppose

 

[The AntiChris]

You asked- ''are you saying that 'will' is a special case (i.e. 'will' is the only thing that cannot be free in a determined system) and that all other uses of 'free' and 'freedom' are acceptable (i.e. uses of 'free' and 'freedom' which refer to anything other than 'will')?'' - even though I have explained the cognitive role of will time and time again, that will is not the driver of behaviour, that will cannot change outcomes, that will does not regulate decision making, plus of course the nature of action within a determined system.

I still have no idea if this was a 'yes' or 'no'. (can anyone else reading this thread enlighten me?)

It's not a yes or no question.

It really is.

The answer is: will plays no role in determining actions....

My question was not about the role of 'will', it was about language use.

 

[DBT]

I don't think that you understand the answers I give.

I understand the words you write, they just don't seem to bear any relationship to the questions I ask.

That's because you cannot seem to grasp the implications that determinism has in relation to the notion of free will. I don't expect you to understand. I'd be very surprised if you did.

It's not difficult. Actions determined by antecedents, which is determinism, does not allow for freedom of choice (doing this instead of that), where will plays no part.

You asked- ''are you saying that 'will' is a special case (i.e. 'will' is the only thing that cannot be free in a determined system) and that all other uses of 'free' and 'freedom' are acceptable (i.e. uses of 'free' and 'freedom' which refer to anything other than 'will')?'' - even though I have explained the cognitive role of will time and time again, that will is not the driver of behaviour, that will cannot change outcomes, that will does not regulate decision making, plus of course the nature of action within a determined system.

I still have no idea if this was a 'yes' or 'no'. (can anyone else reading this thread enlighten me?)

It's not a yes or no question. The answer is: will plays no role in determining actions, a determined action must proceed as determined, unrestricted, unrestrained, determined actions, freely carried out as determined are not instances of free will. There lies your 'free.'

Is that too complicated?

Put another way:
''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. - Cold Comfort in Compatibilism.

You mistake the idea that just because someone feels a desire to do X that that is all there is.

Do I?

You say this in spite of all the other things I have described. Should I repeat them again, only to be ignored and told that I am repeating?

It's a silly game you play.

There are a lot more things in the brain than desire. There are a lot of things I desire for which additional thoughts happen like "yes, I desire the outcome but I will not do "anything" to get it.

Wow, gosh, you have forgotten all that I have described, quoted and cited on the matter of cognition? Do I have to repeat it all again?

The issue here is that the responsibility calculus allows you to identify "Wanting to do X is the desire being felt by Y, and there are no other (apparent) constraints to keep Y front doing what they want so IF we wish to not have X done to us by Y, we need to put some constraints there. Whether we succeed, whether we have °°° in our ••• to add constraints before they complete their execution, is unclear, but we will try."

Jesus, Mary and Joseph.....you don't understand determinism at all, not a bit. You gave a definition of it, probably copied, without understanding how it works.

If I sound irate, it's because of the sheer tediousness of having to explain the basics over and over, yet it's still not understood.


It's not hard: Actions that are determined are not - by definition - free chosen. They cannot be altered, modified or directed by an act of will.

Of course in the end, the ••• to constrain Y from doing X will be judged on its °°° by "what happens, happens".

First we need to be able, as you say, to make this kind of statement: Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.

Because we as humans generally have time to react to apparently °°° ••• which we might stand to oppose

Holy Mackerel.

 

[DBT]

You asked- ''are you saying that 'will' is a special case (i.e. 'will' is the only thing that cannot be free in a determined system) and that all other uses of 'free' and 'freedom' are acceptable (i.e. uses of 'free' and 'freedom' which refer to anything other than 'will')?'' - even though I have explained the cognitive role of will time and time again, that will is not the driver of behaviour, that will cannot change outcomes, that will does not regulate decision making, plus of course the nature of action within a determined system.

I still have no idea if this was a 'yes' or 'no'. (can anyone else reading this thread enlighten me?)

It's not a yes or no question.

It really is.

According to you. The issue is a bit more involved than a yes or no matter. You are not in a position to set the rules.

The answer is: will plays no role in determining actions....

My question was not about the role of 'will', it was about language use.

Language, word usage, common references (explained numerous times), does not prove the proposition. Carefully worded arguments based on flawed premises do not prove their proposition.

It's called begging the question. People talk about a lot of things that are not true. Word usage, common references and assumptions, is not enough.

If free will is to be shown to exist, will must play an active role, and have a real ability to make a difference in terms of freedom.

 

[Jarhyn]

It's not hard: Actions that are determined are not - by definition -

Argumentum Ad Dictum.

directed by an act of will

See, that's the thing. Do you not think a processor can be directed by a set of instructions?

And so do you not think a human can be directed by a set of instructions?

Do you think these instructions cannot contain "while(!result && cancellation_token != cancelled){try{Result = do(stuff);}catch(failure){if (unrecoverable(failure)){throw(failure);}}} return result;"?

The question is whether this ••• is °°° with regards to the result: does result ever measure as nonzero, or does it throw/cancel before that happens?

This has a simple true/false answer that is observable.

°°° and ••• are in some manners passive things. They donlt take active roles and I don't know what insanity or madness some folks have that goads them into thinking it must be that way.

Will is the script the actor reads. Freedom is whether they read it or get hooked off the stage because their act sucks.

Neither of these things "plays a role", one is the role that is played, and the other is whether others allowed them to play it. They are qualities not operations.

 

[The AntiChris]

The answer is: will plays no role in determining actions....

My question was not about the role of 'will', it was about language use.

Language, word usage, common references (explained numerous times), does not prove the proposition.

You've got tunnel vision.

You see everything I post as an attempt to "prove the proposition". This is despite my consistent denials that I'm attempting to prove anything.

My interest here is philosophy. In particular I'm interested in examining how people arrive at their opinions (especially if those opinions run counter to mine).

The problem here is that you're ultra-defensive. You see everything that's not complete agreement with you as an attack on your passionately held views. This makes any kind of serious engagement with you impossible - whatever I post you invariably respond with an uncompromisingly belligerent anti-free will rant.

 

[Jarhyn]

The answer is: will plays no role in determining actions....

My question was not about the role of 'will', it was about language use.

Language, word usage, common references (explained numerous times), does not prove the proposition.

You've got tunnel vision.

You see everything I post as an attempt to "prove the proposition". This is despite my consistent denials that I'm attempting to prove anything.

My interest here is philosophy. In particular I'm interested in examining how people arrive at their opinions (especially if those opinions run counter to mine).

The problem here is that you're ultra-defensive. You see everything that's not complete agreement with you as an attack on your passionately held views. This makes any kind of serious engagement with you impossible - whatever I post you invariably respond with an uncompromisingly belligerent anti-free will rant.

Which gets back to some core ideas I have about how hard determinism comes to be held in the first place: it is a defense mechanism against some difficult realization of responsibility.

It's an argument that because freedom under their definition cannot exist, that they should be free BY our definition to employ any will. Or, someone should be free.

If they pretend nobody and nothing in the universe decides anything except "god", "first cause", or "the fickle fates", then they can pretend that they, or someone else, didn't decide to do something awful.

As it is, I get major sociopath vibes from that picture DBT keeps posting. It's like the meme version of a successful serial killer's home.

The problem here is that it can be both "causal necessity from 0" AND "me, now, in a given moment". A bunch of first cause resolves to "that portion of the situation" and then a sliver of it resolves to "my own decisions." Then a small sliver of "that" is impacted by the sliver of "my own decisions".

In reality the sum total of freedom we have is very, very small compared to the wanton freedoms of nature.

Even so, compared to any given segment of nature, with regards to some specific event, Wanton and Absurd nature--"the configuration of, just-so" rather than principles of operation--has very little leverage.

The speeding comet has no leverage over whether the salad comes, even if it has great leverage over my will to finish my meal.

And that's ultimately why we have this discussion: so we can identify the levers and fulcrums in a causal system, and move or avoid them as we may, so to effect that they no longer limit us in our journey towards the satisfaction of our goals, except where the calculus of how we hold wills and seek goals directs us towards specially/solipsistically selfish actions.

We want to identify the best, most free path to commonly acceptable goals.

Or at least that's why I have it. Some people design to leave off that whole "don't be an asshole" part.