What is free will?

[DBT]

If will plays no part in regulating decision making, Brain function is not a matter of free will.

"Will" is really very simple. We encounter a problem or issue that requires us to make a decision. The brain considers our options and decides what we will do. The will to do something motivates and directs our actions as we go about doing it.

For example, it was our deliberate will to have dinner at the restaurant. In the course of carrying out that will we encountered the restaurant menu. The menu required us to make a second decision, "What will I have for dinner?". We considered the steak and the salad, and decided the salad would be best.

I don't know in what fashion you imagine that the will must play some role in "regulating the decision making".

The sequence of events is that we were hungry, so we decided to we would have dinner at the restaurant. The will to have a meal at the restaurant motivated and directed our actions as we travelled to the restaurant, walked in the door, sat down, and picked up the menu. That is the role of will. The will to have dinner at the restaurant led to our next decision, "What will I have for dinner?". The decision that I would have the salad motivated and directed my actions as I told the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

That is the role of will. That is how will operates within the deterministic system of the brain. It is the intention to do something specific. It carries us through the behavior required to accomplish the specific intent. And it motivates us to perform each step.

Choosing what we will do is something the brain does, and the brain experiences both the feelings and the thoughts as it deliberates about our choices. If asked why I ordered the salad instead of the steak, I can explain that I had bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch, so the salad was the better choice.

I can explain my choice because I was consciously aware of my thoughts and feelings, which were still sitting there in my memory.

Determined function and determined outcomes do not equate to free will.

Free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Like every other function, it is deterministic, and its outputs will be reliably caused by prior events. The most meaningful and relevant prior cause of a deliberate act is the act of deliberation that precedes it.

Freedom of will - by definition (free and will) means that will is in some way 'free' - that will has freedom -

No. It certainly does not mean that the "will is in some way free" or that the "will has freedom". That's an interesting take on the problem, but it is not what people mean when they use the term "free will".

Free will is literally a freely chosen will. That's why dictionaries define free will as "unforced choice". Things like coercion and undue influence can force a choice upon us that we would not have chosen on our own. Free will is about the freedom to choose for ourselves what we will do.

Freedom is the absence of coercion or necessitation.

Years ago, I used to take my granddaughter to Build-A-Bear, where we would build a stuffed teddy bear. What you're trying to do is build-a-definition from scratch, taking the definition of freedom, rather than the definition of free will, to insure that you include the word "necessitation".

And you're attempting to prove that free will must therefore be free from causal necessity. But, as you should know, there is no such thing as freedom from causal necessity. On the other hand, there is freedom from other forms of necessitation, like legal necessitation that you cannot buy liquor until you're 21. This is a necessitation that you can and eventually will be free of, on your 21st birthday. But there is no such thing as "freedom from causal necessity".

The very essence of determinism is necessitation, that events necessarily unfold as determined, neither subject to will or wish.

Nope. If it is causally necessary that our will is the cause of some event, then the event will be subject to our will, by causal necessity.

Causal necessity doesn't actually change anything.

Consequently, will is not free from necessitation (which is the essence of determinism), therefore cannot be defined as 'free will' - just 'will'

Sorry, but the notion that free will must be free from causal necessity is bogus. There is no such thing as "freedom from causal necessity", because there is no freedom without reliable cause and effect. The very notion of "freedom from causal necessity" is a self-contradicting oxymoron.

Free will is a deterministic event in which a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence.

I am just describing how the brain functions, from inputs to motor action and supporting what I say with information from neuroscience in relation to the agreed upon definition of determinism: which of course does not allow alternate actions.

Neuroscience tells us that the brain makes decisions that control what we do. That is all that is required to affirm that the brain is able to choose, from the many alternate possibilities on the restaurant menu, that we will have that salad, even though we could have had the steak.

Compatibilism asserts that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world. The concise proof is four simple premises that lead to an inevitable conclusion:

P1: A "freely chosen will" ("free will") is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

P2: A world is "deterministic" if every event is reliably caused by prior events.

P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).

P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).

C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Careful wording designed define free will to make freedom of will appear compatible with determinism.

And clearly we've been successful.

''Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent.[1] It may, however, be more accurate to say that compatibilists define 'free will' in a way that allows it to co-exist with determinism.'' - wiki.

Yes. We explicitly reject the definition of free will as "freedom from causal necessity", because there ain't no such freedom. Causal necessity is not a meaningful restraint. What we will inevitably do is exactly identical to us just being us, doing what we do, and choosing what we choose. It is basically "what we would have done anyway". And that is not a meaningful constraint.

I think we've been over this issue enough times.

I'll just reiterate:

The claim that free will is compatible with determinism fails to establish its contention because it does not take inner necessitation into account: that decisions are not freely chosen, they are necessitated by elements beyond the regulative control of the system (antecedents)....consequently, that determined actions are not freely willed, but performed as determined.

A determined action must necessarily proceed as determined, unrestricted and unimpeded. Given that decisions are necessitated/determined and actions necessarily follow (motor action), freedom of action does not equate to freedom of will.

Consequently, the claim that 'it is our brain that is performing decision making and action, therefore free will' is not a reasonable conclusion.

 

[Jarhyn]

Incompatibilism doesn't define anything

Oh you very much do define things. You have been defining free will frequently here, particularly in ways that make no sense.

My only reason to suspect why you do this revolves entirely around the desire to divorce yourself from consideration of responsibility.

Breaking a definition does not get you that, though. It just seems petulant.

I have pointed out repeatedly that your usage of freedom is not coherent and not useful.

If your definition of addition is broken, it does not mean things can't be added, it just means you of the broken definition will not understand math and will fail the class.

You are here in this thread "failing the class".

I have outlined "free". I have outlined "will".

A given moment holds a "will", the current vectors and masses in the system at time 1. The vectors can be deterministically crunched to find out what they will be at a later point in time. You can ask sensible, real questions about this system: "is vector A going to pass through point (x,y)?". This language is the same as "is vector A free to point (x,y)?".

It doesn't need the internal requirements to be a will, but then whether or not the will was free becomes relative to some arbitrary observer value: you have to do an integration on the whole system and then you get a map of the freedoms of the system at any point in time.

I launch a ball in a parabolic arc. The ball WILL fall freely UNTIL acted on by the resistance provided by the ground. That until describes when the ball's trajectory loses freedom (in the shape of simple momentum) due to the oppositional force.

The point here is that there is a valid math to calculate "momentary responsibility".

Now, calculation of momentary responsibility is important. It tells us what particles OF THIS MOMENT that are causally driving future to be what it will become with reference to a given event.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I think we've been over this issue enough times.

Of course. That's the nature of a paradox. If a notion contains a false but believable suggestion, and a person takes a nibble on that worm, they end up hooked. The more they wriggle the deeper the hook. So, it's very difficult to get unhooked.

I was very fortunate to find my way out of the paradox as a teenager in the public library. It's just a matter of pushing through the black hole until you come out on the other side.

Free will happens to be a deterministic event. Surprise!

Determinism turns out to be nothing but good old, reliable, cause and effect. Surprise!

And then you're off the hook, and pretty much back where you started. We are the actual objects making our own actual choices for our own goals and reasons according to our own interests. Causal necessity is neither an object nor a force. It neither causes nor necessitates anything. Determinism is about the reliability of our behavior (and all the other objects and forces in the universe), but determinism has no behavior of its own. Determinism never determines anything.

It's like that Zen tale referenced in the Donovan song:

The lyrics refer to a Buddhist saying originally formulated by Qingyuan Weixin, later translated by D.T. Suzuki in his Essays in Zen Buddhism, one of the first books to popularize Buddhism in Europe and the US. Qingyuan writes

Before I had studied Chan (Zen) for thirty years, I saw mountains as mountains, and rivers as rivers. When I arrived at a more intimate knowledge, I came to the point where I saw that mountains are not mountains, and rivers are not rivers. But now that I have got its very substance I am at rest. For it's just that I see mountains once again as mountains, and rivers once again as rivers.[2]

I'll just reiterate:

Yes. You will. And you will continue to reiterate until you see through the paradox yourself.

The claim that free will is compatible with determinism fails to establish its contention because it does not take inner necessitation into account:

Inner necessitation is just us choosing for ourselves whether to order the steak or the salad for dinner. Surprise!

that decisions are not freely chosen, they are necessitated

All events are always necessitated by prior events. And of all of the prior events, from the Big Bang to the scene in the restaurant, our deliberate choosing turns out to be the most meaningful and relevant prior cause of our choice. It is precisely what it looks like, and is not changed in any way by causal necessity.

by elements beyond the regulative control of the system (antecedents)....consequently, that determined actions are not freely willed, but performed as determined.

Us, choosing for ourselves whether to have the salad or the steak, is precisely how the choice is causally determined. It was always causally necessary that it would be us, and no other object in the physical universe, that would be making that choice.

A determined action must necessarily proceed as determined, unrestricted and unimpeded. Given that decisions are necessitated/determined and actions necessarily follow (motor action), freedom of action does not equate to freedom of will.

It was causally necessary, from any prior point in eternity, that it would be us making the choice for our own reasons, and that we would be free of coercion and undue influence. In other words, it was causally determined that it would be a choice of our own free will.

Consequently, the claim that 'it is our brain that is performing decision making and action, therefore free will' is not a reasonable conclusion.

The counter-claim, that it was not our own brain performing the decision making, but rather all of the prior causes of our brain, is not a reasonable conclusion. It is still actually our own brain, us, doing the choosing for ourselves, according to our own goals, desires, reasons, feelings, etc. And, we were free of coercion and undue influence, therefore it was a choice of our own free will, as "free will" is ordinarily defined, in the non-paradoxical sense.

 

[DBT]

Incompatibilism doesn't define anything

Oh you very much do define things. You have been defining free will frequently here, particularly in ways that make no sense.

Ridiculous. You are scraping the bottom of your empty barrel.

I gave an uncontroversial definition of freedom and the agreed upon definition of determinism.

Just apply the uncontroversial definition of 'freedom' to will, then apply the term 'free will' to a determined system and see if will really is free within a system that allows no alternate action, where nothing other than the determined action can be willed, and even that is determined by antecedents.

I can quote what I said, the given definitions, the nature of determinism and will, etc...but I suspect that you'll trot out your own version, something that bears no resemblance to what I said.

The same pattern over and over, I say one thing and it comes back entirely different. Either poor tactics or poor comprehension.

Either way, a waste of time. Believe whatever floats your boat.

 

[DBT]

I think we've been over this issue enough times.

Of course. That's the nature of a paradox. If a notion contains a false but believable suggestion, and a person takes a nibble on that worm, they end up hooked. The more they wriggle the deeper the hook. So, it's very difficult to get unhooked.

I was very fortunate to find my way out of the paradox as a teenager in the public library. It's just a matter of pushing through the black hole until you come out on the other side.

It's more a contradiction than a paradox.

Free will happens to be a deterministic event. Surprise!

It makes no sense. It's like saying a round square or a flat sphere. If will plays no part in information processing and it is information processing, an interaction of inputs and the state of system that determines an action, with no possible alternative possible......nothing is being freely willed.

Nothing is even being willed, yet alone freely willed.

Yet it is asserted: 'deterministic event in the brain, therefore free will''.....?

It doesn't work, not logically, not physically.

Sorry.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It's more a contradiction than a paradox.

The contradiction is in the notion: "freedom from cause and effect".
P1: Freedom is the ability to do something we want to do.
P2: Doing something always requires causing an effect.
C: Therefore, "freedom from cause and effect" is a self-contradiction.

The question, "How can you be truly free if everything you do is subject to prior causes?", creates the paradox. It plants the false suggestion that we must be free of prior causes in order to be "truly" free.

Instead of our normal notions of freedom, we get hooked on the idea that we are being governed by forces outside ourselves. All freedoms disappear, because being free of cause and effect is a logical and physical impossibility.

The proper unravelling of this puzzle is to acknowledge that we have prior causes, but also that we happen to be the prior causes of future events. Having prior causes does not prevent us from being prior causes. The actual mechanisms by which we cause future events includes us choosing what we will do, and then doing it.

Free will happens to be a deterministic event. Surprise!

It makes no sense. It's like saying a round square or a flat sphere.

It makes perfect sense. We are not outside of reliable causation. We are right in the middle of it. We have the millions of years of Sapolsky's evolution behind us as our prior causes, resulting in an intelligent species that gets to choose what it will do.

Choosing is a deterministic operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice in the form of an "I will X", where X is what we have decided we will do. The output is the reliable product of our own goals and reasons, our own thoughts and feelings. So, the operation is clearly deterministic.

Free will is about this choosing operation, specifically about whether it was free of coercion and undue influence. Coercion and undue influence are simply additional causes, so they do not change the fact that choosing is deterministic. Free will is deterministic because it is about the choosing, and choosing is deterministic.

... Yet it is asserted: 'deterministic event in the brain, therefore free will''.....?

As you should know by now, that is NOT what is being asserted. What is being asserted is this: If we chose for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, then THAT is free will.

 

[Jarhyn]

Incompatibilism doesn't define anything

Yes it does, clearly:

I gave an uncontroversial definition of freedom

Your definition is not "uncontroversial". Which, dare I say, is the entire point of this thread.

In fact your definition of freedom merely flows from a bad understanding of determinism and a misunderstanding of how most people use the terms "freedom" and "will".

Freedom as "the calculation of truth value of whether moment force and so the situational vector pass through a given configuration or set of configurations' may not look very much like "what most people immediately think of when they think freedom" but neither does "equality" when being vigorous:
∀u∀v(∀x(x∈u⇔x∈v)

It doesn't really look much like what most people imagine... At first.

But then we can start to break it down and remove nonsensical cultural loading that religions like hard determinism add.

But then when we dig deeper, we do find that this is what most people are approaching when they say "am I free to go?", For example. They are asking if the current situation of nature is one such that IF they were to go, would they be opposed.

To respond to this question one would need to look inside their head, look at what their will is shaped like, and determine IF it contains "if they leave, stop them".

It is trivially easy to answer: they are not asking about the whole future. They are asking about the truth value behind "is there a configuration that prevents leaving?"

This then goes into the situational model and then the truth of "I can leave" becomes false, in the same way as putting a surface of glass around some water means that the water molecules are constrained from exiting that space.

The glass makes the water unfree to be influenced by gravity. The will of the teacher makes the student unfree to leave. It's just that the student didn't have to try leaving beyond the point of the attempt of asking to do so. It is just as real a constraint as the glass, but much more complicated and subtle.

Really, this question was a determination of constraint.

"Are there constraints upon me leaving this place?" Is the same question as "am I free to go?"

The goal, here the evolutionary pressure is to not waste energy doing things that will fail at satisfaction of requirements.

And more to the point, regardless of whether you accept my definition of "free" as a definition specifically for that utterance, the thing I am defining, let's call it °°°, is still a real property regardless of what you wish to name it!

So let's actually operate with it:

"let °°° be 'when causal necessity determines that an object shall pass through a given configuration or one of a set of given configurations'"

And let's define another word:
"let ••• be 'a set of configurations which through causal necessity determines some future aspect of systemic behavioral moment'"

So, now we have "••• that may be assessed as °°°". It is a very real, identified set of things entirely in terms of causal necessity. Namely, the dwarf has a •••, "attempt to open door". The ••• is not °°° with respect to "opening": the door is locked.

These terms are in fact necessary to discuss causal determinism in any meaningful way.

It just happens that the utterances compatibilists attach to these terms are "free" and "will".

 

[DBT]

Incompatibilism doesn't define anything

Yes it does, clearly:

It's clear that you don't understand incompatibilism, and never you will.

I gave an uncontroversial definition of freedom

Your definition is not "uncontroversial". Which, dare I say, is the entire point of this thread.

In fact your definition of freedom merely flows from a bad understanding of determinism and a misunderstanding of how most people use the terms "freedom" and "will".

Hilarious. First off: it's not my definition of freedom. I didn't cook it up. It's not even contraversial.

You persistently scrape the bottom of your empty barrel and come up with nothing.

Freedom as "the calculation of truth value of whether moment force and so the situational vector pass through a given configuration or set of configurations' may not look very much like "what most people immediately think of when they think freedom" but neither does "equality" when being vigorous:
∀u∀v(∀x(x∈u⇔x∈v)

It doesn't really look much like what most people imagine... At first.

The 'calculation of truth value' says nothing about whether something is true or not. Something is either free or not according to its inherent condition in relation to its environment and circumstances. If a bird is confined to a cage, the bird is not able to fly unrestricted (which does not equate to free will), etc, etc...

But then we can start to break it down and remove nonsensical cultural loading that religions like hard determinism add.

You still haven't grasped that we are all working with precisely the same definition of determinism? That the single point of contention is the notion of free will in relation to precisely the same definition of determinism?

 

[DBT]

It's more a contradiction than a paradox.

The contradiction is in the notion: "freedom from cause and effect".
P1: Freedom is the ability to do something we want to do.
P2: Doing something always requires causing an effect.
C: Therefore, "freedom from cause and effect" is a self-contradiction.

Of course there is no freedom from causality. Which is why the idea of free will is incompatible with determinism.

The word free assumes possible alternatives .. yet within a determined system, will has the freedom to do what? Exactly nothing. Nothing that was not fixed at initial condition and how things go thereafter fixed by natural law.

The question, "How can you be truly free if everything you do is subject to prior causes?", creates the paradox. It plants the false suggestion that we must be free of prior causes in order to be "truly" free.

Instead of our normal notions of freedom, we get hooked on the idea that we are being governed by forces outside ourselves. All freedoms disappear, because being free of cause and effect is a logical and physical impossibility.

The proper unravelling of this puzzle is to acknowledge that we have prior causes, but also that we happen to be the prior causes of future events. Having prior causes does not prevent us from being prior causes. The actual mechanisms by which we cause future events includes us choosing what we will do, and then doing it.

Free will happens to be a deterministic event. Surprise!

Word play. The word 'freedom' doesn't suggest or mean 'fixed and unchangeable.' Yet fixed and unchangeable is the very essence of determinism, therefore the antithesis of freedom.

Hence, 'freedom of will/reliable causality' - because everything that happens is fixed and unchangeable within a determined system - is incompatible with determinism...

 

[Jarhyn]

it's not my definition of freedom

Yes it is. You hold and use this definition. I offered a definition that is clearly different. Therefore one is YOUR definition and one is MY definition. That's how this works.

It's not even contraversial.

Yes it is. It is the entire point of the thread that there is contention here.

To say anything different is to beg the question and then hide behind Ad Populum.

The 'calculation of truth value' says nothing about whether something is true or not

Exactly what kind of 1984 "the truth is not the truth" bullshit is this now?

The calculation of truth value of a system says whether some thing in that system is true or false on the basis of premises.

This is entirely the point behind modal logic.

If A is true and a implies b, b is true.

Now as I've pointed out, there is, in this discussion, two definitions being used, one used so as to "WhY Can'T I HoLd AlL ThEsE LiMeS" as relates a bad faith abandonment of responsibility, and one whose definitions of "free" and "will" make sense and allow useful operations for the calculation on truth of responsibility and on truth of satisfaction of requirements.

 

[The AntiChris]

Of course there is no freedom from causality. Which is why the idea of free will is incompatible with determinism.

The logic you use here inevitably leads to the conclusion that the idea of free anything would be incompatible with determinism. Yet you persistently avoid this unpalatable conclusion.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The word free assumes possible alternatives .. yet within a determined system, will has the freedom to do what? Exactly nothing. Nothing that was not fixed at initial condition and how things go thereafter fixed by natural law.

It's really weird to see you answering your own question without realizing it. Let's see if I can make it a bit more obvious, by stepping out of the abstraction and back into our real life scenario.

It was 5PM, the workday was done, and we decided we would have dinner at Ruby Tuesdays. Where is the "will"? It's right there in the "would". Why did we get in the car and drive to Ruby Tuesdays? Because we decided we would. We set our intent upon having dinner at Ruby Tuesdays, and that intention (that "will to do something specific") motivated and directed our subsequent actions. Our actions were to get in the car and drive to Ruby Tuesdays, then get out of the car and walk into the restaurant, and sit at a table and pick up the menu.

So, that's the "will", doing its job of getting us to the restaurant. You specifically asked, "will has the freedom to do what?". To do that. To get us to Ruby Tuesdays so that we can have dinner there. After dinner, and after paying our bill, that will completes it mission as we leave the restaurant. Having completed its mission, that will exits the scene, and the will to drive home takes over.

And, of course, every step in that process was causally necessary from any prior point in time and proceeded forward without deviation.

Where then does the notion of "freedom" enter the picture? Our intention was not thwarted at any point along the way. There was no pile up on the highway that prevented us from getting to the restaurant. All the stop lights were working properly, with no unexpected delays. We were not carjacked by guys with guns at any of those traffic stops. So, we were free to carry out our will to have dinner at Ruby Tuesdays. Free from what? Free from anything unexpected that might have prevented us from carrying out our will.

But that is NOT the kind of freedom that constitutes "free will". Free will has to do with our CHOOSING, specifically our choosing to have dinner at Ruby Tuesdays, rather than anywhere else. We kicked around several alternate possibilities: Pizza Hut, McDonalds, and Red Lobster. Each had its advantages and disadvantages. Some were closer. Some provided dinner quicker. Some were more expensive. And so forth. Each of us had different preferences, but we all agreed that we could satisfy all our preferences, whether steak, or seafood, or salad, at Ruby Tuesdays.

And what was our CHOOSING free of? It was free of coercion and undue influence. And that meets the common understanding of the notion of "free will", that our choice was one that we made for ourselves, while free of coercion and undue influence.

Every step in our choosing process was, of course, causally necessary, due to antecedent events, from any prior point in time. But free will does not claim to be free of antecedent events. It only claims to be free of coercion and undue influence.

And, as you said, "Nothing that was not fixed at initial condition and how things go thereafter fixed by natural law." This included every event within our choosing operation, which was fully determined by our own goals and reasons (with their prior causes). And no natural laws were ever broken by any of our actions during the choosing process.

Free will does not require being "free from initial conditions" or "free from the laws of nature". Free will ONLY requires being free of coercion and undue influence.

Coercion and undue influence are meaningful impediments to our ability to decide for ourselves what we will do. Just like a pile up on the highway would be a meaningful impediment to our ability to drive to Ruby Tuesdays.

The word 'freedom' doesn't suggest or mean 'fixed and unchangeable.'

Correct. The word 'freedom' specifically means the absence of any meaningful impediments to our ability to do what we want, whether it be driving to Ruby Tuesdays, or choosing for ourselves where to go for dinner.

Yet fixed and unchangeable is the very essence of determinism, therefore the antithesis of freedom.

Apparently not. Determinism is not the antithesis to any freedom other than "freedom from causal necessity". And no one really needs to be free of causal necessity, so it doesn't really make any difference that we are not free of it. What we will inevitably do is exactly identical to what we just did of our own accord.

Determinism doesn't actually change anything at all.

 

[DBT]

it's not my definition of freedom

Yes it is. You hold and use this definition. I offered a definition that is clearly different. Therefore one is YOUR definition and one is MY definition. That's how this works.

It's not even contraversial.

Yes it is. It is the entire point of the thread that there is contention here.

To say anything different is to beg the question and then hide behind Ad Populum.

Crock. I gave both a dictionary definition and a logical description of freedom. What is freedom without alternatives? Determinism doesn't allow alternatives.

You want it both ways.

The 'calculation of truth value' says nothing about whether something is true or not

Exactly what kind of 1984 "the truth is not the truth" bullshit is this now?

The calculation of truth value of a system says whether some thing in that system is true or false on the basis of premises.

This is entirely the point behind modal logic.

If A is true and a implies b, b is true.

Now as I've pointed out, there is, in this discussion, two definitions being used, one used so as to "WhY Can'T I HoLd AlL ThEsE LiMeS" as relates a bad faith abandonment of responsibility, and one whose definitions of "free" and "will" make sense and allow useful operations for the calculation on truth of responsibility and on truth of satisfaction of requirements.

That's too silly for words.

It's not that complicated.

Freedom of will must entail freedom, ie, realizable alternatives.

Determinism allows no realizable alternatives, oonly the action determined by antecedents.

No alternative means no freedom...which means free will is not compatible with determinism, and Compatibilism fails to prove its proposition.

 

[DBT]

Of course there is no freedom from causality. Which is why the idea of free will is incompatible with determinism.

The logic you use here inevitably leads to the conclusion that the idea of free anything would be incompatible with determinism. Yet you persistently avoid this unpalatable conclusion.

I've explained references to 'free' within a determined system time and time again. Once more, determined actions must necessarily proceed or unfold unimpeded, without restriction or force as determined. This freedom of motion, movement or action, being determined by antecedents - which is determinism - is not an example of free will.

 

[DBT]

The word free assumes possible alternatives .. yet within a determined system, will has the freedom to do what? Exactly nothing. Nothing that was not fixed at initial condition and how things go thereafter fixed by natural law.

It's really weird to see you answering your own question without realizing it. Let's see if I can make it a bit more obvious, by stepping out of the abstraction and back into our real life scenario.

From my perspective, I'd say that you are interpreting my comments in a way that was not intended or even implied. You interpret i from the perspective of a compatibilist, while I am pointing out the nature and implications of determinism according to an agreed upon definition; that events are not willed, but fixed by antecedents.

If events are not willed, and being fixed by antecedents....where is free will to be found?

Is it to be found within determined actions as carefully defined by compatibilism? No, that is just action unfolding as determined.

This is the case in your following examples.

It was 5PM, the workday was done, and we decided we would have dinner at Ruby Tuesdays. Where is the "will"? It's right there in the "would". Why did we get in the car and drive to Ruby Tuesdays? Because we decided we would. We set our intent upon having dinner at Ruby Tuesdays, and that intention (that "will to do something specific") motivated and directed our subsequent actions. Our actions were to get in the car and drive to Ruby Tuesdays, then get out of the car and walk into the restaurant, and sit at a table and pick up the menu.

So, that's the "will", doing its job of getting us to the restaurant. You specifically asked, "will has the freedom to do what?". To do that. To get us to Ruby Tuesdays so that we can have dinner there. After dinner, and after paying our bill, that will completes it mission as we leave the restaurant. Having completed its mission, that will exits the scene, and the will to drive home takes over.

And, of course, every step in that process was causally necessary from any prior point in time and proceeded forward without deviation.

Where then does the notion of "freedom" enter the picture? Our intention was not thwarted at any point along the way. There was no pile up on the highway that prevented us from getting to the restaurant. All the stop lights were working properly, with no unexpected delays. We were not carjacked by guys with guns at any of those traffic stops. So, we were free to carry out our will to have dinner at Ruby Tuesdays. Free from what? Free from anything unexpected that might have prevented us from carrying out our will.

Intension not being thwarted has no bearing on determined actions. A determined action, by definition, cannot be thwarted, altered, modified or willed. It is determined. It proceeds as determined.

If you are being forced, coerced or pressured, that too is determined. The agents of force or coercion are determined. Your response to being forced or coerced is just as determined as the agents of coercion. Action proceeding without external force or coercion by others is just as determined.

Determinism, by its very nature, allows no freedom of will.

 

[The AntiChris]

Of course there is no freedom from causality. Which is why the idea of free will is incompatible with determinism.

The logic you use here inevitably leads to the conclusion that the idea of free anything would be incompatible with determinism. Yet you persistently avoid this unpalatable conclusion.

I've explained references to 'free' within a determined system time and time again. Once more, determined actions must necessarily proceed or unfold unimpeded, without restriction or force as determined. This freedom of motion, movement or action, being determined by antecedents - which is determinism - is not an example of free will.

I'm sorry, but once again I just cannot see how what you write is responsive to the point I was making,

Are you agreeing that nothing in a determined system can be free (making all uses of the words 'free' and 'freedom' mistaken)?

Or are you saying that 'will' is a special case (i.e. 'will' is the only thing that cannot be free in a determined system) and that all other uses of 'free' and 'freedom' are acceptable (i.e. uses of 'free' and 'freedom' which refer to anything other than 'will')?

 

[Jarhyn]

I gave both a dictionary definition and a logical description

Argumentum Ad dictum is argumentum Ad Populum.

Nothing about it is logical though. It is a logical contradiction.

What is freedom without alternatives?

Coherent.

Freedom is really about whether some thing is free to it's requirement, regardless of your Argumentum Ad Dictum.

Freedom doesn't need the pieces you think it does to be freedom. It just needs to work as something that explodes to a sensible statement in the normal role people have for it in their sentences.

Freedom isn't about choices. It enables a particular kind of choice function (choice upon preemptive freedom calculation), is necessary to that form of choice, but it doesn't actually have anything to do with choice, it has to do with constraint against requirement.

Freedom of will must entail freedom, ie, realizable alternatives

You saying it more doesn't make it any less false. This is an Argumentum Ad Nauseam.

And more to the point, regardless of whether you accept my definition of "free" as a definition specifically for that utterance, the thing I am defining, let's call it °°°, is still a real property regardless of what you wish to name it!

So let's actually operate with it:

"let °°° be 'when causal necessity determines that an object shall pass through a given configuration or one of a set of given configurations'"

And let's define another word:
"let ••• be 'a set of configurations which through causal necessity determines some future aspect of systemic behavioral moment'"

So, now we have "••• that may be assessed as °°°". It is a very real, identified set of things entirely in terms of causal necessity. Namely, the dwarf has a •••, "attempt to open door". The ••• is not °°° with respect to "opening": the door is locked.

These terms are in fact necessary to discuss causal determinism in any meaningful way.

It just happens that the utterances compatibilists attach to these terms are "free" and "will".

If you would like to offer different utterances for °°° and ••• you can go right on ahead.

And then we'll use those utterances to derive responsibility for things, use them exactly the same way we used the terms "free" and "will", and then that allows a responsibility calculus that has such statements as

"(Person)'s ••• unto murder cannot be allowed to be left [apparently] °°°. We must take measures to definiticely constrain their ••• such that it is observably not °°° and to address the fact that they hold ••• to murder folks."

Of course, until reality resolves, we have to operate on the basis of provisional or apparent rather than real °°°.

Compatibilists use the utterances "free" and "will" for °°° and •••.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... I am pointing out the nature and implications of determinism according to an agreed upon definition; that events are not willed, but fixed by antecedents.

If you attempt to ignore or cherry-pick your antecedent events you falsify determinism. I've laid it out correctly for you so that you can see what is actually happening.

1. Our common experience of hunger at 5PM was the antecedent event that caused us to ask, "WILL we go home for dinner or WILL we go out to a restaurant"?
2. That question was the antecedent event that caused the group discussion leading to the decision, "We WILL go out for dinner."
3. That chosen WILL to go out for dinner was the antecedent cause that led our group to ask ourselves the next question, "Which restaurant WILL we go to for dinner?
4. That question was the antecedent event that caused the group to think about several possible alternatives: Pizza Hut, McDonalds, Red Lobster, and Ruby Tuesdays.
5. And that discussion was the antecedent event that caused us to decide: "We WILL go to Ruby Tuesdays".
6. That chosen WILL to go to Ruby Tuesdays was the antecedent cause of us getting into the car, driving to Ruby Tuesdays, walking into the restaurant, sitting at the table, and picking up the menu.
7. Picking up the menu was the antecedent cause of our considering our alternative possibilities, and each of us choosing what we WILL order for dinner.
8. In each case, our chosen WILL was the antecedent cause of us telling the waitress, "I WILL have X for dinner, please".

And we can continue on from there if you like. But the point is that a chosen WILL is the antecedent cause of subsequent actions.

Our chosen WILL IS A CAUSE and our actions are the reliably determined effects of that cause.

If events are not willed, and being fixed by antecedents...

Willful actions are both willed and fixed by antecedents. The will itself IS one of the antecedent causes of subsequent events.

... that is just action unfolding as determined.

And I've just unfolded the sequence of events correctly.

... A determined action, by definition, cannot be thwarted, altered, modified ...

Correct.

or willed.

Will is an actual cause, and it cannot be dismissed without thwarting, altering, and modifying determinism.

So, stop making claims that falsify determinism.

If you are being forced, coerced or pressured, that too is determined. The agents of force or coercion are determined. Your response to being forced or coerced is just as determined as the agents of coercion. Action proceeding without external force or coercion by others is just as determined.

Of course. Except you keep trying to falsify determinism by ignoring actual causes which should be obvious to everyone by now.

Determinism, by its very nature, allows no freedom of will.

No. The nature of determinism is that all events are reliably caused by prior events. This includes events that are reliably caused by humans reliably deciding what they will do and the actions that reliably follow from that freely chosen and inevitable will.

Determinism disallows nothing except indeterminism. Everything else logically pans out exactly the same as it always has.

 

[DBT]

Of course there is no freedom from causality. Which is why the idea of free will is incompatible with determinism.

The logic you use here inevitably leads to the conclusion that the idea of free anything would be incompatible with determinism. Yet you persistently avoid this unpalatable conclusion.

I've explained references to 'free' within a determined system time and time again. Once more, determined actions must necessarily proceed or unfold unimpeded, without restriction or force as determined. This freedom of motion, movement or action, being determined by antecedents - which is determinism - is not an example of free will.

I'm sorry, but once again I just cannot see how what you write is responsive to the point I was making,

You said -'' inevitably leads to the conclusion that the idea of free anything would be incompatible with determinism'' - and my reply dealt with the nature of any reference to freedom within a determined system in the form of freely performed but determined/fixed actions.

Are you agreeing that nothing in a determined system can be free (making all uses of the words 'free' and 'freedom' mistaken)?

Or are you saying that 'will' is a special case (i.e. 'will' is the only thing that cannot be free in a determined system) and that all other uses of 'free' and 'freedom' are acceptable (i.e. uses of 'free' and 'freedom' which refer to anything other than 'will')?

I am pointing out that nothing within a determined system has alternatives. If you feel that freedom of will has no alternatives, that a fixed action is an example of free will, so be it. Enjoy the illusion.

 

[DBT]

I gave both a dictionary definition and a logical description

Argumentum Ad dictum is argumentum Ad Populum.

Nothing about it is logical though. It is a logical contradiction.

It is completely logical. That you can't or won't accept non controversial terms and references is related to your ideology and faith in the irrational belief in freedom of will within a determined system that allows no alternatives

Fixed is not free. Determinism, by your own definition, does not allow deviation, actions are fixed by antecedents (not chosen)....yet will is free? You can't see how silly that is?