What is free will?

[Jarhyn]

determinism by definition allows no deviation or freedom

Determinism damn well allows °°°.

°°° is defined entirely under shared definitions of deterministic systems:

A ••• is "°°°" is when a deterministic system determines that a ••• shall have it's requirement met.

Sometimes the •••(*) is "pick a new ••• from •••A, •••B •••C" where •••C is "try to figure out a new option"

In most cases, the ••• to put a new ••• is very hard to fail a requirement for.

In some rare cases the •••(*) IS NOT °°°: the requirement was to pick A, B, or C, but instead they picked •••D: "Do what the guy with the gun says".

That you dislike that my argument is off YOUR rails means that I am doing the right thing, in the right place.

Again, entirely in terms of Determinism. No requirement here that anyone actually be able to do something different than they did. All it requires is looking at "what happened" after the fact or "what will happen" before the fact.

The latter is obviously provisional, so as to attempt short circuiting the wasted effort.

The alternatives are there but cannot ever be realized. They are physically potentials in disequilibrium. Choice operations clearly happen. The cause for those other things not happening and this thing that did happen happening IS the choice.

And when that choice is °°° with regards to the requirement of the ••• that caused it to be •••A rather than •••B, then we call that a •••(A) held by °°° •••(*), or more often abbreviate it to "A °°° •••"

As others point out, this is useful math for two reasons, first I acknowledged the short-circuited effect on effort, and then there is the effect this has on being able to trace responsibility and address when people generate ••• which we left °°° abrogate the ••• of others such that they are unlikely to be or remain °°°.

We can get into why we need to be symmetrical and respectful of •••, such that all ••• remain °°° except where such would unilaterally make another ••• not be °°° but that's more "the relationship between •••, °°°, and ethics".

 

[Marvin Edwards]

What difference does 'free will' make for what are fixed outcomes within a determined system?

I'm not sure what you you're getting at here, but I'll do my best to answer.

Whether or not someone acts of their own free will bears on the moral judgements we make about the behaviour of that person.

You like to ask what you believe to be simple yes or no questions. So I asked you one. Why is the question so puzzling for you?

Can we call a truce here because I think this is revealing a possible misunderstanding?

To put it simply: is an action, determined and fixed by antecedents, a freely chosen action?

Yes or no?

If yes, please explain how and why. Thank you.

The question isn't puzzling. It's just not possible to respond with a simple yes or no - there's insufficient information. I'll try to explain.

Marvin provided a definition of compatibilist free will in the first post on the Compatibilism: What's that About? thread:

Operationally, free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do while "free of coercion and undue influence".

So you can see, an action is freely chosen if it is "free of coercion and undue influence".

It follows therefore that if you ask if an action is freely chosen but don't tell me if it was "free of coercion and undue influence", then I can't answer. There's insufficient information.

Exactly. One cannot ask whether something or someone was "free" or not without first specifying "free from what?".

For example, an action "determined and fixed by antecedents" would not be free of "antecedent causes".

But it may still be free of coercion and free of undue influence.

Often we imply the constraint without expressly stating it. For example, with freedom of speech, a person is able to stand on a soapbox in the park and speak his mind to the public. But if the police arrest him because he criticizes the government, then he is not free to do so. And everyone would immediately recognize that as a meaningful restraint upon his freedom to speak his mind.

In the same fashion, if someone hijacks your car and forces you to drive him somewhere, then that is a meaningful restraint upon the driver's freedom to decide for himself where he will go.

 

[DBT]

What difference does 'free will' make for what are fixed outcomes within a determined system?

I'm not sure what you you're getting at here, but I'll do my best to answer.

Whether or not someone acts of their own free will bears on the moral judgements we make about the behaviour of that person.

How does that relate to the nature of decision making in relation to determinism?

To put it simply: is an action, determined and fixed by antecedents, a freely chosen action?

Yes or no?

If yes, please explain how and why. Thank you.

The question isn't puzzling. It's just not possible to respond with a simple yes or no - there's insufficient information. I'll try to explain.

Isn't that's precisely what I said when you asked me your yes or no question?

Marvin provided a definition of compatibilist free will in the first post on the Compatibilism: What's that About? thread:

Operationally, free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do while "free of coercion and undue influence".

So you can see, an action is freely chosen if it is "free of coercion and undue influence".

The definition is flawed for the given reasons. The nature of cognition and determinism means that all decisions are necessitated.

That which is necessitated by the state of the system, antecedents, is not freely willed.

That was the point of my question: that an action fixed by antecedents is not a freely willed action. Will plays no part in fixing an action, which is the decision.

It follows therefore that if you ask if an action is freely chosen but don't tell me if it was "free of coercion and undue influence", then I can't answer. There's insufficient information.

It is compatibilism that carefully selects "free of coercion and undue influence" as their definition of free will while ignoring the means by which actions are determined, ie, fixed by antecedents rather than being 'freely willed'

It is this negligence that falsifies compatibilism

 

[DBT]

determinism by definition allows no deviation or freedom

Determinism damn well allows °°°.

°°° is defined entirely under shared definitions of deterministic systems:

A ••• is "°°°" is when a deterministic system determines that a ••• shall have it's requirement met.

Sometimes the •••(*) is "pick a new ••• from •••A, •••B •••C" where •••C is "try to figure out a new option"

In most cases, the ••• to put a new ••• is very hard to fail a requirement for.

In some rare cases the •••(*) IS NOT °°°: the requirement was to pick A, B, or C, but instead they picked •••D: "Do what the guy with the gun says".

That you dislike that my argument is off YOUR rails means that I am doing the right thing, in the right place.

Again, entirely in terms of Determinism. No requirement here that anyone actually be able to do something different than they did. All it requires is looking at "what happened" after the fact or "what will happen" before the fact.

The latter is obviously provisional, so as to attempt short circuiting the wasted effort.

The alternatives are there but cannot ever be realized. They are physically potentials in disequilibrium. Choice operations clearly happen. The cause for those other things not happening and this thing that did happen happening IS the choice.

And when that choice is °°° with regards to the requirement of the ••• that caused it to be •••A rather than •••B, then we call that a •••(A) held by °°° •••(*), or more often abbreviate it to "A °°° •••"

As others point out, this is useful math for two reasons, first I acknowledged the short-circuited effect on effort, and then there is the effect this has on being able to trace responsibility and address when people generate ••• which we left °°° abrogate the ••• of others such that they are unlikely to be or remain °°°.

We can get into why we need to be symmetrical and respectful of •••, such that all ••• remain °°° except where such would unilaterally make another ••• not be °°° but that's more "the relationship between •••, °°°, and ethics".

So, what part of ''all actions within a determined system are fixed by the initial state and antecedents thereafter'' is hard to grasp?

All actions being fixed by antecedents, determining the state of the system in any instance in time, eliminates willed actions.

Without willed actions, you have no claim to free will.

You assert free will regardless of the absence of will (function is not will) within the deterministic process of action initiation, which - again - is fixed by antecedents.

 

[The AntiChris]

What difference does 'free will' make for what are fixed outcomes within a determined system?

I'm not sure what you you're getting at here, but I'll do my best to answer.

Whether or not someone acts of their own free will bears on the moral judgements we make about the behaviour of that person.

How does that relate to the nature of decision making in relation to determinism?

I don't understand the question.

To put it simply: is an action, determined and fixed by antecedents, a freely chosen action?

Yes or no?

If yes, please explain how and why. Thank you.

The question isn't puzzling. It's just not possible to respond with a simple yes or no - there's insufficient information. I'll try to explain.

Isn't that's precisely what I said when you asked me your yes or no question?

Yes, but what I asked did have a yes/no answer. I asked you if you were saying 'X'.

Either you were or you weren't saying 'X'. You were being evasive.

______________________________________________________________________

Anyway we've established that even after 7 months of Marvin painstakingly explaining compatibilism to you, you still don't understand the compatibilist position.

I really don't expect you to accept the compatibilist position but I would have hoped that by now that you would have at least understood compatibilism sufficiently well to be able to ask coherent questions.

 

[Jarhyn]

All actions being fixed by antecedents, determining the state of the system in any instance in time, eliminates willed actions.

So all actions being fixed by antecedents eliminates the fact that my processors actions with regards to shuffling data about are fixed on playing out the script I gave it written in charge patterns that deterministically pills those levers and drives that engine?

Right.

I suppose you have a bridge to sell me too.

Or I can observe that my processors has a will cued up.

At any rate you yourself have admitted to there being willed actions:

Selection does determine will

Selection does determine will

Selection does determine will

Scraping the bottom of an empty barrel you are.

The way you vacillate around on this, it is clear you have no concrete understanding of this, just a wishy-washy mess in which you desperately want people to buy your line for whatever reason.

I will repeat: any person who holds a ••• to kill people unilaterally ought select "themselves" as the person of requirement to kill, and muster all intent they may have within them such that the ••• remains °°°.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Marvin provided a definition of compatibilist free will in the first post on the Compatibilism: What's that About? thread:

Operationally, free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do while "free of coercion and undue influence".

So you can see, an action is freely chosen if it is "free of coercion and undue influence".

The definition is flawed for the given reasons. The nature of cognition and determinism means that all decisions are necessitated.
That which is necessitated by the state of the system, antecedents, is not freely willed.

A claim without merit, because our choice can be free of coercion and undue influence even if it has antecedent causes. Free will is not "free from antecedent causes", it is "free of coercion and undue influence", nothing more and nothing less.

You continue to replace the operational definition of free will with the paradoxical definition! And then you claim the paradoxical definition to be false, to which we all agree, because the paradoxical definition is, well, paradoxical. Freedom requires reliable cause and effect, therefore, one cannot logically speak of "freedom from causation" without self-contradiction!

It is compatibilism that carefully selects "free of coercion and undue influence" as their definition of free will while ignoring the means by which actions are determined, ie, fixed by antecedents rather than being 'freely willed'

Nothing is ignored, except the paradoxical definition. We all know that we have a brain and that the brain makes our decisions. There is nothing in neuroscience that contradicts the fact that each customer in the restaurant decided for themselves what they would order for dinner. Stop pretending that there is.

 

[DBT]

What difference does 'free will' make for what are fixed outcomes within a determined system?

I'm not sure what you you're getting at here, but I'll do my best to answer.

Whether or not someone acts of their own free will bears on the moral judgements we make about the behaviour of that person.

How does that relate to the nature of decision making in relation to determinism?

I don't understand the question.

The question is the same; if decisions/actions are fixed by antecedents, how exactly are they freely willed?

Just saying ''we are doing it, therefore free will'' fails if nothing is being willed. Without the agency of will, there is no claim to free will.

To put it simply: is an action, determined and fixed by antecedents, a freely chosen action?

Yes or no?

If yes, please explain how and why. Thank you.

The question isn't puzzling. It's just not possible to respond with a simple yes or no - there's insufficient information. I'll try to explain.

Isn't that's precisely what I said when you asked me your yes or no question?

Yes, but what I asked did have a yes/no answer. I asked you if you were saying 'X'.

I explained why it wasn't a yes or no question. What I asked you can be answered yes or no.

Is an action, if determined and fixed by antecedents, a freely willed or chosen action? A simple question. Yes or no?

Either you were or you weren't saying 'X'. You were being evasive.

______________________________________________________________________

Anyway we've established that even after 7 months of Marvin painstakingly explaining compatibilism to you, you still don't understand the compatibilist position.

I really don't expect you to accept the compatibilist position but I would have hoped that by now that you would have at least understood compatibilism sufficiently well to be able to ask coherent questions.

Marvin is a good representative of compatibilism, he knows his stuff....but unfortunately compatibilism fails for the given reasons.

What you need to understand is: Determined actions - fixed by antecedents - are by definition not freely willed. Not being freely willed, there is no valid claim for free will. Therefore free will is incompatible with determinism.

Based on the nature of determinism and the inability of will to make a difference within a determined system, incompatibilism is correct.

 

[DBT]

Marvin provided a definition of compatibilist free will in the first post on the Compatibilism: What's that About? thread:

Operationally, free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do while "free of coercion and undue influence".

So you can see, an action is freely chosen if it is "free of coercion and undue influence".

The definition is flawed for the given reasons. The nature of cognition and determinism means that all decisions are necessitated.
That which is necessitated by the state of the system, antecedents, is not freely willed.

A claim without merit, because our choice can be free of coercion and undue influence even if it has antecedent causes. Free will is not "free from antecedent causes", it is "free of coercion and undue influence", nothing more and nothing less.

You continue to replace the operational definition of free will with the paradoxical definition! And then you claim the paradoxical definition to be false, to which we all agree, because the paradoxical definition is, well, paradoxical. Freedom requires reliable cause and effect, therefore, one cannot logically speak of "freedom from causation" without self-contradiction!

It is compatibilism that carefully selects "free of coercion and undue influence" as their definition of free will while ignoring the means by which actions are determined, ie, fixed by antecedents rather than being 'freely willed'

Nothing is ignored, except the paradoxical definition. We all know that we have a brain and that the brain makes our decisions. There is nothing in neuroscience that contradicts the fact that each customer in the restaurant decided for themselves what they would order for dinner. Stop pretending that there is.

Lack of coercion is not enough to establish freedom of will. Inner necessitation determines all actions regardless of the presence or absence of external coercion.

To have a valid claim for free will, it has to be shown that will has real agency within a determined system. Yet we have no evidence that will is present and agency within neural networks in order to make a difference to actions fixed by antecedents.

Without agency will is not free. Actions proceed freely as determined. Freedom of action, but not freedom of will.

Even if not coerced, if we act according to our will, being determined, we must necessarily act according to our will.

 

[The AntiChris]

What difference does 'free will' make for what are fixed outcomes within a determined system?

I'm not sure what you you're getting at here, but I'll do my best to answer.

Whether or not someone acts of their own free will bears on the moral judgements we make about the behaviour of that person.

How does that relate to the nature of decision making in relation to determinism?

I don't understand the question.

The question is the same; if decisions/actions are fixed by antecedents, how exactly are they freely willed?

That really is not the same question.

Just saying ''we are doing it, therefore free will'' fails

You've used quotation marks (usually used to indicate what someone has actually said). Who do you think has actually said this?

What I asked you can be answered yes or no.

Is an action, if determined and fixed by antecedents, a freely willed or chosen action? A simple question. Yes or no?

You still don't understand?

It can be freely chosen, but there is no way of knowing without further information which you should know if you understood compatibilism.

Marvin and I explained this to you carefully in posts #420 and #422.

Are you actually reading what others post? If you are but don't understand the explanation then please ask for clarification - don't just carry on as though no explanation has been given.

 

[Jarhyn]

The question is the same; if decisions/actions are fixed by antecedents, how exactly are they freely willed?

By one of those antecedents being the will.

...The will you acknowledge exists:

Selection does determine will

From there are more questions available to answer and calculate on:
is that will "free: will see successful resolution of requirement"?
Is that will "free: developed and held as the result of a successful resolution of requirement to internal drive?"

Inner necessitation determines all actions regardless of the presence or absence of external coercion

And sometimes that inner necessitation is "do what guy with gun says" and sometimes it is "do what my own wants say".

One comes from outside "for them" and one comes from inside "for me".

To understand this, you really need to look deeply at how it all "stacks". If you want to understand wills on a fundamental level, you must, absolutely must, understand hierarchichy of cause.

You can't just stop at one layer you have to keep going all the way until you integrate to the far side.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Marvin provided a definition of compatibilist free will in the first post on the Compatibilism: What's that About? thread:

Operationally, free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do while "free of coercion and undue influence".

So you can see, an action is freely chosen if it is "free of coercion and undue influence".

The definition is flawed for the given reasons. The nature of cognition and determinism means that all decisions are necessitated.
That which is necessitated by the state of the system, antecedents, is not freely willed.

A claim without merit, because our choice can be free of coercion and undue influence even if it has antecedent causes. Free will is not "free from antecedent causes", it is "free of coercion and undue influence", nothing more and nothing less.

You continue to replace the operational definition of free will with the paradoxical definition! And then you claim the paradoxical definition to be false, to which we all agree, because the paradoxical definition is, well, paradoxical. Freedom requires reliable cause and effect, therefore, one cannot logically speak of "freedom from causation" without self-contradiction!

It is compatibilism that carefully selects "free of coercion and undue influence" as their definition of free will while ignoring the means by which actions are determined, ie, fixed by antecedents rather than being 'freely willed'

Nothing is ignored, except the paradoxical definition. We all know that we have a brain and that the brain makes our decisions. There is nothing in neuroscience that contradicts the fact that each customer in the restaurant decided for themselves what they would order for dinner. Stop pretending that there is.

Lack of coercion is not enough to establish freedom of will. Inner necessitation determines all actions regardless of the presence or absence of external coercion.

To have a valid claim for free will, it has to be shown that will has real agency within a determined system. Yet we have no evidence that will is present and agency within neural networks in order to make a difference to actions fixed by antecedents.

Without agency will is not free. Actions proceed freely as determined. Freedom of action, but not freedom of will.

Even if not coerced, if we act according to our will, being determined, we must necessarily act according to our will.

It would seem obvious that if free will is defined as "choosing for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence", then a choice we make while free of coercion and undue influence would be free will.

The question is whether this is a reasonable definition or not. The evidence that it is a reasonable definition is that free will is commonly understood to have a bearing upon a person's responsibility for their actions. And, if we look at how people actually assess a person's responsibility, we find that people are excused from responsibility under certain conditions. For example, they are excused if they were forced to act against their will. And, they are excused if the cause of their action was a significant mental illness that was a meaningful cause of their action.

So, it seems that our definition of free will is a reasonable definition. It is meaningful to nearly everyone, including you. And it serves a useful function when assessing responsibility.

The challenge to the incompatibilist is to offer a better definition of free will. One that is easily understood and that has meaningful consequences in the real world.

Definitions that incompatibilists have implied, like "freedom from one's own brain" or "freedom from causal necessity", are practical impossibilities. So, they cannot reasonably be the definitions of anything.

 

[Jarhyn]

they are excused if the cause of their action was a significant mental illness that was a meaningful cause of their action.

Not always. Even in the event of mental illness we don't excuse them to just go about and do it. Even when it is a mental illness that causes an abhorrent will to exist in the world, we seek to constrain the will such that it is not free.

 

[DBT]

What difference does 'free will' make for what are fixed outcomes within a determined system?

I'm not sure what you you're getting at here, but I'll do my best to answer.

Whether or not someone acts of their own free will bears on the moral judgements we make about the behaviour of that person.

How does that relate to the nature of decision making in relation to determinism?

I don't understand the question.

The question is the same; if decisions/actions are fixed by antecedents, how exactly are they freely willed?

That really is not the same question.

It pretty much is. The free will issue comes down agency. If 'will' has no agency in relation to action selection, which it doesn't, there is no claim to free will.

That is the end of compatibility, you are left with a label and hand waving.

Just saying ''we are doing it, therefore free will'' fails

You've used quotation marks (usually used to indicate what someone has actually said). Who do you think has actually said this?

I'm essentially paraphrasing compatibilism.

What I asked you can be answered yes or no.

Is an action, if determined and fixed by antecedents, a freely willed or chosen action? A simple question. Yes or no?

You still don't understand?

It can be freely chosen, but there is no way of knowing without further information which you should know if you understood compatibilism.

You still haven't grasped the implications of determinism. Actions determined by antecedents are not freely chosen or willed. It is the antecedents and the state of the system that fix the action.

The actions unfold freely as determined, but they are not freely willed or freely chosen. Freely chosen implies possible alternates. Determinism excludes all possibility of an alternate action.

I shouldn't have to keep repeating the basics;

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

Marvin and I explained this to you carefully in posts #420 and #422.

Are you actually reading what others post? If you are but don't understand the explanation then please ask for clarification - don't just carry on as though no explanation has been given.

Do you read the rebuttals? Not just me, but all that I have provided? If you did, you'd understand what the problems are with compatibilism and what Marvin explained...but apparently not. You see what suits you to see and nothing else.

 

[DBT]

The question is the same; if decisions/actions are fixed by antecedents, how exactly are they freely willed?

By one of those antecedents being the will.

...The will you acknowledge exists:

Selection does determine will

From there are more questions available to answer and calculate on:
is that will "free: will see successful resolution of requirement"?
Is that will "free: developed and held as the result of a successful resolution of requirement to internal drive?"

Inner necessitation determines all actions regardless of the presence or absence of external coercion

And sometimes that inner necessitation is "do what guy with gun says" and sometimes it is "do what my own wants say".

Too silly for words.

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

One comes from outside "for them" and one comes from inside "for me".

To understand this, you really need to look deeply at how it all "stacks". If you want to understand wills on a fundamental level, you must, absolutely must, understand hierarchichy of cause.

You can't just stop at one layer you have to keep going all the way until you integrate to the far side.

Nobody chooses their own makeup, neural architecture or how the brain processes information. Information input interacts with memory by means of neural activity and is represented in conscious form.

None of that is subject to will or wish. Actions are fixed by antecedents. That it is 'us doing it' doesn't equate to free will no matter how many times it is asserted. Wail and gnash your teeth as you may, free will no place in a determined system, therefore plays no part in the function of a brain (being a deterministic system).

 

[Jarhyn]

If 'will' has no agency...

Again, this belies a deep failure of understanding about the parts of the system in the first place.

It's like saying if "if the program has no processing power"...

Of course the program has no processing power, the will is not the neurons, not is the program the processor.

The processor runs the program.

The neurons create and operate on the will.

Your inability to understand even that muchakes the rest of your post a twisted mess.

 

[DBT]

Marvin provided a definition of compatibilist free will in the first post on the Compatibilism: What's that About? thread:

Operationally, free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do while "free of coercion and undue influence".

So you can see, an action is freely chosen if it is "free of coercion and undue influence".

The definition is flawed for the given reasons. The nature of cognition and determinism means that all decisions are necessitated.
That which is necessitated by the state of the system, antecedents, is not freely willed.

A claim without merit, because our choice can be free of coercion and undue influence even if it has antecedent causes. Free will is not "free from antecedent causes", it is "free of coercion and undue influence", nothing more and nothing less.

You continue to replace the operational definition of free will with the paradoxical definition! And then you claim the paradoxical definition to be false, to which we all agree, because the paradoxical definition is, well, paradoxical. Freedom requires reliable cause and effect, therefore, one cannot logically speak of "freedom from causation" without self-contradiction!

It is compatibilism that carefully selects "free of coercion and undue influence" as their definition of free will while ignoring the means by which actions are determined, ie, fixed by antecedents rather than being 'freely willed'

Nothing is ignored, except the paradoxical definition. We all know that we have a brain and that the brain makes our decisions. There is nothing in neuroscience that contradicts the fact that each customer in the restaurant decided for themselves what they would order for dinner. Stop pretending that there is.

Lack of coercion is not enough to establish freedom of will. Inner necessitation determines all actions regardless of the presence or absence of external coercion.

To have a valid claim for free will, it has to be shown that will has real agency within a determined system. Yet we have no evidence that will is present and agency within neural networks in order to make a difference to actions fixed by antecedents.

Without agency will is not free. Actions proceed freely as determined. Freedom of action, but not freedom of will.

Even if not coerced, if we act according to our will, being determined, we must necessarily act according to our will.

It would seem obvious that if free will is defined as "choosing for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence", then a choice we make while free of coercion and undue influence would be free will.

A definition is not sufficient to prove the proposition if or when the premises are flawed. 'Choosing for ourselves' does not equate to free will if will not only plays no part in the choosing, but the actions that are taken are fixed by antecedents.

For something to be 'freely willed' there must be realizable alternatives: determinism allows no alternate action.

For free will to make a difference, an element acting within the system, able to modify or veto, will must have agency, yet will has no agency within what is essentially neural information processing, a brain function.

Function is not will. Will is not free. Compatibilism carefully defines free will in a way that makes it appear compatible with determinism;

''Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent.[1] It may, however, be more accurate to say that compatibilists define 'free will' in a way that allows it to co-exist with determinism.'' - wiki.

 

[Jarhyn]

Nobody chooses their own makeup, neural architecture or how the brain processes information.

Yet another unargued, bald assertion, and a repeated one at that. Your insistence on that nonetheless is false.

I choose, within certain bounds, how my brain processes information.

As Marvin points out, we do it all the time: studying, training, even meditation all have impacts on how the brain processes information.

Actions aren't fixed by antecedents. They are fixed by the current present. The current present is not the antecedent events even if they happened to cause it. You can still look at which antecedent events led to the present, and you can still, and OUGHT still do the math to figure out what those antecedents are.

Not so you can change them in the past but so that you can prevent or produce their alignment in the future, or manipulate the fact of their alignment to an outcome in the immediate present. You are failing to see the forest for the trees, that we wish to discuss exactly which antecedents at any prior point in time lead to the outcome.

We have the power to see where the future is going and make decisions on that basis.

We have the power to see where the past went and make decisions on that basis.

This means that we can, and even out discuss "responsibility in a causal event": which ••• were left °°°; how to address ••• such that they are °°° or remain not °°°.

 

[Jarhyn]

the actions that are taken are fixed by antecedents.

When the fixed antecedents were our own choices, it makes a lot of difference.

Just because the dwarf is in the hallway as a result of the configuration of me hitting "generate world" does not abrogate the fact that he is in the hallway now ALSO of his own choices.

He lives in a much more clearly deterministic world than our own, is the product of fixed antecedents, MUST do, cannot do otherwise, than try the door; he could not do otherwise than try to fight; he could not do otherwise than plan to do it in the great hall; he could not do it while not clutching a very sharp axe.

Yet this is still what that dwarf chose to do: He still has a •••. That ••• is still calculable on (°°°?). That •••(a) was held by his own °°° •••(*).

The dwarf still has °°° •••.

This is because °°° and ••• are compatible with determinism

It is not a dichotomous situation. You insisting it be treated dichotomously anyway is what is called a False Dichotomy.

 

[The AntiChris]

Just saying ''we are doing it, therefore free will'' fails

You've used quotation marks (usually used to indicate what someone has actually said). Who do you think has actually said this?

I'm essentially paraphrasing compatibilism.

No you're not paraphrasing anyone. You presented a nonsensical claim as though it was a direct quote. That's plain dishonest.

What I asked you can be answered yes or no.

Is an action, if determined and fixed by antecedents, a freely willed or chosen action? A simple question. Yes or no?

You still don't understand?

It can be freely chosen, but there is no way of knowing without further information which you should know if you understood compatibilism.

You still haven't grasped the implications of determinism. Actions determined by antecedents are not freely chosen or willed. It is the antecedents and the state of the system that fix the action.

The actions unfold freely as determined, but they are not freely willed or freely chosen. Freely chosen implies possible alternates. Determinism excludes all possibility of an alternate action.

I shouldn't have to keep repeating the basics;

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

Why bother responding in a useful way to what was actually said when you have the opportunity to issue yet another piece of standard anti-free will dogma. Nothing changes.